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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
One of the most striking elements of post cold war politics of the Middle East is the
resurgence oflslamism and its political manifestations. The multifaceted manifestations of
religious politics have sparked a renewed interest in explaining why religious movements
have become principal contestants in the politics of the wider Muslim world. Ample cases
exist regarding the resurgence of religious politics in the Muslim world.
Especially in the last three decades, the resurgent Islamism1 has continually and
considerably caught the attention of the world by gaining both popular acclaim and
notoriety as a powerful alternative voice of opposition against the west and "status-quo"
regimes of the Muslim World. Democratization, Islamist political activism and the
relationship between Islamists and politics are among the most critical political issues for
many Middle Eastern countries as various Islamist movements increasingly challenge
governments for greater participation in the political process (Abdo 2000; Esposito 1995,
1998; Esposito and Voll 1996; Fuller 2003; Eickelman and Piscatori 2004; Owen 2000;
Wiktorowicz 2004; Wickham 2002).
Muslims everywhere, not just in Muslim majority countries, are increasingly
calling for democratization, which is an indication that Muslims can reflect their political
views through the existing political systems to pressure governments tor eform or to
challenge the secular governments for power (Eickelman and Piscatori 2004). In the

1

Islamism (or referred to by some as political Islam) and Islamists will be discussed later in detail
Chapter 2 and 4 separately for each country.

1
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2
Muslim world, Islamist groups insistently called for reform as Islam has eclipsed secular
ideologies as the primary source of political activism (Wickham, 2002). Islamists believe
that the huge problems faced by the contemporary Muslim societies could be resolved
through a return to religion. Al-Islam huwa al-hall (Islam is the solution) is the slogan of
most Islamists in the Muslim world.
The current debates on Islamism, though useful, often revolve armmd the concepts
of security, democracy, or stability. Those debates generally overlook the importance of

process, and the mechanisms and complexity ofislamist political struggle. fu addition, the
current debates often overlook the fact that Islamist groups change over time, and generate
dynamic strategies to combat official constraints, and there is more to the relationship
between the Islamists and the state than just state repression and Islamist violence.
Moreover, those debates often times ignore how Islamists' concern for preserving social
identity against perceived external threats contribute to their politicization. Thus, the major

puzzle is about the increasing role of religion in the political movements throughout the
Muslim world, and how Islamists resist and/or respond to official constraints as well as
perceived external threats to social identity. Moreover, current debates on Islamism do not
generally link Islamist political activism to Islamist frames which are vigorously used by
Islamists to counter perceived external threats and the state control over religion. A frame
is "an interpretive schemata that signifies and condenses the 'world out there' by
selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and
sequences of action in one's present or past environment" (Snow and Benford 1992, 137).
fu relation to those frames and identity oriented political struggle waged by the Islamists,

this study conceptualizes the recent growth of Islamism in the Muslim world through a
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3
Gramscian theoretical framework which helps one articulate a theory of social and
political revolution through the creation of what he terms "cmmter-hegemonic bloc".
The Islamist response to the state control and perceived external threats often takes
place through the mobilization oflimited resources available to them and through the
creation of resonant frames to broaden their base of appeal among various segments of the
Muslim society. In regards to understanding the role of religion in Middle Eastern politics,
this study shows that it is not religion per se but the institutional, organizational and
historical factors in relation to the way politics work that define Islamism's political
appearance. Thus, several questions should be thoroughly answered regarding our major
puzzle: how and why do conflictive or cooperative patterns oflslamist's policies emerge
and change in the context of status-quo oriented state authoritarianism? Under such
authoritarian settings, what makes people to get involved in Islamist activism given the fact
that political activism is highly risky? What aspect(s) oflslamist activism attracts those
people? How do the perceived threats to social identity mobilize Islamists for more
political action? How do Islamists use resonant frames to broaden their bases of political
activism? Within the context of those general questions, my study is going to scrutinize
Islamist political activism in relation to state control of religion and the Islamists'
perceived threats to social identity.
Islamists of Egypt and Turkey have been challenging the status-quo oriented
regimes through a wide range of activities from political participation to civil society
activism and from contentious politics to charity activities especially for the last three
decades. This study argues that Islamist involvement in politics strongly correlates with

two interrelated factors: .first, the state regulation over religion; second, Islamists'
perceived threats to social identity. Through the proliferation of means of communications
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and the growing access of the Islamists to the media, for almost three decades Islamists
have been increasingly concerned about state control over their political activities and
about preservation of their social identity. Political Islam is a multifaceted phenomenon
which is produced by a complex set of independent variables. However the aspects of state
control over religion and identity have been understudied.

A second puzzle is about some of the theoretical approaches to the emergence of
Islamism within the greater framework of the relationship between religion and politics in
Muslim countries. Many studies on the role of religion in politics (i) treat secular and
religious as binary forces ( ii) study religious parties and groups only in relation to secular
institutions (iii) focus on macro level trends and the leadership structure of the religious
parties and groups, and (iv) regard political religion as some form of deviation from the
global imperative of modernity and secularism (Tepe 2002, 28). Fascinatingly, what
happens throughout the Muslim world is contrary to Modernization theory which posits that
the importance of religion in modern societies and their politics would inevitably decrease
in a gradual fashion as societies become industrialized modern societies. 2
This study will contribute particularly to otr understanding oflslamist political
activism and the relationship between the state and Islam in Egypt and Turkey in two
interrelated aspects: the causal aspect and the descriptive/conceptual aspect. In regards to
the causal aspect, this study relates the government control over religion with politicization

2

Weber's conception of religion laid the ground for the binary understanding of religion and traditional
society as an alternative to secular and rational society. According to Weber, religious authority, as
charismatic authority, forms the foundation of traditional societies. For Weber, traditional societies are
unstable in their approach to the transfer of power because charismatic leadership legitimizes itself
through beliefs and faith, as opposed to reason. However, Weber's study of Calvinism as "this-worldly"
religious doctrine and its instigation of capitalism introduced the idea that religious beliefs have the
capacity to transform the social and economic orders, though as an unintended consequence (Weber
1930). Weber also notes that religion and reason have contradictory conceptions of the world, therefore
they can not coexist (Weber 1993).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5
3

of the Islamists within the context of state-society relations. In regards to the conceptual
aspect, this study relates Islamism with social movement literature, frames, and Gramscian
struggle of anti-hegemonic war ofposition. 4

In regards to the causal aspect, this study will provide better explanatory tools to
understand Islamist activism while providing a critique of the dominant conceptual models,
i.e., the theories that can be labeled as the conflict and/or crisis theories, which are
derived from the Modernization theories and (Neo)Orientalist theories. Such theories
generally overlook the importance ofprocess, and the mechanisms and complexity of
Islamist political struggle. Many scholars like Dekmejian, Hoffman and Barakat, Wickham
and Berman explain the rise oflslamism in terms of crisis theory which is a derivation of
Modernization theory. Those approaches interpret the rise oflslamism as a reactionary
response to deteriorating socioeconomic and political conditions in Muslim societies
(often L. Pye' s five developmental crises are cited by them). The proponents of crisis
theories fail to focus upon many crucial aspects related to Islamist activism such as their
frame and discourse creation, alliance building, grassroots activities, popular appeal and
member recruitment.

In regards to the conceptual aspect, this study analyses Islamism in both countries
through a selective reading of the social movement theory because it provides better
explanatory tools than those of the Modernization and/or (Neo)Orientalist theories. Social
movements are defined by Meyer and Tarrow (1998, 4) as "collective challenges to
existing arrangements of power and distribution by people with common purposes and

3

Hypotheses are provided under the section titled "Hypotheses and Method."
Grarnsci's conceptualization of state and society, the role of ideology and organic intellectuals as
unifiers of belief and action, the role performed by organization, leadership, and each individual member
in terms of an organic unity within the revolutionary movement, and the long term strategies of education
and preparation (Grarnsci 1971), all have their parallels in modern Islarnist movements. This study is

4
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solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and authorities". Social
movement organizations (SMOs) diagnose the grievances in a way that resonates with
members and potential members, propose a plausible solution that could be accomplished
by movement participation, and issue a call to arms that motivates action. A successful
SMO must also work hard to maintain the saliency of supportive frames while attacking,
debunking, and ridiculing counter frames (McVeigh, Myers and Sikkink2004). Islamists
groups also take part in the creation of meaning through the frames which will be discussed
in the course of this study. In regards to the identity politics and social/political activism,
this study approaches Islamist activism from a Gramscian perspective through the analysis
of frames and social identity. 5 An extensive literature exists on identity politics and
political activism in various Western contexts, however such studies are lacking within the
context ofMiddle Eastern societies. Thus, another contribution of this study is approaching
Islamist activism from a Gramscian perspective through the analysis of frames and social
identity in non-Western and (semi)authoritarian contexts.
In addition to the causal and conceptual contributions, this study fills a significant

gap in the existing literature on the Middle East. The existing literature lacks of in depth
cross-national and cross-cultural comparisons. Cross-national and cross-cultural studies
provide better insight through a comparative perspective which may not always be
achieved by individually studying cases. Substantive research on various Islamist
movements in separate Arab countries exists; however there is a lack of comprehensive
going to relate Islamist activism to Gramscian political theory through Chapters 3 and 5 as a form of war
of position and counter-hegemony against the secularist elites in Turkey and Egypt.
5
Wiktorowicz (2004) argues that the study of Islamic activism remained isolated from the research on
social movements, and 'most publications on Islamic activism are either descriptive analyses of the
ideology, structure, and goals of various Islamic actors or histories of particular movements." The
mechanisms of activism are understudied, and scholarship tends to ignore developments in social
movement research that can provide theoretical leverage over many issues relevant to Islamic activism
(2004, 3).
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cross-national and cross-cultural studies on Islamism. In this regard, this study of two
culturally and politically different countries of the Middle East will be a significant
contribution to the literature on Islamism.

Existing Literature
What is Islamism and How Does Islamism Manifest Itself?

In Kramer's account, the termislamismhas increasingly been used to denote the
political manifestation of the religion oflslam (2003, 2). Often times, the terms political
Islam and Islamism are used synonymously (Fuller 2003, xi). However, being Muslim and
being Islamist are not synonymous. Ismail argues that contemporary constructions of being
Muslim cannot be equated to being Islamist. Thus, the assertion of a Muslim identity does
not necessarily represent an endorsement of these movements. In Ismail's account, Islamist
actors can be classified, largely, into militants, conservatives and moderates 6• Militants
originate from lower-middle class backgrounds and they use violence as a means of action.
Conservatives and moderates belong to the middle classes with professionals as their main
supporters. Conservatives focus on morality issues and seek Islamization of society and
state institutions but not a takeover of political power. Moderates attempt to work within
the institutional channels of participation. Ismail (2004) counts the Muslim Brotherhood in
the category of moderates. Islamism entails a political ideology articulating the idea of the
necessity of establishing an Islamic government, understood a s a government which
implements the Shari 'a. However, Islamization signifies a drive to Islamize the society
which involves a process through which various domains of social life are invested with
signs and symbols associated with Islamic cultural traditions. Islamist politics both diverge

6

Note the parallels between Ismail's account of Islamists and Husain's account.
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and converge with the process oflslamization. Thus, Islamists and Muslims who seek
Islamization of their societies may not necessarily be the same group of people (2004, 614631).
The version oflslam proposed by the Islamists in general has many political
overtones. For all of the Islamists, Islam is a holistic way oflife, not just a religion, which
encompasses every aspect of human life (Fuller 2003, xi; Husain 2003). As a result,
Islamists plead to redesign the state by implementing the Islamic law (Shari 'a), despite the
fact that various interpretations of the Shari'a exist among the Islamists. I slamism in the
modern sense basically grew as an aspiration to have a government based on Islam and it
manifests itself in three different dispositions: Revolutionary, Traditionalist and
Modernist. Although all Islamists (not necessarily all Muslims) would like to have an
Islamic state and prefer living under an Islamic state to living under a secular state, they
greatly differ in their willingness, de termination and methods for achieving that ultimate
end. Therefore, Islamists do not constitute a monolith in many aspects. For instance, the
Modernist Islamists and the Traditionalist Islamists would be more active regarding
Islamization of their societies than politically pursuing programs for the establishment of
the Shari'a. Other Muslim groups such as sufis (mystics) do not advocate Islamism at all
although they would be willing to Islamize their societies. Inside the same society, several
types oflslamist movements can often be found, and those separate movements usually
hardly cooperate (Husain 2003, 261-285; also see: Hamzawy 2005; Ismail2000; Akhavi
1992; Bayat 1998; Lapidus 1996; Ismail 2004).
The vast majority of the Islamists are willing to participate in politics and they do
not denounce democracy and Western style political institutions. In fact, they draw a lot of
parallels between Western style democracy and some classical Islamic concepts such as
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social and economic justice, equality, shura (consultation), ijma ' (consensus of the Muslim
community, collective decision-making), and bey 'a (affirmations of commtu1alloyaltyoriginally the term denotes the consent provided by the tribal leaders to the first four
caliphs after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, which is considered as synonymous with
elections by many Islamists) 7 (Fuller 2002, 50-52; Esposito 1995).
Violence and dentu1ciation of politics are the two most important criteria that
distinguish the violent and non-violent Islamists. According to the rationale of the violent
revolutionary Islamists, all secularist regimes are illegitimate because they represent or are
direct products ofjahiliyyah which is the other extreme of God's hakimiyyah
(sovereignty). Accordingly, only Allah rules, humans can have nos overeignty and Islamic
revelation takes precedence over the reason-centered view ofthe world. 8
Emergence oflslamism
The emergence of various forms oflslamism is also a result of domestic factors as
well as the international context. Fuller argues that several regimes in the Middle East have
decided topl aythe dangerous game of trying to out-Islam the Islamists becoming more
conservative so as to bolster their credentials against Islamist opposition. For example in
Egypt, the government controlledAl-Azhar which is a prestigious voice in interpreting
Islam, has started to issue more conservative rulings as the regime perceived the emerging
Islamists as an increasing threat. Thus, Islam becomes the vehicle of the struggle between
the state and its challengers as well as the expression of many different agendas in the
7

For a detailed assessment of Islamist concepts on democracy, see Kramer's article: Kramer, Gudrun
(1997) "Islamist Notions of Democracy" In: Political !slam Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds. Berkeley:
University of California Press, pp. 71-82
8
Following the footsteps of Qutb, current violent Revolutionaries consider the struggle to be their
ultimate duty against secularist Muslim governments and against those individual Muslims \IDo have fallen
into jahiliyyah, and only jihad can bring the nizam Is/ami (Islamic order) to the Muslim \\<orld. Qutb's
thought will be examined in chapter 4.
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Muslim world. Similarly, Islam and Islamist movements provide a key source of identity to
peoples focused on strengthening their social cohesion against Western cultural dominance
(Fuller 2003, 54- 55; Schwedler 2001, 1-17).
Many scholars like Dekmejian, Hoffinan, Barakat, and Berman explain the rise of
Islamism in terms of the Crisis theory: they interpret the rise oflslamism as a reactionary
response to deteriorating socioeconomic and political conditions. Many of those scholars
refer to L. Pye's five developmental crises (crises of identity, legitimacy, penetration,

participation and distribution). According to the Crisis theories, growing disillusionment
with secular nationalism and problems oflegitimacy in those regimes along with uneven
socioeconomic development and political liberalization often instigate social reactions that
take religious forms (Esposito and Voll1996; Toprak 1981; Zubaida 1993; Burgat 1993;
Gole 1996). The rapid enforcement of socioeconomic changes produced a group of people
who could not cope with the rapid changes. These masses reacted to modernity by
asserting tradition. Thus, religion only acts as a tool of opposition for masses against the
radical elitist-secularist policies that aim to rebuild a new society. The Crisis models
usually start with the discussion of rapid industrialization and urbanization, and their
impact on the frustrated masses. Later other factors come into the picture such as the failure
of secular regimes, the impact of economic crises on the masses, and the legacy ofthe
Arab-Israeli conflict(Esposito 1995; Esposito and Voll1996; Owen2000; Ozbudun 1976;
Heper and Landau 1991). However, those explanations usually presented by the
proponents of crisis theories are only partial explanations for the emergence oflslamism,
because the proponents of the crisis theories argue that driven by the developmental crises,
the Islamists seek an outlet through political action.
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In her recent article titled "Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society" Berman
attempts to demonstrate "how the rise oflslamism can be illuminated by findings of the
literatures on revolution and civil society, and vice versa." Berman's major argument
revolves arotmd "the declining efficacy and legitimacy" of the Egyptian state which was
for Berman "the necessary precondition for Islamism's rise" (2003, 12). Those crises
create a stalemate where "the existing regime retains political power while ceding
substantial control over the societal and cultural spheres to the revolutionary challenger
[i.e., the Islamists]" Berman also argues that "this stalemate ... is largely a consequence of
Islamists' ability to expand their presence in civil society" (2003, 12). Berman provides
Nasser's mostly failed policies ofPan-Arabismand Arab Socialism, the Six-Day War of
1967, deterioration of Egypt's economic situation, tmemployment, and massive population
growth as examples of the crises which eventually led to the emergence of the Islamist
movements (2003, 13-14). Thus, Berman concludes that "it was against this background
that the contemporary Islamist movement in Egypt emerged" (2003, 14).
Berman also discusses the Egyptian Islamists successes in the Egyptian civil
society in length and argues that "the Islamists offered religion as a solution to the crisis"
and they gainedsupportandrecognition of the masses through their civil society activism
by mainlyproviding"their constituents with a variety of much-needed services" (2003,
15). 9
Crisis theories might be partially explanatory regarding the emergence of those
movements; however, they are not sufficiently explanatory regarding the nature and
direction that those movements take in their political environments. Nevertheless, the
proponents of crisis theories fail to focus upon many crucial aspects related to the

9

Further discussion of Berman's arguments will be provided in Chapter 5.
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activities oflslamists such as their grassroots activities, membership profile, frame
creation, alliance building, popular appeal, member recruitment and creation of frames.
Two major theories, Modernization theory and Orientalism, 10 deeply influence the
way in which most analysts explain Islamist activism and the rise oflslamism. The
Modernization theory asserts that due to the process of secularization, the authority of
religion in modern societies and its political role would gradually decrease as mechanical
solidarity transforms into organic solidarity through a shift from Gemeinschaft to

Gesellschaft (Tonnies). The causal mechanism of the theory fimctions from societal
secularization to political secularization. Modernization theory claims that the more a
society is modernized through industrialization, urbanization, improvement of
communications and mass education, the more religion loses its political significance.
Through secularization of the society people become less religious; and religion becomes a
private and an individual issue, rather than a public and political one.
Contrary to the expectations of Modernization theory and Orientalism, Islamism in
the Muslim world has been gradually gaining strength, widening its base of support,
increasing its political activities and becoming a significant economic and social force as
well. Again, contrary to the expectations of both views (Modernization theory and
Orientalism), Islamism in many Muslim countries does not reject modernism by any means;
in fact most of those movements are modern in their leadership, methodology and
discourse. Regarding the role of religion, the Modernization approach proved to be wrong
about the Muslim world. Especially since the 1980s, Islamist activists in Egypt and Turkey
have gradually become a major political force.

°For a detailed account of the impact of Orientalism in the study of the East see: Said, Edward W.
(1979) Orienta/ism. New York, Vintage Books.
1
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In parallel accounts, groups such as the Islamists in Egypt and Turkey are regarded
as a reaffirmation oftraditional religious beliefs and an outlet for the frustrations ofanomic
social conditions brought by rapid population increase, urbanization and industrialization.
Those studies generally focus upon the strains that are created by the tension between
modernization, political activism, political institutionalization, and traditional beliefs
(Gellner 1985; Huntington 1968; Kepel1993; Smelser 1963). For those studies, the strains
of modernization and Westernization combined with secularization created the prevailing
problems of many Muslim societies that could only be solved by turning to Islamic ideals
(Esposito 1995; Esposito and Voll1996; Owen2000; Poulton 1997; Ozbudun2000; Heper
and Evin 1994). However, the Islamist groups in many Muslim societies are modern, not
traditional, in their leadership, ideology and organization. It can be said that ifthe 19th
century Islamist-revivalist movements were an attempt to modernize religion, the
contemporary movements are just the opposite: they try to Islamize modern structures.
Another approach that distorts our understanding of Islamism is Orienta/ism. The
prospect for democratization in the Middle East has been seen as very low by most
Western scholars who advocate an Orientalist view, which can be briefly explained as the
employment of Western ethnocentrism towards the analysis of the Middle East. In
Gellner's account, Islam displays unique characteristics as a religion in terms of its
immunity to secularization and Islam hinders civil society and secularization as well as
democratization. Thus, Gellner assumes that Islam cannot be secularized and Muslim
societies cannot converge with Western models (Gellner 1994). Sadowski, in his critical
essay on the new Orientalism, argues that the thesis that Middle Eastern societies are
resistant to democratization had been the standard tenet ofOrientalist thought for decades,
and since the 1980s a neo-Orientalist view has emerged. For Sadowski the new generation
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ofOrientalists inverted some of the old assumptions and used a new vocabulary that
allowed them to link their work to a wider international debate about the relationship
between civil society and democratization. They sought to prove not only -as Daniel Pipes
put it- that "Muslim cotu1tries have the most terrorists and the fewest democracies in the
world" butthatthey always would (quoted in Sadowski 1997, 34).

Islamists. Democracy, Civil Society and the State Control over Religion
A significant issue that is extensively discussed in the literature on Islamism is the
relationship between Islamist groups and democracy. Scholars like B. Lewis, G. Kepel, A.
Perlmutter, E. Gellner and D. Pipes argue that democracy is incompatible with Islamism
and may, in fact, be incompatible also with Islam itsel£ Hudson argues that the political
culture concept, as part of modernization-political development paradigm, was abused and
misused to explain Arab politics. Hudson maintains that so many errors were committed
such as gross overgeneralization (Patai), crude Orientalism (Pryce-Jones), Eurocentric
chauvinism (Kedourie), anthropologic reductionism (Gellner), and media sotu1d-bites like
"Shi'a are suicidal, but Sunnis are homicidal" (Hudson 1995, 61). But for some other
scholars things are less clear-cut. For instance, scholars like Esposito, Voll, Sadowski,
Fuller and Robinson, make a distinction between the legitimate lslamist political groups
and extremist ones; and for them the mainstream Islamism in both cotu1tries is not violent,
extremist, and marginal. Many authors including Norton, Ibrahim, Moussalli, Al-Sayyid,
Esposito, Wickham and Robinson believe that the Islamist movements can be a force for
democratic expansion in the Middle East. More importantly, those scholars stress the need
for democracy, party pluralism, and free elections.
A considerable chunk of the literature on the contemporary Islamist political
activism revolves arotu1d the concept of civil society. The dominance of both the Egyptian
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and Turkish states in the modern era cast doubts about the existence of mature civil society
in those cotu1tries. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, various vollll1tary
associations existed in the Middle East as far back as the eighth and ninth centuries.
Korany (1998), Moussalli (1995) and Ibrahim (1995) argue that those vollU1tary
associations were in the form of mystic orders (sufi tariqa), independent ulema,
merchants, guilds, sects, religious foundations (awqaj), and semi-independent selforganizing religious groups (millet). Ibrahim (2002, 31-32) points out that the traditional
Middle Eastern societies not only knew the equivalent of civil formations, but also
depended on them for survival because social services and economic functions were not
expected as immediate obligations of the state and they were mostly left to local
communities, religious foundations, and semi-independent religious groups. In the last two
centuries, most of those traditional structures either disintegrated or severely transformed
through the direct Western penetration of Muslim societies, and through secularizingnationalizing Westernized states in the region.
Norton argues that the flll1ctioningof civil society is one major necessary condition
of a democratic regime. Norton defines civil society as "a melange of associations, clubs,
guilds, syndicates, federations, lll1ions, parties and groups come together to provide a
buffer between state and citizen'' which is more than a mixture of various groups; it also
refers to civility and tolerance for different political views and social attitudes (1995, 711). Although civil society is likely to be in opposition to the government, for Norton, the
government "must play the essential role of referee, rule-maker and regulator of civil
society" (1995, 12). In the Middle East, various associations that form civil society often
provide an outlet for the free expression of political ideas. In Egypt, the government
clampdown on the politically vibrant professional associations in the late 1980s and the
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1990s coincided with a dramatic rise of an assertive Islamist activism through civil society
(Esposito 1998, 249-260). Similarly, limited liberalization measures introduced after the
end of the 1980 military regime in Turkey opened up the public space for the Islamists.
However, as the Islamists gradually gained power, the Turkish military stepped in.
Korany ( 1998, 60) reports that Islamic associations constituted 34 percent of all
Egyptian voluntary associations in 1990. Thanks to the Islamic obligation of zakat
(obligatory alms), many of those Islamic associations do not face the chronic problem of
financing that risk the existence of other secular private voluntary organizations. The
Egyptian government, Korany points out, is increasingly sensitive about the pol iticization
of those associations; in 1988, the Ministry of Social Affairs, which supervises the
associations in Egypt, forbade for any voluntary association to go beyond its purely social
mission. The governmental tendency to exercise control over voluntary associations is
strongest toward those Islamic associations increasingly gaining political capital, like the
MuslimBrotherhood (Korany 1998, 61-62).
Political Islam and the State in Egypt
Within a decade after its founding in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood "had built its
identity as an internally disciplined, financially resourceful, pro-Palestine anticolonial
movement appealing to educated lower-middle- and middle-class effendis II who were
alienated by the exclusionary political and economic system of interwar Egypt"(ElGhobashy 2005, 380; also see Mitchell1969 and Lia 1998). Mitchell argues that Banna's
first priority was to Islamize the society and applying the Shari 'a through political action.
Banna ran and lost in parliamentary elections in 1942 and 1945. The Muslim Brotherhood
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In the Ottoman Turkish the word effendi meant 'Mr." or ''Sir". It is a title of respect generally used for
educated people and/or government employees in the Middle East.
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members actively supported Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser's new regime created in 1952 after
the military takeover of the Free Officers had ousted King Farouk of Egypt. However, the
organization was dissolved by Nasser in 1954, and its leaders and followers were
imprisoned. Later, Sadat's more liberal policies and his easing of tensions with the Muslim
Brotherhood for the purpose of balancing out the leftists in the Arab Socialist Union (ASU)
created opportunities for the Muslim Brotherhood to resume political action (Palmer 2007,
Lia 1998, Mitchell 1969).
Especially during the 1990s Islamic political and social activism continued to root
itself more deeplybothinEgypt and Turkey, withgrowingstrengthamongthe middle
classes, professionals, students, recently urbanized employees and relatively well-to-do
artisans and technicians. The major strategy ofthe Muslim Brotherhood is a pragmatic
accommodation of the existing political system because in terms of politics the group has
become totally focused on constitutional channels to institute the changes that they
anticipate. Another important aspect of the group is the renunciation of violence as a
strategy which is a different approach than that of the radical militant groups. Different
from the common misinterpretation of jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood has a more
comprehensive interpretation of the concept. They see jihad as a personal and collective
struggle to achieve social justice, solidarity and endeavor to build an Islamic state from
below (Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999, 65-66). In October 1994, the Brotherhood
organized a two-day Conference on Freedoms and Civil Society in Cairo by bringing
together hundreds of pr eminent activists and intellectuals, including government figures, to
reach a consensus on basic rights. Also, a delegation from the conference visited the Nobel
Laureate Naguib Mahfouz in the hospital to express support and condemnation of his
stabbing by militant Islamists. At the same time, the Brotherhood issued statements
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condemning every attack by militant Islamists on government figures and tourists (ElGhobashy 2005, 383). 12
The Egyptian government is anxious about the successes of Islamist social and
political organizations whose reputation grew gradually with their successes. The Mubarak
government silences the sources of criticism and opposition and maintains tight control
over all sorts of elections be they local, national, syndical or within universities (Sullivan
and Abed-Kotob 1999, 36). The Muslim Brothers' successful performance in the
associations is due to their "superior organizational and get-out-the vote skills and
transparent management of the syndicates' finances" (El-Ghobashy 2005, 380).
The year 1992 w as a turning point in the government's approach to the Muslim
Brothers which shifted from halfhearted toleration to further legal and physical repression.
In 1992, the Brotherhood candidates won all of the elections to the medical and bar
associations and embarrassed the Egyptian government after the devastating Cairo
earthquake in October by efficiently providing relief for the victims. The official response
was harsh; shortly thereafter, the Prime Minister issued Military Decree 4/1992 requiring
government approval for the collection and distribution of donations. One year later in
1993, the government-controlled assembly passed legislation titled "Law for the
Guarantees of Democracy in Professional Associations" that required participation of at
least fifty percent of members of professional associations in elections of their leading
organs. If they fail to do that, members would be called on to participate in a second
election and a quorum of one third of them would be sufficient. If such condition was not
met, the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs then had the power to appoint an
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administrative council, made up of the oldest members of the association and headed by a
senior judge (Al-Sayyid 1995,142-143).
As the Brotherhood members took control of many professional associations, the
Egyptian gove rnment tightened its grip on the N GOs. According to the HRW (Human
Rights Watch) report, Law 84/2002 severely limits the scope of permissible NGO activity
in Egypt. For example, Article 11 of Law 84/2002 forbids groups from pursuing the goals
of"threatening national unity" or "violating public order or morals". In practice, Article 11
gave the government officials wide powers to harass activists and dissolve civil society
groups. According to the report, the government may use Article 11 as a basis to block an
NGO's registration; to reject particular persons as founders or board candidates; or to
dissolve a group and seize its assets. (HRW Report on Egypt 2005, 8-12).
In spite of the restrictions imposed by the rulingNDP, the Muslim Brotherhood
members continued to win the syndicate elections. As a response, the government simply
closed lawyers' and engineers' syndicates in 1995 and 1996. The social support network
created by the Brotherhood in the early 1990s in those associations was an enormous draw
for these professionals. The Brothers offered full health insurance and other considerable
welfare benefits that no other organization could provide. Similarly, the Brothers
established virtual hegemony in the student associations in major universities. The
Brotherhood used its extensive social resources to support an alienated population
(Campagna 1996, 278-304; Esposito 995, 98-100).
InFebruary2005, PresidentMubarakproposed an amendment to article 76 ofthe
constitution that would allow, for the first time, multi-candidate presidential elections. A
referendum was held on May 25, 2005, as required by the constitution, and the amendment
was approved. However, the terms of the newly adopted amendment make it very difficult
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for candidates other than those ofMubarak's NDP to run for the elections. The difficulties
include requiring aspiring presidential candidates to first secure the support of250 elected
officials (including 140 local council members, 65 People's Assembly deputies, and 25
members of the Shura Council), and requiring that the parties they represent to have existed
for at least five years. The referendum was boycotted by some of Egypt's leading
opposition parties, including the Wafd Party ("Politics of Egypt").
The last presidential election in Egypt was held on September 7, 2005. Husni
Mubarak won a fifth consecutive six-year term in office, with 88.6% of the votes. Until the
presidential elections of2005, Egyptians have only been able to approve or reject a
candidate appointed by the Egyptian Parliament which is dominated by Mubarak' s NDP.
Ten parties joined the elections, the leading candidates were Husni Mubarak from the
ruling National Democratic Party, Nooman Gomaa from the New Wafd Party and Ayman
Nour from the Tomorrow Party. Gumaa and Nour received 7.3% and 2.8% of the votes
respectively. However, the voter turnout rate in the last elections was around 22%. Under
the election law, parties proposed candidates for the election, which were reviewed by the
Presidential Election Commission. The Muslim Brotherhood was not permitted to propose
a candidate for the election because the organization is banned by the government, which
prohibits political parties with a stated religious agenda. The Brotherhood did not endorse
any of the other candidates, but strongly encouraged people to go to the polls and vote for
anybody but Mubarak. Some of the main legal opposition parties, including the leftist
Tagammu Party and the Nasserist Party, boycotted the election having doubts about the
fairness of the whole process. ("Egyptian Presidential Election, 2005").
2005 was also the year of parliamentary elections for the People's Assembly

(Majlis Al-Sha 'ab), the lower house of the Egyptian Parliament. Of the 454 seats, 10 are
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appointed by presidential decree and 444 are elected. There are 222 constituencies, with

each returning two MPs in two categories: "workers and farmers" (the Constitution says
these must accOtmt for at least half of deputies), and "professionals". The winner in each
category is decided on a first-past-the-post basis. To win outright, a candidate must get
over 50% of the vote. Otherwise the top two candidates have to compete in a second
round. The Muslim Brotherhood had a list of over 150 independent candidates ("Guide to
Egypt's Election" BBC News). The elections took place in three stages. The Muslim
Brotherhood won 87 seats in the 454-seat Assembly, almost six times the number it had
before. The rulingNDP won 311 seats, significantly less than the 404 seats it gained in
2000, but just nine seats over the crucial two-thirds parliamentary majority required to
amend the constitution. For the first time in the last five or even six decades, there is an
opposition representation in the Egyptian Parliament around 30 pe rcent. And the strongest
bloc within the opposition representation is the Muslim Brotherhood. Most likely this is
going to generate pressures on Mubarak and his government to pay more attention to
domestic demands, to pay more attention to position platforms, and to the Muslim
Brotherhood. (Hamzawy, CNN Interview; "Egyptian Parliamentary election of2005").

Political Islam and the State in Turkey
In Turkey, the religious party in Turkey was bannedmanytimes.However, the
Islamist party resurfaced again under different names. Each time when the party was
outlawed, the major justification was thatthe religious party was workingtoove rthrow the
government toe stablish an Islamic state in secret. (Esposito 1995; Howe 2000; Ozbudun
2000).
The nature of the secularization process in Turkey paves the way for Islam's
continuous politicization (Kad10glu 2005). For Kad10glu, the strict secularization projects
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from above that originate from Kemalise 3 reforms offended Islamic ways of life in Turkish
society. In order to establish a Western-style regime, the founder of the Turkish Republic,
Kemal Atatiirk initiated radical changes to separate religion and state such as the abolition
of the Ottoman Sultanate (Kingdom) and Ottoman Islamic Caliphate in 1924, the abolition
of religious schools in 1924, the adoption of the secular civil code from Switzerland in
1926, the change of the Arabic alphabet to the Latin alphabet in 1928, and the declaration
of secularism with a constitutional amendment in 1937. 14 Toprakargues thatthe Turkish
principle of secularism is more related to the French tradition of laicism, or even J acobin
anti-clericalism, than the Anglo-Saxon tradition of separation of church and state (Toprak
1996; Gole 1996). For much of the time since Atatiirk founded modern Turkey on the ruins
ofthe Ottoman Empire in the early 1920s, Turkey has featured a strong and politically
influential central state, and a settled policy of hegemonic, state-enforced secularism. This
created a political fault line dividing the secularist political and military elite from proIslamic, anti-statist opposition forces. The voters have held unsteady loyalties and parties
have consequently had short lifespans, which led to newly forming or shifting political
alliances (Tepe 2005, 70).
Turkish secularism under AtatUrk and his successors never meant the separation of
religion and state (Ayoob 2004, 451-463). The state appoints and pays all the prayer
leaders in Turkey's mosques, which are also subsidized by the treasury. The prayer leaders
must be graduates of state-run jmam-Hatip (Prayer Leader-Preacher) Schools training
religious officials and prayer leaders. The Directorate ofReligious Affairs (Diyanet j~[eri
Ba~kanlzg1)

13

sends sermons to all mosques to be read during the sermons of Friday

Kemalism refers to Atati.irkism (M. Kemal Atati.irk, founder of modern Turkey).
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congregations which is a strict requirement. The Turkish state also has a monopoly over
religious education. The Ministry of Education provides religious education through the
Islamic vocational schools and strictly oversees the Qur'anic seminaries. Ayoob concludes
that the state in Turkey controls religion and there is no separation between the two; some
other Middle Eastern states, such as Syria and Egypt, also attempt to exercise such control,
but they do so much less effectively.
The first religious partyofTurkeywas the National Order Party(MNP, Milli

Nizam Partisi) which was established in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan. In 1972, the party
changed its name and became the National Salvation Party (MSP, Milli Selamet Partisi).
All the parties including the Islamist party were closed down in the military intervention of
1980; however the same cadre established the Welfare Party (RP, Refah Partisi) in 1982.

In 1996, the RP established a coalition government with the center-right True Path Party
(DYP, Dogru Yol Partisi) and Erbakan became the Prime Minister after the DYP's female
leader, Tansu <;iller. However, the Turkish Military forced the coalition government to
resign in April 1997. T he RP was closed down by the Constitutional Court of Turkey in
January 1998. The same year, the Islamists created the Virtue Party (FP, Fazilet Partisi).
After the closingdownofthe FP just like the RP by the Constitutional Court of Turkey, the
old guard within the FP e stahl ished the Prosperity Party ( Saadet Partisi) in 2001 (Kanra
2005, 526, 527). A younger and more moderate and conservative faction within the old FP,
known as Yenilikr;iler (Reformists) formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP,

Adalet ve Kalkznma Partisi) on August 14,2001. As opposed to the old guard in the FP,
the younger generation within the FP who established the AKP was more moderate and
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Before 1937, Islam was accepted as the official religion of the new Turkish Republic in the Turkish
constitution. This was changed with a constitutional amendment, and the principle of secularism was
accepted in 1937.
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less aggressive. For instance, the AKP adamantly took the initiative and sped up Tlll'key' s
EU membership negotiations which were absolutely opposed by the old guard in the FP. In
his various speeches, Erbakan harshly criticized the EU and often referred to it as "the
Christian club".
Kanra (2005) argues that a break from the rhetoric of the thirty-year-old Islamic
politics was crucial for the success ofthe AKP. The RP and later the FP have earlier
developed an increasingly aggressive tone throughout the ascendancy of the party. In his
study, Kanra found a strong resentment among the Muslim community of this aggressive
style which led to the ban of the party by the Constitutional CourtofTlll'key. The AKP, led
by Erdogan, followed a different path than those of the RP and later the FP. Unlike the RP,
Erdogan branded the AKP a centrist-conservative party like the Elll'ope an Christian
Democrats committed to secular principles. However, the RP had not openly admitted that
it had been committed to secular principles. DlU'ing the election campaign, religious
themes, including the headscarfissue, were put in the background in favor of more
immediate issues like the economy and the problem of corruption. Dlll'ing the electoral
campaign before the November 2002 elections, the AKP continuously reiterated its loyalty
to the main principles of the secular system (528-530).
Heper and Tokta~ (2003, 173-177) assert that Erdogan' s conception of a properly
functioning democracy is informed by the Islamic term of shura (consultation). He defined
democracy as an exchange of ideas and consultation to the widest extent possible. In fact,
when he was the major of istanbul before becoming the prime minister, Erdogan invited
members from the two secularly oriented political parties to take part in the standing
municipal committees and he made it his policy to seek expertise overpiety,andduringhis
term, Erdogan's municipality was quite successful in meeting the myriad needs of istanbul
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like building new dams and improving the water distribution system, de creasing air
pollution by forcing industrial plants to follow environmental regulations, creation of new
green areas, improving the natural gas and subway infrastructure.
The Struggle over Identity Through Cultural Frames
Another significant issue regarding the struggle between the state and the Islamists
is the continuous attempt of both states to establish a systematic control over religion. In
Egypt approximately half of the mosques are under the control of the state, whereas in
Turkey all ofthe mosques organized under the Directorate ofReligious Affairs are
controlled by the state. Initially this was not a response or a reaction to Islamist groups and
Islamism because both countries established that tight control over religion as they evolved
modern nation-states at the be ginning of the twentieth century. Historically in both states the
official-orthodox interpretation oflslam dominated and alternative religious interpretations
were perceived with suspicion; the reply of the state has usually been repression. Although
there are some dissident Islamic scholars in both countries arguing that Al-Azhar and the
Directorate of Religious Affairs should not hold a monopoly on religious teachings, both
states enjoy an official monopoly on religious affairs. However, these dissidents are not
and cannot be vocal enough to challenge the monopoly of the state on religious affairs
mainly because of the state dominance and control over religion (Ibrahim 1995, 60-61;
Abdo 2000, 43-45).

In addition to the strategic and structural dimensions of mobilization, framing
literature within the social movement theory has increasingly addressed how individuals
conceptualize themselves as a collectivity, how prospective participants are convinced to
participate and the ways in which meaning is produced and disseminated by the group
members. Tarrow argues that movement leaders "cannot simply adapt frames from
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traditional cultural symbols, .... they orient their movements' frames toward action in
particular contexts and fashion them at the intersection between a target population's
culture and their own values and goals" (1998, 109-110). Snow and his associates call this
process "frame alignment" (Snow et al. 1986).
Through the study of framing, we can understand the "interpretive schemata" that
offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events around the
group members. There are basically three types of frames: diagnostic, prognostic and
motivational (Snow and Benford 1988, 200-204). Diagnostic frames identify and define a
problem or attribute blame or causality (like, Secularist regimes is the source of Muslims'
problems). Prognostic frames go beyond problem specification or blaming, it defines
strategies, tactics and targets about 'what is to be done' (like, Islam is the solution). Both
types of frames use a factual reasoning. Thirdly, motivational frames explain the rationale
for action that is strongly normative (like, Working for the establishment of an Islamic state
is the duty of every Muslim). Hence, motivational frames add a moralizing dimension to the
specification of problems, culprits and strategies, and produces cognitively hot arguments
that demand collective action to redress perceived injustices.
Frames are about reflecting upon the process of grievance interpretation. Frames
make sense of emotions and direct an agent's course of action in such a way as to channel
that emotion. Thus, emotions are often a crucial source of the energy which fuels movement
activism (Tarrow 1998, 112). It is because agents feel injustices and feel that others are
wronged, so they are moved to action. Tarrow argues that religion is a recurring source of
social movement framing because it is a reliable source of emotion: "Religion provides
ready-made symbols, rituals and solidarities that can be accessed an appropriated by
movement leaders". Klandermans ( 1997, 44) argues that the transformation of social issues
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into social movement frames does not occur automatically: "It is a process in which social
actors, media and members of society jointly interpret, define and redefine states of
affairs."
Framing is inherently about interpretation of grievances (Crossley 2002, 135) and
in order to mobilize support, movement organizers must link their frames with those of
their potential constituents (Snow et al. 1986). This process is known as frame alignment.
Through the frame alignment, movement leaders "orient their movements' frames toward
action in particular contexts and fashion them at the intersection between a target
population's culture and their own values and goals" (Tarrow 1998, 11 0). Snow et al.
( 1986) provide four basic possibilities for frame alignment through which movements
formulate their messages in relation to the existing culture. Frame bridging is the "linkage
of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a
particular issue or problem". Through frame bridging, movements link a movement to
"unmobilized sentiment pools or public opinion preference clusters" (Snow 1986, 467) of
constituents with similar views andgrievances without organizational base. Frame

amplification is "the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a
particular issue, problem, or set of events" (1986, 469). This might involve persuading
prospective movement participants that their values require them to support a particular
cause or involve an attempt to amplify beliefs about the causes of particular problems and
the ways of solving those problems (Crossley 2002, 135). Frame extension is the process
of extending the boundaries of the original frame(s) "so as to encompass interests or points
of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but of considerable salience to
potential adherents" (Snow 1986, 472). Frame transformation takes place when the
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existing frames "may not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to,
conventional lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames" (Snow 1986, 473).
Framing is about construction of meaning. Through certain grammatical constructs
and interpretive lenses, the groups create an intersubjective meaning and facilitate
movement goals. The term framing is used to describe this process of constructing meaning.
Islamic movements, like other social movements, are involved in the production of
meaning through the framing process. Islamic movements, driven by the issues of identity,
culture and post-materialism, are in a constant struggle over meaning and values. Control
and reconstruction of state institutions may be an effective instrument for creating a society
governed by the Shari 'a. However, control and reconstruction of the state are only one of
many routes for change. Thus, Islamists believe that the state is a means for the production
of meaning, not an end. In fact, most Islamic struggles are waged through society and
cultural discourse rather than state institutions or government decision-making bodies.
Disagreements and framing contests over meaning increase competitiveness as various
groups produce and disseminate different meanings. (Wiktorowicz 2004, 15-19).
Islamists also compete with official frames or official attempts to establish a
control over the creation of meaning. Most regimes in the Muslim world utilize Islam as a
form of legitimization and a fight continuously takes place over the formal and informal
organizations that produce and sustain the symbols and their meaning (Eickelman and
Piscatori 2004). To maintain their legitimacy, regimes in the Muslim world strategically
either create new frames or modify the old ones for their own benefit to maintain their
interests and power.
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Social Identity and Contentious Politics
Tarrow argues that contentious politics occurs when ordinary people join forces in
confrontations with elites, authorities, and opponents. Contentious politics happens when
changing oppor tunities and constraints create incentives for social actors. Contentious
collective action lies at the base of all social movements; however this does not mean that
movements do nothing else but contend. The movements build organizations, elaborate
ideologies, construct collective identities, and socialize and mobilize their followers
(Tarrow 1998, 2-3). For Tarrow, social movements are better defined as " ... collective
challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction
with elites, opponents, and authorities" rather than "as expressions of extremism, violence,
and deprivation" (1998, 4). Similarly, Tilly (1982, 26) defines social movements as:
"as ustained s eries o f i nteractions be tween powerholders and persons successfully
claiming to speak on behalf of a c onstituency I acking formal representation, in the
course of which those persons m ake pub! icly v isible de mands for c hange i n t he
distribution ore xercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations
of support"

Diani (1992, 13) defines social movements as "a network of informal interactions
between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or
cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity."
According to social movement research on participation patterns, "individuals are
drawn into participation ... as the result of their embeddedness in associational networks
that render them 'structurally available' for protest activity'' (McAdam 1994, 36-37).
Social networks, ease the uncertainty of activism and provide negative peer pressure if one
does not participate (McAdam & Paulsen 1993, 644). People tend to associate with people
similar to themselves (Klanderrnans 1992, 88). Social networks tend to be homogeneous
and to reproduce themselves. Accordingly, the constituency of social movements, including

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30
their social movement organizations, most often follows specific, horizontal lines of social
categorization like race, gender, or class. Klandermans (1988, 175) argues that people tend
to validate information by comparing their interpretations of grievances with those of
significant others, particularly like-minded individuals. Tilly (1978, 62-63) uses the word

catnet (a combination of category and network) to reflect the socially homogeneous nature
of social movements by emphasizing the collective identity of those groups. Clark (2004,
946) points out that public information campaigns, rallies, and the like can be successful
for gaining new members; however, face-to-face interaction with a trusted individual
within the same social network is the most successful way to ensure participation.
Tarrow' s definition of social movements has four empirical properties: collective
challenge, common purpose, social solidarity, and sustained interaction. Tarrow contends
that "collective challenges are most often marked by interrupting, obstructing, or rendering
uncertain the activities of others". However, particularly in authoritarian settings, they can
also be symbolized by slogans, forms of dress or music, or by renaming familiar objects
with new or different symbols (Tarrow 1998, 5). Islamists engage in many similar forms of
actions 1ike creating and reinterpreting new concepts and introducing new meanings. 15
The coordination of collective action depends on the trust and cooperation among
the participants by shared identities and on the collective action frames that justify and
motivate collective action (Tarrow 1998, 21). Through the frames, social movements
shape grievances into broader and more resonant claims (Snow and Benford 1998) and
stimulate participants (Gamson 1992). Framing also has an identity aspect. Through
framing, the group members define the "us" and "them''. By drawing on inherited collective

15

An example of this is going to be presented in Chapter 3 and 5 respectively in regards to
reinterpretation of the concept of ''da 'wa" (call to God) by the Islamists in contemporary Egypt and
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identities and shaping new ones, groups define their enemies by real or imagined attributes
or evils (Hardin 1995). States are also constantly framing issues both to gain support for
their policies and to contest the meanings created by the contentious groups. The struggle
between states and movements takes place not only about particular issues, but about
contests over meaning (Melucci 1996). Social groups require solidarity to act and creating
or modifying identities around their claims is one way of doing that. Tarrow argues that
building a movement around strong ties of collective identity does much of the work that
would be normally done by the organization, but it cannot do the work of mobilization,
which depends on framing identities so that they will lead to action, alliances and
interaction (Tarrow 1998, 119).
Social identity refers to the ways in which individuals and collectivities are
distinguished in their social relations with other individuals and collectivities. Social
identity represents ourunderstandingofwhowe and other people are, and therefore, also
their understanding of themselves and others (including us). Jenkins differentiates between
the collective identity and the individual identities, proposing that the latter emphasizes
difference, while the former similarity. (Jenkins 1996) . Through the process of inclusion
and exclusion, group boundaries are constructed (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995). Jenkins
(1996) argues that a consequence of defining the other is the imposition of negative and
putative characteristics on a collective other, whose politics, culture and lifestyle must be
resisted and repelled.
Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue that the formation and maintenance of social
identity involves two processes: i) Categorization (i.e., mtionality, religious affiliation),
which identifies intergroup boundaries by producing group stereotypical and normative

Turkey. Originally the concept only applied to non-Muslims. However, contemporary Islamists
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perceptions and actions, and assigns people including self, to the contextually relevant
category. ii) Self-enhancement, which guides the social categorization process such that
ingroup norms and stereotypes are largely ingroup-favoring. Accordingly, people have a
basic need to see themselves in a relatively positive light in relation to others, and that self
enhancement can be achieved through comparing the ingroup positively in relation to
relevant outgroups. If comparison with outgroups is unfavorable, then group members
experience a negative social identity. Individuals with negative social identity are likely to
attempt to their group better, which frequently involves competition with relevant other
groups. Thus, the mere act of individuals categorizing themselves as group members was
sufficient to lead them to display ingroup favoritism. After being categorized of a group
membership, individuals seek to achieve positive self-esteem by positively differentiating
their ingroup from a comparison outgroup on some valued dimension. In this regard,
perceived external threats to social identity can be specified as unwanted influences of
outgroup norms, perception of foreign threats, and perception of relative weakness in
socioeconomic status in comparison with relevant outgroups resulting from unfavorable
intergroup comparisons.
Islamism often times challenges repressive regimes and even under repressive
regimes as Scott argues subterranean resistance cultures may sometimes emerge though
they may not engage in overt protest action, but they generate and produce resistance
identities and beliefs (Scott 1990). Scott maintains that within these cultures, gestures and
symbols of defiance are woven into the fabric of everyday life. For instance common
phrases can achieve a highly charged meaning, and certain style of handshakes can become
a popular vernacular of grassroots resistance (Scott 1985). For instance the Islamic

reinterpreted the concept and applied it to Muslims.
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Islamists often perceive political activism as a form of Gramscian war of position as part
ofidentitypol itics, andlslamistframes frequently are ina continuous struggle with the
official frames created by the secularist elites. Framing is an ongoing process which
requires the movement leaders and members to revise and modify frames continuously to
find new ways of connecting with potential supporters, and to reach new audiences (Snow
and Benford 2000).

Cases, Hypotheses And Model
Most-different-systems Design
Although Turkey and Egypt represent most different political systems with their
different backgrounds in history, language, national identity, and political evolutions,
Islamism is a strong social and political force in both countries. Casual observers might
associate the emergence of society-centered Islamism in those two countries with Islam
However, this is a tautological assumption. Neither does Islamism emerge in every Muslim
society, nor do all Islamist movements share all of the same characteristics. There are two
significant aspects that convince one to study Islamism in both countries. First, those are
the two countries with high levels of state control over religion, and also high levels of
Islamist political activism Second, it is theoretically intriguing that in both countries, the
emergence oflslamism followed a similar pattern (the pattern will be explained below).

Third, in both countries Islamism also expresses itself as a response to perceived external
threats to social identity.

16

In the third and fifth chapters will examine how the concept of da 'wa (literally it means call, in the
Islamist context, it means call to Allah or dissemination of Islam) achieved a totally new meaning.
Originally the concept refers to dissemination oflslam among non-Muslims. However, according to
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Hypotheses and Model
This study attempts to explore Islamism through two dimensions. The first
dimension is about the relationship between the state, religion and the Islamists examining
the relationship between the state control over religion and the emergence oflslamism. The
second dimension is identity oriented which mainly examines the development process of
the Islamist concern for preserving social identity against perceived external threats. Thus,
this study attempts to explore:
( 1) The correlation, if any, between the increased state control over religion and
the revival oflslamist political activism.
(2) The correlation, if any, between perceived external threats to social identity and
the resurgence oflslamist political activism in regards to advancements in communications
and modern media.
Islamism has been part of Turkish politics since the early 1970s. Why has Islamism
started to rise since the mid 1980s and has accelerated since the early 1990s, but not
before? Similarly, Islamism has been on the rise in Egypt since the early 1990s? In this
study, i tis hypothesizedthatlslamismin both countries is on the rise in regards to the
blending of two major factors: the increased state control over religion and the Islamists'
perception of external threats to social identity. Through the use of diagnostic frames, the
Islamists identify those perceived external threats. Later, through the use of prognostic
frames Islamists take a course of action against those threats. Lastly, through the use of
motivational frames Islamists motivate and mobilize their supporters for further political
action.

contemporary Jslamists, the concept often refers to increasing Muslims' religious understanding and
piousness.
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A brief look at the political histories of both cotmtries reveals that the emergence of
Islamism in both cotmtries follows a similar pattern. The earliest interaction between the
Islamists and the regimes is about cotmterbalancing. Both regimes used the Islamists to
cotmterbalance the leftist political movements through the later years of the Cold War era.
Sadat displayed an accommodationist approach towards the Islamists to cotmterbalance the
leftist elements in the ASU (Arab Socialist Union) which was trying to undermine his
authority. Similarly, the military government in Turkey used the Islamists to cotmterbalance
the leftists. When the regimes perceived Islamists as threats, they left accommodationist
policies and adopted a harsher policy towards the Islamists.
The February28 ( 1997) indirect intervention of the Turkish military into the
politics and the forcing of the Islamist-Right wing coalition to resign marked the highest
point of the regime intervention against the growing Islamist political activism. Similarly,
in Egypt, Mubarak left his previous accommodationist approach after the early 1993s and
started to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood through a series of tough legislation,
crackdowns and limitation of the political activities of the Islamists. However, in both
cotmtries, the Islamists managed to survive those harsh conditions and in fact strengthened
their positions in politics of their cotmtries. Moreover, both cotmtries also experienced an
increasing level of official control over the religion. Both regimes tightened their grips on
the religion through establishing more official control over religious institutions through a
selective policy of confrontation and/or cooptation.

In the light of the previous discussions, in this study it is hypothesized that:
HI: The rise ofJslamist political activism is positively related to the increased

state control over religion.
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H2: The rise ofIslamist political activism is also positively related to perceived

external threats to social identity.
There are various reasons of the emergence of the Islamist reaction to the state
control over religion. The first one is the state's perception of control over religion as part
of a social engineering project.

17

Social engineering refers to the efforts of the government

or private groups to influence popular attitudes and social behavior on a mass scale.
Various societal groups always perceive those projects with suspicion, disapproval and
oppos ition. 0 ften times, social engineering goes hand in hand with pol itical engineering
which is the counterpart of social engineering in the realm of politics. Moreover, in both
countries the state control over religion goes handinhand with the highly paternalistic-

patriarchal18 political structure supported by the secular official ideologies. Nasserism
and Kemalism tried to marginalize and as well as to control Islamic institutions. However,
this did not lead to the disappearance oflslam from the public realm. It rather paved the
way to its politicization (Kadwglu 1998; Tamir 2000).
The state elites' interest in social engineering projects is not primarily confined to
a few policy areas; indeed it is a comprehensive social, political and economic project 19 •
Thus, it is one of the reasons why many secular elites of the newly independent states in the
Middle East established socialist or semi-socialist economies where the state controlled

17

An interesting anecdote about Nevzat Tandogan (1894-1946), the former governor of Ankara may help
illustrate the amount of social engineering applied by the state elites in Turkey. When Tandogan met
communist university students protesting on the streets he said: "What is going on here? If it is necessary
for Communism to come to Turkey, we [the state elites] are going to introduce it to our country, not you!
"For a discussion of social engineering in Turkish politics see: 'The Struggles of a ''Strong" State"
Barkey, Henri Journal oflnternational Affairs 54, no. 1 (Fall2000): p. 87-105
18
Although originally the word devlet (state) in Arabic is a feminine word, the widely used concept of
devlet baba (father state) is often used in Turkish when people refer to the state which demonstrates the
p.aternalistic-patriarchal character of the state.
9
It is very noteworthy that the Turkish elites adopted elitist Jacob in French laicism (not Anglo-Saxon
secularism) as an official ideology at the early stages of the newThrkish republic which was established
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the economy. Those new states had little room for private educational institutions, and
often times single-parties dominated. The elitists had little trust in the masses. Moreover,
the governments either did not allow any free press or when they allowed it, the
governments heavily censored the already weak private media. Various societal groups
have always perceived those kinds of social engineering projects with suspicion, and
Islamists are not an exception to that (Mardin 1991, 1992; Yavuz 2000, 2003; Karaman and
Aras 2000; Frey 1965; Ozbudun 1996).
The second reason of state control over religion is directly related to political
engineering. When it was in its earliest stages, Islamist political activism was perceived as
an ideological rival for the official ideology maintained by the secularist state elites of
both countries. Thus, Islamism did not completely match with the ideal "game of politics"
envisioned by the secularist state elites. Because of this conception of rivalry and
mismatch by the state elites, the official response for any form oflslamism was often harsh
and oppressive. In fact, any opposition to the state elites and their official ideology was
unwelcome. In fact, both regimes have been characterized by bureaucratic centralization,
intolerance for political opposition and states' lack of respect for civil rights and
freedoms. For instance, the Turkish constitution forbids creation of political parties based
on religion and ethnic identity, which rules out the major enemies of the official ideology
(i.e., Political Islam and separatist Kurdish sub-nationalism). The Egyptian constitution
makes it illegal to apply for creation of political parties based on religion and class which
rules out the Islamists and the Communists (Kararnan and Aras 2000; Kadwglu 1998; Gole
1996; Yavuz 2000, 2003; Najjar 2001).

in 1923 after the demise of the Ottoman Empire. This was a deliberate choice as French laicism fits
perfectly into the bureaucratically centralized elitist secular outlook.
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The third reason for the Islamist reaction about state control over religion is both
side's uncompromising position and lack of consensus between both parties. The struggle
between both sides is often perceived as an "either-or" type of situation by the secularist
elites and the Islamists. In other words, both sides perceive politics as a zero-sum game in
which a Gramscian counter-hegemonic war of position has to be won for final victory.
Often times political struggles are waged through politically-emotionally charged symbols
what Eickelman and Piscatori (2004) call "Muslim politics". For instance, the banning of
headscarves for female students and government employees has become a serious symbolic
struggle between the seculars and Islamists in Turkey for the last two decades (Kadwglu

1998; Cizre and <;1nar 2003). Moreover, there is also an identity and framing aspect of the
whole struggle between the two parties. Due to the increased access to various forms of
media, perceived external threats cause a greater concern among the Islamists regarding
social identity. Through the diagnostic frames, the Islamists take a protective-defensive
stance in matters regarding social identity. This, in turn, urges the Islamists to counterattack
those perceived external threats to social identity to preserve it through the use of

prognostic frames. As politics is perceived as a Gramscian war of position, the Islamists
try to win political battles by recruiting more soldiers for their ranks through the use of

motivational frames. As briefly outlined earlier, groups often times tend to react to
outgroup norms in a disliking way and are mot iva ted to eliminate them from their i ngroup
norms. Thus, they aim to preserve group identity and unity, and ultimately self-purity due to
self-attachment to the group (Tajfel and Turner 1986). For the Islamists, the outgroup
norms can be non-Islamic values and practices, Western power and dominance (i.e.,
cultural, military), Western culture and symbols, and secularism (Ozbudun 1976; Mardin

1973; Narh 1999; <;arkoglu2002; Toprak 1981, 1996).
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The fourth reason is about the organic nature oflslam besides confirming the
identity dimension of Islamist politics. Scholars like Abdo (2000), Ayubi ( 1991 ), Clark
(1995, 2004), Husain (2003), Smith (1970), and Toprak (1981) explain the Islamist
challenge in relation to Islam's being anorganic religion. Smith (1970, 249) argues that an
organic religion maintains no c hurchhierarchy or priestly class, indeed withinanorganic
religion "sacral law and sacral social structure are of the essence ... religion is largely
equated with society, and distinct ecclesiastical organizations ... are secondary."
Theoretical distinctions drawn in Christianity between the realms of God and of the ruler
are absentinislam(Husain,2003). Toprak(1981) argues that in anorganic religion the
distinction between religious and social systems is obscured, the two systems merge. In
Islam, this merger is both prescribed and effected by the Shari'a which has somethingto
say about every aspect of life. It is this organic nature oflslam that makes the Islamists
substantially against state regulation of religion. According to the Islamists, political
institutions are de signed to de fend and promote Islam, not the state. The primary loyalty of
Muslims is to the ummah (the communityofMuslims),rather than the state, and to the

Shari 'a rather than the ruler. 20 Thus, it is this organic nature oflslamthatmakes it clash
with the government as it tries to control religion from above, and create an Islamist
reaction to such measures of the secularist governments. Islamists believe that the state has
no right to control religion authoritatively and they use available political venues to
struggle with such state attempts as the state heavily intervenes into religion not necessarily

20

A saying of Prophet Muhammad explains this further: (from Sahib Bukhari, Volume 9, Book 89,
Number 258): 'Abdullah narrated: The Prophet said, "A Muslim has to listen to and obey (the order of his
ruler) whether he likes it or not, as long as his orders involve not one in disobedience (to Allah), but if an
act of disobedience (to Allah) is imposed one should not listen to it or obey it. Obeying the ruler is a
religious obligation in Islam. A saying of Prophet Muhammad instructs Muslims to obey their ruler (from
SahihBukhari, Volume 9, Book89, Number 251): AbuHurairanarrated: Allah's Apostle said, 'Whoever
obeys me, obeys Allah, and whoever disobeys me, disobeys Allah, and whoever obeys the ruler I appoint,
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for the sake of religion, but for political reasons. Although the secularist states that control
religion substantially contradict with their secular nature, intervening into religion has
many political benefits (i.e. social engineering); the greatest one of them is eliminating
Islamist opposition.
Turkish and Egyptian regimes heavily restrict various forms of political
participation through some official barriers as well as controlling religion. Under such
circumstances, the Islamists vigorously attempt to use any political venues available to
them as a reaction to state control over religion including civil society activism. Thus for
the Islamists, political activism through the civil society is not just a political act, but also
a type of activism with cultural-symbolic undercurrents with an emphasis on social identity
which can be best explained by the Gramscian concepts of counter-hegemonic struggle and
war of position, and culture/identity oriented new social movements.
Regulation of religion in both countries has two aspects. The first aspect relates to
the official control over official religious hierarchy. The second aspect relates to the
struggle between the official and the Islamist frames. In both countries, the governments are
highly secularist and they regulate religion in various ways through the official institutions
of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey, and Al-Azhar in Egypt. Both states
promote what many scholars call "Official Islam" actively as opposed to the politically
active version oflslam promoted by the Islamists. Controlling religion is not necessarily
perceived as a non-secular practice by Egyptian and Turkish authorities although the two
regimes are highly secular in nature. The Muslim Brotherhood candidates in Egypt control
many major professional associations and existing research documents a serious increase
in the number oflslamic civil society organizations in Turkey especially after 1983.

obeys me, and whoever disobeys him, disobeys me."However, rulers also have to follow the shari'aand be
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I operationalize the state regulation of religion through the number and extent of
parliamentary and governmental acts that regulate religious affairs in both countries, the
powers and the extent of the official religious hierarchy through which the state regulates
religion, the extent of the government's reachove r various religious institutions (mosques,
religious foundations, charity organizations educational institutions), the number of
mosques controlled by the government and the number of religious personnel appointed by
the state, and censorings of religious publications and sermons. I operationalize Islamist

political activism through the increasing public sentiment for an interest in an Islamic
system, resurgent grassroots or populist Islamist movements. Resurgence oflslamism and
its political manifestations could be demonstrated by five major indicators. First, the
spread oflslam from homes, mosques, and Islamic schools into the mainstream
sociocultural, legal, economic, and political spheres of the contemporary Muslim states.
Second, Islamism engenders widespread discussion and debate oflslamic issues in the
mass media, leading to a proliferation of books and articles on Islamic theology, history,
jurisprudence, culture and civilization. Third, Islam's emphasis on socioeconomic equality
and justice has significant populist appeal at a time of great disparity between the rich and
the poor. Fourth, Islamists often reassert the relevance of the Islamic approach to solving
contemporary problems while presenting a criticism of both the secularist elites and the
materialist values imported from the West or the socialist-communist world. Fifth, Islamist
movements have strong anti-imperialist, anti -colonialist and nationalist undercurrents.
Thus, the Islamists call for an end to international dependence on Western powers.
As stated earlier, the rise oflslamist political activism is also positively related to

perceived external threats to social identity. The formation and maintenance of social

just.
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identity involves categorization and self-enhancement. Categorization (i.e., nationality,
religious affiliation) identifies intergroup boundaries by producing group stereotypical and
normative perceptions and actions, and assigns people to the relevant category. Selfenhancement guides the social categorization process such that ingroup norms and
stereotypes are largely ingroup-favoring. Therefore, many people have a basic need to see
themselves in a relatively positive light in relation to others, and that self enhancement can

be achieved through comparing the ingroup pos itively in relation tor elevant outgroups. If
comparison with outgroups is unfavorable, then group members experience a negative
social identity. Individuals with negative social identity are 1ikely to attempt to their group
better, which frequently involves competition with relevant other groups. Accordingly,
perceived external threats to social identity can be specified as unwanted influences of
outgroup norms, perception of foreign threats, and perception of relative weakness in
socioeconomic status in comparison with relevant outgroups resulting from unfavorable
intergroup comparisons (Tajfel and Turner 1986).
Ytlrnaz (2002) argues that the rise of political Islam in Turkey is positively related
to perceived external threats to social identity specified as secular and Western cultural
influences and unfavorable intergroup comparisons (i.e. perceived weakness in
comparison with the West). Perceived external threats to social identity could be
categorized under six separate themes; and the three frame types (diagnostic, prognostic,
and motivational) play a significant role in the way that Islamists perceive those external
threats to their social identity. The first theme is the perceived immorality or moral
erosion. Indeed this is the most frequently repeated theme in the Islamist writings including
criticism of non-Islamic lifestyle or actions considered immoral from an Islamic
viewpoint. Examples include consumption of alcoholic drinks, gambling, prostitution,
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pornography, and extramarital sexual intercourse. The theme also includes some crimes
such as theft, murder, and drug use (Ytlmaz 2002, 76).
The second theme is Western cultural influence which is also expressed as the
primary source of perceived moral erosion and corruption ofMuslim identity. Moreover,
for the Islamists, the secular regime is the main vehicle of such influences, as the regime
and the secular elites are believed to impose Western norms through the secular law and
educational institutions. The second major source of perceived moral erosion for the
Islamists is the visual and written media. The corruption of the Muslim identity is
considered as another major source of perceived external threats to social identity by the
Islamists. Islam, according to the Islamists, is perceived as the main source of social
identity and imposition of the strict secular policies by the state elites undermines the
Muslim identity. For the Islamists, it is impossible to divide human existence into the
individual spiritual or private domain and the public secular domain due to the organic and
holistic nature oflslam. For the Islamists, the secularists' attempts to empty Islam of its
social and political meaning disturb the Islamists greatly (Ytlmaz 2002, 77-78).
The third theme is domestic suppression oflslam. Secular ideologies (i.e.
Kemalism and Nasserism) produced a politicization oflslam rather than its secularization.
Activities of mosques, Islamic political parties and associations are severely restricted
due to harsh secularization measures often imposed undemocratically by the secularist
elites (Ytlmaz, 2002: 79; Karaman and Aras 2000).
The fourth theme is about economic issues. Islamists argue that the secularist elites
are not indeed in favor of economic development of their country with the assumption that
as a country becomes wealthier, there will be more pressures for democratization, human
rights and rule of law. Thus, according to the Islamist claim, the secular elites keep people
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under control by keeping the country at a sustenance level andkeepingpeoples' minds
occupied with bread and butter issues, not with politics, democracy and human rights.
Moreover, according to this understanding, the secularist elites do not want to jeopardize
their privileged positions by allowing an economically powerful Islamist class. 21 Majority
of the time, those kinds oflslamist assumptions are also linked with Islam's emphasis on
socioeconomic equity and justice (Ytlmaz, 2002: 79; Husain 2003; Rubin 2005).
The fifth theme is Western imperialism The arguments view the West as the major
imperialist power whose aim is to exploit and control the Muslim world. The vehicles of
Western imperialism are specified as Western military presence in Muslim countries,
economic dependency on the West, Western cultural influences, and the cooperation of the
ruling elites with the West (Yllmaz 2002, 80).
The last theme is the Muslim's lack of self esteem against the West. Islamists
frequentlyclaimsuperiorityoflslamas a social, political and economic system against
capitalism and corrnnunist/socialist systems which for Muslims are Western in origin.
Islamists frequently portray capitalism as an excessively materialistic, competitive,
exploitative and therefore inherently immoral system Socialism is viewed as another type
of exploitative unjust political system where peoples' rights are severely limited. Based on
such criticisms, Islamism is offered as a genuine alternative which, according to the
Islamists, eliminates any form of exploitation. Accordingly, Islam is believed to balance
individualism and corrnnunity life without giving superiority to either (Ytlmaz 2002, 81;
Husain 2003; Rubin 2003).

21

In the Turkish political lexicon, the extent of the economic activities of the businesses owned by the
Islamists is labeled as yesil sermaye -green capital- (since green is popularly considered as the color of
Islam). For a detailed discussion see: Rubin, M (2005) "Green Money, Islamist Politics in Turkey"
Middle East Quarterly, V.l2, I. 1
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There are two aspects oflslamist political mobilization: organizational aspect and
ideational aspect. Islamists use various resources available to them to mobilize support for
their cause such as informal horizontal relationships among the group members, regular
formal and informal meetings of the group members, informal religious learning circles

(dars), recruitmentthroughthe mosque (masjid), providing cheaper housing for students
and recognition through charity activities. Moreover, through a large networkoflslamist
NGOs, professional and student associations, and unions Islamists actively mobilize
individuals. Those are the organizational aspects oflslamist mobilization.
The ideational aspect oflslamist political activism often develops in the form of
frames in relation to the perceived external threats to social identity. Islamist mobilization
often times goes hand in hand with creation of Islamist frames by those groups. I slamist
frames link those perceived threats to political activism through the need for preserving
Islamic social identity through a protectionist viewpoint. Moreover, the Islamists often link
Islamist identity with political mobilization through an activist conception of da 'wa 22 •
Frames are also utilized by the Islamists to create Islamist discourses. Thus, Islamist
frames and discourses contain high levels of political criticism of secularism and the West
so that they are frequently targeted in the official frames by the government elite and the
members ofthe official religious establishment. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the
official religious establishment often develops counter frames to combat the Islamist
frames.

22

Da 'wa literally means call, call to God and dissemination of religion. For more information on how the
original concept of da'wa which was mainly towards non-Muslims was transformed into a more activist
version which is more towards Muslims, see Chapters 3 and 5.
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Cases and Focus of Study
Before the 1980s Islarnists in both countries had been politically active, however
the number and scope oflslamist political activism has been gradually increasing in the
last three decades. After the 1980s Islamism has exponentially grown in both countries in
regards to a parallel advancement in the media and communications. The model in this
study is longitudinal and cross-national. The scope of this study for Turkey is the period
since the establishment of the Islamist Party ofTurkey (National Order Party) -1970- to
present. The focus is on the periods tartingwith the end of the military rule (1980 -1983)
and the AKP's rise to power (2002). For Egypt, the scope ofthis study is the period
between Sadat's liberalization policies (infitah) -1974- to present. However, the main
focus is on the Mubarakperiod (1981- ). Those periods are chosen deliberately since
both countries heavily experienced Islamist political activism during those years.
The focus of this study is on the Islarnists who are politically active through
Islarnist professional associations, student unions, human rights groups, and charitable
organizations in the civil society. Through snowball sampling, in Egypt I have interviewed
Islarnists who were members of the Medical Association, Cairo and Ain Shams University
Student Union, and several other Islamist charity organizations. Those associations are
controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and they are highly politically active. I have also
interviewed small businessmen and government employees. In Turkey, I interviewed
members of the MCrsiAD (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) and
the MAZLUMDER23 (The Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed

23

MOsiAD is a business association established by the Islamists imitating secular TOsiAD (Turkish
Association of Industrialists and Businessmen). MAZLUMDER is the Islamist version of secular iHD
(Association of Human Rights).
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People) as well as the AK.P representatives. I have also interviewed Islarnist businessmen
and regular citizens who described themselves as Islarnists.
There are many reasons why I chose those organizations in both countries. First,
those organizations are highly involved in politics and they constantly criticize the human
rights violations by the state and non-democratic official practices. Those groups are also
vocal on many political issues that do not necessarily fall into their area of operation.

Second, these organizations present a wide array of organizations operating on different
areas. Third, the normative component of those organizations and their Islarnist discourses
closely relate to contentious politics and social-political activism. In addition to the study
those groups, this study also examines how the Islarnists frame various issues and how
those frames are related to Islarnist political activism. To do this, I identified different
types oflslarnist frames (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational) in the Islarnist literature
and through my interviews I linked how those frames were related to Islarnist political
activism.

Methods and Plan of Study
A variety of methods were used to test the main hypotheses stated earlier. Those
methods are: face-to-face interviews with members oflslarnist civil society associations,
members of official religious establishment and other relevant human subjects whose
views would be significant to the research, content analysis of various documents (like
religious newspapers, books, sermons, press releases, websites, and related printed
material by Islamist groups), discourse analysis of newspapers, journals, speeches and
sermons, and archival work. In the case of abundant material, simple random sampling
was used. Where there were difficulties in obtaining the total number of sources,

convenience sampling was preferred.
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Methods
Face-to-face Interviews
Face-to-face interviews included (reachable) members ofthe religious
establishment (Diyanet j$leri Ba$kanlzgz-Directorate of Religious Affairs- in Turkey, and
Al-Azhar in Egypt), significant figures oflslamist civil society associations that are stated
earlier, as well as other relevant human subjects whose views would be significant to the
research such as ex and present members of parliament, academics, newspaper editors,
political activists and so on. Besides scheduled face-to-face interviews through my
personal contacts, snowball sampling was used. For each country, approximately 50
people were interviewed separately. The interviews lasted 45-60 minutes most of the time.
Such sample composition produced a balanced and broader view of the Islamist
movements and ofthe official religious establishment. The interviews also included
several respondents from the bureaucratic ranks of the official religious establishment as
well as clerics and prayer leaders who provide religious instruction or lead the
congregational prayers in the neighborhoods of cities.
In my interviews with the Islamists, I had a variety of participants with different
levels of activism, age, socioeconomic background, and gender. One of the limitations of
this study was about the gender of the respondents. Since traditional Middle Eastern
societies are not fully appreciative of male-female communication (because of the
traditions and religion), female respondents felt shy about responding to questions, and
some prospective female interviewees refused to be part of this study. I interviewed a total
of twelve female interviewees (nine female interviewees in Turkey, and three in Egypt;
please see the interviews' profiles for chapters 3 and 5 for details). In fact, I intended to
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have interviews with more females, however that was not possible. If I were a female
analyst, it would be possible to have more interviews with female respondents.
The interviewing process was semi-structured; the interviewees received both
unstructured and structured questions. The open-ended questions targeted respondents'
subjective views regarding state control of religion, perceived external threats and reasons
for Islamist political activism (see attached interview questions). The responses were
noted, and any references (words, phrases, sentences ... ) regarding state control of religion,
perceived external threats and Islamist political activism were highlighted. Later, after
completing the interviews, the relative weight of such responses were counted as well as
comparing them to other reasons attributed to the hypotheses in the study. Participants were
also given the opportunity to express their ideas freely about the relationship between state
and religion andaboutthe Westin general. The purpose of such design was to check
whether interviewees by themselves saw those factors as a significant independent
variable in explaining the growing popularity of political Islam without any intervention
during the interviews.
Following those general questions, the respondents received more specific and
more structured questions about their perception of state control of religion and external
threats. First, the interviewees were asked whether they believe state control over religion
existed, and if it did, whether such control was legitimate in their perception. They were
also asked to provide examples of such control through the open ended questions.
Additionally the interviewees were asked about their beliefs about the possible causes of
such control. They were also asked whether such control makes them engaged in increased
political activity in any way. Second, the interviewees received more specific questions
about their perception of Western values, threats on cultural and religious values, traditions
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and religion. They were also requested to answer specific questions about their perception
regarding whether those threats were related to politicization and increase of their political
activities in any way.
Respondents' answers were noted on separate sheets with no identifying
information on them to ensure confidentiality. The responses then were categorized into
themes (similar to the six separate themes stated earlier). Those themes later helped me to
map out Islamist frames (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational). In short, interviewees'
responses about causes of state control over religion and external threats were associated
with diagnostic frames; their responses about what should be done to deal with those
problems were associated with prognostic frames; and their responses about their rationale
for political activism were associated with motivational frames. The interviewees were
free to refuse to be interviewed at any time.
Content and Discourse Analyses
In the content analysis, themes (similar to the six themes stated earlier) were
utilized by creating theme categories. The theme categories were mutually exclusive to
ensure that the data was analyzed only in one category. Data analysis was based on

counting frequencies of the themes as well as relating those frequencies with Islamist
frames and discourses. Where there was no direct access to materials, secondary sources
were utilized. Through the content analysis, I sought to identify how Islamists diagnosed the
state control over religion and the perceived threats to their social identity (similar to the
six separate themes stated earlier) through Islamist literature like books, journals, and
pamphlets. Additionally, the content analysis revealed how various grievances are framed
and how prognostic and motivational frames are used by Islamists to urge the members for
political action. The content analysis included various prominent Islamist newspapers and
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journals like Milli Gazete (The National Gazette), Altznoluk (Golden duct), Szzzntz
(Spring), and Vakit (Time), Yeni $ajak (New Dawn) as well as books and pamphlets
written by prominent Islamists 1ike Hasan AI-Banna and S ayyid Q utb.
This study also linked Islamist discourse( s) to Islamist frames. Through the
discourse analysis I sought to reveal how the prognostic and motivational frames stated
through the Islamist discourse affect the recruitment and mobilization of the members of
those groups through the use oflslamist frames. In this regard, it is crucial to understand
how Islamist rhetoric and a religious worldview (weltanschauung) are used to attract
people, create an appeal, and recruit new members to broaden the base of support for the
Islamist groups. Discourse is not just a simple collection of words, but "sets of rules that
... enable practices and are reproduced and/or transformed by them... Discourses manifest
themselves in both linguistic and non-linguistic practices." They are also productive in the
sense that they produce truth and are inherently political because "they are about the
production and distribution of power" (Laffey and Weldes 2004, 28). In short, discourse
analysis aims to "uncover the way that reality is produced" Moreover, "discourse analysis
involves the systematic study of texts to find evidence of their meaning and how this
meaning translates into a social reality." One of the major differences between discourse
analysis and content analysis is that discourse analysis is constructionist, because it
assumes that reality is socially constructed; whereas content analysis is realist since it
assumes that an independent reality exists (Hardy et al 2004, 19-21; Crawford 2004, 23).
Although many studies independently use discourse andcontentanalyses, few studies have
combined both. Hardy et al. (2004, 19-20) and Neuendorf (2004, 34) argue that there can
actually be a mixture of the two methods.
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Through the frame analysis I sought to gain insight into "the ideological dynamics of
structuring oppos ition, mobilizing actors, and sustaining cohesion necessary for successful
collective action''. Besides focusing on the strategic aspects of framing (how social
movement activists/entrepreneurs construct messages of injustice and grievances), this
study also focused on the underlying concepts of culture and ideology through the thorough
analysis of the "discursive foundations" (Steinberg 1998, 846) of the framing processes.
Steinberg argues that a careful analysis of discourse(s) provide useful for some unresolved
problems of frame analysis regarding the conceptualization of ideology, identifying the
manifestation of the frame, the distinctions between discourse and material resources, the
micro-macro linkages in the framing process, and the difficulties of maintaining frame
fidelity andalignment(1998, 847). Discourse is the social production of meaning that is
essentially dialectic and dynamic. The Bakhtinian discourse theory argues that discourse is
dialogic that involves an "interactive process of meaning production'' within social
interaction. A constant struggle between actors takes place "to invest discourse with their
preferred meanings". Thus, production of meaning through discourses is both
"intralinguistic and highly contested" and from the Bakhtinian perspective, ideological
meaning and consciousness are "not within us, but between us" ( 1998, 852).
Discourse does not neutrally convey meanings. Rather, discourse is "a process of
joint ideological labor, one that is often fraught with underlying ambiguities and
contradictions that can become manifest in public contention". As Bakhtinians emphasized,
Steinberg maintains, discourse becomes "an explicit battleground for ideological wars of
position that are dynamic products of dialogic interactions" (Steinberg 1998, 853). Purvis
and Hunt argue that the framing process takes place through the discursive fields. Through
the genres that exist within those fields, collective actors can draw upon to construct
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discursively diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation (Purvis and Hunt, 1993). Steinberg's
discursive approach depicts framing as an inherently collective process, and "tilting the
frame with a discursive turn" enables us to recognize the role of ideology in social
movement mobilization and action (1998, 862). In short, analyzing frames from a
discursive perspective opens more opportunities for researchers to fully uncover the
relationship between the creation of ideas/ideologies, discourses, (collective) identities,
frames and social movement mobilization.
Analyzing Islamist frames and discourses revealed how Islamists produce truth and
meaning, and 1ater disseminate it through their religio-political discourse. More
specifically, the analysis oflslamist frames and their relation to Islamist discourses also
helped me clarify how the diagnostic frames were used to identify the perceived threats to
social identity by the Islamists. Similar to the method used in interviews and content
analysis, theme categories were created out of the most frequently repeated themes. Later,
those theme categories were linked to creation of frames and discourses. 24

Archival Work
Besides face-to-face interviews and content analysis, this study also embarked
upon archival work primarily to help understand the nature and level of state control over

24

For instance: poverty is one of the themes used in Islamist frames. The problem of poverty is
expressed by the lslamists through phrases like: ''Islam does not want poverty''. Later, the prognostic
frames are created as a remedy for poverty like: 'Through the institution of mandatory alms (zakat) Islam
tries to eliminate poverty''. Afterwards, motivational frames like "every Muslim has to pay his/her zakat
to eliminate poverty in Muslim countries" are added to the diagnostic and prognostic frames. Similarly,
one powerful Jslamist theme is Jslamists' anti-secularism. Anti-secularism is expressed through
diagnostic frames like: ''Secularism is one of the main sources of Muslims' problems". Later prognostic
frames are employed by the lslamists defining strategies and tactics about \\hat is to be done, like: "Islam
is the solution" or 'Replacing the secularist regimes with Islamic regimes will solve the problems of
Muslims". Consequently motivational frames complete the whole picture by providing explanation for the
rationale for action. Diagnostic and prognostic frames generally use factual reasoning; however
motivational frames are strongly normative. Thus, motivational frames add a moralizing dimension to the
specification of problems, strategies, and they demand collective action. An example of such a
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religion in both countries. The work primarily consisted of the study of official regulations
designing the ope rations religious affairs in both countries, and the powers and the extent
of the official religious hierarchy through which the state regulates religion. Through the
archival work, I sought to reveal the extent of the government's reach over various
religious institutions (mosques, religious foundations, charity organizations educational
institutions) controlled by the gove rnrnent. I also s oughtto reveal how the gove rnrnent
organizes the affairs ofreligious personnel appointed by the state. I was also in constant
contact with three professors who study the Middle East and discussed various issues
extensively about my subject as I wrote. I greatly appreciate their help and corrnnents.
Chapters and Organization
This study consists of seven chapters. The first chapter is the introductory chapter.
The second and third chapters are similar in many ways. The second chapter is about the
development oflslamism in Turkey. I briefly introduced major selected historical events as
they relate to the Islamists and formation oflslamist activism. The chapter makes a brief
introduction to Islam, and demonstrates the historical roots of the relationship between
Islam and politics. The demise of the Ottomans, colonialism and the emergence of Turkish
nationalist-secularist movements is examined as they relate to the formation of current
Islamist movements. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the new
secular Turkish republic byM. K. Ataturkwere analyzed with a priority given to the role
of state-religion and state-society relations. The primary emphasis in the second chapter is
on how Islamism developed in relation to state control over religion and how Islamists
perceive external threats to their social identity. The fourth chapter is similar to the second

motivational frame of the Islamists about their anti-secularism would be: ''Struggling/striving for the
establishment of an Islamic state is an Islamic obligation ifardh) on every Muslim".
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chapter except, its focus is Egypt. Starting from the era ofMuharmnadAli in Egypt, the
fourth chapter discusses the role of religion in Egyptian politics. Ali's authoritarianwayof
dominating the ulema (religious class) and his rapid program of modernization and
Westernization are discussed as they relate to formation oflslamism in Egypt. The
colonialization period, the Urabi Revolt and the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood are
discussed. Additionally, a brief account of the historical evolution oflslamist political
movements is provided for the period after the military coup of Free Officers of Egypt as
those were the precursors of contemporary Islamist political movements. Also, a
discussion of Sadat' s accommodationist policies towards the Islamists after Nasser's
dominance is provided.
The third and fifth chapters foe us on Turkey and Egypt respectively by utilizing the
social movement and Gramscian theories. In those two chapters, I examined the political
activities oflslamists by testing my hypotheses. In those two chapters, a detailed analysis
of state control over religion, the perceived threats on social identity, and politicization of
each movement is provided in the light of my interviews and context analysis.
Additionally, I discussed the Islamists' ideology (politics as jihad), rhetoric and way of
mobilizing the movement participants. Moreover, frames (official vs. Islamist) and the
battle waged over frames by the two governments and the Islamists were also discussed in
length.
The sixth chapter is a comparison and contrast of the Islamists in the two countries.
Similarities and differences were laid out between the two. The last chapter provides a
brief account of the possible direction thatthe Islamists of both countries mighttake in the
future. Moreover, in this chapter I provided my insight on the possibilities for the Islamists
in two countries to challenge the status quo. Whatwouldhappen iflslamists change the
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status quo in their countries? In such a case, what kind of path(s) are those Islamists going
to follow? The seventh chapter also ties up all of the chapters and provides the conclusion.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF ISLAM, TURKEY AND TURKISH SECULARIZATION
Islam

In the period from Prophet Muhammad's death in 632 to the transfer of locus of
power from Damascus to Baghdad in the midst of the 8th century, the Islamic ummah (the
universal Islamic community) developed from an Arab origin to a universal empire through
the Arab conquest. The Arab conquests transformed tribal-nomadic people into the ruling
elite of an imperial structure. Arabic replaced other languages like Greek, Persian and
Aramaic as the language of literature, administration and science. Claiming to be the
continuation of the Abrahamic monotheistic religions, Islam replaced Judaism, Christianity,
Zoroastrianism and paganism in the Middle East. While replacing those religions, Islam
actually did not eliminate them In an interaction with the existing 1iterary, religious and
administrative traditions of Byzantium and Iran, Islam created a civilization centered
around the revelations contained in the Qur' an. 25

Emergence and Rise oflslam
Before the rise oflslam, the two major powers in the Middle East were two
competing imperial states: Byzantine Empire in the west and Sassanid Empire of Iran in the
east. In the early 7th century, the Byzantine Empire stretched from the Italian peninsula
25

Cleveland, William L., (1994). A History of the Modern Middle East. Westview Press. Boulder, San
Francisco; Hodgson, Marshall G. S. (1974 ). The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World
Civilization. University of Chicago Press; Hourani, Albert. (1991 ). A History of the Arab Peoples.
Cambridge, Massachusetts; Lapidus, lraM. (2002). A History oflslamic Societies, New York. Cambridge
University Press
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across southern Europe to the capital city of Constantinople including the Middle Eastern
provinces of Egypt, Palestine, Syria and parts of Iraq and Anatolia. The strong Byzantium
was weakened by the rivalry of the Sassanids with continuous warfare from 540 to 629.
The Sassanid Empire of Iran contested Byzantium for control of the territories between
Iraq and Egypt. In 602, right before the rise oflslam, Sassanid ruler Khusraw attacked the
Byzantium and captured Jerusalem and Egypt. But in 622 the Byzantine emperor Heraclius
defeated the Sassanid forces and recaptured the lands. As the two major empires of the
Middle East were waging wars between themselves, a movement was emerging in the
sparsely inhabited lands of the Arabian Peninsula (Lapidus 2002, 3-8).
The Arabian Peninsula, with the exception of Yemen and a few oasis settlements, is
a vast desert. In comparison to the Byzantium and Sassanids, the Arabian peninsula of the
early 7th centurydidnot have any central authority. Tribes were the largest units of
political and social structure. In fact, the majority of the inhabitants were nomads raising
camels, goats or sheep. During the two centuries before Islam, Arabia became increasingly
important as a commercial transit route between the two big empires of the Middle East
and Yemen which received commercial goods through the Indian Ocean. The camel
caravans carried those goods to Gaza, Damascus and cities of Iraq passing through Hijaz
region.Bythe early7 1h century, Meccanmerchants became rich, organized their own
caravans and managed to secure their caravans by paying different tribes for protection. In
addition to being a commercial center, Mecca was also a religious center with the Ka 'ba
(the most sacred Islamic shrine, located in the city of Mecca) previously built by Prophet
Abraham and his son Prophetlshmael. Paganism was a longstanding traditional religion of
the Arabs in Mecca who converted Ka 'ba into a shrine which attracted pilgrims all
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throughout the Arabian Peninsula annually. Part of the city's wealth and influence came
from the pilgrims (Cleveland 1994, 6-7).
The leading clans ofMecca were all members of the Quraysh tribe that established
the city, dominated most of its religious, commercial and political role. Muhammad ibn
Abdullah was born in Mecca in 570 coming from the clan of Hashim which be longs to the
tribe ofQuraysh. Muhammad's father, Abdullah, died just before his birth and he became
an orphan at the age of six. Abu Talib, Muhammad's uncle, raised and protected him. As a
youngman,Muhammadengagedinthe caravan trade and by the age of25 he married
Khadijah who was a wealthy widow .Khadijahis anhonoredwomanfor the Muslims
because she was the first convert to Islam when Muhammad became a prophet and she
protected Muhammad during the very difficult years of his prophethood when he was
scorned and rejected by the Meccans (Lapidus 2002, 18-22).
Muhammad was respected as a trustworthy and decent person and lived as an
ordinary life as a merchant and a family man until the age of forty. As he got closer to forty
he often left Mecca to meditate in a cave in the Mt. Hira near Mecca. Besides meditation,
Muhammad was also concerned about the problems of pagan Arab society and seeking
ways to resolve them. In the monthofRamadan,duringthe Lay/at al Qack(the Night of
Power) the holiest month of Muslims, Muhammad was approached by angel Gabriel and
started his prophetic mission. That night marked the beginning of a huge movementthat
would transform the Arab society and later the others and lead to the emergence of a
monotheistic religion.Duringthe remainingtwentytwoyears of his life, Muhammad
continued to receive revelations which are recorded, memorized and later collected into a
single book by his companions because Muhammad was illiterate. Muhammad's
prophethood can be divided in two phases, the period at Mecca ( 61 0-622) and the period
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in Medina (622-632). The Meccan verses lay out the theological foundations of the
religion, the verses of Medina outline the basis of an Islamic society.
During his Meccan years Muhammad's preaching attracted very few people and
produced considerable opposition because Muhammad's message was a direct challenge
against the social, economic and religious structure of the city. Not only did Muhammad
criticize the attitudes of the wealthy Quraysh merchants, Muhammad condemned the
religious practices of the pagan Arabs including those that made Mecca a wealthy
pilgrimage center. After some years the opposition turned to persecution and when an
invitation came from the city ofYathrib (later Medina, located at 200 miles north of
Mecca), the small band of Muslims migrated from Mecca to Medina. Medina was a fertile
oasis with mostly farmers suffered from an old blood feud among the several tribes in the
city. Muhammad became a mediator between those tribes and received protection for
himself and his believers. The event known as the hijrah (emigration) which took place in
the year of 622 marks the beginning of the Muslim calendar and also was a turningpointin
the history oflslam (Cleveland 1994, 5-9).
Muhammad became the head of a small state during his ten years of prophethood in
Medina, and prepared to capture his native city. During these ten years Meccans launched
two campaigns against the Muslims in Medina but each time the outnumbered Muslims
managed to defeat the Meccan forces. In 630, Muhammad managed to besiege Mecca with
tenthousandmenandthe city fell with no fight. WhenMuhammadcapturedhis native city,
he forgave his enemies and secured their properties. The first thing that Muhammad did
when he entered the city was to destroy the idols in Ka'ba. From the conquest of Mecca in
630 to the death of Muhammad in 632 most of the tribes in Arabia accepted Islam and
submitted to the authority of Mecca. Muhammad managed to create a unified state out of
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constantly fighting little tribes and completed Islam as a social, economic and a religious
system. After Muhammad's death, Abu Bakr who was one of the first converts to Islam and
was Muhammad's father in law became the successor (caliph). Abu Bakr (632-634) and
his three successors, 'Umar (634-644), 'Uthman (644-656) and 'Ali (656-661) are known
as the Rashidun (the rightly guided)caliphs because of their adherence to Islamic
principles. During the time of the Rashidun, Islam expanded tremendously. Muslims
defeated Sassanids and Byzantium, captured most parts of Iran, Damascus, Jerusalem and
all North Africa. Within hundred years ofMuhammad's death Muslim forces reached the
Indian subcontinent in the east and occupied Spain and crossed the Pyrenees in the west.
The Sassanid Empire was completely destroyed and Byzantium lost its lands in North
Africa and in the Middle East. Besides the amazing speed and extent of the conquests, the
durability of those conquests was also stunning. Except for Spain, the areas occupied
during the first century of expansion remained Mus lim to the present day (Cleve land 1994,
10-14).

The Umayyad and Abbasid Empires
The question of succession to the caliphate became an issue when 'Uthman was
murdered by rebellious Arab tribesman in 656.When 'Ali was elected as a caliph, he was
contested byMu'awiyah, the powerful governor ofSyria. The forces oftwo contestants
clashed in Siffin in 657 but the result of the battle was inconclusive. This was also the
beginning of the Sunni-Shiite split in Islam's history. When 'Ali was murdered in 661,
Mu' awiyah became the caliph and the founder of the Umayyad dynasty (661-750).
Although Mu' awiyah' s successors continued toe xpand the Islamic Empire, they were
troubled by internal dissention partially caused by the policy of Arab exclusivism adopted
by the Umayyadrulingelite by discriminatingagainstthe continually growing non-Arab
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converts to Islam The discontent grew into a revolution that destroyed the Umayyad
dynasty in 750 and brought to power the Abbasid dynasty (750-1258). The first one and a
half centuries ofthe Abbasid Empire was a period ofrelative political stability, economic
prosperity and increasing universalism all throughout the Islamic Empire. These conditions
attracted many other nations into Islam and created a rich and diverse civilization. When
the Abbasids were at the peak of their power other regional Islamic dynasties and cultures
were being formed too. Each of those dynasties formed their particular synthesis of local
and Islamic practices. So, there was no single Islamic polity or culture that was tied to the
Abbasids in Baghdad. It is true that the fall of the Abbasid dynasty in 1258 created
political fragmentation, it did not lead to a dark age oflslamic culture and did not cause a
power vacuum Because Islam was universal, a period of stagnation in one segment ofthe
Islamic ummah could be reversed by an infusion of intellectual, economic or military
energy from another. Among the others, Turks are one example of that phenomenon. During
the eleventh century the military power andrulingauthoritypassedfromArabs to Turks in
the central Islamic lands (Lapidus 2002, 45-56)
The Turks
Before converting to Islam, Turkish pastoral nomads from central Asia were in
contact with Islam for some time. After converting to Islam, Turks served as professional
soldiers in the armies of various Abbasid caliphs. By the middle of eleventh century Seljuk
Turks established domination over Iran and in 1055 the Abbasid caliph invited Seljuk
leader to assume military and administrative authority in Baghdad. The Turkish Seljuks
became the lieutenants of the caliph. After the Seljuk defeat of the Byzantine army in
Manzikert in 1071, t he migrating Turkish tribes moved into Anatolia and gradually
transformed the land into a Turkish-Muslim state of their own (Cleveland 1994, 36-38).
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By 1157 fragmentation took place in form of various Seljuk princedoms as the
Seljuks could not maintain their authority over the vast Islamic empire. The Seljuk period
had 1asting importance in the history of Islam and Turks. First it demonstrated the universal
character oflslam as Turks quickly converted to Islam Second, nomadic Turks quickly
adapted to urban life and embraced the high culture oflslam like excelling in arts,
architecture and respecting the Shari'a and the ulema. Third, S eljuk Turks rejuvenated the
Sunni Islam by establishingandsponsoringthe madrasah system which is a state
sponsored education for the ulema. Fourth, the Seljuks prepared the groundwork for the
emergence of the Ottoman Empire in the Anatolian lands. It was during this politically
fragmented era of the Islamic Empire when the Crusaders first appeared in the Middle East
and established four Latin kingdoms. A serious threat came later on from the east during the
thirteenth century. The Mongols first 1ed by Genghis Khan and then his son HUlagU
destroyed everything in their path to Baghdad including the city itself in 1258. H UlagU
aimed to conquer Egypt; however a new dynasty in Cairo, the Mamluks, defeated the
Mongols and established its control over Egypt and Syria in 1260u ntil they were taken
over by the Ottomans in 1517 (Cleveland 1994, 39).

The Rise and Expansion of the Ottoman Empire
The Ottoman state emerged out of a dozen small Anatolian principalities created
after the destruction of the Seljuk Empire. These Turkish principalities were Islamic
warrior states inspired by the tradition of ghaza (warfare against non-Muslims to extend
Islam), and the ghazi spirit played an important role shaping the Ottoman Empire. One of
the principalities led by Osman achieved significant victories against the Byzantine forces
during the early 1300s. Victories of Osman attracted other chieftains and tribesmen to his
side and Osman's son Orhan captured the city of Bursa from the Byzantines in 1326.
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Orban's principality made the successful transition from a frontier principality to a state
and his subjects started to be known by his family name, Osmanh (Ottomans). The Ottoman
expansion of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries was like the Arab conquests seven
hundred years earlier. Ottomans added new European territories into their states while
extending their rule to the Arab lands where Islam had originated (inalctk 2001, 5-9).
When Ottomans conquered Egypt and most of the Arab lands in 1517, they were
recognized as the protectors of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina; moreover Sultan
Selim who conquered those lands received the title of caliph and enhanced the Islamic
standing of the Ottoman rulers. In fact, sultans did not use their title until the nineteenth
century to obtain Muslim support to drive out European imperialists. The Ottomans
reached their peak under the rule of Sultan Siileyman and at his death in 1566, stretched his
empire from the Danube to Yemen, from Albania to the Crimean shores of the Black Sea,
and from Algeria to Baghdad (inalctk 2001 ).
Ottomans are known for their strong and well established bureaucracy. Along with
the bureaucratic and military elite, the ulema was the third pillar of the Ottoman ruling
class. With the Ottomans, the ulema had a hierarchical class structure including the qadis
Gudges) appointed by the government for various administrative subdivisions of the
government. As the empire expanded, the chief religious dignitary of the empire, the Sheikh

a/ Islam, oversaw the appointment of qadis and the madrasah teachers in addition to
providing legal opinion for the sultans. The income of the ulema class was independent of
the government, it was provided by the religious endowments (the waqfj, however their
appointments were not. Also, in addition to providing slave soldiers for the Janissaries, the
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exception of the religious establishment composed of entirely free Muslims. The talented
children were taken from their parents and were assigned to special royal schools within
the palace and they went through a hard training period. They studied Persian, Arabic and
Ottoman Turkish and also learned arts like calligraphy and painting as well as military
strategy. The term slave here may be misleading, in theory they were slaves of the Sultan,
but they accumulated vast wealth and had immense power and had slaves of their own. The
success of the

dev~irme was

dev~irme system the

determined by their talents, not by their families. With the

Ottoman elite was constantly renewed and because it was forbidden to

enslave a freeborn Muslim, their sons excluded from holding positions. Therefore the
system did not allow for hereditary positions (Shaw and Shaw 1976, 36-39).
Another characteristic of the Ottoman social and political system is the millet
system where the sultans organized their non-Muslim subjects into religious communities
called millets, and granted them a considerable amount of autonomy. Each of the three
major non-Muslimreligions (GreekOrthodox,JudaismandArmenianChristianity) was
granted millet status and was placed under the direct authority ofthe leading church
patriarch. The two patriarchs and the grand rabbi were selected with the approval of the
sultan and resided in istanbul. The millet officials were granted both civil and religious
responsibilities such as tax collection, education, justice and religious affairs within their
religious communities. In this system, an individual's identity was determined by religious
affiliation, not by nationality or by location. These minorities were tolerated but they were

26

It was the system of collection of young boys from conquered Christian lands by the Ottoman Empire
to build a loyal slave army and class of administrators: the Janissaries, or other administrative servants.
The word dev:jirme means ''picking up" in Ottoman Turkish. Boys delivered to Ottomans in this way were
called acemi oglanlar (novice boys). The dev:jirme was similar to a system used by earlier Islamic
dynasties, such as the Abbas ids who used slaves to build armies -especially guard troops- intended to be
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barred from service in the armed forces or from being a member of the Ottoman ruling
elite. All these practices originate from the practices of Prophet Muhammad during his life
in Medina where Muslims, Christians andJ ews signed a treaty (known as the constitution
ofMedina) to coexist. The Qur'an refers to Christians and Jews as the people of the books
and in the Shari'a those minorities have a special status (Djimmi-protected community or
minority) (inalctk2001, 66-74).
The Ottomans lost their dominance especially after the seventeenth century mainly
because of the external factors. The European merchant capital penetrated the empire and
Ottomans started to sell raw materials to European producers and bought manufactured
goods from them Ottomans hadaneconomymainlybasedon agriculture. This benefited
Ottoman merchants atthe beginning, butin the longrun there was a huge shortage of raw
materials for domestic consumption. The prices rose and there was huge inflation. The
state did not have enough resources to meet its expenses and increased military expeditions
drained the economy. Ottomans signed a series of commercial treaties known as the
Capitulations including extensive privileges for Europe an merchants. Along with their
economic effect on the empire, those treaties had long-term political implications. In the
military realm, after the Treaty ofKarlowitz in 1699 signed with Austria, the Ottomans
were on the defensive. For the Ottomans, the eighteenth century was a period of political
and economic disintegration as Ottomans lost their ability of control their territories. The
decline of central authority also enabled the local leaders to gain regional power. Although
some sultans like Selim III had huge efforts to reform the Ottoman system, the forces of the
status-quo usually succeeded (Shaw and Shaw 1976; inalctk 2001 ).

loyal to the ruler and thus provide a steady pool of manpower that was outside of local politics, but in
many cases they ended up supporting or staging coups.
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As Ottomans lost their ability to control their territories gradually, by the late
eighteenth century Egypt became a de facto independent state under a revived Mamluk
order. In fact, Ottomans destroyed the Mamluk state in Egypt in 1517, but the local Mamluk
rulers remained powerful through the years and as the Ottomans started to lose their control
in the region, the Mamluk rulers emerged as regional powers. After the French revolution
of 1789, Britain and France were in conflict which extended to dominating overseas
markets and strategic outposts. Egypt was the subject of that rivalry and Napoleon invaded
the country in 1798 by defeating the Mamluk forces. The same year British forces defeated
the French forces; however the French military remained in Egypt three more years until a
British-Ottoman allied force drove the French out (Vatikiotis 1991; Lewis 2002).
Muhammad Ali of Egypt was an ethnic Albanianbornandraisedinthe Greek city
ofKavalla. He arrived in Egypt as part of the British-Ottoman allied force as second in
command of an Albanian contingent. Several people competed to fill the power vacuum
left by the French and Muhammad Ali was the successful one. In 1805 Ali was recognized
as the governor of Egypt by istanbul. Through forty years, Ali achieved an amazing internal
development and imperial expansion for Egypt. Ali retransformed the army and
reorganized the administrative structure, increased agricultural production and introduced
heavy industry. Ali wanted to be independent of the Ottoman Empire and establish a
hereditary dynasty for his family. To increase his power Ali destroyed most of the local
Mamluk rulers and strengthened the armed forces. 27 Ali sent several educational missions

27

Additionally, both in the Ottoman Empire and in the Egypt of M Ali the centralizing governments of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries sought to break the hold of the ulema over waqfs and to gain control of
the revenues because the waqfs were outside ofthe states' control. M. Ali granted huge amounts ofland
to certain government officials and to his relatives who were supposed to cultivate the land for some tax
exemptions. M. Ali also experimented with new crops; the most important of them was the long staple
cotton which became Egypt's cash crop quickly. To irrigate more land, M. Ali also introduced forced
peasant labor to build irrigation canals. A program of industrialization was initiated with an emphasis on
war related materials and textiles (Lewis 2002, 183-184; Vatikiotis 1991).
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to Europe, established educational institutions to produce civilian and military personnel
and a translation office and government press to prepare Arabic textbooks for students
(Cleveland 1994, 63-73).
On several occasions, Muhammad Ali helped the Ottoman Sultan through several
military campaigns as the Ottoman Sultan requested help from Muhammad Ali. Ali's first
overseas military campaign was against the puritanical Wahhabi movement in Arabia who
had captured the two holy cities. The Ottoman SultanMahmudii (1808 -1839) ordered
Muhammad Ali to put down the revolt. Ali's son Ibrahimledthe Egyptian forces and
captured the two holy cities in 1811. Ali also aimed at Sudan and by 1820 captured all of
it. Ali's forces also helped the Ottomans to subdue the Greek nationalists who revolted
against the Ottomans. To obtain raw materials and a large market for Egypt's new
industrial output, Ali turnedagainstthe SultanandinvadedSyria in 1832.A li's son
Ibrahim led the Egyptian forces and defeated the Ottoman army. After a treaty Muhammad
Ali's son Ibrahim became the governor of Syria in 1833. In 1841 the European powers
imposed a settlement on the Ottoman-Egyptianconflictknownas the Treaty of London.
Muhammad Ali was forced to withdraw from all territories he occupied except Sudan.
Although Ali lost a lot of the land he had occupied, he achieved a major objective. The
treaty stated that the governorship of Egypt was to be a hereditary office held by his family.

In fact, Ali's descendants ruled Egypt until 1952 (Cleveland 1994, 73-76).
The Decline ofthe Ottoman Empire
For the Ottoman Empire the nineteenth century was the era of nationalist
independence movements within the empire, starting with its European subjects and
continuing with its Muslim subjects. Those nationalist independence movements were often
manipulated by the great European powers for their own ends. Serbs were the first to
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revolt and Greeks followed the Serbs against the Ottomans. Being tmable to end the
rebellion, the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II invited Muhammad Ali's forces to Greece. The
Ottomans managed to end the revolt; however the European powers asserted their interests
and changed the outcome of events. In 1827, without a declaration ofwar, the Great Power
alliance fleet destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet in Navarino Bay in Greece. When
Mahmud II still refused to concede the loss of the region, the Russians attacked the
Ottomans a year later and crossed the Danube River and captured Adrianople. However,
hostilities were avoided when Russia and Britain decided that the fragmentation of the
Ottoman Empire was not in their best interest and the existence of a weak buffer Ottoman
state between their competing ambitions was preferable to waging a war for dividing the
Ottoman territories. With the Convention of 1832 Greece became independent (Quataert
2005, 81-82).
The first half of the nineteenth century was the period of reform for the Ottomans.
Mahmud II eliminated the Janissary and established a new army along European lines
trained by European advisers. Mahmud II also established the educational infrastructure for
the new military. Renovating the tax farming system, reorganization of the bureaucracy,
introduction of the Official Gazette, and opening of a translation office were major reforms
ofMahmudii. One major issue remaining was how to limitthe authority of the leading
ulema because the entire religious establishment was mostly independent of the central
state and had a considerable amotmt of control over the revenues ofthe ooq£Mahmudii
aimed to 1imit the authority of the sheikh al Islam, the chief religious dignitary of the
empire, by making his office part of the state bureaucracy. Also like Muhammad Ali,
Mahmud II tried to control the ooqfrevenues and created the Ministry of Religious
Endowments (1826) to administer waqfincome and transfer any surplus to the state
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treasury. Although this measure of centralization did not completelyworkatMahmudll's
time, it was the be ginning of state intervention in the affairs of religious establishment and
it weakened the position of the ulema (Shaw and Shaw 1976, 280-286).

The Tanzimat Era
The reform attempts ofMahmud II and emulation of European methods of
administration and education brought a continuing expansion of the role of the state. The
graduates of new state-sponsored schools increasingly moved into the top ranks of state
hierarchy. The Islamic foundations of the society were not openly criticized by those new
generation of Western style educated officials; however their policies gradually reduced
the significance ofthe religious establishment. The Tanzimat period (1839-1876) ofthe
Ottomans was the most intense period of nineteenth century Ottoman reforms. The royal
decree of GUlhane ( Giilhant': Hatt-i Hiimayunu) in 1839 made all subjects of the Sultan
equal. Regardless of their religion all Ottoman subjects had equal opportunities and
obligations. By that decree, the Sultan tried to secure the loyalty of the Christian and
Jewish subjects while nationalism was a growing idea among the minorities of the empire.
Instead of the millet system, the reformers tried to create an Ottoman citizenship (Quataert
2002, 66). Two other remarkable changes took place in the areas of education and
legislation. The central authority created many secondary schools throughout the empire
and placed them under the control of the Ministry of Education. This was another step
toward limiting the control of the religious establishment and the ulema because
historically education used to be under the administration and supervision of the ulema. A
new legal code was compiled based on the Shari'a, but a lot of penal and commercial
codes were introduced following the French civil code as a model (Cleveland 1994, 7982).
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One ofthe results of increased interaction between the Ottomans and Europe was
the creation of a group of intellectuals and bureaucrats known as the Young Ottomans
( Genf Osmanii/ar). They were not a coherent group; however their main concern was to

reconcile the new institutions of the Tanzimat and the traditional Ottoman and Islamic
institutions. One of their main successes was to elaborate the notion of Ottoman patriotism
Another success was the creation of a constitutional monarchy in 1876. However the
constitutional monarchy did not live long, after two years SultanAbdi.ilhamid II dissolved
the assembly and suspended the constitution (Quataert 2002, 65-67).
The Tanzimat reforms did not come cheap. To cover the budget deficits, the
reformers started to get loans from Europe starting in 1854 during the Crimean War. After
twenty years, about sixty percent of the state's total expenditure was allocated for paying
those debts. In 1881 the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was established to reserve
certain state revenues to pay the debt. The Ottomans lost their financial independence. The
reforms in the Ottoman Empire created an institutional dualism With the exception of
destruction of Janissaries, most traditional institutions remained. Although there were new
courts and some changes to the legal code were made, they did not eliminate the Shari'a
courts and the new elite educated in European-style institutions coexisted with the
graduates of religious schools or with the ulema. There was also a large gap between the
educated officials and the population. The nineteenth century reforms of the Ottomans and
of Egypt brought certain advantages; however, they also brought economic instability,
social disruption and alienation, and political crises (Shaw and Shaw 1976; inalctkand
Quataert 1997).
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The Response oflslamic Society and the Ulema to the Tanzimat Reforms
By the end of the nineteenthcenturymostofthe Muslim lands were under some
form of European control. Those who escaped direct occupation had severely limited
sovereignty and did not have economic independence. Muslim intellectuals and activists
argued that widespread degeneration of the Muslim societies and deviation from the true
religion were the main causes of such defeats. That kind of a self criticism and a reaction
against the adoption of European ways led to an assertion oflslamic values.
Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909) was the last Ottoman sultan who exercised
unrestrained royal authority. In 1878 he suspended the constitution andabolishedthe
parliament. His period is characterized by cautious reform, conservatism and a reaction
against Europe an institutions and ide as. To maintain the integrity of the empire,
AbdUlhamid II stressed the Islamic heritage ofthe empire and instead ofthe idea of
Ottomanismhe adhered to Pan-Islamism Adherence to Pan-Islamismandbenefitingfrom
his title as the caliph of the Islamic ummah were useful diplomacy tools. From a domestic
perspective, AbdUlhamid's policies were intended to secure the loyalty of Arab subjects of
the empire. In fact, during his era, many Arab notables ellioyed increasing prestige.
Abdiilhamid' s era also marked the increasing German influence in form of army
reorganization and of investment capital in the empire (Cleveland 1994, 113-118).
Muslim intellectuals were increasingly concerned about the survival of the Islamic

ummah in the Ottoman Empire increasingly dominated and penetrated by European
powers. Although some members of the ulema recommended the rejection of all Western
innovations, some new thinkers like Jamal Al-DinAl-Afghani (1839-97), Muhammad
Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) recognized the importance of
accommodating European achievements in science and technology within the framework of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

73

Islam. Afghani's call for direct action in the name of Islamic solidarity appealed to many
people. For Afghani Islam did not contradict with the spirit of science and technology,
however Muslims had become ignorant of true Islam. To rediscover the true Islam,
strengthening the unity of the ummah was necessary. Afghani was a believer in PanIslamism and he was especially critical of Muslim rulers who allowed European armies to
invade Muslim territories and permitted European capital to control their economies. Thus,
collective solidarity combined with action was necessary to resist exploitation and to bring
the Islamic revival (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5).
The YoungTurkRevoltof1908 and the Collapse ofthe Ottomans
The movement ofYoung Turks was a combination ofthree separate dissident
groups; first was an Ottoman exile community in Paris and Geneva existing from the time of
the Young Ottomans, second was a group of discontented civil servants and students, the
third was a coalition of dissident army officers. In 1889 students in the military medical
academy found a secret protest society known as the Committee of Union and Progress
(ittihad ve Terakki [ CemiyefJ]). In 1896 Abdiilhamid' s spies uncovered the organization

and arrested and exiled its members. In 1908 a group of officers from the Third Army in
Salonika (Selanik) revolted and demanded that AbdUlhamid restore the constitution. The
Sultan accepted the demand from Salonika, the constitution was restored and elections
were held in the same year. One year later a counterrevolution broke out against the new
government by some soldiers and theological students in istanbul who were resented by the
influence of the Europeanized army officers. The Third Army acted fast and put down the
disturbances and Abdiilhamid was accused of cooperating with the counterrevolutionaries.
Abdiilhamid was deposed and sent to exile to Salonika by the Third Army. The ittihad ve
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Terakki gradually gained the full control of the parliament. Much like the Young Ottomans
forty years earlier, the Young Turks were Ottomanists. 28

In the wake of Arab and Balkan nationalism, the emergence of Turkish nationalism
was natural. At the beginning of the twentieth century the Ottoman Empire lost eighty
percent of its lands in Europe. Two trends emerged simultaneously. The first is PanTurkism, the other is Turkism For Pan-Turkists the Ottoman Turks were just one branch of
several Turkishspeakingpeoples who live ina vastterritoryfrom the Balkans to China.
Turkismwas more appealing to the Turks of the empire which focused on the Ottoman
situation. Turkism stressed the crucial Turkish contribution to the success of the Ottoman
Empire and argued that there was a special pre-Islamic and pre-Ottoman cultural heritage
that distinguished the Turks from other subjects of the empire. It was a departure from
Ottomanism; however many elements of nationalism, Islamism and modernism were
combined among the adherents of the movement. Z. Gokalp was the most prominent of them
whose following statement summarizes the situation: "we be long to the Turkish nation, the
Muslim community and the European civilization". During the turbulent years of the empire
Turkism did not fully develop as a coherent ideology, however after the establishment of
the new Turkish Republic by M. Kemal it emerged as a developed ideology. The ittihad ve

Terakkiwas also successful in silencing Arabism before the First World War by co-opting
leading Arab dissidents by appointing them to some administrative posts (Shaw and Shaw
1976, 284-292).

28

Ottomanism is a concept developed during the First Constitutional Era ( 1876-1878). Ottomanism was
highly effected by thinkers as Montesquieu and Rousseau and the French Revolution. It was promoting the
equality among the various ethnic and religious groups within the empire. The idea originated among the
Young Ottomans. Ottomanism regarded all Ottoman subjects equal before the law. The Millet system was
not dismantled but secular organizations and policies were applied. Primary education, conscription, head
tax and military service \Wre are applied to non-Muslim groups. For more details see: Shaw and Shaw
(1976).
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On October 1914 the Ottoman Empire joined the First World War after it allied
itselfwith the Germans and the Ottoman fleet bombarded several Russian ports on the
Black Sea. The Capitulations were denounced and protectionist tariffs were introduced to
break the economic dependence of the empire on foreigners. The war divided the empire
and its Arab provinces were occupied by Britain, France and Italy. Following the peace
settlement and the establishment of the mandates a new regional state system came into
existence in the Middle East. The interwar era in the Middle East witnessed an AngloFrench dominance. In the same period most of the Arab political activity was primarily
devoted to achieving independence from foreign control. The war years did not produce
upheaval and the same elite that had power and prestige before 1914 continued to maintain
their privileges during the 1920s and 1930s in the Arab world. In fact local political
leaders were dependent for their positions on the discretion of the occupying power.
Therefore even as the Arab political leaders demanded independence, they tried not to
upset Europe an authorities too much. The Second World War accelerated the end of
Anglo-French dominance in the Middle East and led to the emergence of independent Arab
states in the region (Cleveland 1994, 140).

The New Turkish Republic
The Emergence of Modern Turkey from the Ruins of the Ottoman Empire
By the end of 1918 istanbul, the Ottoman capital was controlled by the British. The

ittihad ve Terakkileaders fled the country and the Sultan under the guns of the British had
to sign the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 di vi ding the remaining Ottoman lands between the
British, French, Italians and Greek. However in the heartland of Anatolia local Turkish
resistance groups were determined to resist occupation and division of their country.
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Several experienced Ottoman cormnanders organized and led those local forces. Mustafa
Kemal was one of them and gradually became the leader of the emerging national
independence movement. Kemal first defeated the Greek forces that captured the city of
Izmir, its hinterland and the city ofBursa. Kemal attempted to broaden the base of
resistance and find a means to replace the istanbul government which was under British
control by convening the representatives in Ankara chosen by local resistance groups in
April 1920. The representatives agreed to form a government on April 23, 1920 with
Mustafa Kemal as the president. In January 1921 the Assembly adopted a constitution with
the principle of popular sovereignty. The local resistance movements also turned into a
regular national army (Lewis 1968).
Kemal' s forces managed to capture izmir after defeating the Greeks and then
headed for istanbul which was under the control of the Allied forces. The British invited
both Ankara and istanbul to send representatives to the upcoming negotiations. Kemal
argued that the gove rnment in Ankara is the true representative of the Turkish nation and
introduced legislation that would abolish the sultanate and turn the caliphate into a
religious office without a political authority. In November 1922 the assembly passed a
resolution that separated the caliphate from the sultanate (kingdom), and eliminated the
sultanate, which ended the Ottoman era. The last Ottoman Sultan Mehmed VI Vahdeddin
left istanbul under British protection; the Assembly designated his cousin Abdtilmecid as
caliph. With the treaty of Lausanne in 1923 Turkey was recognized as a sovereign state
(Cleveland 1994, 166-169).
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Authoritarian Reform in Turkey
After establishing the governmental mechanisms of the new republic, M. Kemal
(Atatilrk 29) initiated an intensive reform (inktlap) period to eradicate the Ottoman past
and replace it with a Western orientation in all realms of life. Kemal' s reforms can be
understood through the six principles that he assigned as the foundations of the doctrine
known by his name, Kemalism: reformism, republicanism, secularism, nationalism,
populism and etatism Reformism permeated the whole Atatilrk era. Republicanism was a
part of the constitution and marked a significant difference from the Ottoman era with the
emphasis on the principle of popular sovereignty. Secularism was the central element of
Atatilrk' s reforms. Atatiirk initiated secularism first by deposing Caliph Abdiilmecid and
abolishing the caliphate and banishing all members of the Ottoman royal family from
Turkey. The office of Sheikh Al-Islam was abolished and the religious schools were
closed, and the Ministry ofReligious Endowments was eliminated. In 1926 the Assembly
voted to abolish the Mqelle (the codified Shari'a laws of the Ottoman Empire). Swiss
civil code, Italian penal code and German commercial code were adopted as the law. The
new laws introduced during the YoungTurkand Tanzimateras were based on the Shari'a;
but the changes of 1926 were a complete break with the past. The sufi (mystics) orders
were banned. Atatilrk also abandoned the fez and made it criminal to wear it. Hats became
a symbol of the Westernization. The lunar calendar was replaced by the Gregorian
calendar and Sunday became the holiday instead ofFriday, and the Ottoman alphabet was
replaced by the Latin alphabet. One of the controversial acts of reform was making it
obi igatory to issue the ezan (originally adhan in Arabic, call to prayer) in Turkish instead

29

His surname, meaning the father ofthe Turks, was bestowed to him by the Turkish Grand National
Assembly in 1935.
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of Arabic. It was clear that the ulema class had no place in this picture (Ytlmaz 2002;
Lewis 1968).
The other two overlapping principles ofKemalism were nationalism and populism,
which had similar objectives. Nationalism was about creating a sense of being a nation and
a national identity. For that purpose AtatUrk initiated a language reform by replacing the
alphabet in 1928. At some point some extreme theories were also used such as the sun
language theoryclaimingthat Turkish was the first spoken language on earth. AtatUrkalso
established People's Houses (Halkevlen) all over the country which were a combination
of adult education centers, sports clubs and political indoctrination units. The government
had to take the revolution to the masses. As well as recreational purposes, the main focus
was on promotingsolidarityandmobilizingthe masses. Those houses were run by
AtatUrk' s Republican People's Party ( Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and were used to
generate support for the party and the reforms. Also a massive program of educational
expansion took place especially focusing on the rural areas with no schools (Lewis 1968).
AtatUrk and his economic planners concluded that the new republic had to be less
dependent on imports and that the basic industries had to be developed. Private capital was
insufficient for that purpose, therefore the government decided to intervene directly and to
divert state money for major industrial projects. As a result, etatism (state capitalism) was
a necessity for the new republic to industrialize. The focus was on the textile, steel, paper,
glass, cement and sugar industries. Etatism was not a complete success; inefficiency, poor
productivity and the neglect of the rural areas were major problems associated with the
etatist projects (Lewis 1968).
AtatUrk died in 193 8 at the age of fifty seven. The Turkish people deeply mourned
his death. He was a charismatic and an inspirational leader. He started his career as an
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Ottoman military officer and proved himself in the battles of the First World War and the
war of independence. AtatUrk's talent in creating a nation state from the ruins ofthe
Ottoman Empire was remarkable. However, for some people his secular reforms were too
abrupt. Some of the secular measures alienated some segments of the population, and cut
the Turks off from their Islamic past. In spite of the authoritarian measures of his rule, the
democratic institutions established at the beginning of the new republic have remained. The
transition of power to his successor and close friend, ismet inonli, was smooth. inonli
became the president after AtatUrk's death on November 10, 1938, and advanced Atatiirk's
reforms in the upcoming years. During the Second World War, inonli's Turkey remained
neutral until almost the end of the war. Three months before the end of the war, Turkey
declared war on Germany and qualified for charter membership in the UN (ZUrcher 1998,

184-196).
Secularist-AtatUrkist Ideology and Government Control over Religion
Ever since the beginnings of modernization of the Ottoman institutions through the

18th century, the primary goal of the modernizers had been the preservation of the state. For
instance, the Tanzimatreforms (1839) launched in the late Ottoman period were geared
towards preserving the existing order. However, the Ottoman statesmen's encounters with
the West during and after the reforms have fundamentally changed the major premises of
the old Ottoman order. The traditional millet system based on religious stratification of the
Muslims andnon-Muslims began to be dismantled in the course ofthe Tanzimat reforms.
Later, the equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire was
introduced in the Reform Edict of 1856 (Islahat Fermam) which promised full equality to
the non-Muslims. The Edict included equality in liability for military service as well as for
entry to governmental positions and schools (Kadwglu 1998, 3).
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After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the new Turkish Republic, e stahl ished by

Mustafa Kemal Atati.irk in 1923, adopted a process of secularization which was more akin
to the French secularist model (laicism) than the Anglo-Saxon mode 1which involves the
separation of state and religion. In French laicism, which Atati.irk emulated, religion is
perceived as an entirely private matter and churches are voluntary associations. The
French secularism is based on positivist Comtean ideals. A. Comte believed that history
progressed from theological, to metaphysical, and then to positive modes of thought and
related types of social organization. Thus, Comte envisioned a view of progress by turning
away from theology towards the scientific study of nature and society. He foresaw the
development of societies through utilizing the scientific methods of empirical observation
which would pave the way to a social evolution under the supervision of specialists or
social engineers (Kadtoglu 1998, 5).
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, the new
Turkish Republic was established by M. Kemal Atati.irk and his close associates who
altogether led the independence war against the British, Greek and French. In addition to
separating Islam from politics and completely secularizing the new republic, Atati.irk also
wanted to subordinate Islam to the new republic through measures like confiscating the
properties of the religious endowments ( vala~, banning religious education, prohibiting the
use of religious symbols in public andsubordinatingthe clergy (ulema) by prohibiting
private religious organizations. For instance, in 1924, the Caliphate was abolished and the

Shari'a was replaced by the Swiss code in 1926. The next year, the religious orders
(tarikat) were banned and Western forms of hats, clothing and calendar were introduced.
Earlier, the 1924 Constitution envisioned Islam as the official religion of the new republic.
However, after a constitutional amendment in 1928 I slam was no 1onger the religion of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

81
republic. In 193 7, the Turkish state officially became a laic (secular) state with another
constitutional amendment. According to Berkes ( 1964, 461-4 79) Kemalist secularism
sought to rationalize Islam, and aimed to take religion under the control of popular
sovereignty,ratherthanabolishingit. 30 In Toprak's (1995, 90) words, AtatUrk's secular
measures "were basically designed to establish state control over religion rather than to
separate the two spheres." The Directorate ofReligious Affairs (Diyanet i~Jeri
Ba~kanbg1, DiB) was created 1924 under the Ministry of Interior Affairs

(if i~Jeri

Bakan1Ig1) to maintain the secular nature of the state. Karaka~ (2007, 10) points out that
AtatUrk established the institution with the "goal of de politicizing .. .Islam through a state
takeover of certain religious functions and integrating it into the Kemalist state-building
project." Thus, through a secularist interpretation of religion, the DiB was given the
responsibility "to prevent non-state and anti-Kemalist circles from using religion for
political mobilization against the state." The secularists referred all matters that were
connected to religion to the DiB (the role of the DiB will be discussed extensively in the
next chapter). The governments of the multi-party era remained faithful to the secularist
principles set forth by Kemal AtatUrk.

The Multiparty Era
inonU followed AtatUrk' s line of reforms regarding economic and social
development embodied in the principle of etatism which suggests a major role for the
government in sponsoring industrial development. Because of domestic and international
pressures, inonU allowed greater freedoms for the expression of political dissent. In 1946,
four members of the CHP left the party and established a new party, the Democratic Party

30

Berkes highlights the combination of the Durkheimean and Republican tones in M. Kemal Ataturk's
conception of religion. For details, see Berkes (1964 ).
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(Demokrat Parti, DP) 31 (Cleveland 1994, 261). Bayar was elected as the president after
inonii and Menderes became the Prime Minister. Bayar was a banker with a long record of
government service and Menderes had a law degree coming from a wealthy family. Neither
of them had any military background as opposed to AtatUrk or inoni.i. During the
Democrats' decade in power, the national assembly included many professionals and
businessmen instead of government officials and military officers turned politicians. This
was a radical break from the Ottoman and early Republican tradition where a career in the
military or the bureaucracy served as a path to political power. One of the first actions that
the Democrats did was to legalize the adhan32 (the call to prayer) in Arabic. From 1932 to
33

1950 the government forbade to call the adhan in Arabic; the Turkish translation of the
call was heard from the minarets for 28 years.
Religious education was offered to all Muslim students through the imam-Hatip
schools34 (Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools) in the educational system and the number

31

Those four members were C. Bayar, A Menderes, R. Koraltan, and F. Kopriilii. In the elections of
1946, the new party got only 65 seats out of 465 seats in the national assembly. In the next four years, the
Democrats constantly criticized the ruling party on many platforms and effectively worked for the
creation of a grassroots political organization throughout Turkey. In the elections of 1950, the Democrats
won 396 seats in the national assembly, the Republicans only got 68 seats; after 27 years of Republican
rule, the party founded by Atatiirk was out of office
32
Allaahu Akbar (4x) God is the greatest.
Ashhadu Allah i/aaha illa-Lah (2x) I bear witness that there is no god except Allah.
Ashhadu anna Muhamadar rasuulullah (2x) I bear witness that Muhammad is Allah's messenger.
Hayya 'alas Salaah (2x) Make haste towards prayer.
Hayya 'ala Falaah (2x) Make haste towards salvation.
A-Salaatu Khayrun Mina-Naum (2x-only for the first prayers of the day at dawn) Prayer is better than
sleep.
Allaahu Akbar (2x) God is the greatest.
Laa ilaaha illa-Lah There is no God except Allah.
33
Tann uludur.
Siiphesiz bilirim, bildiririm, Tann 'dan b~ka yoktur tapacak.
Siiphesiz bilirim, bildiririm, Tann'nm elr;isidir Muhammed.
Haydin namaza.
Haydin felaha.
Namaz uykudan hay1rhd1r.
Tann uludur.
Tann'dan b~kayoktur tapacak.
34
The imam-Hatip Schools will be discussed in lenth in the next chapter.
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of schools for training Muslim prayer leaders was increased. The government also devoted
considerable amotmt of money for repairing existing mosques and building new ones
throughout the cotmtry. In this new more favorable political climate, more religious books
were published and public observance oflslamic rituals intensified, such as fasting during
the month of Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca. People were free to practice Islam
which contributed to the popularity of the government. Menderes was not in favor of
overturning the secularist principles although his government's respect for religion
contributed to the popular support for the DP (ZUrcher 1998, 220-231).
The Democrats also diverged from the Republicans on the economy. Menderes was
for liberalization, allowing more private enterprise and reducing the role of the state in
economy. The Republicans, on the other hand, were against liberalization of the economy
and they favored the continuation of etatist principles that had been first established by
Atatlirk Menderes government also undertook agricultural reforms and sought to improve
the I iving standards of the peasants in rural areas. The Democratic government imported
large quantities of agricultural machinery, built dams and irrigation canals and constructed
a national network of highways whichimprovedcommunicationandope ned remote
regions ofthe cotmtryto commercial agriculture. However the initial suddengrowthofthe
economy slowed down as by the mid-1950s, a series of droughts devastated the rural
areas, and the Democrat's high level of government spending created large annual budget
deficits which then created a large national debt (Cleveland 1994, 263).
After the mid-1950s, the Democratic government introduced a series of repressive
measures that allowed the government to censor the press, imprison the journalists, and
shut down oppositional newspapers. Violent protests began to happen in cities during the
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spring of 1960. Menderes used the army to maintain law and order. 35 A few weeks after the
Kayseri incident, the military intervened on May 27, 1960 tmder the command of Gen.
Cemal GUrsel. The army seized the major cities and arrested leading government officials
including President Bayar and Prime Minister Mende res. The Turkish military announced
that it was not intending to stay in power for a long time, in fact in October 1961, the

military returned their barracks and peacefully transferred power to the civilian authorities.
The purpose of the military was not to establish a longtermmilitaryrule in the country, but
the intervention was done with the belief that Menderes government had strayed away from
the principles ofKemalism (AtatUrkism). A National Unity Council of thirty-eight officers
led the country during the military rule. Chairman of the council, Gen. GUrsel, became
president and prime minister. The first act of the Cotmcil was to draft a new constitution
prepared by a group of law professors from istanbul University. The new Turkish
constitution was approved in July 1961 which replaced the unicameral legislature with a
bicameral one consisting of a senate and an assembly (Cleveland 1994, 264). Before
elections were held, nearly 600

~mbers

of the former overthrown government were

charged with offenses invol vingpol itical and financial corruption and subversion of the
constitution. Most of the charges were fabricated. The trials lasted almost a year and 450
individuals received different prison terms. Menderes and two of his cabinet members
were sentenced to death and were hanged in September 1961. The controversial execution
ofMenderes and two ministers was seen by the followers of the DP as a political act, not
as an act of justice (Ahmad 1993, 123-132).

35

Menderes also used the army to disrupt Republican Party campaign meetings. In Aprill960, troops
blocked the Republican leader Inonii's train before it entered the city ofKayseri where he was scheduled
to make a campaign speech. When former war hero and close friend of Atatiirk got off the train to see
what was happening, the troops parted before him, Inonii boarded the train and the train entered the city
without any incident.
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Two parties were established following the legacy of the Democrat Party: the
Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) and the New Turkey Party ( Jeni Tlirldye Partisi, YTP).

In the parliamentary elections of 1961 these parties received 35 and 14 percent of the votes
respectively compared to the 38 percent won by the CHP. President Giirsel asked inonii to
form the government, and inonii established a coalition government with the AP which
lasted only six months. The CHP had two more tmSuccessful coalitions. The fourth
coalition government was created by an independent senator, S. H. UrgUplii, who was
elected on the AP list. The voters were tired of weak and inefficient coalition governments,
and in the 1965 general election they voted for the populist AP which was led by Si.ileyman
Demirel (1924- ). Demirel was able to rise to the top because the top layer ofthe DP
leadership had been eliminated from politics by the military (Ahmad 1993, 137).
Rapid Urbanization and Politicization of Turkey in the 1960s

In the 1960s, Turkey was experiencing a complex process of social economic and
demographic changes. The population nearly doubled in twenty-five years from 21 million
in 1950 to about 40 million in 1975. After the end of the Second World War, Turkey
experienced rapid urbanization. In 1950 8.4 percent of the population lived in the cities of
100,000 and over; in 1975 the figure was 23 percent. In search of better economic
opportunities, Turkish peasants moved to larger cities; they did not always find better jobs,
and shantytowns inhabited by poor migrants became a prominent feature of large cities in
Turkey (Cleveland 1994, 265).
Ahmad argues that politics of the 1960s contrasted sharply from those ofthe
previous decade in Turkey. Turkey had be en thoroughly pol iticized after 1960 a nd the new
freedoms provided by the constitution permitted ideological politics for the first time.
There was a strong left-wing presence in the country, especially in the universities. These
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political trends coincided with Turkey's disillusionment with the U.S. Mende res had
remained I oyal toW ashington and supported U.S. pol icy unquestioningly. After seizing
power, the junta immediately reaffirmed Turkey's commitments to the Western allies
(Ahmad 1993, 136-138). For instance, during the Cuban Missile Crisis ofOctober 1962,
Prime Minister inonil stood by Washington even ifit could bring nuclear annihilation to
Turkey. However, during the same crisis, Turkey learned that it was little more than a
bargaining counter in the negotiations be tween the superpowers in the peak years of the
Cold War and that its interests were not taken into account by the U.S. during the
negotiations. Public opinion became convinced that Turkey's interests were negotiable,
andduringthe Cyprus crisis of 1963 -4, Washington's siding with Athens inflamed public
opinionagainstthe U.S. (Ahmad 1993, 139). There was overwhelming popular support for
Turkish military intervention to the island and inonil government was considering to
proceed. However, President Johnson's letter of 5 June ( 1964) to inonil prevented the
possible military intervention by warninghimthatweapons provided by Washington could
not be usedwithoutU.S.consentandthe NATO alliance would not come to Turkey's aid
against the Soviets ifTurkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention. The contents
of the letter which contributed to anti-Americanism were leaked to the press (Ahmad, 139141).
The anti-American camp included neo-Kemalist nationalists of all political
orientations as well as leftists who often overlapped. For those people, Turkey's
predicament was about its dependence on the capitalist West whose leader was the U.S.
They reinterpreted Turkey's war of liberation as a struggle against imperialism for the
purpose of establishing an independent, non-aligned state. They also criticized the rulers of
post-war Turkey for lacking the determination to preserve the true independence of the
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country. For themboththe CHP and the DP were guilty; the CHP for accepting the Truman
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and the DP for leading Turkey into NATO and the
Baghdad Pact. The right was alarmed by the appeal of this new radical nationalism of the
left which it denounced as communist. Ahmad argues that since the neo-Kemalists were
successful in making nationalism one of the fundamentals of their ideology, the right, which
hitherto had monopolized nationalism, was forced to use Islam as a counter-force. For
instance, the new right-wing organizations such as the Association toCombatCommunism
were found as early as 1962 and presented Islam as the antidote to communism(Ahmad
1993, 142).
Demirel, whose Justice Party won the 1965 election, had spent a year in America
as an Eisenhower Fellow and was employed by a US multinational corporation operating
in Turkey. Demirel was attacked from all sides; the left denounced him as a capitalist, the
right denounced him as a Freemason. During the late 1960s, Turkey's workers became
more militant in their struggle for higher wages and better working conditions. The
employers resisted and numerous strikes and lock-outs followed each other. Politicized by
the events ofthe 1960s and by the propaganda ofthe Worker's Party, in 1967 a group of
unions broke away from the pro-government confederation (TURK-i~) and formed the
radical confederation DISK (Devrimci i.jci Sendikalan Konfederasyonu- The
Confederation ofRevolutionary Workers' Unions). The traditional lower-middle class in
the AP began to criticize Demirel, adopted an Islamist rhetoric and started to organize
politically. The AP won the parliamentary elections in October 1969, but its share of the
vote was reduced by 6.4 percent. In January 1970, Necmettin Erbakan formed his own
party, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP), which was the first Islamist
party of Turkey. Later in December another faction broke away from the AP and formed the
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who was among the officers who carried

out the 1960 coup, renamed the Republican Peoples Nation Party the Nationalist Action

Party(Milliyetfi Hareket Partisi, MHP) in February 1969. TUrkefs purpose was to
attract the same lower middle class vote by creating a militant, ultra-nationalist party
claiming to be equally opposed to capitalism and communism (Ahmad 1993, 143-144).
Societal changes, rising political tensions, rapid urbanization and industrialization,
high inflation rate, high unemployment rates, militant labor movements, inadequate
educational system resulted in a state of chaos in Turkey. By January 1971, the universities
ceased to function; radical left-wing students robbed banks and kidnapped US servicemen,
and attacked American targets. The homes of university professors critical of the
government were bombed by neo-fascist militants. Factories were on strike, and the
Islamist movement became more aggressive and openly rejected AtatUrk's principles and
Kemalism On 12 March, 1971 the generals (the Chief of General Staff and the
commanders of the army, navy, and air forces) presented a memorandum to Pres. Sunay and
the chairmen of the two chambers demanding the formation of a strong, credible
government capable of implementing reforms. They threatened to assume power if the
Demirel government refused to resign, Demirel resigned. This military intervention is
known as the coup by memorandum because unlike the 1960c oup, the armed forces did not
seize power (Ahmad 1993, 144-147).
Islam and Politics: The Conceptual Framework
It is often suggested that contemporary Islamist movements are seeking to establish
an Islamic state that had existed at some point in the history of Muslims exemplified by the
Islamic state first established by Islam's prophet Muhammad (570-632) in the city of
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Medina36 after Muslims emigrated there in 622. Implicit in this suggestion is the argument
that Islam has a particular political theory. Although it is still debated that such a theory
exists, the contemporary Islamists continually refer to the religious texts and the tradition of
Prophet Muhammad as well as certain precedents set by earlier Islamic governments in
history (Ayubi 1993). The earlier sections ofthis chapter will briefly introduce some of
those references employed by the contemporary Islamists.
Contemporary Islamist movements are inspired by the vision of a prophetic
community. They attempt to return to the principles oflslamic morality and to a renewal of
personal commitment to the foundations oflslam. Moreover, the Islamists commonly aim to
control the state and to use the power of the state to enforce Islam. To them, the state is
simply the force that requires the citizens to adhere to Shari'a. Islamists often argue that the
ideal Islamic state has no institutional form, and it is embodied in the leadership of
individuals who are dedicated to Islamic principles. Thus, Lapidus argues, contemporary
Islamist movements have ambiguous political implications; while some believe that the
control of the state is essential to the success of an Islamic social and moral program, some
others look upon states as inherently corrupt and incapable of realizing Islamic values
because they do not see the state as a realm of moral fulfillment (Lapidus 2002, 25, 26).

36

Before Islam, city of Medina was known as Yathrib by the people of the Arabian Peninsula. Mter
Muslims migrated there in 622, Muslims changed the name of the city to At-Medina Al-Munawwarah,
the enlightened city (or the city of Prophet Muhammad). This event, known as Al-Hijrah (emigration),
marked the beginning of the Muslim lunar calendar. Muslims who were less than a total of70 people had
to emigrate to Medina due to heavy persecution by the powerful idolatrous Meccan tribes following an
invitation by the two most powerful tribes of the city (Al-Aws and Al-Khazraj-predominantly nonMuslim at that time). Those tribes invited Prophet Muhammad as a mediator to mediate conflicts and long
lasting blood feuds between them. In an incredibly short amount of time Prophet Muhammad was able to
resolve conflicts between them; and pronounced the two tribes as brothers. Gradually, Islam's message
was able to convert the majority of the inhabitants of Medina and surrounding Arab tribes into Islam.
Prophet Muhammed established the first Islamic city-state based on the Medina Charter signed between
Muslims, Jews and the idolatrous dwellers of the city creating a city identity for all. The charter \\hich is
considered the first Islamic constitution enabled the early Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of Medina
to coexist peacefully and defend their city against the Meccan tribes and their allies.
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Islam as a Historical and Organic Religion
Before Prophet Muhammad's emergence, Arabia was a politically fragmented
region, largely pastoral, primarily idolatrous in religion, and without either an organized
state or a region-wide church. Muhammad or ganizeda MuslimcommunityinMedina to
fulfill God's command in a variety of matters such as faith, ethical conduct, family,
commerce, law, war, diplomacy and politics. In the early days oflslam, religious identity
did not supersede clan and tribal identity, but was rather superimposed on them Also,
there was no differentiation between Prophet Muhammed's religious role as the prophet of
Islam in spiritual and moral matters, and his role as a tribal mediator and arbitrator in
resolving conflicts. Thus, no distinction was made between the realm of religion and that of
the state (Lapidus 2002, 9). The original Islamic sources (the Qur'an and the Hadith texts)
do not have much on matters of government and politics. Immediately after the death of
Prophet Muhammad, the Muslim community faced with the pr obi em of government; and the
first disagreements that took place and eventually led to the division of Muslims into
Sunnis, Kharijites and Shi'a were predominantly about politics, not theology. The Qur'an
did not stipulate a specific form for the state or the government, nor did Prophet
Muhammed appoint a successor37 for himself. Ayubi ( 1993) argues that given the limited
nature of political stipulations in the Qur'an and Hadith, Muslims have had to borrow and
improvise to develop their political systems, inspired by the Shari'a, by Arabian tribal
traditions, and by the political heritage ofthe lands they conquered, especially Persian and
Byzantine traditions. The influence of the first source was more noticeable during the era of
the first four rightly guided caliphs (AI-Khulafa 'AI-Rashidun, namely Abu Bakr, 'Umar,

37

Prophet Muhammed just requested his close friend and one of the early Muslims Abu Bakr to lead the
congregational prayers when he became very sick before his death. After his death, Muslims perceived
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'Uthman, and' Ali), the secondduringthe Umayyaddynasty, and the thirdduringthe
Abbasid, Seljuki and Ottoman dynasties (Ayubi 1993, 7).

In Islam, the realm of Caesar and the realm of God are mutually inclusive, and
Islam makes no distinction between religious and political aspects of human life. In this
regard, Islam provides models for both individual and political action (Husain 38-43).
Islam is a historical religion Unlike ahistorical religions (like Hinduism and Buddhism),
Islam perceives history as divinely ordained. Muslims see the hand of God purposefully
guiding history. Religion explains the beginning, and the end of human history and the
direction it must take. For Islam, particular events in history are crucial acts of revelation
(Smith 1970, 248-249). For example victory in battle is considered as a sign of God's gift;
likewise defeat in battle was God's warning and test. The following verses (8:7-9) are
about the victory of Muhammad in the Battle ofBadr (624):
(7)Behold! Allah promised you one of the two (enemy) parties, that it should be yours:
Ye wished that the one unarmed should be yours, but Allah willed to justify the Truth
according to His words and to cut off the roots of the Unbelievers;- (8) That He might
justify Truth and prove Falsehood false, distasteful though it be to those ingui It. (9)
Remember ye implored the assistance of your Lord, and He answered you: "I will assist
you with a thousand of the angels, ranks on ranks."

The following verses (3: 139-142) are about the defeat of Muslims in the Battle of
Uhud ( 625), after an initial success the Muslims were driven back and the Prophet was
also wounded:
(139)So lose not heart, nor fall into despair: For ye must gain mastery ifye are true in
Faith. ( 140) If a wound hath touched you, be sure a similar wound hath touched the
others. Such days (of varying fortunes) We give to men and men by turns: that Allah
may know those that believe, and that He may take to Himself from your ranks Martyrwitnesses (to Truth). And Allah lovethnotthosethatdo wrong.(141) Allah's object
also is to purge those that are true in Faith and to deprive of blessing Those that resist
Faith. ( 124) Didye think that ye would enter Heaven without Allah testing those of you
who fought hard (In His Cause) and remained steadfast?

this as a sign where according to the understanding of the early Muslims, the Prophet Muhammed pointed
out to Abu Bakr to be the khalifah (caliph) of Muslims after his death.
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Thus, in history such particular events that are considered as acts of revelation set
specific precedents for establishing a social, economic and political order that conforms to
a divine design. Hence, to devout Muslims, what Muhammad did is as important as what
Muhammad said and to the devout believers Muhammad is the most significant role model.
For Muslims, he was a charismatic religious leader, a successful statesman, a just judge, a
competent administrator, a courageous military leader, a loving husband and father and a
trustworthy friend (Husain 2003, 39-40).
Besides being a historical religion Islam is an organic religion as well. Islam as a
religion encompasses every social aspect of human beings. Smith ( 1970, 249) maintains
that anorganic religion has no c hurchhierarchyor priestly class; indeed within anorganic
religion "sacral law and sacral social structure are of the essence ... religion is largely
equated with society, and distinct ecclesiastical organizations ... are secondary." In this
regard, theoretical distinctions drawn in Christianity between the realms of God and of the
ruler are absent in Islam (Husain, 2003). While some religions emphasize the role of a
well established and well structured clerical organization that has a separate identity from
bothgove rnmentandsociety, Islam as an organic religion maintains nos uch church
hierarchy or priestly class. In an organic religion, religion is largely equated with society,
and distinct ecclesiastical organizations are secondary. In organic religions the distinction
between religious and social systems is obscured, in fact the two systems merge. Toprak
(1981, 23) argues that in an organic religion the distinction between religious and social
systems is obscured, the two systems merge. In Islam, this merger is both prescribed and
effected by the Shari 'a which has something to say about every aspect of human life like
marriage, divorce, hygiene, manners, crime, punishment, economics, politics, war and so
forth. The society is the urnmah(the brotherhood/ community of the believers) and the
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ummah is a religious community and apolitical society. Thus in Islam political institutions
are designed to defend and promote Islam, not the state. Those institutions are supposed to
establish and uphold an Islamic system based on the Shari'a. Thus, the primary loyalty of
Muslims is to the ummah, not to the state, and to the Shari'a, not to the ruler (Toprak 22,
23; Husain 38-43).
The Interplay Between Modernization, Secularization and Islamism
Many modern Middle Eastern states are organized around secular identities and
development goals defined in either capitalist or socialist terms. In those states, Islam no
longer legitimizes the state and no longer defines its moral or social vision. All ofthese
states have secular educational and legal systems. However, secular states give special
consideration to Islamic symbols and practices (Lapidus 2002, 26).
The modernization theory assumed that complex economic structure and political
development proceed in tandem. Economic specialization leads to political
institutionalization; and 1he displacementoftraditional (usually landed) elites by urban
middle classes leads to the emergence of centralized commercial, bureaucratic and
educational structures. According to this formulation of modernization theory, religion
gradually recedes from 1he public life. Consequently, the religious establishment is seen as
resistant to change. As the civic order becomes secularized, rational conduct becomes the
norm and this leads to greater political participation and political stability. Eickelman and
Piscatori argue that the fundamental difficulty with the modernization theory lay in the
sharp contrast between two artificial constructs: modernity and tradition, and the
consequent misunderstanding of the entrenched social functions of tradition (2004, 22-23).
Filali-Ansary (1996, 76-80) argues that Muslim societies did not experience
secularization as an internal or autonomous move; external influences either started the
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process or disrupted it. However, secularization is a current reality in the Muslim world;
no Muslim society today is governed solely with reference to religious law; and religious
traditions are no 1anger predominant in the Muslim world. Thus, secularization in the
Muslim world happened before religious reformation which is a complete reversal of the
European experience in which secularization was more or less an outcome of such
reformation. Husain (2003) argues that the failure of the secularists in the post colonial
Muslim states is one of the major factors that fuel Islamism today. During the colonial rule,
the Europeans not only exploited their colonies, but used them as export markets for their
surplus capital and consumer goods. Moreover, Europeans introduced modernization and
Western secular education. The indigenous elite initially both emulated and cooperated
with the European powers, they embraced westernization and secularization. However, it
was the same indigenous elite that became the leaders of independence movements in those
countries with the decline of colonial rule after the First World War (Husain 2003, 131-

134). The Europeans never granted independence to their colonies in the Muslim world in
exchange for their cooperation against the Axis nations in general, and the Ottoman Turks
in particular. Nationalism also became a potent force among the Muslims through the end
of European colonial rule replacing the loyalty of the Muslim people to the Islamic ummah.
The Muslim secularist elites quickly filled the political void left by the departing
colonial administrations. The Secularists worked to transform the predominantly rural and
traditional Muslim world into modern urban nation states by pursuing programs of
modernization, westernization and secularization. Despite the Muslim secularists' early
popular support, within a few decades their credibility and legitimacy eroded. The rapid
economic growth achieved in some Muslim countries did not significantlybenefitthe
impoverished majority. Instead, the economic gains were enjoyed mostly by the wealthy
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elite. Secularists' modernization project unfortunately did not bring substantial
development and wealth to the people. Muslim secularists used the Western idea of
nationalism to integrate and unifY their fragmented societies, and to consolidate their
political power. Muslim secularists also used Islamic rhetoric and symbolism in domestic
and foreign policy to achieve greater popular support. However, instead of appeasing the
Islamists, the Muslim secularists' political use oflslam legitimized Islamism and
undermined secularization process in those countries. (Husain 2003, 133-139).
Emergence oflslamism as a Political Movement
Politicians who governed Turkey from 1971 to 1973 ruled the country under
instructions from the military. The military believed that they could rid the country of its
class divisions, its economic disparities, and its ideological disagreements by imprisoning
discontented political activists. Under the martial law, the government imprisoned many
political activists, mainly of the left. Political violence temporarily diminished, however
the real underlying social, political and economic reasons behind political violence did not
end. In the 1973 elections the CHP came to power again under its new leader, BUlent
Ecevit after inonU. Since the CHP did not have enough majority in the parliament, it had to
create a coalition government with the Islamist National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet

Partisi, MSP).
The MSP is the continuation of the MNP which had been established in 1970 and
then dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 19 71 for violating the articles of the
constitution regarding secularism. The short term of stability did not last long. The same
kind of political violence resurfaced after 1975. Many coalition governments fell, and
minority parties exercised an influence which exceeded their real political power. The
CHP and the AP granted excessive favors to the minority parties to attract them as coalition

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96
partners. The small parties were given many cabinet positions for their support in the
coalition governments. Those ministers filled the public bureaucracy and the law
enforcement agencies with their supporters. Professional civil servants and police were
heavily politicized by the elements of the extreme right and left. The polarization of those
agencies reduced the abilityofthe governmenttodeal with the growing violence in the
country (Ahmad 1993, 159-180, Cleveland 1994, 267).
The collapse of civil order in the country was accompanied by two worrying
developments. The first one was the increased activities of Kurdish separatists. The
second was the rise of uncompromising Islamist activism led by the MSP. In September
1980, the party organized a massive national rally where the crowds demanded the
establishment of the Shari'a and refused to sing the Turkish national anthem in their
gatherings. These developments threatened the secular and nationalist Kemalist principles
which were highly regarded by the Turkish military. Six days after the MSP incident, on
September 12, 1980 the High Command of the Turkish military carried out a well planned
coup which was the third military intervention since 1960 (Ahmad 1993, 181; Cleveland
1994, 268). In his statement broadcasted over radio and television, the leader of the coup,
Gen. Kenan Evren, held the parties and the politicians responsible for the social divisions,
the economic breakdown, and the anarchy and violence. The leading civilian politicians
were placed under house arrest, and a five member National Security Council led by Evren
took charge of the administrative and legislative responsibilities of government. The
Council ruled Turkey until the parliamentary elections of November 1983 ?8

38

Martial law was proclaimed, the constitution was suspended, the parliament was dissolved, and the
parties were closed down and virtually all of the professional associations and trade unions were dissolved
and thousands of suspected terrorists and political agitators were arrested and later tried by the military
government. Erbakan, the leader of the MSP, was charged with violating the secular principles ofthe
constitution and received a four-year imprisonment. In October 1981, the Council appointed a
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The referendliDl of 7 November 1982 made Gen. Evren the president of Turkey and
the new constitution was popularly approved in the absence of any real criticism under the
military government because the NSC banned all criticism of the constitution and Gen.
Evren. Ahmad (1993, 187) argues that the voters were sure that if they had rejected the
constitution, the military rule would have be en prolonged because the yes vote in the
referendliDl for Gen. Evren as the new president was combined with the yes vote for the
constitution itsel£ All members of the 1980 parliament were disqualified from political
activity for five years, and all the party leaders were disqualified for ten years by the
military government. The new electoral law introduced a ten percent national threshold to
reduce the influence ofthe smaller parties in the parliament.
Conclusion
The legal, political and military reforms in the late Ottoman period did not become
very successful and the Ottoman Empire collapsed after the First World War. The jtfihad

ve Terakkis lack ofvision should also be counted as a reason for the collapse as they
believed that through authoritarian measures, they could perhaps prevent the collapse.
However, the collapse was pretty quick as the juihad ve Terakki elites sided with the
Germans during the war. After the collapse, a new Turkish republic was born out of the
ruins of the Ottomans under the leadership ofM. Kemal AtatUrk. AtatUrk and his close
associates followed a highly secularist and nationalist agenda to transform what was left

consultative assembly to draft a new constitution. In November, the Law on Higher Education was passed
which aimed to depoliticize the universities by purging all the leftist professors. The new constitution
strengthened the presidency by giving him more powers. The president could dissolve the parliament, and
call for a general election if parliament WclS paralyzed, could rule by decree if he believed that there \WS a
national emergency, and could select the members of the constitutional court from nominations provided
by the courts and councils. The president could also veto legislation and constitutional amendments and
take the constitutional amendments to a referendum. Besides those powers, the president also had the
power to select all the high-rank bureaucrats, to appoint the chief of staff and to convene and preside over
monthly National Security Council meetings.
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out of the Ottoman Empire on the Anatolian peninsula into a developed independent nation.
In addition to secularism and nationalism, bureaucratic elitism and etatism (state
custodianship ofthe economy) constitute the major pillars ofKemalism(Atatiirkism).

In the new Turkish Republic, the military, be ing a highly secularist institution, di d
not remain apolitical, and intervened into politics three times ( 1960, 1971, 1980). Two
new constitutions were written after 1924 (1961 and 1982 Constitutions) under military
regimes. Those constitutions clearly reflect the protectionist view of the secularist
establishment in regards to preserving the privileges and authority of the bureaucratic elite,
as well as the secular principles. State was thought to be superior to citizens; basic
responsibilities of the citizens usually come before their basic rights and freedoms.
Islamism in Turkey evolved through several stages since the establishment of the MNP by
N. Erbakan in 1970. The following chapter will discuss the emergence oflslamism in
Turkey as a well established political movement by focusing on the period after the 1980
military coup as well as the social, economic, and political conditions that paved the way
for its emergence.
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CHAPTER Til

ISLAMIST POLITICS IN TURKEY
This chapter examines contemporary Turkish Islamism in the light of interview data
and content analysis with an emphasis on the activism aspect of contentious Islamist
movements in the larger context of social movement theories. In doing this, government's
control over religion and the Islamists' perception of external threats will be used as
independent variables.
There are several recent works that examine Turkish Islamism from a social
movement perspective by authors such as Yavuz (2003) and White (2002). However, these
two authors appear to analyze Islamismfrom what! call an identity/opportunity (Yavuz)
perspective, and social network (White) perspective. Although both authors study Islamist
activism from a social movement perspective and use the methods employed by the social
movement theorists, Yavuz and White seem to overemphasize the impact of identity,
opportunity structures, and horizontal networks on the emergence oflslamism respectively.
For example, Yavuz emphasizes the conservative identity created around the gecekondus
(slums around bi gcities) through the kinship relations and rural neighborhood ties of the
inhabitants. Also, Yavuz emphasizes the role of the (neo)liberal openings on the emergence
of Islamist identity and I slamist groups that took pi ace during the (hal period in Turkey
after the military coup of 1980. With those liberal openings, for Yavuz, Islamists were able
to mobilize the available resources and benefit from the opportunities that emerged as a
result of those liberal policies. White has a different approach in explaining Islamist
activism. For White, Islamist political activism is prompted through the collaborative work
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and horizontal networks through lower and lower-middle class neighborhoods oflarge
cities. Both authors seem to credit the emergence oflslamism in Turkey to demographic
shifts that take place in lower and lower-middle class neighborhoods around larger cities
of Turkey. My approach throughout this study recognizes the impact of those social

networks and the identity aspect of Turkish Islamism; however by themselves, I believe the
horizontal networks and emerging opportunity structures are not enough in explaining the
emergence oflslamism in Turkey. I believe both Yavuz and White seem to underestimate
the role of state control over religion in Turkey and the Islamists' concerns over
preservation of their Islamic social identity (Muslimness) on their increased level of
politicization in the last three decades. The following sections will analyze emergence of
Islamism in Turkey and introduce the interview data.
Emergence ofls1amism in Modern Turkey
Islamist pioneers emerged during the late Ottoman period and their influence on the
early Turkish Republican Islamists continued in the decades following the establishment of
the Turkish republic. Islamists of that time displayed mixed reactions to the new secularist
regime. While Mehmed AkifErsoy (1873-1936), the poet ofthe Turkish national anthem,
chose hijra (emigration) to Egypt, Bediiizzaman Said Nursi ( 1873-1960) dropped any
distinctly political action in favor of going grassroots to revive the essentials oflslamic
belief among the people without making any direct references to politics. Similarly,
Siileyman Hilmi Tunahan ( 1888-1959) started an apolitical grassroots movement to
preserve the popular knowledge about the rituals oflslam. Some of the early Turkish
Islamists were co-opted by the regime, such as Semsettin Giinaltay (1883-1961), who later
served as prime minister for a briefperiod (1949-1950), right before the multiparty era in
Turkey. Others were either imprisoned or executed (like Nursi and iskilipli Attf
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Hoca ).Duringthe early period of the Turkish Republic tmtil the multiparty era, Islamism
as a political discourse was delegitimized and eliminated from the public discourses in any
form or capacity.
After Atati.irk' s death in 193 8, variants of Islamism gradually appeared in public
life. Islamist intellectuals like

E~refEdip

(1882-1971), S. Nursi, Necip Faztl Ktsaki.irek

(1905-1983), and Nurettin Top~u (1909-1975) established their own tradition. This
generation oflslamists represented neither the ulema nor the official religious
establishment, and made significant contributions to Islamism (c;etinsaya 1999, 367).
Among the Islamists of the multiparty era, the most outspoken voices against the secularist
regime were N. Faztl Ktsaki.irek, and Osman YUksel

Serdenge~ti

(1917-1983) with their

Biiyiikdogu (the Great Orient) and Serdengeffj magazines, respectively.

40

There was also an increasing demand for Islamic books. A wave of translations
into Turkish from the Islamist thinkers of the Muslim world (most prominently, the books of
Sayyid Qutb and Mawdudi) took place after the introduction of multiparty era in Turkey.
For instance, Sezai

Karako~

(1933-

) with his

Dkili~(Revival)

was among the pioneers

of this trend. The masses who consumed those Islamist publications were predominantly of
rural backgrotmds, and they were the first educated generation of their families. In addition,

39

iskilipli Attf Hoc a ( 18 75 -1926) was executed by Atattirk's jstiklal Mahmeke Jeri (Courts of
Independence) on February 4, 1926 because he was critical of Atattirk's new dress code. He authored
Frenk Mukallitligi ve Sapka (Imitation of the West and the Hat) in 1924 before Atattirk's 'Hat Law''
1.25.1925) ooich required all Turkish citizens to wear Western style hats.
0
Their Islamist criticism of the secularist regime had heavy nationalist undercurrents. Among other
magazines with Islamist content, Sebiliirre$ad, as the magazine oflslamist pioneers that was closed by
the one-party regime but started its publication towards the end of it, Biiyiik Cihat (Greater Jihad), Hiir
Adam (Free Man), and Selamet (Salvation) stood out. Apart from the conservative-nationalist magazines,
a new generation of young Islamists started to get organized in several national student organizations that
were led by Islamist intellectuals of their time. The most prominent of those organizations were Millf
Miicadele Birligi (The National Struggle Union), Komiinizmle Miicadele Dernegi (Association for
Struggle against Communism), and Milli Tiirk Tale be Birligi (National Union of Turkish Students,
MTIB). Among them, the MTIB was the most popular Islamist student organization.

p
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they were mainly, but not always, imam-Ha{jp41 high school graduates and they began to
read translations oflslamist thinkers together in book circles. Later, through the late 1970s,
one of the most prominent Turkish Islamists Ali B ula<; successfully synthesized Q utb and
Mawdudi' s conceptions and applied them into the Turkish context through his exemplary
works titled (:agda.j Ka vramlar ve Diizenler (Modern Concepts and Regimes) ( 1979) and
islam'm AnlajJlmasJ Ozerine (On Understanding Islam) (1980).
By removing Islam from the public domain, the Kemalist revolutionaries were able
to secularize urban areas; however this policy failed to transform the majority of the
people in rural areas of Turkey. With the exclusion of religion from politics, politics
became a matter of nation-building and was largely confined to a small authoritarian circle
in Ankara (Yavuz 2003, 57). Erdogan (1999, 382) argues that Turkey's secularist policies
had two basic characteristics: " ... a strict separation of religion and politics, and an
understanding of secularism as a social project" .42 The strict separation model suggested
that religion and politics are clearly distinct areas of human endeavor that should be kept
as separate as possible from each other. Moreover, religion is seen as a personal, private
matter, best left to the realm of personal choice and action. Secularism was also perceived
as a social model through which, the secularists believed, the Turkish society could be

41

Prayer Leader-Preacher schools were established and run by the Ministry of Education to educate the
imams (prayer leaders) and vaizs (preachers) for the mosques. After graduation the imams and vaizs
become government employees working in government controlled camis (mosques; indeed, all mosques
are controlled by the government in Turkey through the Directorate of Religious Affairs Diyanet isleri
B~kanhg1, DiB, under the Ministry of Interior). More information will be provided about imam-Hatip
schools in the following sections.
42
The modernizing and secularizing reforms of Ataturk harshly repressed Islam not only as a religion but
also as a culture. These harsh measures treated Islam as merely a religion, thus Kemalist ideology, which
was the official ideology of the new Turkish republic, ignored Islam as a w.ty of life. This neglect directly
reflected in the social science studies in Turkey, \\here most of the studies take Islam either as pure
religion or politics. Islam as cultural w.tys of life and identities has been widely discarded from the
spectrum ofTurkish social science (Turam 2001, 94).
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elevated to the level of modern/contemporary Western civilizations (muas1r medeniyetler
seviyes1).
During the single-party era in Turkey ( 1923 -1950) two forms oflslamist
oppositional movements emerged in response to the cultural revolution imposed by the
statist-bureaucratic Turkish elites who were also the elites of the Republican People's
Party (CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partis1) . These movements were led by two separate
religious groups in Turkey: Nalcyibendis and Nurcus. The Nurcus led a spiritual inwardoriented Islamic movement whose goals were piety, self-purification and selfconsciousness. The Nurcus sought ways of freeing themselves from state control since they
were perceived by the state as illegitimate. Unlike the Nurcu movement, the Na~ibendi
43

orders pursued a more revolutionary and confrontational strategy by leading several
conspicuous antisecular disturbances (Yavuz 2003, 56).
The state's repressive strategy toward Islam was relaxed significantly with the
introduction of multiparty politics. Turkish peasantry and small townspeople vastly voted
for the new center-right Democrat Party government (DP, Demokrat Parti, 1946-1960) in
the first multiparty elections of 1950. The DP was secular in orientation, however in a
purely pragmatic way, it was sensitive and responsive to the demands of the population
including those of the pious. One of the first things thatthe DP did after winning the
parliamentary election was to change the call to Muslim prayer ( ezan) in its original
form44 • The decade from the first successful multiparty experiment to the first military coup
of 1960 experienced a relaxation of relations between the state and the religious
connnunity; there was a growth in manifestations of popular religious sentiments evidenced

43

Religious orders (tarikats) were banned through the Kemalist (Atatiirkist) reforms.
During Atatiirk's reforms, the call to prayer was translated from Arabic to Turkish and the Turkish
version was recited from the minarets of the mosques all over Turkey. This angered the pious Muslims.
44
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in the building of newer mosques, establishment of additional imam-Hatip schools and
religious seminaries, and diminishing suppression ofthe activities of religious orders

( tarikat) (Yilmaz 2002, 19). During its rule, the DP carefully co-opted certain Islamic
groups like Nurcus and Nak§ibendis into the electoral system to expand its electoral base.
The military coup of 1960 put an end to the convergence of the Islamists and the DP
by temporarily banning all political parties and political activities in Turkey (Ahmad
1991). This was the first military intervention in the history of the Turkish republic which
was mainly due to the military's reaction to the DP' s reversal ofthe secularist policies and
dismantling of the state centric economy with liberal economic programs which diminished
the state bureaucracy's power and prestige significantly. A new constitution was written
after the coup of 1960, and the 57th Article of the 1960 Constitution stated that the political
program of the political parties must be in line with the secular republic, or otherwise
would be outlawed (Tepe 2002, 99).

The Gramscian Struggle: Politics as Jihad
In this study, the Gramscian theory will be used in combination with the social
movement theory. Employing the two theories will make it easier to explain Islamist
political activism in Turkey at two separate levels: the macro-level and the micro-Jevel.45
At the macro-level, the Gramscian theory will enable this research to explain how the
Turkish Islamists perceive themselves as a collectivity, and how they relate with the
general political system on the whole. And at the micro-level, the social movement theory

45

Both levels should not be seen as dichotomous (like the dichotomy between, for instance, D. Easton's
macro-level Systems Theory or T. Parson's Structural Functionalism and R. lnglehart's or G. Almond and
S. Verba's micro-level analyisis of politics. This study also does not attempt to go into the agent wrsus
structure debate later crystallized between the Systems Theorists and Structural Functionalists, and the
Rational Choice Theorists). For a general discussion of macro, and micro-level theories, see: Peters, B.
Guy. (1998). Comparative Politics: Theory and Method. New York, NYU Press, and Chilcote, Ronald
H. (1994). Theories of Comparative Politics. CA Westview Press.
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will help this research explain why the Turkishlslamists dow hat they do, how do they
interact with their members, mobilize resources, benefit from opportunity structures. When
necessary, a cross-level discussion will be provided when different forms of political
activism overlap or intersect. Indeed both Gramscian and social movement theories will be
employed in this study ina complementary manner, not ina mutually exclusive way.
Although the Gramscianperspective is pretty useful in analyzing the way that the
Turkish Islamists perceive their struggle vis a vis the secular establishment, it does not
provide useful tools to explain the Islamist political activism at the grassroots and
neighbor hood 1 eve l. Complementing the Gramscian theory, in the following sections of this
study, the social movement approach will be employed in explaining the Islamist outreach,
how Islamists benefit from opportunities and opportunity structures, and how several
constraints influence Islamists' political activism at the grassroots level. The Gramscian
approach is advantageous regarding how the secularist establishment and the Islamists
perceive and approach politics; however, the Gramscian approach cannot adequately help
to investigate Islamist outreach, opportunities and constraints.
My reason for choosing the Gramscian approach is twofold. First, Gramscian
theory is functional in explaining how the Turkish Islamists perceive their struggle in
regards to the government control over religion. As stated earlier, since both sides
perceive politics as a zero-sumgamewhere one's gain is another's loss, political activism
becomes a tool of hegemonic struggle which can be best explained in Gramscian terms. 46
When both sides perceive politics as a zero-sum game, any game strategy that they employ
would be about gaining strategic posts (or strongholds) to conduct the "war of position." In
a sense, the Turkish secularist bureaucratic elite and Islamists are alike in regards to their

46

This point was discussed in chapter one earlier.
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perception of politics, which can be summarized as "politics is war."47 Indeed, this is a
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highly contentious just like other contentious political struggles waged over identity,
religion, and c ulture. 48 Second, the Gramscian approach will be informative in the analysis of
competing frames of the secularist elites and the Islamists as it elaborately examines the
relationship between hegemony, counter-hegemony, and war of position waged within the
political and ideological realm through the creation offrames. Thus, the Gramscian approach
provides the researcher with the conceptuaVtheoretical tools to examine the struggle between the
secularist establishment and the Islamists by laying out the intricate interplay between
hegemony/counter-hegemony, ideology, warofposition, organic intellectuals, and frames.
Overall, the Turkish Islamists' perception of politics asjihad'9 through a Gramscian
perspective will permeate the following sections.

47

Perceiving politics as such is similar to Machiavellian realism. The text above shows how Machiavelli
perceives politics. There has been similar cases of pure realism in perceiving politics. One such approach
belongs to Mao Zedong ( 1893-1976), the chairman of Chinese Communist Party, who stated ''Politics is
war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed." Such approaches to politics are still popular,
for instance Neo-Conservative activist David Horowtz stated: 'Politics is war conducted by other
means ... " During the 2000 presidential and congressional elections, every Republican member of the
U.S. Congress received a free pamphlet, compliments of Congressman Tom DeLay, the party's majority
whip. Written by conservative activist David Horowitz, the pamphlet was called The Art of Political War:
How Republicans Can Fight to Win. It came with an endorsement on the cover by Karl Rove, the senior
advisor to then-candidate George W. Bush. According to Rove, The Art of Political War was 'a perfect
pocket guide to winning on the political battlefield from an experienced warrior."ln addition to DeLay's
gift to members of Congress, the Heritage Foundation, one of the leading conservative think tanks in
Washington, found Horowitz's advice so impressive that it sent another 2,300 copies to conservative
activists around the country. The information above about Horowitz is cited from: John Stauber and
Sheldon Hampton, "The War at Home" Published on Monday, May 17, 2004 by CommonDreams.org
at: http://www.commondreams.org/views04!0517-08.htm
48
This type of conception of politics has parallels with Clausewitz's statements about war which he
described as "politics with bloodshed" as well as with the Machiavellian thought. Machiavelli argues that
politics is a type of war. 'Thus, you must know that there are two kinds of combat: one with laws, the other
with force. The first is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first is often not enough, one
must have recourse to the second." (Machiavelli, 69).
49
The Arabic word ofjihad literally means struggle which comes from the verb jahadah (JHD), to
struggle; and contrary to popular misperception, it does not mean holy war. Accordingly, a person's
struggle with his/her carnal desires is also a type ofjihad (struggle) for Muslims. Fighting in the
battlefield is just one type ofjihad.
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Politics as Jihad: The l\1NP
The closure of the DP by the military regime did not prevent various religious
groups from getting involved into the political game. After 1960, the Nurcu and Na~ibendi
communities actively kept supporting the Justice Party (AP, Adalc:t Partis1) of Silleyman
Demirel in the 1960s until the establishment of the firstlslamistpartyofTurkey: The
National Order Party (MNP, Milli Nizam Partisi, 1970-1972) ofNecmettin Erbakan in
1970. The MNP was established by Erbakan and leading Na~ibendis with the advice of
M. Zahit Kotku50 ( 1897-1980), a prominent Na~ibendi sheikh/1 and the party was the
predecessor of the National Salvation Party (MSP, Milli Selamet Partisi, 1972-1980), the
Welfare Party (RP, Refah Partisi, 1983-1998), the Virtue Party (FP, Fazilet Partisi, 19972001), the Felicity Party (SP, Saadet Partisi, 2001-present) and the Justice and
Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalklnma Partisi, 200 1-present). Ltitfi Dogan' s 52
statements about M. Zahit Kotku and his role in the establishment of the MNP are quite
interesting:
Mehmed Zahit Kotku was the brainchild of the party [the MNP]. He wanted to have a
party \\here Muslims could feel at home. We \\-ere, in fact, tired of being used by other
center-right parties. I became involved in this part because of Zahit Efendi [Master
Zahit]. I remember that evening when Zahit Efendi invited five people and told us that
''you are all men dedicated to the cause of protecting and advancing this nation. The core
identity (kimlik) and character (ki~ilik) of this wounded nation is Islam. Your main
heritage is Islam and as Muslims you can heal this wound by listening to what our
Turkish Muslim people want. What they want is an Islamic sense of justice and the
restoration of their Ottoman-Islamic identity."( quoted in Yavuz 2003, 207)

Erbakan and his close associates named their new movement the National Outlook
Movement (Milli Gorii~ Hareketi, MGH) before they had established the MNP. The

M. Zahit Kotku (1897-1980) was the leader ofiskenderp~a Cemaati (Cemaat: Community) which is a
prominent branch of the Nak~ibendi order. The N~ibendi order is one of the oldest Islamic orders, it
was established by Muhammed Bahaeddin Nak~ibend ( 1318-13 89). For Kotku's life visit:
http://www.iskenderpasa.com/MZK/hayati.asp For the iskenderp~a Cemaati:
http://www.iskenderpasa.com/Default.asp
51
The spiritual leader of a religious order ($eyh in Turkish).

50
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followers of Zahit Kotku first mobilized a group of community leaders and merchants to get
Necmettin Erbakan to the Grant National Assembly of Turkey ( Tiirldye Biiyiik Milfet

Meclisi, TBMM) fromKonya (a conservative city in central Turkey) in 1969. K otkuand
his followers set the organizational model and necessary networks for the formation and
evolution ofMGH into MSP (Yavuz 2003, 207-208). Before analyzingislamismin Turkey,
a brief overview of the Gramscian concepts will be provided below as they relate to
Islamism in Turkey as a social movement.
Antonio Gramsci ( 1891-193 7) was a leading Italian Marxist, a journalist, and a
major theorist who spent his last years inMussolini's prisons in Italy. In Prison Notebooks
Gramsci developed a new Marxist theory applicable to the conditions of advanced
capitalism. Gramsci did not depart from the classical Marxian analysis of capitalism, and
like Marx, Gramsci recognized that the struggle between the ruling class and the working
class was the driving force that moved society forward. However, Gramsci departed from
the traditional Marxist view of how the ruling class ruled. It was here that Gramsci made a
major contribution to modern thought in his concept of the role played by ideology. (Burke
2005).
With the rise of fascism and the failure of the Western European organized labor
movements, Gramsci contemplated on the questions of why the working class was not
necessarily revolutionary, and why it could be defeated by fascism (Gitlin 1994, 516).
According to Gramsci, the term ideology is often seen as referring simply to a system of
ideas and beliefs. However, it is closely tied to the concept of power. The traditional
Marxist theory of power was one-sided in its analysis ofthe role of force and coercion as
the basis of ruling class domination. For Gramsci, what was missing in Marx's theory of

52

Liitfi Dogan, former head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DiB, Diyanet i~leri Ba§kanltgt) from
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power was an lUlderstanding ofthe "subtle but pervasive forms of ideological control and
manipulation that served to perpetuate all repressive structures" (Boggs, 38). Thus,
Gramsci identified two distinct forms ofpolitical control: domination, and hegemony.
Domination referred to direct physical coercion by the government, and hegemony referred
to both ideological control through the control of culture and more crucially, consent.

Gramsci assumed that no regime, regardless ofhow repressive itmightbe,couldmaintain
its authority mainly through coercion. In the long run, as Gramsci theorized, it had to have
popular support and legitimacy in order to maintain stability (Simms 2002, 564; Burke
2005).
For Gramsci hegemony is the permeation of an entire system of values, attitudes,
beliefs and morality throughout society and i thas the effect of supporting the status quo in
power relations. In Gramsci' s lUlderstanding, hegemony becomes an "organizing principle"
that is diffused by the process of socialization into every aspect of human life. Depending
upon the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalized by the population, it
becomes part of what is generally called "common sense" so that the philosophy, culture
and morality of the ruling elite comes to appear as the natural order of things (Boggs 1976,
39, quoted in Burke 2005). Gramsci believes that there exist two processes of attaining
hegemony: eliminating or subordinating oppos ing forces, and winning active or passive
consent of subaltern allies (Gramsci 53). Later Gramsci discusses the interdependence of
force and consent; he maintains that:
The methodological criterion on which our own study must be based is the following:
that the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'domination' and as
'intellectual and moral leadership'. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which
it tends to 'liquidate', or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and
allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 'leadership' before
winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the

1968 to 1971.
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winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but
even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 'lead' as well (57-8).

Gramsci maintains that domination without intellectual and lll)ral leadership is not
hegemony. Where Gramsci discusses the Piedmont situation, in which social groups
emerged that wanted to dominate, but not to 1ead; he says that this situation does not
constitute hegemony. He says: "It is one of the cases in which these groups have the
function of "domination" without that of "leadership": dictatorship without hegemony"
(Gramsci, 106). According to Gramsci, the crisis of hegemony happens when the ruling
class loses the consent of the masses, or when there is a mobilization oflarge subordinate
classes (peasantry or intellectual petit bourgeoisie) against the ruling class. Gramsci
argues that in such crisis situations anything can happen, and the ruling class usually
attempts to reassert its control by using violent solutions to quell the opposition (Gramsci,
210-211 ). To Gramsci, cultural institutions like the state, school, and church persuade the
subordinated class to conform and consent to the political status-quo and therefore to their
own domination. Gramsci also develops the idea of counter-hegemony as an oppositional
force through whichrevol utionaries subvert the ruling class ideology and substitute
democratic socialism for capitalism. To accomplish this, the subordinated classes must
develop counter-hegemonic institutions and ideologies of their own in order to carry out a
universal coup through cultural subversion rather than violence. Gramsci' s conception of
intellectuals 53 is broad. Teachers, politicians and theologians create and perpetuate cultural
values thus producing both hegemony and counter-hegemony. Traditional intellectuals
originate and espouse dominant ideology, whereas organic intellectuals create counterhegemonic ideals and "establish anti-ruling class institutions and platforms of expression
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that challenge the right-to-rule of the dominant group." These revolutionary minded
ideologues must gradually build a "liberatory ideology" that will eventually become
universal by replacing the ideology of the dominant classes (Simms, 565).
Gramsci believes that the way of challenging the dominant hegemony is through
political activity. However, Gramsci proposed a distinction between two different kinds of
political strategies to for the revolutionaries to reach their goals: i) oor ofmanoeuvre, and
ii) oor ofposition. The war of manoeuvre is a frontal attack; and the main goal is a quick
victory. It is recommended for societies with a centralized and dominant state power that
have failed in developing a stronghegemonywithin the civil society (like the Bolshevik
Revolution of 1917). However, the war of position is a long struggle primarily through the
civil society. Besides taking control of the civil society, for Gramsci, the revolutionary
forces should also struggle to gain control through culture and ideology. Gramsci suggests
this type of struggle (war of position) for the liberal-democratic societies ofWestern
capitalism with relatively weaker states but stronger hegemonies (i.e., Italy) because
Gramsci believes that these countries have more extensive and intricate civil societies that
deserve a longer and more complex strategy (Stillo 1999).
The ideology of the MGH revolves around doing service to religion and enabling
the political representation of the religion. Ytldtz (2003, 189-190) argues that the MGH is
a particular synthesis of religious and non-religious themes reconciling traditional Islam,
modernism and politics. However, the MGH' s modernism was limited to scientific and
technological progress and de finitely did not include cultural and religious transformations
of the Turkish society. Indeed, the intellectual sources ofErbakan and the MGH is an
"amalgam of traditional Sunni-based Islamic culture and Sufi [mystic] worldview

53

Gramsci's conception of traditional and organic intellectuals are going to be discussed in the following
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embedded within a developmentalist

discourse 54"

(Yildtz 2003, 189). In the MGH' s

political discourse, the backwardness and subordination of the Muslim world (including
Turkey) were associated with the domination of global Western imperialism. Erbakan and
his associates argued that promoting a strong Islamic consciousness/piety and heavy
industrialization would be the key solutions to end Western exploitation and domination of
the Muslim world.
Yildtz further argues that the MGH intended to promote an Islamic message in the
guise of nationalistic expression. While doing that, the movement elites took the advantage
of double connotations of the word milli in Turkish: national and religious (referring to the
Ottoman millet system). Yildtz further argues that the ideological core of the MGH is a
combination of traditionalist discourse and a modern but defensive conception of so-called
Western science and technology which are readily welcomed through establishing
references to the Islamic roots of science and technology. Another central issue ofthe
MGH's discourse is the emulation of the Western way of life by the Turks. According to
the MGH's narratives, the Turkish nation has undergone a fundamental moral degeneration
due to blindly emulating the Western way of life. The MGH's followers also hold this
emulation responsible for the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. By going back to the
origins oflslamand by applying the underlying Islamic ethics, the MGH discourse urges
the Turks to undergo a spiritual renewal (Yildtz 2003, 189-190).
The MGH's perception of the Atati.irkist ideology is similar to Grarnscian notion of
hegemonic ideology in several ways. First of all, for the MGH followers, ideology is

sections.
54
This two-sided understanding of development (both spiritual and material) is expressed in Turkish
Islamists' literature as zulcenaheyn (two-winged).
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closely tied to the concept of power. In other words, the MGH's perception55 of its
political struggle vis-a-vis Kemalism is pretty similar to what Gramsci thinks ofthe
ideology of dominant classes in capitalist societies: "subtle but pervasive forms of
ideological control and manipulation that served to perpetuate all repressive structures"
(Boggs, 38). Many of the interviewees who were from the MGH movement shared the
same perspective towards ideology (i.e., hegemonic). They tended to understand Kemalist
56

ideology in terms of"ideological control and manipulation" exerted by the secularist
elites of Turkey.

The Interviewees' Profile
Many of my respondents were outspoken about the secularist regime and the secular
principles stated in the Turkish constitution as part of the Kemalist ideology. Indeed, many
have spoken more openly as they had already been informed by me earlier that their names
would not be disclosed. Although some of my interviewees did not want me to conceal
their names, I had to opt for anonymity to not to gettheminvol ved in any legal persecution
because oftheir critical statements.
I conducted a total offorty-nine interviews in three cities (Ankara, istanbul and
Samsun). I stayed in istanbul briefly, thus the bulk of my interviews took place in Ankara
and S amsun. Seven of the forty-nine interviewees described themselves as non-Islamists.
Three of the forty-nine voted for the MHP, the nationalist party; and the other four voted for
the secularists CHP. I had two unfinished interviews, so they were not included into this
study. One of those two felt uncomfortable and did not want to talk, and the other had an

55

This can be clearly seen in the m-itings of Islarnist political m-iters like Abdurrahman Dilipak, Ahmet

T~getiren, Hekimoglu ismail, Ali Bula<; (his earlier m-itings), Mustafa Karahasanoglu and others.
56

This point will be discussed in detail under section F: Islamists Push Forward in the War ofPosition
and the subsequent subsections.
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important phone call just after our conversation started and had to leave; and later I did not
have a chance to meet that individual again. The interviews took place during the period
after the third week of July until the end of August. After finishing my interviews in Turkey,
from August 2007 until late April 2008, I conducted additional eight phone interviews with
people whom I got in touch through my contacts in Turkey. I purposefully hadeightmore
phone interviews after having forty-two face to face interviews with the Islamist
interviewees just to complete the total number of my Islamist respondents to fifty.
Eleven of the fifty interviewees were graduates of the imam-Hatip schools; three of
the eleven were working as prayer leaders in Ankara (2) and Sarnsun (1 ). Seventeen of the
fifty were of rural origins (recently moved to the city for finding a new job or for pursuing
his/her education); two of the seventeen were still living in rural areas. Nine of the fifty
were female interviewees; seven of the nine female interviewees described themselves as
Islamists, the remaining two eli d not. Twenty-eight interviewees had four-year college or
two-year vocational school degrees; sixteen had high school degrees, and the remaining
five had either the basic elementary or secondary school education or were high school
dropouts. One of my interviewees was illiterate.
Age of the interviewees was unevenly distributed across different age categories.
The following age categories are arbitrarily created. Since snowball sampling was used,
age was not used as a determinant of who would become an interviewee. Eleven
interviewees were between the ages of 18-24; fourteen were between 25-34; twelve were
between 35-44; nine were between 45-54; and the remaining nine were above the age of
55.
A small part of the interviewees were individuals whom I knew personally,
however, the majority of the interviewees were people whom I met through my
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connections. Mainly, the snowball sampling was used; and often times to gain the trust of

interviewees, I had to declare that I was a close friend of person x whom the interviewee
knew personally. To a certain degree, this had to be done because it facilitated some form
of trust between me and my interviewees. This enabled me to gain the trust of the
interviewees and my interviewees were more open in their statements and they were more
willing to talk. In fact, the period during which my interviews took place was a politically
vibrant period just after the July parliamentarian elections when the AKP increased its
votes to 47 %. Thus, people were willing to talk about politics, and the debates over the
relationship be tween Islam and pol itics in Turkey were being done in full swing.
One finding of my interviews was that Turkish Islarnists were highly against
Kemalist secularism. 84% of the interviewees believed that as it was applied in Turkey,
secularism was not the same as secularism as applied in advanced democratic Western
countries. 92% of the interviewees believed that secularism in Turkey was used as a "tool
to oppress religion." And finally, 82% ofthe interviewees believed that the government in
Turkey was trying to control religion through various means. For instance 62% of the
interviewees mentioned governmental control and restrictions over religious education as a
means to control religion. 68 %believed that imposing the headscarfban was a means for
control over religion. Muharrem was one of those interviewees who were highly critical of
secularism. He worked for the municipal government of Ankara in a junior administrative
position. After finishing the jmam Hatip57 High School in Kayseri (a conservative city in
central Turkey) in the late 1980s, he came to Ankara where his older brother lived to
pursue his college degree in public relations. During his high school years in Kayseri, as a

57

imam Hatip schools are established and run by the Turkish government for the purpose of educating
prayer leaders and preachers for the official religious establishment in Turkey-Diyanet i#eri Ba~kanltgt
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teenager, Muharrem frequently attended conferences and panel discussions organized by
the MGH bringingprominentlslamistwriters and the (current and/or prospective) MGH
followers together. After finishing college inAnkara,pr imarilythroughhis older brother's
connections with the MGH, Muharrem found a job in the municipal government of Ankara.
Melih G5kyek, 58 an Islamist from the RP, took over the mayorship of Ankara from the
secularist CHP in 1994 nrunicipal elections. In our conversation, Muharrem argued that
AtatUrk and his followers were extremely elitist and established and official ideology for
the purpose of manipulating the masses. He remarked: "sovereignty never truly belonged to
people in Turkey ...the secularists say that sovereignty belongs tope ople, buttheyhave
never respected the masses ... Kemalists have never been sincere." 59
The Road to the Coup of 1980
Through the 1970s, unstable coalition gove rnments 60 of Turkey were unable to
solve the country's economic and social problems and failed to reach a consensus as

(The Directorate of Religious Affairs) which controls all of the mosques throughout the country {jmam:
Prayer leader, Hatip: Preacher).
58
M. Gokc;ek is still the major of Ankara \\hich is the capital of Thrkey.
59
Earlier in our conversation Muharrem was referring to one of Atattirk's most well known sayings about
sovereignty. In several of his sayings, M. Kemal Atattirk's assigned sovereignty directly to the Turkish
people. The most well known is: "Hakimiyet kayztszz $Ortszz milletindir (Without any reservations,
sovereignty belongs to the nation)" which is written on the wall of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
60
Previously, the MNP was shut down by the Constitutional Court of Turkey, primarily due to the
pressure from the Turkish military, on May 20, 1971 shortly after the establishment of the party, on the
grounds that it violated the secularist principles of the Turkish Constitution. Thus, the MSP was
established in October 1972 to succeed the MNP. In the 1973 general elections, the MSP got 11.8
percent of the total wtes and later became a coalition partner in successive governments. To the surprise
of many, the MSP became a coalition partner with the secularist CHP, \\hich at that time was led by
Btilent Ecevit. However, Ecevit's coalition government did not last long after Turkey's costly military
operation in Cyprus in the summer of 1974. The MSP later became a coalition partner in a new''National
FrontGovernment" on March 31, 1975 formed tmder the leadership of the center-right AP led by
Suleyman De mire!. A third coalition partner of the National Front was the nationalist MHP led by
Alpaslan Ttirke~. After the June 1977 general elections, the MSP was also included in the second National
Front Government formed by Demirel. Demirel resigned in July 1977, however he returned to power in
August as the head of an almost identical coalition government including the MSP, MHP, and AP.
However he was forced to resign again due to defections from his own party in December. Later, Ecevit
formed a coalition government in January 1978 with a promise to deal with the economic problems and
political violence that was increasing as a result of the clashes between the extreme left and right groups.
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antagonism between the radical left and radical right escalated into violent clashes on the
streets. On September 12, 1980 the Turkish military led by the Chief of Staff Gen. Kenan
Evren seized power in a bloodless coup and restructured the country with a newly drafted
constitution in 1982 written under the military rule which lasted until 1983 61 • After the
coup d' etat of 1980, t he military government in Turkey, which ruled the country for three
years until the parliamentary elections of 1983, banned all political activities in Turkey,
closed down all political parties, and imprisoned the leaders of political parties.
Civil Society and the Islamist Politics in the Aftermath of the Military Rule
Cohen and Arato differentiate political society, civil society and economic
society from each other. In their formulation, political society includes political parties,
political institutions and legislative organs ofthe governments while economic society
includes businesses, manufacturers, industries, service sectors, distributors, and firms. On
the other hand, civil society is a buffer between the political society, the economic society
and the ordinary citizens. Civil society organizations act like an intermediary between the
state and citizens by continuously creating new identities anddemandingmore democracy
and rights. civil society groups struggle for making the institutions of political society more
receptive to the newly emerging identities and demands, and they can become a major
driving force behind democratization and accountability of political leaders (Cohen and
Arato 1997). In other words, " ... the mediating role of political society between civil
society and the state (political society sets up receptors for the influence of civil society) is
indispensable, but so is the rootedness of political society in civil society" (Cohen, 38).
Thus, the relationship oflslamist movements with civil society and democracy in Turkey is

After the October 1979 elections, the AP established an a! l-AP minority government backed by the MHP
and MSP (Narli 1999, 39).
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largely determined by the nature of relationship between the political society and the state
in Turkey since among other things, one of the major purposes of the Islamist civil society
groups is to carry the underrepresented and muted Islamist voices and views into the public
realm (Kadwglu 2005, 27-28).
After the 1980 c oup, during the military rule, the Turkish military "imposed a new
constitution that restricted the activities oflabor unions and voluntary associations and
abolished the autonomous status of the university and state-run television and radio."
However, ironically, the junta depended on Islamic institutions and symbols for
legitimization because the junta was seeking to discredit the leftist and rightist ideologies.
The military regime was hoping to create a more homogeneous and less political Islamic
community by fusing Islamic ideas with national goals under the supervision of the state.
Before the coup, Turkish society was greatly divided by ideological polarization between
the extreme left and the right; "Islam, in this radical departure from the military's past
practices, offered a way to reduce or even eliminate the cultural differences that led to the
polarization of Turkish society." Interestingly, the leadership of the coup "considered Islam
a pacifying and submissive ideology preferable to the threat of communism'' (Yavuz 1997,
67). To realize their goals, the generals of the military regime actively used an organization
named Aydmlar Ocag1 (Association of Intellectuals' Hearth) which contributed to the
creation of an ideologyknownas Tiirk-islam Sentezi (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis). 62

61

For detailed accounts of the period, see Ahmad (1993) and ZUrcher ( 1998).
The military leaders have associated themselves with the ideology. With their support, a group of
conservative scholars created consent for the consolidation of state power \\flo organized themselves into
theAydmlar Ocag1 (Association of Intellectuals' Hearth) (<;etinsaya 1999, 373-376; Kaplan 2002, 114).
The members of the association were cultural nationalists. For them, religion was indispensable and Islam
was the essence of the national culture. They believed that "Turkishness and Islam cannot be split from
each other; cannot be thought separately; and cannot be listed in order of priority." They reinterpreted the
nation and state as a family and as a community, and selectively used Ottoman-Islamic ideas to make the
past relevant to the present. By drawing attention to the danger of ideological fragmentation to the family,
nation, and state, they attempted to reunify the Turkish citizens after a decade of terror and anarchy
62
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Newer Qur' anic seminaries were opened during the military rule, religious classes in
elementary, middle and high schools became compulsory, and additional imams (prayer
leaders) were employed bythe government(Margulies and Ytldtzoglu, 148-149; Kaplan,
2002; Gole, 1996).

Political Engineering, Government Led Depoliticization, and Political Alienation of the
Masses after the Coup
After a decade of terror in the 1970s, the coup leaders sought to depoliticize
Turkey through social engineering with the help of The Intellectual's Hearth and the
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. The communitarian nature of the Turkish state after the military
coup of 1980 become evident(Yavuz 1997, 68). Another aspect of the period after the coup
was promotingAtatUrk by the military as a national symbol to unite the nation. 63 The 1981
"Atatlirk is Hundred Years Old Campaign" was celebrated extensively throughout the
schools, the military, and the public bureaucracy by the orders of the military regime
(OzyUrek 2006, 101-102). Additionally, all elementary school kids (1 st_8th grades) start
their day in schools by reciting the National Pledge64 (Milli And) which reads:
I am a Turk, I am trustworthy, I amhardworking.Myfirstprincipleistoprotectmy
minors and to respect my elders, and to love my motherland and my nation more than
myself. My goal is tor ise and to progress. 0 AtatUrk the great! I swear that I will
continuously walk through the path you opened and towards the target you pointed. May
I be sacrificed for the Turkish nation. How happy is the one who says: "I am a Turk."

inflicted by the extreme rightists and leftists. They were, however, against radical religious movements.
They argued that Turkish people would remain respectful towards religion; however Turkey would never
be a theocracy (<;etinsaya, 374; Yavuz 1997, 68).The association "put forth amoral and philosophical
rationale for the [Turkish-Islamic] Synthesis ... to legitimize the hegemony of the new ruling elite" (Yavuz
1997, 68). In addition to the heavy use oflslamic symbols and culture, the organization was strictly
antisocialist which overlapped with the antisocialist stance of the generals. In return, this favored the
religious right to a great extent after the military coup of 1980.
63
All governmental offices and classrooms must have a portrait of AtatUrk, the Turkish National Anthem
(Milli Mar~). and AtatUrk's Address to the Turkish Youth (Atatiirk 'iin Gen9lige Hitabesi), framed and
hanged high on a visible wall, and elementary school kids have to memorize the National Anthem and
Atati.irk's Address and recite them on Monday mornings and Friday afternoons before Atatiirk's bust on a
r.edestal found in the yard of every school (public or private) in Turkey.
4
All translations from Turkish have been made by me unless stated otherwise.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

120
The junta established a civilian cabinet "to carry on the day-to-day administration
of the country" (Hale 1994, 24 7) and ruled Turkey with non-political technocrats 65 who
were mainly older bureaucrats, university professors, and retired high rank officers. Before
the end of the military rule, the generals created a new constitution in 1982 that guaranteed
the dominance of the army in Turkish politics through the newly created National Security
Council (Milli Giivenlik Kurulu, MGK), and scheduled parliamentarian elections for
November 1983. In the new constitution, the president was given extraordinary powers

66

;

the leader of the junta, Gen. Evren automatically became the new president of the country,
and all members of the pre-coup parliament were disqualified from political activity for
five years and all party leaders for ten. The MGK was given extraordinary powers

67

(ZUrcher 1998; Ahmad 1993).
With such extraordinary powers, the junta leaders were determined to depoliticize
the people through "crushing every manifestation of dissent from the left, including
revolutionaries, social democrats, trade unionists, and even members of the nuclear
disarmament movement." By January of 1981 there were about 30,000 people in detention.

65

The most significant appointments were those ofTurgut Ozal who became deputy prime minister with
responsibility for the economy, and Kaya Erdem, a close associate of Ozal 's and a former official of the
Turkish Central Bank who was appointed finance minister (Ahmad 1993, 183).
66
The 1982 Constitution which was written during the military rule (1980-1983) established a
strengthened presidency in the parliamentarian system of Turkey. Thus, many appointments for key
bureaucratic positions like the director of state radio and television (Tlirkiye Radyo Televizyon Kururnu,
1R1), the director of the Higher Education Council (Yiiksek Ogretim Kururnu, YOK), governors of
provinces ( valis) and subprovinces (kaymakams ), and ambassadors have to be approved by the president.
The president does not have the authority to initiate legislation, however the president is to enact laws
passed by the TGNA within 15 days. With the exception of budgetary laws, the president may return a law
to the 1GNA for reconsideration. If the 1GNA reenacts the law, it is binding. Constitutional amendments
require a two-thirds majority for approval. They also may be submitted to popular referendum. The
rresident can also refer legislation to the Constitutional Court.
7
Additionally, the existing Martial Law Act was amended which gave the army more powers. The
generals could now carry out crude censorship, ban strikes, public meetings and demonstrations, suspend
newspapers and other publications, and dismiss local and central government staff whose employment was
deemed "undesirable without right of appeal." The extent of depoliticization also reached the universities.
The Board of Higher Education ( Yilksek Ogre tim Kurumu, YOK) was established to oversee
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Ahmad reflects the harsh conditions created by the martial law authorities after the military
coup (1993, 185):
The use of torture, never uncommon, now became widespread and systematic, with a
number of suspects and prisoners dying in suspicious circumstances. The regime never
denied the existence of torture; it merely claimed that it W<IS the work of rogue
policemen and not policy, and that all charges were investigated and the guilty punished.

The new law on parties went into effect on 24 April 1983 and the following day,
the MGK lifted the ban on politics. The new law required that parties be founded by at
least 30 citizens (excluding the previously disqualified 723 ex-politicians) and gave the
MGK the pow er to veto any founding members without pr ovi ding any explanation. Within a
matter of weeks 17 parties were established, however only two of them had any
substance. 68 The junta allowed only three parties to compete in the November 1983
elections: The Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyet9i Demokrasi Partisi MDP) led by
retired Gen. Sunalp, Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi ANAP), and
Necdet Calp's Populist Party (Halkfl Parti, HP).69 When the polls indicated that Ozal was
ahead of Sunalp and Calp, the generals ofthe junta decided that President Evren and Prime
Minister Ulusushouldsupport Sunalp openly and attack Ozal. Both men expressed their
open support for Sunalp and attacked Ozal in a panel discussion broadcasted live on
November 4, just two days before the elections. This event changed Turkish politics after
the junta because the voters became even more hostile towards the "state party" and

postsecondary education in Turkey. Director and members ofYOK are directly appointed by the president
1993; Chtena 1999).
8
One W<IS the Social Democratic Party (Sosyal Demokratik Parti, SODEP) established by Erda! inonU,
the son of ismet inonli who was a close associate of Atatlirk, former president (2nd), and former prime
minister. The other was the Great Turkey Party (Biiyiik Tiirkiye Partisi, BTP) which was Demirel 's AP in
a disguise. Generals of the MGK closed down the BTP. Though, SODEP was not banned, the MGK vetoed
its founders and prevented it from contesting in the election.
69
It is still a matter of debate why the junta did not ban Ozal's ANAP. Indeed, the junta never expected
ANAP to win because the junta was openly supporting Sunalp's MDP and the generals were expecting it to
win the parliamentary elections of November 1983. People associated Sunalp and Calp with the
bureaucratic, repressive state, and it WGlS only Ozal who projected the liberal, anti-statist, and antibureaucratic image and the promise of a quick return to civilian rule.
~Ahmad
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Turkish citizens predominantly voted for ANAP. The MDP achieved only 23.3 %, the HP
got 30.5 %, and ()zal's ANAP got 45.2% of the votes (Ahmad 1993, 188-190).

Controlled Liberalization And The Reemergence Of Political Islamism
ZUrcher (1998) points out that Ozal's ANAP was a strange coalition of various
ideological currents and interest groups, who had joined it partly because they had
nowhere else to go under the military's restrictive policies. The party attracted the support
of the old center-right AP, the MSP and the MHP. Ozal's personality was crucial to the
party; in fact, Ozal was related with both camps: he had previously worked both for the
private sector and the State Planning Organization70 (Dcvlct Planlama Tc~kilatJ), and he
had connections with the Na~ibcndi order through his elder brother KorkutOzal who had
been a leading member of the MSP since its establishment. Moreover, Ozal was down to
earth and was from a modest background; he was coming from a middle class family from
Malatya, a city in eastern Turkey. Like Demirel, Ozal was the kind of politician with whom
the average Turk could identify. In fact, Ozal' s election slogans often referred to
strengthening the ortadirck(middle class), which literally meant the center pole of a tent
(ZUrcher 1998, 297).
Due to Ozal's neoliberal economic policies coupled with an export oriented
approach, small and medium scale manufacturing industries rapidly grew as the
government pol icy has encouraged their growth by taking an active role in the construction
of organized industrial districts for small and medium-size enterprises. 71 Gtilalp (2001,
435-436) points out that political Islam found a particularly fertile ground in the rise of

70

The State Planning Organization (SPO) is an official agency working under the Prime Ministry assisting
the Cabinet to formulate and implement developmental goals. The SPO was established in 1960.
71
Giilalp (200 1) notes that by 1997, there were 3 6 such districts, housing several thousand
establishments. Of these 36 districts, only 6 were built during the twenty-five years between 1962 and
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petty entrepreneurship especially in the provinces of central Turkey. Students of Turkish
politics recognize this newly emerging class oflslamist entrepreneurs as "Anatolian
Tigers" 72 (Anadolu Kaplan/an), and the financial resources that they controlled as "Green
Capital" 73 ( l2$il Sermaye). Not all of these petty entrepreneurs were necessarily Islamists;
however the Islamist segment of the business class comes primarily from among this
sector. 74
Later in 1990, those entrepreneurs would join forces and establish M0SiAD75
(Glilalp 2001, 437-438). This "green" or "Islamic" capital was invested in different
sectors. The religious orders and brotherhoods (tari.kat) received new freedoms under
Ozal' s period of controlled liberalization. Indeed, Ozal was not an Islamist, however he
was a member of the Nalqibendis,· and his older brother Korkut Ozal was one of the
founders of the MSP. DuringOzal's prime ministryandpresidencythese new groups were
"allowed to officially finance the construction of private schools and universities, and they
established social services for the feeding of the poor and handed out scholarships to
students in schools and universities." Currently, there are an estimated 130 separate
religious orders in Turkey with a total of approximately 10 million members

(Karaka~

2007, 20).

1987, ooereas 30 have been built since 1987. Establishments within these districts were given generous
tax advantages.
72
Analogous to "Asian Tigers".
73
Green, by many, is considered as the color oflslam, yet this has no religious basis.
74
Ozal's Neoliberal policies provided new opportunity spaces for the Islamist entrepreneurs. Indeed, the
post-1980 period has seen the rise of new companies whose establishment depended on the limited
savings of many partners and/or shareholders. YiMP ~ and KOMBASSAN are two such companies. They
have both become successful businesses in a short time frame. Moreover, the "Anatolian tigers" have not
limited their activities to Turkey. They are also trying to expand their businesses into Europe, America,
and Asia. There is no doubt that these associations and businesses are contributing to the Turkey's
economic development (<;aha 2001, 43).
75
MUSiAD, (The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen-Miistakil Sanayici ve
j$adamlan Dernegi), its philosophy and activities will be discussed in detail through the end of this
chapter.
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The Just Order (Adil Diizen)
On July 19, 1983, after the junta leaders decided to allow elections, Ali TUrkmen
and his thirty friends 76 established the RP. Tiirkmen was a proxy for Erbakan who was
imprisoned and banned from politics during the military regime. After political restrictions
for ex-politicians were lifted with a national referendum on September 6, 1987, Erbakan
became the new leader of the party. 77 The most appealing program that the RP presented
was the Just Order platform78 (Adil Diizen), and most RP supporters identified social
equity as the main objective of the Just Order. 79 The Just Order was first introduced in
1985 into the RP's party program and it is based on a theoretical charter that introduced by
two Islamist university professors (Siileyman KaragUlle and Siileyman Akdemir) who
founded Turkey's first Muslim commune, the Akevler Koopertifiin izmir.
Right before the 1991 parliamentary elections Erbakan presented the Just Order to
the Turkish audience with a booklet, Just Economic Order, under his name (Yavuz 2003,
221 ). Many RP supporters associate the Just Order with concepts like justice, stability, and
ending bribery, nepotism and corruption, respect for basic rights and freedoms, and an end
to undue Western influence over Turkey. Erbakan' s youth associations under the MGH
utilized the structural opportunity of the imam-Hatip schools and appealed to the alienated

76

At least thirty founders were required to establish a political party according to the Law on Parties.
Indeed, almost all ofthe ex-politicians returned to politics. Demirel became the leader of the True Path
Party, Ecevit the Democratic Left Party, and Alpaslan Ttirke~ the Nationalist Labor Party which later
changed its name to the Nationalist Action Party.
78
More information on the Just Order can be found on the FP's website at: http://www.saadet.org.tr/ The
FP also has a website in English at http://www.saadet.org.tr/english.asp which is not as comprehensive as
its website in Turkish. Or, see Milli Q>zfun Dergisi (Journal of National Solution) at
http://www.millicozum.com
79
At the Third General Convention of the RP in October 7, 1990 Erbakan voiced the Just Order and since
then it has been used as the fundamental slogan of the party. The Just Order is more than a radical
criticism of Capitalism. Issues like social solidarity, prevention of WclSte, progressive taxation, equal
governmental services for everyone, equal income distribution, and abolition of interest are the main
pillars of the Just Order (Ytldtz 2003, 192; Karagillle 2007). Yawz argues that the Just Order ''marked
one of the first times a group of Muslim professionals used Islamic precepts to justify notions usually
77
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conservative masses of the gecekondus (shantytowns) through framing strategies that
framed Islam either through a promise for social justice (Adil Diizen, Just Order) or a
pledge for Shari'a rule through electoral politics for more politicized religious masses.
Just like its Islamist counterparts in the other Muslim countries, the powerful message of
"Islam is the solution" ( (:6ziim hlamda .0 was delivered to the alienated poor dwellers of

gecekondus by providing social services through Islamist social/charity organizations.
Kamil, one of my interviewees, shared Muharrem's views on the Just Order. Kamil
is a retired civil servant who worked for the Directorate of Population and Citizenship
Affairs (NiitiJs ve Vatanda$1Ik i$feri Miidiirliigi.J) under the Ministry of Interior in a small
town in central Turkey. He pointed out that he was coming from a very conservative family
and learned how to pray when he was in the elementary school and started to go to the
neighborhood mosque with his father. 80 Since his early adulthood, Kamil supported the
MGH, attended many conferences organized by the movement, read its literature, and voted
for the MSP since its establishment. Kamil believed that Turkish people either partially
understood or did not get the concept of the Just Order. He remarked by shaking his head
from right to left in a sad tone: "opponents of the RP often slandered and ridiculed the Just
Order and Erbakan, and the majority of the Turkish people believed those false accusations
and ridicule by the secularist media." Kamil also strongly believed that the media in
Turkey was controlled by anti-Islamic secularist writers and producers who often enjoy
slandering and ridiculing Muslims and Islam In our interview, he remarked: "Thank God!
(Elhamdlilil/ah.0 Muslims are newly gaining strength in the media, but this is not still

enough to break the secularists' monopoly in the media."

associated with liberal ideologies, namely pluralism, democracy, the free market, and individual
responsibility"
80
As opposed to many Arab Muslims,
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The RP' s Electoral Record
The RP' s electoral record shows a sudden gradual increase over the years. Before
Erbakan, under Ahmet Tekdal's leadership the RP participated in local elections and won
mayoral seats in two eastern cities (Van and Urfa) by receiving 4.4 %of the total votes.
After Erbakan's takeover of the party leadership, in the parliamentary election of 1987 the
RP increased its share of votes to 7.2 %. However, the party was short of the ten percent
threshold 81 required to gain a seat in the Turkish parliament. After winning9.8% of the
votes in 1989 local elections, the RP elites formed a purely pragmatic alliance with the
MHP and Reformist Democratic Party (Islahaffi Demokrasi Partisi, IDP) on September
23, 1991. After the Alliance won 16.9% ofthe votes in the 1991 general elections, and
gained s bcty-two seats in parliament; within a month twenty-two deputies from the MHP
and IDP resigned from the RP returned to their parties.
The major turningpointfor the RP in Turkish politics was the RP's victory in the
local elections of 1994. On March 27, 1994, the RP won 19.7% of the national vote. ProIslamist majors took control of twenty-nine larger cities including istanbul and Ankara
which made the RP a significant force in Turkish politics (Yavuz 1997,71 -72). The
Islamist mayors of Ankara and istanbul were able to solve the chronic problems of citizens
with responsible fiscal management and a wide range of services affordable for
everyone. 82 One chronic problem of Ankara used to be the traffic jams. Gok<;ek, in several

81

The 550-member 1BMM (Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi, Turkish Grand National Assembly) carries
out legislative functions. Election is by proportional representation. To get seats, a party must obtain at
least 10% of the wtes cast at the national level. This threshold mechanism is intended to reduce the
likelihood of coalition governments by reducing the number of smaller parties in parliament.
82
Since the local elections of March 1994, RP mayors have \\Urked hard and offered better services to
the citizens by improving public services and solving many of the chronic problems of the larger cities in
their control. One such service was the Halk Ekmek Projesi (Bread for Citizens Project). Both istanbul
and Ankara municipalities established and started to run large automated bakery complexes in the
outskirts of istanbul and Ankara, and started to sell the standard 400 grams bread (approximately 14
ounces) for a cheaper price to people at several locations through the kiosks owned and operated by the
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years, was able to solve the problem by building several additional bridges and tunnels at
the busiest intersections and by streamlining the city's traffic in a more efficient way.
Rasim, one of my interviewees, is a shuttle bus driver for a private transportation company
that has contracts with several public institutions in Ankara. He enthusiastically said:
Before Gok<yek, there used to be heavy congestion at the intersections, so I could only
work for one institution. Now, I am \IDrking for t\\-0, because I do not waste time in city
84
traffic. By God, (VallahP) I am anAlevi ; and I used to vote for the CHP. My whole
family still wtes for the CHP, but after what Gok<yek had done, I am now voting for him.

It was right after the RP' s victory in the 1994 local elections when the RP scored
its second victory in the December 1995 parliamentary elections. The RP received 21.4 %
of the votes, became the leading party in the parliament. However, the number of the RP
seats was not enough to create a majority government; thus, in the summer of 1996, Erbakan
established a coalition government with Tansu <;iller's center-right True Path Party (Dogru

JiJJ Partisi, DYP) which received 19.2% percent of the votes and became the third. 85 Many
ordinary Turkish citizens associated the RP with positive attributes like honesty, justice
and equality. 86 At the ideational level, the RP deputies and mayors successfully framed the
means of solving the Turkish people's problems with Islamic notions of honesty, justice,

municipal governments. This was a significant service for the vast majority of poor and middle class
Turkish families since bread constitutes one of the major items in the Turkish people's diet. In Ke9i0ren,
a middle-class neighborhood of Ankara, one older housewife who was waiting on the line to buy some
loaves of bread said to me: "May Allah bless the mayor! [M. Gok<;ek], this [buying cheaper bread] is a
great contribution to our family budget." More information about the project (in istanbul) can be found at:
http://www.ihe.com.tr/english/default.asp (in English). For Ankara: http://www.ankhalkekmek.com.tr/ (in
Turkish).
83
Using the phrase Vallahi does not indicate piety (as using "Oh my God" in English does not indicate
p,iety). It is a common phrase often used in the Turkish language to emphasize a point.
4
The Alevis is an offshoot of the Shi'a, and they often vote for the secularist CHP. The Turkish-Alevi
beliefs and traditions are significantly different from the Shi 'a traditions and beliefs.
85
Refer to the Appendix for general election results in Turkey.
86
By citing the results of a 1995 survey, Yavuz argues that the party program of the RP is articulated in
Islamic concepts, and the RP managed to successfully establish a link between particular Islamic notions
and the contemporary social, economic and political problems of the people. For instance, in March
199 5, 172 people "OOre asked to identify the three most common characteristics of the RP. Over 70 % of
the respondents associated the RP with honesty ( duriistliik), justice (adalet), and equality ( e~itlik). Other
commonly cited characteristics are the RP's stance against corruption and bribery, protecting tradition
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socio-economic equality, observing others' rights (kul hak/a, i.e., refraining from violating
others' rights). 87

Structural Strains: The Secular Backlash and the February 28 Period
The RP-DYP coalition lastedonlyabouta year. The Turkish military took the
accession of the RP into government as confirmation of its belief that irtica (Islamist
reactionism) had become a substantial threat to the secular nature of the Turkish republic.
On February 28, 1997, less than a year after the establishment of the RP-DYP coalition
government, through the MGK the military issued a list of demands and measures designed
to reinstate the secular nature of the government and reverse the supposed Islamization of
Turkey. 88
The architects behind the February 28 process were the Turkish military, former
President SUleyman Demirel (1993-2000), the DSP, and the CHP, the members of the
judiciary, TUSiAD (Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen), the civil
societal network of the secular establishment, and the secular media. Article 35 and 85 of
the Internal Service Regulation of the Turkish Armed Forces state that the "Turkish military
shall defend the country against internal as well as external threats, if necessary by force."
Thus, the military justified its intervention on February 28, 1997 t hrough forcing the
coalition government to meet the demands of the military at the monthly MGK meeting as

and morals, helping the poor, sincerity, lUlity, solidarity, and elimination of social immorality (Yavuz
1997, 74; Giilalp 1999, 24).
87
Thus, people who voted for the RP deputies and mayors did so both through prospective and
retrospective judgment. That is, first people voted based on the promises made by the lslamist candidates
supported with strong Islamic concepts mentioned above (prospective judgment). Second, people voted
based on the record of public services that had been provided for them until the elections by the Islamist
deputies and mayors during their tenure (retrospective judgment).
88
The MGK., consisting of President Siileyman Demirel, Prime Minister Erbakan, three other ministers
from Erbakan's cabinet, and six generals convened for their regular monthly meeting. Different than the
previous meetings, this particular one resulted in a ''soft" coup d'etat against the government oflslamist
Erbakan. The generals had already changed the security doctrine of the military by defining irtica as the
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defending the country against their biggest perceived (internal) threat: Islamism. The
coalition government under the premiership of Erbakan did not last longer, and Erbakan
resigned on June 17, 1997 just four months after the declaration of the MGK decisions on
February 28.
The process, which is also called as a post-modern coup d'etat by many Turkish
commentators, was an attempt to reconstruct politics in Turkey by ensuring "the continuity
ofthe basic assumptions of the Kemalist model" (Cizre and c;mar 2003, 310). Immediately
after the implementation of the generals' demands, approximately 900 military officers and
several civil bureaucrats were expelled from their posts due to their alleged Islamic ways
of life (ASDER 2004; Arslan 2005, 45-4 7). Businesses affiliated with the Islamists were
labeled "green capital" and discriminated against in governmental contracts. The headscarf
banstrictlyremainedinplace in all educational institutions,andhundreds ofQur'an
courses and all ofthe secondary (middle) schools (61h_gth grades) ofthe imam-Hatips
were closed. 89 Mosque construction was restricted, and all mosques were placed under
state control.
During the February 28 pr ocess90 the Constitutional Court of Turkey (the highest
court in the country) closed down the RP, andErbakan was banned from politics for 10
years and Recep Tayyip Erdogan was abruptly sentenced to 10 months imprisonment for
reciting Gokalp's following verses: "Minarets are our bayonets, domes are our helmets,

primary national security threat, even more dangerous than the Kurdish terrorist group PKK (Partiya
Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers' Party), and other foreign adversaries, such as Syria and Greece.
89
According to the MGK declaration on March 31, 2001, the number of the Qur'anic courses closed by
the state reached to 370 and the personnel of religious institutions indicted by the state WciS 12,071. 'Kriz
~Iiacak," Milliyet, March 31, 2001.
90
The Turkish military was adamant about the February 28 project, and the generals appeared very
confident in the success of their policies. In 1999, when the Chief of the Turkish General Staff General
Htiseyin Ktvnkoglu, was asked about the prospects for the continuation of the process, he remarked: "If
necessary, February 28 process will last a thousand years" ('ilk Kez Konu~tu," Sabah, 9.4.1999).
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mosques are our barracks, believers are our soldiers" (Kocactoglu, 448-450). 91 The
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consequence of this sentence would mean a life-long ban from politics for Erdogan
because the Turkish Law on Parties stated that if someone had been convicted for
"political" reasons, he/she would be banned from politics for life. For the purpose of
overseeing the implementation ofthose measures, the MGK established a special unit
composed of the military personnel called Ba t1

(:ah~ma

Grubu (The WesternS tudy

Group) that directly reports to the MGK working within the Headquarters of the General
Staff in downtown Ankara (Kuru 2006, 183-184). The goal of the group was to collect
information about the political orientations of civil society groups, mayors, governors,
government employees, political party cadres, and media personalities.
The generals did not have a difficult time inimposingthis new doctrine upon the
civilian members of the council and had it approved as the official national security
doctrine immediately (Kuru 2006, 182). The generals forced the civilian members to sign a
program to fight irtica, which included drastic secular measures. The demands of the
generals from the government included: closing the Islamistparty (the RP) and banning its
leaders from politics, expanding teaching on Atati.irkism to cover almost all courses,
scrapping the secondary school system for the imam Hatip schools, introducing strict age
limitations for the Qur'anic seminaries (religious seminaries to teach the Qur'an),
appointing staunch Kemalists as university presidents, cleansing the public bureaucracy by
firings uspected I slamists, continuing the strict enforcement of the ban on headscarves for
females, and other similar discriminatory measures against the suspected Islamists (Cizre
and <;mar 2003, 310-312).

91

The poem was written by the founder of Turkish nationalism Ziya Gi:ikalp and published in a book
recommended by the Ministry of Education. See: Heper, M. and~· Toktruj (2003). ''Islam, Modernity, and
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The MGK's press declaration explains the rationale of the meeting by emphasizing
that "secularism in Turkey is not only the assurance of political regime, but also ... a way of
life."

92

In the following months, subsequent pressure from the military through the MGK

and the civilian component of the secular establishment (the bureaucracy, judiciary, and
secular media) led to the collapse of the coalition government in June 1997 (Cizre and
<;tnar 2003, 309). After the collapse of the coalition, a new coalition government was
formed with M. Ytlmaz's ANAP and B. Ecevit's DSP93 to implement the directives ofthe
military. Ytlmaz became the prime minister and Ecevit was the deputy prime minister. In
November 1998, after a vote of no confidence from the Turkish parliament the Ytlmaz
government ended due to corruption charges because ofYtlmaz's close ties to some
"underworld-linked businessmen bidding for state contracts" (Yavuz 2003, 250). President
Demirel nominated Ecevit to be prime minister who created a minority government until
the parliamentary elections of April 1999.
The February 28 process came as a shock to the Islamists who in general concluded
that the military's intervention into politics was a top-down effort of the secularist
establishment to protect the secularist nature of the regime. Indeed, there was a consensus
among the Islamist and secular commentators 94 on the media about the process. The
common belief was that it was a "secular reflex" to protect the secular nature of the
Turkish regime in the face of the rising Islamist politics. During the process, Islamist

Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case ofRecep Tayyip Erdogan." Muslim World. Vol. 93, pp.
157-185. Erdogan spent four months in prison.
92
MGK's Press Declaration, February 28, 1997, accessed at the web site of the MGK at
http://W\\<W.mgk.gov.tr/basinbildiri l997/28subatl997.htm September 16,2007. For 18 policy decisions
ofthe MGKonFebruary28, 1997, see Appendix.
93
The name for the new coalition was ANA-SOL (ANA from the ANAP, SOL from the DSP, Demokratik
Sol Parti)
94
For example, see Ali Bayramoglu's (a secular columnist) comments on the February 28 process in his
article "Laik tutumdan Ktzrl Elmacthga" Yeni ~afak, December 21, 2005 at:
http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2 00 5/aralik/21/ abayramoglu.html
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newspapers like Milli Gazete, Zaman, Yeni Safak, and Vakit criticized the authoritarian
top-down policies of the MGK.
The remarks of Hasan, one of the AKP officials in a suburb of Ankara, summarize
what many Islamist, including the old school Islamists of the SP, think about the February
28 process: "The military and the secularists did not want Islam and us Muslims to succeed
politically in this country. Our strengthening simply scared them; ... they have exploited
Atatlirk and his ideas to struggle with us." Hasan also commented that there was a law for
protecting Atatiirk"5 which could only happen in repressive countries. He found this
ridiculous because he thought that such laws belonged to backward countries that impose a
particular official ideology on their citizens. 96
My interviews revealed that Islamists in general believed that the way that the
principle of secularism had been applied in Turkey was contrary to the spirit of secularism
itsel£ Islamists claim that the secularist establishment in Turkey does not equally distance
itself from all religions since, as they claim, by top-down authoritarian policies, the
secularist establishment has been trying to eliminate Islamism from the political realm.

95

Actually he was referring to the Law on Crimes Committed Against Atatiirk (Atatilrk Hakkmda

i~lenilen Suflara Dair Kanun) \\hich is still in effect in Turkey. It is the Law number 5816 of the Turkish

penal code. It is also popularly known as the Law of Protecting Atatiirk (Atatiirk'ii Koruma Kanunu).
People who openly criticize Atatiirk could be inprisoned between 1-3 years upon conviction. If criticism
is committed through the media, the punishment is increased by fifty percent. Atilla Yayla, a respected
professor of Political Science and the president of Liberal Dii~iince Toplulugu (Liberal Thought
Association) was recently sentenced to 15 months in prison for allegedly insulting the memory of
Atatiirk. Later the court converted Yayla's sentence to a fine. The basis for his sentence was that a court in
izmir ruled that Yayla had violated the Law on Crimes Committed Against Atatiirk when he made the
following statement in a conference: "In the future we will be asked the question 'Why are this man's
[Atatiirk's] statues and photographs all over the place?' You cannot bury this issue. This will certainly be
debated."Yayla's defense la~ers appealed the sentence. For details, visit Sahin Alpay's article at Today's
Zaman at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetav.do?haberno=l33692 "Atatiirk and the
'Atatiirkist system ofthought'" Today's Zaman, 2.11.2008 accessed on2.13.2008.
96
Almost unanimously Islamists openly and harshly criticized the February 28 process. Among my
interviewees, Cezmi commented in a similar vein by referring to the military and the secularists: "Their
intentions are clear ... They can not openly fight against Islam in a country with a Muslim majority. So,
they use secularism as a pretext to punish us just for being Muslims, and just for coming up with a demand
to have a say in the politics of our country."
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Feyzullah is an Islamist lawyer whom I interviewed in Ankara. He is also an active
member of the MOsiAD. He comes from a middle class family from eastern Turkey. I met
Feyzullah in one of my visits to the headquarters ofMOSiAD; later we arranged an
interview in his office in Sthhiye which is in walking distance from KlZllay (downtown
Ankara). Feyzullah stated that Turkish regime had never had an equal distance between
itself and Islam He also added that if the Turkish regime had had that equal distance, the
Turkish Islamists would not have dealt with what he called antidemocratic oppressive
practices ( antidemokratik baslacJ uygulamalar). Like many of my other interviewees,
Feyzullah did not perceive secularism as being fundamentally at odds with Islam since he
repeatedly stated that if the secularist establishment had be en neutral about Islam in Turkey,
Muslims would have actually benefitted from that situation, Feyzullah stated that "the
secularist e stabI ishment in Turkey had two major goa Is: maintaining their power

(iktidanm devam ettirmel() and prevent Islamic movements (islami hareketleri
engellemel() whether they be political, social, economic or even purely religious in
nature." Feyzullah also maintained that if true secularism had been applied in Turkey, it
would not have been antidemocratic and hostile to political expression oflslam97

Government Control over Religious Education
After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the 1924 Law of
Unification of Education ( 1924 Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu) sought to create a new citizen
committed to Kemalist ideology by promoting secular-nationalistic ideas through the
secularist education to attain "contemporary Western civilization" (Gale 1996, 22). One

97

In a similar vein, Hayreddin Karaman (''Hukuk Yarg1yi Baglamaz M1?'' Yeni $afak 3.20.2008), a
prominent Islamic scholar and a columnist oflslamist Yeni Safak, argues that the secularist establishment
is willing to punish Islamists in Turkey by portraying Islamists' democratic demands as antisecular actions
violating the secularist nature of the Turkish Constitution.
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year after the proclamation of the republic, the Directorate ofReligious Affairs (Diyanet
i~Ierj Ba~kan!Jg1, DiB) was founded in 1924. Karaka~ (2007, 10) argues thatAtatUrk

established the DiB with the "goal of depoliticizing .. .Islam through a state takeover of
certain religious functions and integrating it into the Kemalist state-building project."
Karaka~ (2007, 11) maintains that through the secularist interpretation of religion the DiB

was supposed to "prevent non-state and anti-Kemalist circles from using religion for
political mobilization against the state." The Kemalists referred all matters that were
connected to religion to the DiB and later placed the DiB under the Ministry oflnterior
Affairs ( i9 i~leri Bakanbg1). Thus," all questions of theology, faith, and religious ritual
were to be decided upon by the DiB" which was to be "solely responsible for overseeing
the mosques, for the organization of worship, and for the discussion of religious affairs that
exclusively involved matters of faith." The Islamic scholars oftheology and law (ulema)
and the clergy were made subordinate to the DiB.
Since the closure of the medreses in 1924, private religious education of Islam has
been prohibited in Turkey. This ban is not just about Islamic schools; other religions have
also been targeted by the secularist regime. The only non-Muslim theological school ofthe
Greek Orthodox Church remained ope n until 1972; and since that time, although the
Church's has made numerous attempts to reopen the school, those efforts have been futile.
Kuru (2006, 188) argues that the ban on private Islamic education and intense popular
demand pushed the state to pursue two policies: i) over the years, the state has provided
obligatory religious education in public schools, and ii) opened Qur'anic seminaries,
imam-Hatip schools, and faculties of theology. Through these policies, the Turkish state
does not aim to support Islam; instead, it has two broader aims: i) regulating and
overseeing religious institutions and religious education by hiring the Islamic clergy and
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scholars at several levels as government employees, thus creating a religious bureaucracy
and making them subservient, accotu1table and responsible to the state, and ii) creating an
"Official Islam'' as opposed to "political Islam'' by defining the Orthodox version of
religion sanctioned by the state.
Another major goal behind such policies was to unify the new nation through the
uniform state-sponsored education. The Law brought all educational institutions liDde r the
control of the Ministry of Education, closed down all medreses (traditional theological
seminaries established during the Ottoman Empire). The Faculty of Divinity was opened in
1924 in Ankara. The same year, the Ministry of Education opened 29 four-year vocational

imam-Hatip schools in several cities. In 1930, the Ministry closed down all of them. In
1948, due to intense popular demand, the CHP's single-partyregime in Turkey established
ten-month religious seminaries to educate prayer leaders and preachers as people started
complain about the lack of prayer leaders and preachers in their neighborhoods. The
Faculty ofDivinitytu1der Ankara University was reopened in 1949. W ithineightyears
after the DP's coming into power in 1950, the number ofthose schools were increased to
26. 98 Before the military coup of 1980, their number reached 379. By 1995, right before the
February 28 process, their number reached a maximum of395; and the generals, after the
February 28 process, forced the government to close down the first four years of the
schools-secondary schools- which drastically cutdown the number of students enrolled in
those schools ("imam Hatiplerin Tarihi" 2004; "iHL'lerin 77 Yth" 2000).

98

1he DP also opened up jmam-Hatip high schools as the earlier versions of those schools were limited
to only secondary school kids. Additionally in 1959, the fustitute of Higher Islamic Studies (Yuksek blam
Enstitiisii) was opened at istanbul University; a similar institute was opened in Konya in 1962. By 1970,
the total number of jmam-Hatip schools reached up to 72. However, until 1977, the graduates of those
schools were not accepted in any university other than the Faculties of Divinity (Dahiyat Fakulteleri).
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The process of opening up newer imam-Hatip schools has been a highly politicized
event. Islamist parties and associations carried out a sustained campaign between 1973 and
1997 to build new imam-Hatip schools by collecting donations from individuals and
businesses. Through societal activism, new associations mushroomed to build and maintain
the schools under the name ofimam-Hatip Associations (jmam-Hatip Derneklen). The
earliest of those associations was ilim Jayma Cemiyeti (The Association of Disseminating
Sciences) established in 1951 (imam Hatiplerin Serencarru, 2006). The growing civil
society in Turkey in the late 1970s and 1980s empowered Islamic groups to act on and
build upon their resources and have access to other people. Many ordinary Turkish citizens
contributed to the movement financially and by volunteering (like fundraising), be cause
they wanted their children to have a more conservative education with an Islamic code of
ethics and values. However, even though those schools were run by the Ministry of
Education many secularist Turks and the military perceived the growing movement as a
threat to the secularist pillars of the Turkish Republic (Yavuz 2003, 126).
Many conservative families wanted their children to enroll into the imam-Hatip
schools. Kamil enrolled two ofhis three children in the late 1980s into the imam-Hatip
(one ofthem went to a technical school) when those schools were mushrooming all over
Turkey. He believed that in addition to regular high school curriculum, his children would
learn Arabic and several religious classes (like Theology, Exegesis, Creed, Methods of
Jurisprudence, Life ofProphet Muhammed and Ethics, Muhammed's Tradition and
Methodology, and Preaching) there. Indeed, Kamil's children later did not choose to be
prayer leaders or preachers, and after high school they chose management and accounting
related majors in college. The secularist media in Turkey has been critical regarding the
number of the imam-Hatip schools by contending that Turkey did not need that many
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religious schools; and the government did not need that many preachers or prayer leaders
to be employed lUlder the DiB. People who are imam-Hatip graduates believe that the
secularist establishment perceived them as "enemies of the state." 99 One common argument
often brought up by those people was that the imam-Hatip schools were run by the Ministry
of Education and their curriculum was strictly controlled by the Ministry. There was
nothing in their curriculum that would make them "turn against the Turkish state." Thus,
they repeatedly argued, the secularist establishment was against the imam-Hatip schools
because they were against Islam, and they expressed their enmity against Islam by attacking
the schools. Eleven of my interviewees were graduates of imam Hatip schools 100 and many
brought ups imilar arguments, which appear to be the common sentiment of the graduates of
those schools, in line with the arguments of the subscribers of the imam-Hatip forums.
Emin was one of the graduates ofimam-Hatip schools. After graduation, in the
early 1990s he served as the prayer leader (imam) in a small subprovince of Ankara since
then. I met Emin through one of his relatives. Emin shared the sentiments ofimam-Hatip
graduates reflected on the online forums. He believed that being a prayer leader was not
easy; they were working longer hours (prayer times change according to the seasons), and
they were being paid less than other governmental employees. Emin also argued that the
secularists' criticisms ofthe imam-Hatip schools and their graduates as reflected in the
secularist media were unjustifiable. He stated: "love of country is under nobody' s
monopoly ... we [imam-Hatip graduates] love this country as much as the secularists, may
be even more ... in their criticisms they [secularists] are doing a great injustice." He, like

99

I subscribed to several online imam-Hatip forwns (like imam Hatip Forum at www.imamhatipforum.net,
and iHL Frown at www.ihlforwn.net) and read some debates under different forwn topics revealing their
views regarding how the secularists have been perceiving the schools.
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most other graduates, believed that the secularists were indeed enemies oflslam; however
ina countrywithMuslimmajority it would not be easy for anyone to openly express their
enmity towards the religion. Thus, he believed that the secularists' attacks on the schools
were a sign of their enmity towards Islam. He stated" ... because they cannot directly
attack Islam, they attack sincere Muslims and the schools."
imam-Hatip schools were not the only type of religious schools challenging the
trans formative function of Turkey's secular-Kemalist education. imam-Hatip schools are
part of the public school system in Turkey. Newly emerging private Islamic schools also
had a similar challenge. In Turkish society, "major change took place in the 1980s and
1990s when high rates of literacy and mass printing converged with the emergence of a
middle-class" (Yavuz 2003, 122). A new reading public with Islamic sentiments formed.
This new reading middle-class also demanded their children to pursue education in an
Islamic environment. Thus, "with the opening of private,religiouslyorientedhighschools,
the state lost control over the production of a state-centric secular identity." Especially in
the Ozal era, a rapid expansion oflslamic groups in the educational sphere took place. By
the 1996-1997 academic year, a total of120 outof376 private high schools (about32
percent of all private high schools) belonged to Islamic foundations with approximately
three hundred thousand students enrolled in them (Yavuz 2003, 122-123). Students of those
schools usually come from conservative middle-class Sunni families. 101 Kuru (2006, 189190) reports that in 2003, the Erdogan government initiated a project to finance all private

100
Among my 11 interviewees who were imam-Hatip graduates, only 3 chose to work as prayer leaders
after graduation. From the remaining 8, 5 pursued their college education in various fields, 3 found jobs
after graduation.
101
Since private Islamic education is under the monopoly of the state, Islamist movements have opened
private secular schools, which have used the same curricula of secular public schools. These schools are
still a matter of criticism by the secularists since they are run by Islamist movements and more
importantly those schools inculcate students religiously through extra-curricular activities. No state
funding exists for these schools.
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schools regardless of their orientation. However, the project was vetoed by secularist
former President Sezer.

In my interviews, I did not directly interview the interviewees whether they were
involved with the private schools established by the Islamists. However, in the course of
my interviews, a few interviewees mentioned their involvement with those private schools.
One of my interviewees, Kerim, mentioned the fact that he sent his older son to one such
private school in Ankara (Private Samanyolu High School) in the late 1990s. Kerim was a
relatively well-to-do businessman in the food wholesale business, a partner of a food
wholesales company operating at GiMAT, a site for food wholesalers in Yenimahalle,
Ankara. Samanyolu High School is run by a company (Ba~kent Egitim, Yaym ve Ticaret
Limitet Sirketi) established by people who are closely associated by Fethullah Glilen.
Kerim told me that he knew some businessmen, mainly in the food wholesales business,
donating money for the Gillen community on a regular basis; and through his personal and
business relations with those businessmen, he got to know the Gillen movement. Indeed,
Kerim also stated that he had started donating money for the Gill en community which was
before he enrolled his son into Samanyolu.
Kerimelaboratedthe details of how he got to know the Gillengroupduringour
conversation. He stated:" ... one day, one of my close friends asked me ifl was available
tomorrow night. I said why you are asking. He said we would go and visit "a good place."
I did not understand anything ... " Indeed, K erim' s friend invited him to a ders, a religious
lecture, at the residence of an individual who would later become one of their common
friends. Kerim's friend, on the way to the ders, explainedhimthattheywere going to a

ders. Kerim knew what a ders was, however he had never attended one earlier in his life.
Kerim and his friend were greeted by the owner of the residence (not by his wife); and
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were invited to the living room where there were some 4-5 other men sitting on the two
large couches next to each other in a larger living room. One of the men was sitting on an
armchair; and in front of the man on the armchair, there was a small coffee table on which
there was an open book The host seated Kerim and his friend, and because no more place
was available on the couches, he sat on another armchair. The man on the armchair smiled
at Kerim and his friend and greeted them: "Esselamu Aleykiim 102 You are welcome oh my
brothers ... " The man introduced himself as Ahmed Hoca; 103 and said: "because we have
two new guests this week, I think it will be a good idea for us to meet." Everyone
introduced themselves; and as Kerim reported, many people in the room including the host
were either small businessmen or tradesmen. After the introductions, Ahmed Hoca said:
"tonight God willing ( in~allah) we are going to read a lesson about our Prophet's miracles
from the Mektubat." 104 Kerim told me that Ahmed Hoca had started to read a chapter from
a book which had appeared to be an old book on Islamic creed including a lesson on
Prophet Muhammed's miracles. Kerim thought so because the language of the book
sounded old, and Ahmed Hoca, as he read from the book, was explaining the topic and
from time to time providing the meanings of the old Ottoman words in contemporary
Turkish. Indeed, the book, which was read by Ahmed Hoca, was written by Bediilzzaman
Said Nursi; and Kerim would learn this later at the end of the ders. Kerim, indeed, became
part of an Islamist "reading circle" and as he reported during our interview, since then
Kerim continued to attend the weekly circles ( ders).

102

Esselamu Aleykiim is the universal Muslim greeting, which is in Arabic. It means ''Peace be upon you"
Hoc a is not a name, it is a title. Depending upon the situation, it can either mean teacher or preacher.
So, Ahmed Hoca means, Ahmed the Teacher, or Ahmed the Preacher.
104
Mektubat (The Letters) is one ofthe books ofBediilzzaman's Treatises of Light Collection (Risale-i
Nur Kiilliyatt).
103
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In our interview, we also talked about Kerim' s perception of the Samanyolu High

School where he enrolled his son in the late 1990s, which as Kerim told, happened after he
met the Gtilen movement. Kerim sent his son there for two reasons. First, it was a very
goods chool and the quality of education was quite high. Second, it was run by religious
people, so Kerim wanted his son to be educated by religious teachers and get Islamic
values and morals not through the curriculum, but through the actions and attitudes of
teachers around him. In Turkey, private schools are not allowed to have religious
curriculum since the religious education is under the monopoly of the gove rnrnent.
However, in many of the private schools run by religious groups like the SamanyoluHigh
School, students are encouraged by the teachers and administration to participate into
extracurricular activities directed by the teachers. Kerim reported that after taking part in
some of the clubs, his son's attitudes changes ina positive way. InKerim's words his son
became: "well-behaved, respectful and polite (edepli, sayg1h ve efend1)." Kerim also
reported that many parents were concerning about negative peer pressure on their children,
but he never had that kind of concern.
Islamists in Turkey seem to understand the significance of education. My
interviewees, like Kamil, Muzaffer, Kerim and Gtilsen commented on the significance of
education. 105 Kamil, for instance believed that "for years in Turkey, the secularist mentality

105

Islamists whom I interviewed were highly critical and emotional about the issue. For instance,
Muzaffer stated: "without changing the mentality of the secularists, we can not solve the headscarf issue
in Turkey ... unfortunately they are not willing to change their minds, for them Muslims are dangerous and
should be stopped at any cost" Muzaffer also thought that in the past the secularists were criticizing
Muslims for not caring about education of females; however now it W<lS the Muslims who were willing to
send their daughters to schools to have their education, but the secularists became upset about it. He
believed that the secularists were not sincere in their efforts to educate the Turkish people. For Muzaffer,
the secularists '\vanted it [to educate people in] their -way." He maintained: "... If a Muslim woman is a
custodian or a -waitress at a school and wears the headscarf it is not a problem for the secularists, but if a
female student or teacher wears it, it makes the secularists mad ... They always blamed Muslims for being
ignorant and uneducated. But when we wanted to get more educated, and be ourselves at the same time,
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dominated everything .... they were the educated ones ... " Kamil also argued that people
with religious sensitivities did nothing to encourage their children to have education
beyond high school. For him, since sincere Muslims did not care about education over the
years, they did not have a say in the government. On the other hand, he also believed that
things are currently different. He stated:
" ... now it is the sincere believers who try to educate their kids, however the secularists
are not happy about it ... Look, now they [the secularists] do everything to prevent
Muslims from educating their kids ... Don't you know the injustices done to the imam106
Hatip graduates? ..• Don't you see how they have been trying to prevent our girls to
have education because they \\ear the headscarves?"

GUlsen, who had to give up her headscarfto pursue her education in a nursing
school, was also highly critical about the headscarfban. She argued that the headscarf
issue in Turkey had become a symbolic issue. She stated: "the secularists made it a matter
of pride ( olay1 gurur meselesi yapt1lar) ... the rise of Islam in Turkey made them [the
secularists] upset... they panicked and chose us [the females with headscarves] as
targets ... " Islamists whom I interviewed did not approve the headscarf ban and believed
that it was completely anti-democratic. They appeared to recognize the importance of
education both at the individual and at the movement level because they believed that
education meant power.
Islamists believe that such anti-democratic measures are direct outcomes of the
secularist state's deliberate attempts to control religion. According to the Islamists, the

they did not like it at all ... Education and knowledge make people more powerful; they do not want to see
Muslims becoming powerful. .. "
106
Kamil was referring to the complex formula used to calculate the points of students taking the
nationwide university entrance exam in Turkey ( Oniversite Sznav1 Katsay1s1). The formula discriminates
against the graduates of the imam-Hatip Schools as \\ell as the graduates of the Vocational High Schools.
imam-Hatips are considered Vocational High Schools by the government because their students learn a
skill. When graduates of vocational schools chose a college in the same category as their high schools,
they do not lose points. However, if they want to pick a different category, they are punished by the
formula. For instance, when a graduate of the imam-Hatip Schools choses The Faculty of Theology he/she
would not be punished. However, if the same student picks any other degree, they are punished by the
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state's control over religion is not limited to restricting people's liberties; indeed, they
believe that through official channels, the secularist Turkish state tries to control religion
by controlling religious education and mosques. The following section will discuss the
government's control over mosques.
Government Control over Mosques
In Turkey, be sides religious education, the camis (mosques) are under the complete
control of the gove rnment. The jmams of mosques are hired by the gove rnment, and a 11 of
them are civil servants of the state's DiB 107 (Kara 2003; Canatan 1997; Karaka~ 2007).
Erdogan succinctly points out the intentions of the designers of the 1982 Constitution
written during the military rule in reaffirming the state's control over religion through the
DiB (1999, 380):
" ... Article 136 of the [1982] Constitution, \\lhich provides for the creation of the
Department of Religious Affairs, considers religion subject to the parameters of
"secularism" as a means of national integrity. Therefore, any other conception or
practice of religion is excluded from constitutional protection".

Karaka~ (2007, 11) reports that today the DiB is one of the largest public

institutions in Turkey. The institution oversees the almost 78,000 state mosques and 5,000
state Qur'anic seminaries (2006: 157,000 students) (See the table in the Appendix). The
DiB has other responsibilities including the preparation and distribution of the Friday

sermons centrally from Ankara to all mosques in the country; the de sign and the content of
broadcasts about Islam and ofQur'an recitations in the state media (on TRT channels,
usually one-hour programs once a week); the translation of religious texts; the writing of
fetvas (a religious edict or a ruling on Islamic law issued by an Islamic scholar) on a

formula The government defends the formula by arguing that they were encouraging students to have
their colle§e education in the same category/field as their high school education.
107
The 8 9t article of the Law of Political Parties (no. 2820) forbids a political party to propose the
abolishment of the DiB.
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variety of different questions submitted by ordinary citizens regarding religious issues; the
organization of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca; and providing religious services for
Turkish Muslims abroad (the DiB is also active in Europe, where it is known under the
acronym DiTiB, Diyanet i$leri Tiirk islam Birligi-[The Directorate of] Religious Affairs
Turkish-Islamic Union). The DiB currently employs approximately 80,000 personnel; many
of them are prayer leaders, preachers, and Islamic jurisprudents who are all public
employees

(Karaka~

2007, 11).

The agency's resources ofapprox. 1.3 billion YTL (about 1.06 billion US dollars)
in 2006 represented the fourth-largest item in the state's budget (See the table in the
Appendix). The money is split between paying the salaries of the personnel, maintenance
of the mosques and construction of new ones, and the bureaucratic expenses and
publications. The DiB is always headed by a theology professor 108 who is appointed by the
Prime Minister. The percentage of the budget allocated for the expenses of the DiB could
be perceived not so high by some observers. However, in many large cities or towns in
Turkey, through the neighbor hood mosque associations ( cami derneklen) and the
continuous donations ( bagl$) of the congregation, the needs of the mosques are locally met;
thus, the share of the budget that directly goes to the DiB is spent mainly for the salaries of
the DiB personnel, and for bureaucratic expenses and publications. Moreover, many items
are subsidized for the mosques by the central government or the local governments. For
instance, the water and electricity services are subsidized by the local governments for

108

These theologians are educated by the public tmiversities (Faculties of Theology or Higher Islamic
Institutes), thus private groups can not establish and rtm those schools. Currently, Prof. Ali Bardakoglu is
the head of the DiB. See Table 3.4 in the Appendix.
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mosques, and in many neighbor hoods various charity organizations undertake various costs
associated with ope rating and maintaining the mosques.

109

All vaa.zs (lectures delivered by imams before the congregational Friday prayer)
and hutbes (sermons during the Friday prayers) are under the control of the DiB. The
sermons are important for observant Muslims because they are weekly lessons for Muslims
encompassing a wide range of issues from creed to morals, and from anecdotes of Prophet
Muhammed's and his companions' lives to some issues pertaining the daily worships of
Muslims. Sermons have an educational function; and the congregation has to 1isten to the
Friday sermon since listening to the sermon is part of the weekly Friday prayer. The
sermon is followed by a short prayer led by the prayer leader. There are also some
optional prayers performed individually by the Muslims after the Friday prayer. Sermons
usually last fifteen to twenty minutes and they are very formal.

In many mosques, there are also the ders (religious lectures on a variety of different
topics). Although they are not part of the requirements of the congregational Friday prayer,
many pious Muslims got o the mosques early (about 40-45 minutes before the obligatory
sermon starts) for the purpose of listening to the lectures. Compared to the sermons, the
lectures are less formal. In the past before the centrally distributed sermon system,
individual prayer leaders used to prepare their own lectures and used to lecture the
congregation on a variety of different issues. The issues included a wide range of topics
which could be about creed, theology, stories and tradition of early Muslims including
Prophet Muhammed, morals, Islamic education, and questions about obligatory worships.
Additionally, the prayer leaders used to answer written questions submitted by the

109

All sorts of mosque renovations are often undertaken by charity organizations and private foundations.
In small towns or villages, people in the neighborhoods often volunteer if a new mosque is being built or a
renovation is being made.
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congregation a week ago. With the introduction of central sermons, this type of lecturing
system was also abolished. Instead of prayer leaders individually lecturing before the
sermons, the new system introduced a centrally broadcasted lectures prepared and
delivered by a scholar of the DiB in that province or subprovince. Usually the lecture
delivered in the largest mosque of a city or town is broadcasted to all other mosques in that
area. The only minor exception would be the limited number of travelling preachers of the
DiB who occasionally preach in different locations of the same province. With the new
system, all sermons are directly delivered to the prayer leaders of every neighborhood
mosque; and throughout the county the lectures before the sermons are broadcasted via a
central broadcasting system The sermons are mailed to prayer leaders prior to the
congregational Friday prayers, and the prayer leaders have to recite those nationally
standard sermons that are written by the DiB scholars.
During my interviews, the interviewees are asked some open ended questions and
the issue of central sermons came under discussion in regards to the broader topic of state
control over religion. More than half of the interviewees argued that the sermons in Turkey

°

avoided m:ddling with politically sensitive issues and were highly "sanitized."11 Five of
the interviewees claimed that it would be "foolish to expect any political content in
sermons prepared by scholars of the DiB who are government employees." Seven of the
interviewees argued that some of the sermons recited by the prayer leaders had nothing to
do with religion, since they were about topics like the Republic Day or abstaining from
using foreign currencies. Three of my interviewees were highly critical of the sermons;
they believed that through the sermons the government was trying to de politicize and
politically pacify Muslims. One of those interviewees, T ekin, a young university student in
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Ankara, believed that the secularist elites had never liked Muslims to get involved into
politics, and they had done everything to prevent Muslims to get politically active. Tekin
believed that the secularists could not even tolerate the smallest religious demands coming
from the Muslims. Forty-three (86 %) respondents believed that the secularist government
was using legal means to prevent the Islamists from coming to power. Indeed, the Islamists
repetitively offered reform proposals to make the DiB an autonomous institution funded by
private Islamic foundations rather than the state. Thirty-two respondents ( 64 %) stated that
Muslims had the ability to govern their own religious affairs without any governmental
intervention.
Perception of External Threats
Another cause of the Islamists' politicization is their perception of the external
threats to their Islamic social identity (Muslimness). Social identity refers to the ways in
which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their social relations with other
individuals and collectivities. Social identity represents our understanding of who we and
other people are, and therefore, also their understanding of themselves and others
(including us). This collective understanding is closely related to group boundaries that are
created through the process of inclusion and exclusion (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995).
Jenkins (1996) maintains that one of the results of defining the other is the imposition of
negative and putative characteristics on a collec(jve other, whose politics, culture and
lifestyle must be resisted and repelled. In a similar fashion Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue
that the formation and maintenance of social identity involves the processes of
categorization and self-enhancement. Categorization (like national identity, religious

110

Indeed, many interviewees used the Turkish idiom "suya sabuna dokunmamak" which can be
translated as "avoiding meddling with controversial issues".
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affiliation) identifies intergroup boundaries by producing group stereotypical and
normative perceptions and actions, and assigns people including self, to the contextually
relevant category. Self-enhancement guides the social categorization process such that
ingroup norms and stereotypes are largely ingroup-favoring. In this regard, perceived
external threats to social identity can be specified as unwanted influences of outgroup
norms, perception of foreign threats, and perception of relative weakness in socioeconomic
status in comparison with relevant outgroups resulting from unfavorable intergroup
compansons.

How does the Islamists' Perception ofExternal Threats Relate to Political Activism
Perception of external threats is not absolute, they can change based on the way that
the movement leaders frame issues and shape the movement's collective identity. A good
example would be the AKP' s stance on the EU. The AKP adamantly took the initiative and
sped up Turkey's EU membership negotiations which were absolutely opposed by the old
guard in the VP. Indeed, Erbakan, the leader of the RP often criticized the EU by referring
to it as the "Christian club." However, unlike the RP, Erdogan branded the AKP a centristconservative party like the European Christian Democrats committed to secular principles.
Seventeen of my interviewees were of rural backgrounds. I did not visit rural areas to
conduct my interviews, andonlytwo of my interviews were actually of rural origins and
they were living in rural areas. I had the chance to interview them because they were
visiting their friends and family in the city during the summer. Other fifteen interviewees
were born in rural areas, still had relatives and parents in rural areas, and they had moved
to the city for pursuing their education and job training, or tow ork. Among my
interviewees, the ones from rural backgrounds (seventeen people) and the ones with lower
education (sixteen of my interviewees were high school graduates, six either had
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elementary or secondary school education or were high school dropouts) were more
skeptical about Turkey's prospective EU membership than the more educated upper-middle
class interviewees (twenty-eight of my interviewees had college or two-year occupational
school degrees after high school).
One of the ways that the Islamists frame external threats is their linking of
secularism with a secularist/elitist project of social r:nginr:r:ring.lll Social engineering
refers to the efforts of the government or private groups to influence popular attitudes and
social behavior on a mass scale. Various societal groups always perceive those projects
with suspicion, disapproval and opposition including the Islamists. Often times, social
engineering goes handinhand with political engineering which is the counterpart of social
engineering in the realm of politics. Moreover, in both countries the state control over
religion goes hand in hand with the highly patr:rnalistic-patriarchaP 2 political structure
supported by the secular official ideologies. Nasserism and Kemalism tried to marginalize
and as well as to control Islamic institutions. However, this did not lead to the
disappearance oflslam from the public realm. Such attempts rather paved the way to its
politicization (Kadwglu 1998; Tamir 2000). Islamists reject Jacobinism, and social
engineering, and often perceive the two as antidemocratic and authoritarian.
Islamists argue that the state elites' interest in social engineering projects is not
primarily confined to a few policy areas; indeed it is a comprehensive social, political and
economic project as they perceive Islamism as a rival (or the main rival) ideology. In the
Islamist literature, the Turkish republican elites' adoption of Jacobin French laicism(not
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For a discussion of social engineering in Turkish politics see: Barkey, Henri. (2000) "The Struggles of

a "Strong" State" Journal ofInternational Affairs Vol. 54, Issue 1. pp. 87-105
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Anglo-Saxon secularism) as an official ideology is often cited and critically elaborated
upon. Islamists often times argue that this was not a coincidental choice but a deliberate
one as French laicism fit perfectly into the bureaucratically centralized elitism of the
secularists (Mardin 1991, 1992; Yavuz 2000, 2003; Karaman and Aras 2000; Frey 1965;
Ozbudun 1996).
Islamists have always perceived those kinds of social engineering projects with
suspicion. As stated earlier, 84% of the interviewees believed that secularism as applied
in Turkey was not the same as democratic Western secularism 92% of the interviewees
believed that since its inception secularism in Turkey had been used as a "tool to oppress
religion" and 82 %of the interviewees argued that governmental control over religion
existed in Turkey. For instance 62% of the interviewees mentioned governmental control
and restrictions over religious education (governmental limitations on the imam-Hatip
schools and their graduates, and on the Qur' anic seminaries 113) as a means to control
religion, and 68% of the interviewees believed that imposing the headscarfban was one of
the most leading means for the governmental control over religion.
A second aspect of external threats for the Islamists is the extent of state control
over religion. Islamists maintain that the secularist elites of Turkey have always perceived
Islamist activism as an ideological rival against the official Kemalist ideology maintained
by the secularist elites. This is about both side's uncompromising position and lack of
consensus between the secularist elites and Islamist movements since both sides often
perceive politics as a zero-sum game. This game entails the waging of a Gramscian

112

Although originally the word devlet (state) in Arabic is a feminine word, the widely used concept of
devlet baba (father state) is often used in Turkish when people refer to the state which demonstrates the
paternalistic-patriarchal character of the state.
13
More discussion ofthe government control over the Qur'anic Seminaries will be provided in a
separate section.
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counter-hegemonic war of position which has to be won for final victory. For instance, the
recently resurfaced headscarf debate has become a seriously charged and symbolic
struggle between the two sides.
The interviewees responses provided in this section can be related to the organic
nature oflslam (please refer to the earlier discussion oflslam as an organic religion on
page 7). In an organic religion" ... religion is largely equated with society" (Toprak 1981,
23). Husain (2003) points out that that in anorganic religion the distinction between
religious and social systems is obscured, indeed the two realms actually merge. In Islam,
this merger is both prescribed by the Shari'a. In this regard, anything that would threaten
the Muslim way oflife or Muslims' daily practices or religious or social obligations is
perceived as a direct threat against Muslim identity, including the state's attempts to
control religion. This "perception of threat" then urges Muslims to protect their
Muslimness, or their Muslim identity.
The Content Analysis
Discussion of the frames represented in the Islamist press or the literature will be
evaluated via content analysis. The content analysis includes counting the frequencies of
the themes taken from Ytlmaz (2002) in the Islamist monthly SJZJntP 4 (Disclosures), one
of the oldest Islamist monthlies, which started to get published in February 1979.
Currently, Stzmtt is the most widely read Islamist monthly. 115 In many ways, Stzmtt is the
ideal choice for the content analysis. First, as stated earlier, it is the most widely read
Islamist monthly. Second, it heavily emphasizes issues like Muslim identity (Maslaman

ldmligJ) or Muslimness (Miisliimanhk), Islamic consciousness Us/ami ~uur), and Islamic
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The monthly can be accessed at http://www.sizinti.com.tr/ (in Turkish)
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zeal/passion
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(islamigayret). Third, it has a wide range of reader base. The monthly has

a various sections that address issues like science and religion, society, literature,
medicine, education, history, and technology. Needless to say, all ofthe articles are written
from an Islamic perspective. The editorial piece ( ba$yaz1) and the section called "The
Emerald Heights of the Heart" (Kalbin Ziimriit Tepelen) are written with a very heavy and
symbolic language. The editorial piece usually addresses a wide range of issues focusing
on Muslimness, Islamic passion and Islamic consciousness. The Emerald Heights section
discusses Sufism and mystical aspects oflslam. The other sections focus on a quite varied
range of issues as indicated above.
S1zmtl is published by the most prominent Nurcu117 group in Turkey known as the
Fethullah Giilenmovement. 118 To promote their views, GUlen's followers have set up a
wide range of organizations and published several journals including SJzmti, Jimi

Omit 19

(New Hope) and the Fountain 120 (in English). Gillen's followers also have been
organizing national and international symposiums, panel discussions, and conferences. A

115
The circulation numbers for the monthly are not disclosed by the publishers; however the numbers are
estimated between 600 thousand to 1 million.
116
The Gi.ilen and his followers summarize the concept oflslamic zeal or passion under the umbrella term
of'hizmet" \\hich literally means service (serving Islam).
117
Nurcus have been discussed under sections Band C earlier.
118
Muhammet Fethullah Gillen (1938- ) is a Turkish Islamic scholar and writer \\ho is the leader of the
most prominent Nurcu group in Turkey. The movement is also known as Fethullah~tlar (followers of
Fethullah). In addition to the journals listed in the main text, the GUlen movement also has a daily, Zaman,
in addition to several television stations like the S'IV (Samanyolu Televizyonu), Mehtap 'IV, Ebru 'IV, and
Cihan News Agency. The movement also has several radio stations in major cities of Turkey. The Gi.ilen
community owns and runs about 100 schools in Turkey. The schools are funded by the Gi.ilen community
Gi.ilen also encouraged his followers to establish schools in the Turkish-speaking Central Asian republics
of the former Soviet Union, where his movement recently has gained many loyal followers after the
collapse of the Soviets in 1991. In 1996, Gillen's followers financed a non-interest bearing bank, Asya
Finans, backed by 16 partners and $125 million in capital. GUlen also encouraged Turkish businessmen to
establish businesses in the newly established Central Asian countries. Followers of Gillen have also
founded more than 200 schools around the world from Tanzania to China, but mostly in the Turkic
republics of Central Asia. For more information about Gillen's life and movement, see: Aras and <;aha
(2000) ''Fethullah GUlen and His Liberal 'Turkish Islam' Movement" MERIA, Vol.4, 1.4, pp. 30-42, also
visit GUlen's website (in English) at: http://www.fgulen.org/
119
The journal can be accessed at http://www.yeniumit.com.tr/
120
The journal can be accessed at http://www.fountaimnagazine.com/
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foundation established by GUlen's followers, the Journalists' and Writers' Foundation,
brings secularist and Islamist intellectuals together in what are called Abant Meetings. The
foundation has organized conferences and has invited prominent intellectuals to talk on
various issues such as democracy, the Kurdish problem, and dialogue among civilizations
(Aras and <;aha 2000). GUlen's followers opened several hundreds of schools
predominantly in former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, Balkans, Europe, Africa and the
Middle East.
While counting the frequencies of theme categories as elaborated by Y1lmaz
(2002), this study included the journal articles on every January issue of S1zmti from 1979
to 2008. 121 In a total of28 issues from 1979 to 2008 (see footnote 89 for exceptions), there
were a total of373 articles. Among those 373 articles, 158 ofthem included the discussion
of the theme categories; thus they constituted the total sample population of this study since
the remaining articles were about particular issues like biology, literature, history, and
arts. Within those 15 8 articles, some heavily elaborated identity issues while others made
indirect references to the Muslim identity.
One particular challenge about reading the S1zmtJ articles was the language of the
articles. The general tone of the journal tended towards using a heavy symbolic language
through making indirect references to various Islamic issues including the Muslim identity.
Besides the heavy symbolic language that has parallels with the symbolic language of
Beditizzaman Said Nursi's Treatises ofLight (Risale-i Nur), the S1zmti authors often used
121

Several exceptions have been made since there were short periods of discontinuity in the publication
of the journal. For instance, one exception was made for the year 1979 since the journal started to get
published in February of that year, thus the February issue is included into the sample population for
1979. The journal was not published in 1987 and 1988, thus no issues were used for those two years.
Later it started to be published in August of 1989, thus for 1989 the August issue is used. For 1990, the
January issue exists. Later in October of 1991 the journal started to be published again. Thus for 1991 the
October issue is used. Since then, there is no discontinuity in the publication of the journal. Except the
cases indicated above, for all other years the January issues are included into the sample population).
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older words from the Ottoman period which sometimes made it harder to comprehend the
articles. Additionally, in some articles Muslim identity and Turkish identity are used
equivocally (and often interchangeably). In such cases, a discretionary choice was made
based on the topics discussed in the course ofthe articles. By borrowing Yilmaz's (2002,
76) six-fold categorization, the frequency of theme categories are recorded upon reading
each article from the sample population. Later those frequencies are calculated by using a
simple ratio (i.e., the total number ofthe occurrences of one particular theme category's
frequency divided by total number of all theme categories' frequencies). The percentages
are rounded to integer numbers.
The .firsttheme category is the perceived immorality (ahlaksJzlik) or moral erosion

(ahlaki bozulma). Perceived immorality is the most frequently repeated theme in the
Islarnist writings including criticism of non-Islamic lifestyle or actions considered immoral
from an Islamic viewpoint. Examples include consumption of alcoholic drinks, gambling,
prostitution, pornography, and extramarital sexual intercourse. The theme also includes
some crimes such as theft, murder, and drug use (Yllmaz 2002, 76-77). In the content
analysis, immorality/moral erosion122 was found to be the most frequently repeated theme
in a total of 158 articles in S1zmt1 by constituting 26 pe rcent of the total theme occurrences.
The authors often linked moral erosion to religious

laxity(gcv~cklik,

rchavct) and

weakness of faith (iman zaYJDlgJ, imanda zaafj. The most frequently suggested solutions
by the authors against moral erosion were learning about Islam and prophet Muhammed's
life, practicing the religion ( dinin ya~anmas1) and associating with death (rab1ta-i me vt)

122

Words with similar meanings in Turkish such are counted. For instance the words ifsat, 9iiriime,
96kiintii, bozgun, yozla~ma, dejenerasyon ... all refer to social corruption and moral erosion. Also, an
article often included several related topics, the frequency of multiple themes are separately recorded.
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and thinking about the hereafter ( ahiret) (i.e., the rewards and punishments for people who
do good deeds and bad deeds respectively).
The second theme category is Western cultural influences and perceived cultural
degeneration due to Muslims' imitation of Western culture and values. According to the
Islamists, Islam (being an organic religion) is a complete way of life, thus Muslims do not
need to imitate the Western culture and values. Imitation of the West is also expressed as
the primary source of perceived moral erosion and corruption ofMuslim identity. Islamists
maintain that the secular regime and intellectuals are the main vehicle of such influences, as
the regime and the secular elites are believed to impose Western norms through the secular
law and educational institutions. For the Islamists, another source of perceived moral
erosion is the secularist media (Ytlmaz 2002, 77-78). Islam, according to the Islamists, is
perceived as the main source of social identity, values and norms, and imposition of the
strict secular policies by the state elites undermines the Muslim identity. In Sizwti,
Western cultural influences were found to be the second most frequently repeated theme by
constituting the 21 percent of all theme occurrences in the sample population. The SizwtJ
authors often linked Western cultural influences and cultural de generation of Muslims to
blindly imitating the West ( taklit or bat1 mukaJlitligilhayraniigi) due to Muslim's lack of
religious knowledge and purpose (gaye/ama9), and Muslims' ignorance (cehalet).Another
reason for Western cultural influences is the inability of Muslims to build a strong sense of
Muslimness (Miisliimanbk) and Muslim pride and consciousness ($uur/bilin9) to resist
againstthe Western cultural influences. Raising Muslims' consciousness through religioushistorical learning, social control among Muslims (sosyal kontrol), and setting appropriate
Islamic role models and targets for Muslims are considered among the remedies for the
Western cultural influences.
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The third theme category is domestic suppression oflslam. Islamists argue that
secularists use the Kemalist ideology to secularize Muslims further. Therefore they believe
that activities of mosques, Islamic political parties and Islamic civil society associations
are severely restricted due to harsh secularization measures often imposed
undemocratically by the secularist elites (Karaman and Aras 2000; Yilmaz 2002, 79;
Kadwglu 1998). In SJzmtJ, the theme category of domestic suppression oflslam constituted
12 percent of the total number of theme occurrences. Finding out references for the
domestic suppression oflslam was trickier since the SJZJntJ authors often refrained from
making direct references to the theme in their articles. Words like pressure (bas/a),
obstruction (engelleme/mani alma), and prohibition (yasal() were used to refer to
suppression oflslam by the secularist regime and elites. However, due to the
reconciliatory approach of the GUlen movement, almost no hostile remarks were used
about the government authorities, and almost no direct references were made alleging an
official conspiracy against the Muslims with the intention of suppressing Muslims and
Islam in Turkey.
The fourth theme category is the economic challenges. Islamists argue that the
secularist elites ignored the economic development of their country with the assumption
that as a country be comes wealthier; there will be more pressures for democratization,
human rights and the rule oflaw. Thus, according to the Islamist claim, the secular elites
intended to keep people under control by keeping the country at a sustenance level, thus
keeping peoples' minds continuously occupied with bread and butter issues; not
necessarily with politics, democracy and human rights. Moreover, according to this
understanding, the secularist elites do not want to jeopardize their privileged positions by
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allowing an economically powerful Islamist class
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• Majority of the time, those kinds of

Islamist assumptions are also linked with Islam's emphasis on socioeconomic equity and
justice (Ytlmaz, 2002: 79; Husain 2003; Rubin 2005). In Sizmti, the theme of economic
challenges scored the lowest percentage by constituting just 7 percent of all theme
occurrences. Muslims' ignorance ( cahillik), lack of direction and method (yollyontem),
and misunderstanding/misinterpreting the principles (siinnetullah) that God had set for
achieving success (i.e., the one who works harder will be richer) on this earth are listed as
the reasons of the economic challenges that Muslims face. The remedy, for the S1zmti
authors, would be correctly reading God's principles for achieving success, and working
harder under a plan and program through social solidarity of Muslims.
The fifth theme category is Western imperialism. The Islamist arguments view the
West as the major imperialist power whose aim is to exploit and control the Muslim
world. The vehicles of Western imperialism are specified as Western military presence in
Muslim countries, economic dependency on the West, and the cooperation of the ruling
elites with the West (Ytlmaz 2002, 80). In SJzmti, the frequency of the Western
imperialism theme was 15 percent. Often, the authors linked Muslim countries'
backwardness (in collective terms, not necessarily in individual terms) to Western
imperialism (military and economic) and to corrupt secularist leaders who only think about
their self interests. The authors generally assume that Muslim countries are systematically
kept backward and weak so that the Western powers could exploit the resources of Muslim
countries. However, in their discussion of Western imperialism, the S1zmti writers often
times refrained from making direct references to particular Western countries by name,

123

In the Turkish political lexicon, the extent of the economic activities of the businesses owned by the
lslamists is labeled as yesil sermaye -green capital- (since green is popularly considered as the color of
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although several references were made to the major colonial Western powers by name like
the British, and the French. Interestingly, nodi rect references were made by the authors
about the US regarding Western imperialism in the Muslim world. One remedy of Western
imperialism was bringing Muslim leaders who truly absorbed Islamic values to power so
that they could implement Islamic solutions to break the dominance of the Western powers
throughout Muslim countries. Other remedies were ending selfishness ( bcncil/ilq among
Muslims, promoting benevolence (yardmJSeverliklha)'lrseverlilq to strengthen Muslim
societies, and inculcating Muslims to create a collective Muslim consciousness

(~uur).

The last theme category is the Muslim's lack of self esteem Islamists frequently
claim superiority oflslam as a social, political and economic system against Capitalism
and Communist/Socialist systems which for Muslims are Western in origin. Islamists
frequently portray capitalism as an excessively materialistic, competitive, exploitative and
therefore inherently immoral system Socialism is viewed as another type of exploitative
unjust political system where peoples' rights are severely limited. Based on such
criticisms, Islamism is offered as a genuine alternative which, according to the Islamists,
eliminates any form of exploitation. Accordingly, Islam is believed to balance
individualism and community life without giving superiority to either (Yilmaz 2002, 81;
Husain 2003; Eickelman and Piscatori 2002; Rubin 2003). In Sizmt1, the theme category of
Muslims' lack of self esteem constituted 19 percent of all theme occurrences. The authors
argued that since Muslims do not read the Islamic history properly and adequately, and do
not learn from their mistakes, they often lack self esteem ( ozgiivcn). Many S1zmti authors
argued that the Islamic history (besides the Ottoman-Turkish history) was full of cases that
should inspire today's Muslims. For the authors, the sense of pessimism

Islam). For a detailed discussion see: Rubin, M (2005) "Green Money, Islamist Politics in Turkey"
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(karamsarhk/yeis) and helplessness (faresizliR) also lead to lack of self esteem To
eliminate such feelings, the authors argued, Muslims should help each other (yard11nla~ma,

teavtin), and act under solidarity (dayam~ma/tesaniid) which are often recommended by
the religion. The following section is going to discuss the frequency of the theme categories
and compare the content analysis with the interviews.
The Content Analysis and the Interview Data
The first theme (immorality and moral corruption) was the most frequently repeated
theme in the Islamist monthly Stzmti (26 %). The interview data also support this finding.
Among the interviewees, 62% believed that non-Islamic publications or media are the
cause of immorality in Turkey. 82% believed that families were not providing enough
moral education in Islamic terms for their children, and they perceived this as a major
cause of immorality. Respondents made comments/criticisms about the secular media by
arguing that their publications/broadcasting encouraged masses to do immoral acts like
drinking, gambling, or having pre-marital sex. Zekiye, a female interviewee stated: "one
never sees the secular media encouraging what is morally good ... characters in movies
abundantlydrinkalcohol and extra-marital affairs are perceived normal. .. "
The second most frequently repeated theme was the Western influences and the
resulting cultural degeneration (21 %) . 60 % of my interviewees believed that blindly
imitating the Western style of life was the cause of immorality in Turkey. The interviewees
were highly critical of the foreign movies as well as domestic movies imitating the foreign
ones. Young respondents who had access to the internet complained about pornography and
"indecent content" (muz1r or edepsiz yaymlar) over the internet. As stated above in the
section above, the respondents mostly agreed that Muslims should be aware of their

Middle East Quarterly, Vol.l2, Issue 1
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Muslimness, stop blindly imitating the West, and promote their own values in regards to
the corrupting influence of the Western culture and media.
The third most frequently repeated theme was Western imperialism in Stzmtt (15
%). This is different from the Western cultural influences and the Muslims' imitation of the
West. In Stzmtl, the vehicles of Western imperialism are specified as Western military
presence in Muslim countries, Muslims' economic dependency on the West, and the
secularist Muslim elites' cooperation with the West. My interviewees were differentiating
between the cultural aspect and the military/economic aspects of Western imperialism.
What I understood from their statements was that they perceived Western cultural
influences and moral erosion from an identity-culture perspective. However, the
interviewees linked the word imperialism with concepts like colonialism, foreign rule,
military intervention and economic dependency. Of all of my interviewees, 72 % of them
believed that the Western countries had been imperialist and had had an agenda to
dominate Turkey (and other Muslim countries).
The fourth most frequently repeated theme was domestic suppression oflslam (12
%).About this theme, my content analysis of Stzmtt and my interview data do not match.
Before doing the content analysis I was expecting to see a higher frequency rate for this
particular theme in Stzmtl since at higher percentages, my interviewees strongly argued that
domestic suppression oflslam in Turkey was actually happening. However, my expectation
did not turn out to be that way. This perhaps could be explained by the Gillen group's
conciliatory approach when compared to other Islamist groups. Indeed, 84% of the
interviewees believed that secularism as applied in Turkey was not the same as secularism
as applied in advanced democratic Western countries, and 92% of them argued that
secularism in Turkey was used as a "tool to oppress religion" and finally, 82 % believed
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that there was governmental control over religion in Turkey (For more discussion of this
topic and for some interviewee narratives refer to earlier section: Politics as Jihad:

Highly Against Kemalism and Secularism).
The last two themes were economic challenges (7 %) and Muslim's lack of self
esteem ( 19 %) in the content analysis. My interview questions did not directly handle those
topics. However, in some of my interviewees' responses to the open ended questions,
those issues were addressed by them The following paragraphs of this section will relate
the themes with an activist and protectionist conception of da 'oo (hizmet, call to God).
The ideational aspect oflslamist political activism often develops in the form of
frames in relation to the perceived external threats to social identity. Islamist mobilization
often times goes hand in hand with creation of Islamist frames by those groups. Islamist
frames link those perceived threats to political activism through the need for preserving
Islamic social identity through a protectionist viewpoint. Moreover, the Islamists often link
Islamist identity with political mobilization through an activist conception of da 'oo 124 • In
the context of SJZJnti the Islamic concept of da 'oo ( da va in Turkish) is used
interchangeably with the concept of hizmet (literally hizmet means service, serving Islam).
Man of service 125, for the authors of SizmtJ, meant someone struggling for the cause of God
to disseminate religion (Hizmet adamJ!Dava adami). Indeed, the Islamic conception of

hizmet is offered as a panacea for the ills of Muslim societies. In the conception of SJZJnti
authors through dissemination of God' s message ( da valhizmet), those societal ills would
eventually disappear. This way of conceptualization can be linked to Islam's organic and
holistic nature discussed earlier in Chapter 1 and the earlier sections of this chapter.
Additionally, various types of frames are also utilized by the Islamists to create Islamist

124

Da 'wa literally means call, call to God and dissemination of religion.
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discourses. 126 Thus, Islamist frames and discourses contain high levels of explicit and
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implicit political criticism of secularism and the West. Mainly because of such criticisms
the Islamist frames are often targeted by the secular-official frames of the government
elites. In addition, the members of the official religious establishment target Islamist frames
through the official Islamic frames created by the DiB and by the official Islamic scholars
who worktmder the institution (Dursun, 2001 ) (The last part of the following section
contains a brief analysis of official frames voiced through the sermons, please refer to the
discussion there).
The ClosingDownofthe IslamistParty
Besides official control over religion, the secularist establishment in Turkey
actively used legal means to contain Islamism Examples of such legal means include (but
not limited to) banning headscarves, imprisoning suspected Islamists, closing down
religious parties, confiscating the assets of religious organizations and the I ike. 0 n June 28,

1996, for the first time in its history, Turkey had a prime minister whose political
philosophy was based on Islam However, the February 28 process abruptly forced the
DYP-RP coalition to resign. In January 1998, t he Turkish Constitutional Court, under Chief
Justice A. Necdet Sezer 127, closed down the RP and banned Erbakan from politics for five
years on the alleged activities of the RP to undermine the secularist regime in Turkey and
to establish Shari'a. 128 In the defense ofthe RP, isrnail Alptekin (Erbakan's lawyer), and

125

See Appendix Ill for F. Giilen's conception of"man of service" and ''people of service."
Refer to the earlier discussion in Chapter 1 's sub-sectionA.B-Content and Discourse Analysis for
the relationship between frames and discourses.
127
AN. Sezer later became president of Turkey in 2000. Presidents are elected by the 1BMM, the
parliament, (TGNA, Turkish Grand National Assembly) and serve for seven years. The 1982 Constitution
f:ives the president extended powers. See footnote number 25.
28
The charges (Kocactoglu 2004, 448-452) for the closing down of the RP were several: Article 68 of
the Constitution states that 'ho party could be established against the secularist principles of the
Republic". fu addition, Article 69 requires those parties that use "religious symbols, emotions, and
126
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his associates argued that there were no clear statements prohibiting headscarves in
statutes that regulated the dress codes in state institutions, religious education was a
necessity, and practicing religion was protected under the Constitution and it is an integral
part of universal human rights and freedoms .. Regarding the speeches ofErbakan and party
officials, the defense lawyers argued that those speeches enjoyed a principled
parliamentary immunity and they should be understood in context, not as particular
statements of religious :fundamentalism Additionally, the defense lawyers reframed
secularism and argued that secularism does not (and should not) meanhostilitytowardany
religion including Islam The defense also argued that the indictment was based on flimsy
evidence such as newspaper articles from secularist columnists (Kocacwglu 2004, 450).
The Constitutional Court of Turkey adopted the principle of secularism as
described in the preamble of the 1982 Constitution in its decision to dissolve the party in
January 1998 and ban Erbakan and some other party officials from politics for five years.
The Court defined secularism as "a way of life that has destroyed the medieval scholastic
dogmatism and has become the basis of the vision of democracy that develops with the
enlightenment of science, nation, independence, national sovereignty, and the ideal of

arguments" to be banned. In his case against the RP, the Chief Public Prosecutor Vural Sa~ alleged that
the RP supported the struggle offemale students and civil servants to wear the headscarf, and this was
against the decisions of the MGK and conflicted with both the Constitution and the Law of Unity of
Education 128 • Second, V. Sa~ accused Erbakan, RP's leader and the former prime minister, of hosting a
dinner party for some tarikat (religious order) leaders sympathetic to the government at the official
residence of the prime minister. By the prosecution, this was found to be against the strict separation
between the religion and the state. Third, RP was accused because of its position regarding the jmamHatip schools. Prior to the case against RP and Erbakan, these state-run schools were deemed a breeding
ground for Islamists by the secularist circles that were committed to close do'Wll those schools. Finally,
earlier public speeches ofErbakan and the RP officials were used as evidence against them with the
allegations that the party was committed to bring Shari' a to Turkey. Additionally, the prosecution
assumed that RP was the representative of a bigger monolithic Islamist threat at the political scene.
Interestingly, "part of the evidence against RP was based on a compilation of newspaper articles in which
Islam in general and Refah [RP] in particular were described as working against women's rights and
against progress and development." Another part of the indictment prepared by Chief Public Prosecutor
Sa~ included statements to the effect that Islam is not compatible with democracy; Atatiirk was
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humanity" (Case No: 1997/1 Political Party Dissolution, Official Gazette, p.255). This
definition of secularism appears to be different than the notion of secularism applied in
democratic states. Moreover this definition also seems to include an underlying implication
that religiously oriented political movements could not be democratic because the Court
described secularism as "the basis of the vision of democracy ... " By describing
secularism as "a way oflife" and by implicitly associating Islam with "medieval
scholastic dogmatism," the Court seems to legitimize an antidemocratic practices aiming to
shape the society from top down while disregarding democratic principles. This definition
also strictly denies any democratic demands of religious expression in the public sphere
because the Court perpetually argued that religion could only be tolerated in the private
conscience of an individual, and any reflection of religiosity in the public realm was
defined as an act against the secular principles ofKemalisrn.
Erbakanwas expectingthe closingdownofthe WP, thus Erbakanhadhis lawyer,
ismail Alptekin, found a new party, the Virtue Party (FP, Fazilet Partis1) on December 17,
1997 about a month before the announcement of the Constitutional Court's decision. After
the closure, 144 RP deputies in the parliament switched to the FP. At the first convention of
the party on 14 May 1998, Ismail Alptekin, the caretaker of the party, resigned from his
post and was replaced by Recai Kutan, a veteran and close associate ofErbakan in the
party. 129 The young reformist wing of the party be came increasingly upset since Erbakan
did not allow anyone of the young members of the party to serve in the executive
committee ofthe new FP. Under Abdullah GUI's leadership, the young reformist generation

extensively cited relying on his speeches where he perceived Islamic identity as a threat to Turkish
national/nationalist identity (Kocacwglu 2004, 449).
129
Indeed, Erbakan was controlling the affairs of the FP behind the curtain through R Kutan and Oguzhan
Asilti.irk. Kutan was recognized as a non-charismatic but moderate person who was able to get along well
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of the FP challengedKutan in the party convention on May 14, 2000. Abdullah Giillost the
leadership to Kutan with a narrow margin; however this clearly demonstrated the power of
the reformist wing in the party.

In the parliamentary elections of 18 April 1999, the DSP got 22.2% of the votes,
the MHP got 17.9 %, the newly established Islarnist FP got 15.4 %, the ANAP got 13.2%
and the DYP got 12 %. The electoral results were clearly related to the institutionalization
ofthe politics offear. The military, with the help of secularist media, successfully used
scare tactics and this fear resulted in "the erosion of two major center-right parties [the
DYP and ANAP], the weakening of the Islamist FP, and the increased support for the two
nationalist parties 130 [the MHP and DSP]" (Yavuz 2003, 251). The FP lost votes because
of its tension with the military and people retrospectively associated the FP with its
precursor (RP) and with its closing down by the Constitutional Court. Thus, many people
regarded the FP as a party of risk and refrained from voting for it. The conciliatory tone of
the FP and the transformation of the FP's ideas about Turkey's membership to the European
Union

131

did not prevent a secularist Kemalist attack on its policies or members. 132 After

the closure of the FP, the Islarnistmovement in Turkeydi vided into two parties. The

with the party cadres. Kutan also adopted a conciliatory tone toward the military that previously ousted the
RP from the government (Giilalp 1999, 41; Narli 1999, 43).
130
The MHP and DSP are both nationalist parties at the opposite sides of the ideological spectrum in
Turkey. The MHP is on the right; the DSP is on the left.
131
The older generation in the RP and FP often denounced the EU by claiming that the EU is a "Christian
club" that essentially has hostile objectives regarding Turkey that would clash with the national interests
of Turkey.
132
For instance, when Merve Kavak<;I, who was elected to parliament as an FP deputy of istanbul,
attempted to participate the swearing- in ceremony wearing her headscarf, she was not allowed to do it.
Hundreds of secularist deputies demanded her to leave the oath ceremony immediately. The Chief Public
Prosecutor opened a similar case against the FP at the Constitutional Court on May 7, 1999, and accused
the FP of becoming an extension of the previously banned RP, as well as blaming Kavak91 for committing
a provocative criminal act against secularism (Shively 2005, 49-52). The Constitutional Court opened
another closure case with the same charges against the newly established FP right after the Aprill999
parliamentary elections. The fate of the FP was similar to that of the RP. The FP was closed down by the
Court on June 22, 2001 by arguing that the FP was merely the continuation of the RP under a new
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traditionalist wing established the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) on July 20, 2001.
The young reformist wing established the Justice and Development Party (Ada let ve

Kallanma Partisi, AKP 133) on August 14,2001. In the elections ofNovember 3, 2002, the
FP was marginalized with 2.5 percent of the national votes while the AK Party became the
leading party with 34.3 percent of the votes. 134
Types and Strategies oflslamist Political Activism
Islamists in Turkey have be en quite resourceful in employing various types of
political activism One significant aspect of their activism is political activism through
what Clark (1995; 2004) calls "horizontal ties". Clark argues that Islamism is not a
movement of the disenfranchised poor, but of the marginalized, educated middle class.
Through "horizontal networks that connect largely homogenous circles of friends together"
separate, independently run Islamic banks, schools, neighborhood associations, charities,
study circles, daycare clinics, hospitals, and other organizations are linked to one another;
and "within this network of institutions, Islamic PVOs, or Islamic social institutions ...
have been particularly successful, providing services to thousands of people each year"
(Clark 2004, 942).
White (2002) uses the term "vernacular politics" to describe the type oflslamist
political activism carried out through the horizontal ties that Clark mentioned. Vernacular

leadership; and thus, just like the RP, the FP should also be closed down for being antisecular (Narli
1999, 43).
133
Adalet ve Kalkmma Partisi is also known as AK Parti. ak means white in Turkish.
134
Before the AKP's rise to power in November 2002 parliamentarian elections, Ecevit's administration,
whose left-of-center DSP had been heading a three-party coalition government with the nationalist MHP
and the centrist ANAP, was unable to solve the economic problems of Turkey. The economic prospects
were bleak: economic growth plummeted by 15 %points compared to the previous year and was at -7.5 %
in 2001; the Turkish Lira lost 113 %of its value against the U.S. Dollar; real income for employees fell
by 20 %; about 50,000 retail and small businesses had to file for bankruptcy; unemployment rose by 1.5
million people. Between 2000 and 2002 the unemployment rate rose by 4 %points to 10.3 %. (Karak~
2007, 29-30).
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politics or politics through horizontal ties is more than political parties attempting to reach
out to the citizens through their representatives in the form of traditional electoral
campaigning, meeting, rallies and advertising. For White, vernacular politics is "a valuecentered political process rooted in local culture, interpersonal relations, and community
networks, yet connected through civic organizations to national party politics" (2002, 27).
Her study is based on research in middle-class suburbs ofistanbul and Ankara. White
defines the basis ofvernacular politics in Turkey as "local networks of people united
within a complexsetofnorms of mutual obligation. These widely shared norms require
people to assist one another in open-ended relations of reciprocity, without calculating
immediate return" (2002, 20). Political activism takes place through the cells (hiicres),
upon which the Islamist network is based upon. White argues that cells are based on
preexisting networks. "Linked to one another, clusters of cells easily constitute a mass
movement" (2002, 21). According to White, one interesting aspect of this type of
mobilization is that "people involved in local network politics perceive themselves as
practicing community, not just doing politics."
The new generation oflslamist politicians using the vernacular political forms
manage to establish a more populist and egalitarian type of relationship between the party
and constituency. For White, it is only the Islamists who communicate and personalize their
messages in the local idiom of the residents. In contrast, secularists, despite being local to
the community, display a cultural elitism that often does not accept a close engagement with
the local values (2002, 76). Thus, the success of the Islamist mobilization lies in
vernacular politics, which involves recognition of the local cultural norms in political
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mobilization. As she insightfully points out, the secularist activists' rejection oflocal
cultural practices means that such vernacular politics is out of their reach.
Islamists were also successful in garnering support from female voters.

Karaka~

(2007, 24) points out that women were mobilized through the RP's and AKP's women's
commissions organized at the provincial levels. Islamist women often gather at "tea
afternoons" on topics such as "the dissolution of the traditional family structure" and "drug
abuse", and the women's commissions offered informal cooking and sewing classes open
exclusively to women (with or without headscarf). Unlike other secularist parties, the RP' s
and AKP's women's commissions (many ofwhom were volunteers) were speaking the
language of the masses. Many middle-class traditional female voters often found women's
commissions of secularist parties as cold and aloof from themselves. Indeed,

Karaka~

maintains, the lslamist RP, of all parties, was the very first to discover the sociopolitical
importance of women in electoral politics in a patriarchal society, and in doing so it had
raised the self-esteem of many women. The RP' s women's commissions attracted around
one million women to the RP over the course of six years (24). After the establishment of
the AKP, many of those commissions were transferred to the AKP and they have been
actively working on similar outreach programs for prospective members.
During the field work, nine interviews were made with female interviewees. Seven
of them stated that they had voted for the Islamist party in the most recent elections. The
remaining two interviewees (Fatrna and Selin) described themselves as non-Islamists. 135

135

Fatma works as an administrative secretary in health insurance industry. She stated that she had voted
for the MHP (nationalist) party in the January elections and Selin stated that she had voted for the CHP
(secularist) party. Although Fatma described herself as a religious person, she stated that she did not voted
for the Islamists because for her the Islamists had not been promoting the national interests of Turkey.
Fatma was against Turkey's membership to the EU, and she believed that the Islamists had a compromising
and conciliatory attitude against the EU. Fatma found many demands of the EU (like the Copenhagen
Criteria) unacceptable and detrimental to the sovereignty and national interests of Turkey. Selin is a high
school teacher. She had many concerns about the Islamists; she claimed that the Islamists were corrupt
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Two out of seven female interviewees stated that they were regularly attending those
meetings. The other four, like Necmiye, stated that they were trying to attend, indeed most
of them attending every other meeting. One female interviewee stated that she attended
those meetings "a few times."
Gi.ilsen was one ofthe two interviewees who actively attended those women's
meetings. GUlsen was a nurse working for small private clinic in Ke9ioren, one of the
middle-class suburbs of Ankara. GUlsen stated that she was coming from a conservative
family in a subprovince ofSivas, a small conservative city in central Anatolia. GUlsen
pursued her education in Kayseri, another conservative city in central Anatolia, to become
a nurse. She reported that she stayed in a private female dorm operated by an organization
affiliated with the MGH because her parents arranged her accommodation before she
started her education there. GUlsen reported that in the dorm the older female students,
whom they referred abla (elder sister), were observant oflslam and often talked about
religious topics. She also pointed out that she had regularly attended conferences organized
by the MGH including some female authors and MGH activists like Sule YUksel Senler and
Emine Senlikoglu.After finishing her education inKayseri, she started working for one of
the government-run hospitals in one of the eastern provinces. Several years later she
married Murat, a gove rnmentofficial working for the Ministry of Agriculture ( Tanm

Bakan1Ig1) and moved toAnkara.Duringthe interview,! askedherwhatgot her closer to
the Islamist movement. She focused on two important factors; namely being from a
conservative background, and having stayed in a private dorm operated by the Islamists.

and heavily involved in nepotism. Selin also argued that sooner or later the Islamists would bring the

Shari'a to Turkey, and when it happens, she said: ''They [the Islamists] will force all of us [women] to
cover our heads with a scarf, allow polygamy... [and] ... ban alcoholic drinks ... "
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Necmiye was one of the seven interviewees who stated that she would vote for the
Islamists in the July elections (I interviewed her right before the elections). Indeed,
Necmiye met Giilsen through a common friend and Giilsen convinced her to attend the
women's meetings. Necmiye is an older housewife, and she had been attending women's
meetings of the AKP for the last six years. Other than sharing common conservative values
(because she is coming from rural conservative origins), there were several other
important factors for Necmiye's involvement in the AKP's women's meetings. First,
Necmiye mentioned she really enjoyed socially interacting and bon ding with like-minded
women. She finds other fellow women sincere and friendly. Second, often times besides
formal conferences and meetings ofthe women's organizations, there are also informal
meetings in neighborhoods among women. Necmiye indicated to me that she was able to
attend those informal meetings in her neighborhood about once a week. She indicated that
she could not attend many of the formal meetings since it required her to take two busses to
attend formal meetings at the party's headquarters and she was busy with the chores as her
husband works and her two kids attend highschool. She told me that small groups of
womenregularlycame together weekly atthe informal neighborhood meetings often in one
of the attendee's residence. Jhird, N ecmiye interestingly pointed out that women don ot
directly talk about politics; however political messages are conveyed in the general course
of conversations. My other female interviewees who were regularly or occasionally
attending the women's meetings made similar comments about their experiences. The
interviewees who regularly or often attended those meetings conveyed the importance of
attending such meetings; and often provided a religious rationale for their participation like
"the one who remains alone becomes a friend of the Satan" (yanhz kalanm dostu
~eytand1r)

or "there is mercy of God in congregation" ( cemaatte Allah 'm rahmeti vard1r).
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It could be understood from the responses I got from the interviewees who

regularly attend meetings that those meetings were a lot different than formal party
activities that took place at the party headquarters or some conference halls throughout the
year. Their meetings took place in a more informal setting where different females bonded,
became friends and extended their networks of friendship through other members. The
female party representatives and other participants who were associated with the women's
organizations often interpreted the most current political events, and from time to time read
short passages about party activities and party news and informed the attendees of the
recent developments during the meetings. However, they had food (many of those meetings
were like potlucks), and the attendees had time to meet each other and socialize. In
addition to their regular meetings, the women's organizations also arrange fundraising
events (kermes) and channel charity(zekator sadaka) through their members: unused
clothes, furniture or other items are donated through the women's network; clothes, shoes
and school supplies are donated to school kids living in poor gecekondu areas; and
attendees of the meetings inform other fellow women of their poor neighbors so that those
donations could be channeled to the appropriate places.
Explaining Islarnist Outreach, 0 ppor tunities and Constraints
One of the ways of explaining Islarnist outreach is assessing the relationship
between Islam and civil society. Indeed, there is a rich array of civil society associations
in the Islamic history; and contemporary Islarnists often voice their demands through civil
society associations in the Muslim world 136 (Al-Sayyid 1995; Bayat 1998, 2002; Clark

136
However, some scholars \\ho share Gellner's (1994) views believe that Islam is one of the rivals of
civil society because Islam can not be secularized. 1n this argumentative view, as societies become more
secular through industrialization and rationalization, the individuals become gradually more liberal;
indeed, according to this argument, in such societies, religion and its role in politics eventually
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1995, 2004; Esposito 1995, 1998; Fahrny 1998; Ibrahim 1995, 2002; MlU1Son2001; Norton
1995). Identity demands and Islamic solidarity through horizontal networks are the two
most significant aspects oflslamist civil society in Turkey (Keyman 2007). As Islamic
identity claims have become more and more pluralized and multi-dimensional, they have
also be gun to ope rate mainly as group-based demands for religious rights and freedoms.
For Keyman (2007, 217), Islamist identity claims are a "politics of identity operating
within modernity and demanding recognition." Through "the tides and ebbs of Turkish
politics", Islamists were able to utilize several resources as well as presenting particular
demands (like the headscarfissue). Utilizing resources and voicing political demands take
place through a process which Tarrow (1998) labels "contentious politics." Islamist
political activism can best be understood through Tarrow' s conception of contentious
politics.
Emergence of Opportunity Spaces
Tarrow argues that contentious politics occurs when ordinary people join forces in
confrontations with elites, authorities, and opponents. Contentious politics happens when
changing opportunities and constraints create incentives for social actors (Tarrow 1998, 23). Thus, to properly understand Islamist political activism in Turkey, ore should carefully
examine the Islamists' voicing their demands when opportunity spaces present themselves.
In addition to that state sanctioned Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, Ozal' s neoliberal
free market policies 137 also had a huge impact on the emergence oflslamist entrepreneurs
labeled by many as "Anatolian Tigers" in central Anatolian cities like Kayseri, Denizli,

disappears. For Gellner, liberal individuals are crucial for the establishment of a mature and vibrant civil
society. Since, in Gellner's account, Islam can not be secularized and Muslims can not be liberals, one can
not talk about a well functioning civil society in Muslim societies.
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Gaziantep and <;orum. A significant portion of the tigers are members of the

MOslAD

(Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, Miistakil Sanayici vc
i~adamlan Derneg1) which was found in 1990. Those companies made up of family

businesses and small to medium-sized companies were "able to establish themselves on
the world market as producers of, and suppliers for, export goods in the textile, leather,
produce, construction and engineering industries"

(Karaka~

2007, 21). In 2006, 2,600

companies were members ofthe MOslAD, that accounted for about 12 percent of Turkey's
GNP

(Karaka~

2007, 20).

Ozal's neoliberal policies opened up opportunity spaces for the Islamist
entrepreneurs who later organized themselves under the Islamist civil society associations
like the MOsiAD. Indeed, MOsiAD was not the only Islamist civil society association that
was established. Many similar groups mushroomed in the same period (early 1990s).
However, it was not just the Islamist entrepreneurs who successfully utilized these new
opportunity spaces. In the same period, in addition to Islamist civil society associations
there was also an increase in the number oflslamic publications, journals, radio stations
and television channels, banks,pr ivate schools, charity organizations, and pr ivatelyrun
Islamist student dorms.
Another factor that significantly contributed to the Islamist movement is population
shifts in Turkey. Turkey has experienced rapid urbanization since the late 1960s which
gradually accelerated after the 1980s. Earlier, children ofupper and upper-middle class
citizens used to attend universities. Those families traditionally have been more secular
than the rest of the Turkish population. However, with rapid urbanization more middle
class young adults had a chance to attend universities since the early 1980s. Thus, it was

137

This was discussed earlier llllder section D.B-Controlled Liberalization and the Reemergence of
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not a coincidence to see more conservative males and females across the university
campuses colU1trywide. 138 Moreover, the voicing ofthe headscarfright for females since
the late 1980s is directly related with the increasing number of females who chose to adopt
the Islamic dress for themselves in the university campuses.
Another populational change in Turkey was the emergence of slum-like suburbs
around big cities as a result of rapid urbanization in Turkey (gecekondu 139 mahallelen).
Islamists have made significant openings in those neighbor hoods through horizontal
networks and civil society activism. Often, rural people, with hopes of finding better jobs
for themselves and better educational opportunities for their children create such places
around big cities. 140 Approximately 13 million people (approximately one quarter of the
total population) lived in these neighborhoods 141 in the mid-1990s, 80 percent of whom

Political Islamism.
138
Yusuf, one of my interviewees, is a news coordinator working for an Islamist monthly. He pointed out:
''I was one of the two students who were praying regularly in a class of about hundred students at the
faculty of communications." Yusuftold me that there was not a place for them to pray, so they used to go
downstairs to pray in a small room where the custodians used to drink tea. He happily remarked: 'Thank
God! [Elhamdulillah.~ Now the mosques around the campus in Ankara are full of college students".
139
Gecekondu literally means, "built during the night" (gece: night, kondu: built, placed). Many of these
homes are extremely modest, and built in a short amount of time on illegally occupied state land without
ancf construction permits.
14
As these families established themselves and found better job opportunities, they usually moved out of
these neighborhoods for more affluent areas. However, they often carried their conservative outlook into
those new neighborhoods. Mahmut is one such individual. In the late 1960s, he came to Ankara from his
village when he was a teenager and started to li\e with his older brother \\ho was married and living in
Onder, a slum area of Ankara at that time. Mahmut worked in several low-skill jobs. He had a high school
diploma. Later with the advice of his older brother he took dactylography classes during the nights after
his shift with the hope of finding a better job, and he did. Several months after finishing his classes with
his newly acquired skill, he found a new job as an office clerk at the accounting office of the Gazi
University. He said: "in the exam, I was extremely excited, but tried to remain calm. The university
official who administered the exam expected us to write at least hundred words in a minute with no errors,
I wrote more than hundred, and they hired me." This was a turning point in his life. Over the years he
gradually excelled in the administrative echelon in the accounting office. After saving enough money, he
married, moved to another apartment, and established a family of his own. When he was able to save
enough money and with some help from his relatives, Mahmut bought an apartment unit in Ke9ii:iren, a
recently developed middle-class suburb of Ankara.
141
Yavuz (2003, 84)points out that people living in the gecekondus are not exactly equivalent to the
people of the slums one confronts in places in Latin America or South Asia. He maintains: "While
squatter towns originally did not have electricity or sewage services, this underclass participated in local
politics, managed to gain very basic social services, and linked the gecekondus to the city. The inhabitants
of gecekondus are not alienated and isolated from urban life in the manner of many impoverished rural
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could be considered part of a conservative religious population (Karaka~ 2007, 24). Due
to the state's inadequacy in the social, economic, educational, and health care services in
those areas, the charity groups associated with the RP distributed relief goods, the RP
mayors financially supported the needy through the municipal funds, and helped their
inhabitants find jobs and gave out scholarships to school and college students.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Turkey also experienced an explosion oflslamist

publications, books, and media organizations. However, the emergence oflslamist media
did not happen overnight; it should be understood as an outcome of the processes resulted
in the Islamists' utilization of new opportunity spaces in the longrun. For instance, when
the Menderes government (1950-1960) ended the persecution ofthe Nur movement, the
movement gradually evolved into a "textual-community" organized around small reading
circles contemplating on Nursi' s Treatises of Light (Risale-i Nur). Later in the 1970s,
these small reading communities "evolved into a major social movement, the Nur
movement, with powerful economic, cultural, and political capital" (Yavuz 2003, 33).
Indeed, it was not just the Nur (or Nurcu) movement that was involved in the
expansion of Islamist literature. In 1983, during the month of Ramazan 142 the Religious
Publications Fair (Dini JfJymlar Fuan) was first organized in Ankara on the large
courtyard of Kocatepe Mosque which is the largest mosque in the city. Many Islamic
publishing houses participated to the fair which offered thousands of books in addition to
Islamic media. One year later, the fair was also organized in istanbul on the historical
courtyard of Sultanahmet Mosque. Just like its counterpart in Ankara, the istanbul

migrants to Sao Paulo, or Calcutta; rather they tend to be upwardly mobile, energetic, and initiative
oriented. They seek integration rather than isolation. Moreover, they generate a sense of cultural
dynamism that allows them to succeed in their reinterpretation of rural traditions and adaptation to urban
life"
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Religious Publications Fair also attracted htu1dreds ofthousands of visitors during the
months of &mazan. Several years later, other smaller cities like Kiitahya and Malatya
also organized similar fairs for Islamic books due to large popular demand for Islamic
literature. Books in those fairs range from translations of the Qur'an, Hadith books and
practical guides for obligatory prayers and other worships to Islamist books by the leading
Islamist writers like Ali Bula9, Abdurrahman Dilipak, Fehmi Koru, and Ahmet Ta~getiren.

Culture and Framing: The Role oflslamist Frames in Islamist Activism
Atatiirk and secularists after him perceived Islam as an "inferior cultural marker;"
thus, "Islam constituted a threat, because Kemalist Westernization relied primarily on
changing the attitudes of individuals whose commtu1al self-identity and emotional security
had heretofore been provided by Islam" (Sakalhoglu 1996, 235). Sayan (2002, 20) relates
the increasing ideological polarization of Turkish politics since the early 1990s based
largely on the tension between the secularists and the Islamists. In other words, according
to this type of perception of politics, any victory of the Islamist ideology is a loss or retreat
of secular Kemalist ideology since often politics is perceived as a "zero-sum game" by the
political actors of Turkish politics.
In a setting where such types of political perceptions exist, often times politics is
carried out through highly charged symbols. E ickelman and P iscatori (2004) de scribe this
type of politics as "symbolic politics." Through the use of a symbolic language, Islamist
political leaders and movement activists utilize Islamist frames to address the grievances,
propose solutions for them, and mobilize movement members to redress them. In the social
movement literature, a frame is described as "an interpretive schemata that signifies and

142

Ramazan is the month offasting for Muslims and is considered holy. It is either 29 or 30 days because
it is observed according to the lunar calendar, not the solar calendar.
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condenses the 'worldoutthere' by selectively punctuating andencodingobj ects, situations,
events, experiences, and sequences of action in one's present or past environment" (Snow
and Benford 1992, 137). According to Tarrow, frames are about grievance interpretation.
Tarrow argues that frames make sense of emotions and direct an agent's course of action in
such a way as to channel that emotion. Thus, emotions are often a crucial source of the
energy which fuels movement activism The things that move movement participants into
action is that they feel injustices and feel that others are wronged. Tarrow further maintains
that religion is a recurring source of social movement framing because it is a reliable
source of emotion: "Religion provides ready-made symbols, rituals and solidarities that
can be accessed an appropriated by movement leaders" (Tarrow 1998, 112). As "social
movement organizers" (Snow and Benford 1988, 200-204), Islarnist movement leaders and
activists in Turkey utilize frames to i) identify and define political problems and interpret
political realities, ii) define strategies and tactics of the movement, and iii) explain the
rationale for political activismthroughhighlynormative arguments. Snow and Benford
label these three basic types offrames as: i) diagnostic, ii) prognostic, and iii)
motivational frames.
FrarningandidentityFormation through Islam
Diani defines social movements as "a network of informal interactions between a
plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural
conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity'' (1992, 13). This definition is an
identity oriented definition of social movements. Culture and framing are more related to
the identity aspect of social movements. Identity is created through the movement
participants' " ... embeddedness in associational networks that render them' structurally
available' for protest activity" (McAdam 1994, 36-37). In a social movement organization,
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people tend to associate with people similar to themselves (Klandermans 1992, 88).
Klandermans argues that people tend to validate information by comparing their
interpretations of grievances with those of significant others, particularly 1ike-minded
individuals (1988, 175). Tilly uses the word catnet(a combination of categoryand

networ/() to reflect the socially homogeneous nature of social movements by emphasizing
the collective identity of those groups ( 1978, 62-63). Clark points out that public
information campaigns, rallies, and the like can be successful for gaining new members;
however, face-to-face interaction with a trusted individual within the same social network
is the most successful way to ensure participation and solidify group identity (2004, 946).
Therefore, as Tarrow points out, the coordination of collective action depends on the trust
and cooperation among the participants by shared identities and on the collective action
frames that justify and motivate collective action (1998, 21).
The framing process also has an identity aspect because through framing, the group
leaders and members collectively define and redefine the "us" and "them''. Often times,
movements define their enemies by real or imagined attributes or evils by relying on
existing collective identities and creating new ones (Hardin 1995). However, this is a
competitive process where states also constantly frame issues to legitimize their policy
choices, or to mobilize people behind certain policy goals. This struggle also includes the
states' contesting the frames created by the contentious groups (Melucci 1996). Tarrow
maintains that building a movement aroundstrongties of collective identity does much of
the work that would be normally done by the organization, but it cannot do the work of
mobilization, which depends on framing identities so that they will lead to action, alliances
and interaction (Tarrow 1998, 119).
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The way that the Islamists use several types of frames is directly related with the
process of identity formation and contesting the official secularist frames created by the
secularist elites. In framing the current problems regarding Turkish secularization,
Islamists often use diagnostic frames 143 by simply arguing that secularism in Turkey never
meant a clear separation of church and state; and it was simply used as a tool to oppress
religion. The Turkish Islamists claim that the early secularist elites of the republic had
attempted to transform the Turkish people in mind and in appearance 144; and by doing that
they had been attempting to reach the contemporary level of Western civilization 145 through
authoritarian measures without a will to democratize the political system in Turkey.
Prominent Islamist writers/columnists also discuss secularism in length. In fact,
ordinary Islamists' perceptions of Turkish secularism are shaped mainly by the way that
the prominent Islamist writers frame Turkish secularism. For example, Ali Bula<;, one of

143
Diagnostic frames identify and define a problem or attribute blame or causality. For a detailed
discussion of the frames, see Chapter 1.
144
Feyzullah, an Islamist la\\-)'er, appeared to be quite well-informed about the political history of Turkey.
Indeed, he made references to the Sapka ve K1lzk K1yajet Devrimi (Revolution of Hat and Dress) which
was part of Atatiirk's reform package. Atatiirk visited a conservative small town in northern Turkey
(Kastamonu) on August 24, 1925 and delieved a speech to the local people with a Western style hat on his
hat. Atatiirk made the following statements: ''Biz her noktai nazardan medeni olmally1z. Fikrimiz,
zihniyetimiz, tepeden t1rnaga kadar medeni olacakt1r. Medeni ve beynelmilel k1yajet milletimiz it;in
lay1k bir kzyafettir, onu giyecegiz... Millet vazzh olarak bilmelidir ki; medeniyet oyle kuvvetli bir
ate~tir ki ona bigane kalanlan yakar, mahveder. jryinde bulundugumuz medeni aile de lay1k
oldugumuz mevkii bulacak ve onu muhafaza ve i'la edecegiz. Refah, saadet ve insanlzk bundadtr. "We
have to be civilized [modern] regarding every aspect [of social life]. Our ideas, [and] mentality are going
to be modern from top to toe. Civilized and international dress is the type of dress that our nation
deserves; and we are going to wear them ... The [Turkish] nation should know that civilization is such a
powerful fire that it burns and destroys those who are unaware of it. We are going to find the place that we
deserve in the family of civilized nations, and we are going to protect and exalt it. Prosperity, felicity, and
humanity are all in this [endeavor]. When Atati.irk returned to Ankara from his trip, people greeted him
with Western style hats. A few days later, the Cabinet initiated a legislation making it mandatory for
governmental employees to wear hats . Later, on November 25, 1925 a law was enacted making it
mandatory for all Turkish citizens to wear hats. Indeed, majority of my interviewees, like Muharrem,
Feyzullah, Kamil, and Gi.ilsen made similar statements in regards to their perception of secularism in
Turkey.
145
The concept of "muastr medeniyetler seviyesi, "the level of contemporary civilization of the West,
was often referred to by Atatiirk.
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the prominent Turkish Islamist intellectuals, ("Laiklik ve Ba~ortiisli" Zaman, 2.9.2008)

146

argues that lllllike the way that it was applied in other democratic colllltries, Turkish
secularism was not applied in a democratic fashion. Bula9 maintains that Turkish
secularism was used as a tool both to mute religio-political demands and to control
religion by the secularist elites. Dilipak ("Bir Ba~ka A91dan Ba~ortiisli Sorunu" Vakit,
2.6.2008) 147 argues that the merit of obeying the state's authority is related to the state's
commitment to protecting basic rights and freedoms including the free exercise of religion.
If the state does not protect those rights and freedoms, then people have the right to selfdetermination. Dilipak (Vakit, 2.1.2008) 148 further argumentatively states that "Secularists
whowantto ban the headscarf are a group of minority" which he calls "the White Turks
who believe that they are the masters of the society, always dream about reforming Islam
[according to their secular perspectives] ... and always want to be social engineers [who
forcibly try to transform the society due to their secular agenda]".
An Islamist prognostic frame 149 regarding secularism states that the secularists
should give up their elitist notions of considering themselves as the saviors (or guardians)
of the country (kurtanc1 zihniyet1), and stop interfering into peoples' affairs. Islamists also
create prognostic frames regarding the course of action for Islamists to follow. Many
Ali Bula9, ''Laiklik ve B~ortiisii" (Secularism and Headscart) Zaman 2.9.2008. For a similar argument
see Ali Bula9, ''Bir Ucube Model" (A Strange Model) Zaman 323.2004. Bula9 is one of the most
prominent Turkish Islamist writers and is one of the senior columnists in Turkish daily Zaman, an Islamist
daily. Bula<;: writes on a wriety of issues \\hich revolve around Islam, secularism, Islamic identity, and
Turkish politics. Zaman is an Islamist newspaper owned by followers ofFethullah Giilen, the leader of a
prominent branch of the Nurcu movement. Zaman is the largest Islamist daily whose circulation is about
750 thousand. The second most circulated Islamist daily is Yeni Safak whose circulation is around 130
thousand. Vakit, Bugiin, Yeni Asya and Milli Gazete are other Islamist dailies. (The circulation numbers
are taken from YAYSAT-MDP at: http://www.yaysat.com).
147
Like Bula<;:, Dilipak is also a prominent Islamist writer \\ho writes for daily Vakit \\hose circulation is
approximately 55 thousand. Abdurrahman Dilipak ''Bir B~ka A<;:tdan B~ortiisii Sorunu" (The Headscarf
Problem from a Different Angle) Vakit 2.6.2008
148
Abdurrahman Dilipak, Yine Ba§ortiisii (Headscarf Again) Vakit, 2.1.2008.
149
Prognostic frames go beyond problem specification or blaming, it defines strategies, tactics and
targets about 'what is to be done.' See Chapter 1 for details.
146
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prominent Islamist writers including A. Bula9, F. Koru, A. Dilipak, A.

Ta~getiren,

and H.

Karaman 150 urge the Islamists to stay the course and not to give up their struggle, and to stay
away from the secularist provocations. It is also very interesting that Islamist
commentators/columnists like Bula9, Koru, Dilipak (and others mentioned above) often
portray their struggle as a democratic struggle instead of defending a freedom of religious
expression. When the headscarf debate became a controversial issue in the mid-1980s,
Islamist commentators and columnists defended the Muslim females' right to cover their
heads as a religious right, and insisted that for Muslim females it is an Islamic obligation to
cover themselves. And often, Islamist columnists claimed that in a Muslim-majority
country like Turkey, the government could not prevent females from fulfilling a religious
obligation. However, especially in the last decade or so, the Islamist intellectuals'
perception of the issue significantly changed. Their perceptions shifted fromportrayingthe
headscarf issue as an expression of religion to pursuing a democratic right. The major
reason behind this shift is surely tactical because portraying the problem from a democratic
rights perspective would enable the Islamist to appeal to a larger segment of the Turkish
population than they would have possibly appealed tow hen they had portrayed the issue
from an Islamic perspective 151 • Indeed, the Islamist intellectuals have managed to garner
support for their case from some secularists whom Kuru (2007) calls "passive secularists"
(as opposed to "assertive secularists"). One such passive secularist is Ali Nesin 152 who

150

Those columnists are the most linked and cited Islamist columnists both by the secular and Islamist
media including both secular and Islamist online forums and blogs.
151
As an example of such an argument see A Bula9's article in Zaman: "B~ortiisii Neyin Simgesi 1-2"
1.28.2008 and 1.30.2008. Only a limited number ofBula9's \Witings are available in English at:
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web!IistYazarlar.do
152
Recently, Ali Nesin, an atheist and a passive secularist, who is the son of a rrominent Turkish \\<Titer
Aziz Nesin (1915-1995) and a leading mathematics professor, issued a statement supporting the lifting of
bans of headscarves. Nesin received harsh criticisms from the assertive secularists due to his support for
the headscarf. For more information visit: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
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recently issued a statement against the assertive secularists' eagerness to use nondemocratic measures to ban headscarves.
Motivational frames

153

add a moralizing dimension to the specification of

problems, culprits and strategies, and produces cognitively hot arguments that demand
collective action to redress perceived injustices. More specific arguments about the nature
oflslamist struggle in achieving'realizing the Islamist goals focus on the prospective
rewards that will follow the current achievements accomplished by the AKP. To epitomize
this, the AKP's electoral strategists used the catchy slogan of"No halt, stay the course!"

(Durmakyok, yola dcvam.~. Interestingly, at the provincial and peripheral levels, the AKP
party officials heavily use a parochial tone, explaining the party achievements from an
Islamic perspective. However, on the national media, to explain the party achievements,
the party leaders/officials and the deputies use a tone that emphasizes democratic rights,
economic development, and social improvements. This is clearly a tactic to gather more
support from the more moderate audience by emphasizing significant goals in a secular
perspective. In the literature of social movements this is known as fi·amc amplification.
Another aspect oflslamist frames relates to the notion of f}amc alignment which is
linking the movement frames with those of their potential constituents (Snow etal.
1986).

154

Through the frame alignment, movement leaders "orient their movements' frames

web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=l33294 "Ali Nesin's non-partisan stance greeted with insults"
2.5.2008 Today's Zaman (http://www.todavszaman.com), accessed on 2.6.2008.
153
Motivational frames explain the rationale for action through normative statements.
154
Snow et al. (1986, 467-4 73) provide four basic possibilities for frame alignment through which
movements formulate their messages in relation to the existing culture. These are frame bridging,frame
amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. These are discussed in detail in Chapter 1.
Frame bridging is the '1inkage oftwo or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected
frames regarding a particular issue or problem". Through frame bridging, movements link a movement to
'\rnmobilized sentiment pools or public opinion preference clusters" of constituents with similar views
and grievances without organizational base. Frame amplification is 'the clarification and invigoration of
an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events.''Ihis might involve
persuading prospective movement participants that their values require them to support a particular cause
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toward action in particular contexts and fashion them at the intersection between a target
population's culture and their own values and goals" (Tarrow 1998, 110). However, this
process is often a contentious one which includes a constant struggle between the secularist
structures and Islamists, as Islamists compete with official frames or official attempts to
establish a control over the creation of meaning. To maintain their legitimacy, regimes in
the Muslim world strategically either create new frames or modify the old ones for their
own benefit to maintain their interests and power.

Organic Intellectuals and Frame Resonance
Gramsci identified two types of intellectuals: traditional and organic. Traditional
intellectuals are those who regard themselves as autonomous and independent of the
dominant social group and are regarded as such by the population at large. They seem
autonomous and independent. The traditional intelligentsia sees itself (wrongly) as a class
apart from society, and the thinking groups which every class produces from its own ranks
organically. Through the language of culture such organic intellectuals articulate the
feelings and experiences which the masses could not express for themselves. The second

type is the organic intellectuals. They grow organically with the dominant social group, the
ruling class, and the organic intellectuals are their thinking and or ganizingelement. The
organic intellectuals were produced by the educational system to perform a function for the
dominant social group in society. It is through this groupthatthe ruling class maintains its
hegemony over the rest of society (Burke 2005). In his Notebooks, Gramsci (1971) argues
that the working class movement should produce its own organic intellectuals. Gramsci

or involve an attempt to amplify beliefs about the causes of particular problems and the ways of solving
those problems (Crossley, 135). Frame extension is the process of extending the boundaries of the
original frame(s) "so as to encompass interests or points of view that are incidental to its primary
objectives but of considerable salience to potential adherents." Frame transformation takes place when
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insisted that the ideological struggle was fundamentally important for social change. Thus,
this struggle was not limited to raising the consciousness of the working class, but it must
also transform their consciousness (Burke 200 5). Gramsci maintained that "the mode of
being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence ... but in active
participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, "permanent persuader" and not just
a simple orator ... " (Gramsci 1971, 10)
Gramsci' s conceptualization of organic intellectuals as unifiers of belief and action
has a unique place in his theory where he discusses the relationship between state and
society, the role of ideology and, the role performed by organization, leadership. Organic
intellectuals play a key role in e stahl ishing anorganic unity among the members within the
revolutionary movement, and in the long term strategies of education and preparation for
the war of position. Such Gramscian conceptions have parallels in modern Islamist
movements. Gramsci argued that "all men are intellectuals", i.e., they all have intellectual
and rational faculties. However, " ... not all men in society have the social function of
intellectuals" (1971, 9). Gramsci claimed that modern intellectuals were not just thinkers,
but directors and organizers who helped build movements and produce hegemony by means
of ideological apparatuses such as education and the media.
For the prospective movement participants to become mobilized, there must be
some "degree of resonance" between the interpretive frames ofthe leaders ofthe social
movement and individuals (Snow et al. 1986, 477). Snow and Benford (1988; 2000)
maintain that there are three major conditions for frame resonance: 155 ( 1) ideational

the existing frames ''may not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to, conventional
lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames."
155
Benford and Snow (2000) also point to ''salience" as the other factor of resonance, alongside with
centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. In fact, Islam already had a crucial value
for the audience to whom the Islamist frames were meant to address by the Islamist movement leaders and
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centrality/narrative fidelity: the frame must rely on the existing traditions and values of the
constituency; (2) empirical credibility: the frame must have an evidential basis; and (3)
experiential conmensurability: the social problems that the frame addresses must be
relevant to the constituents' problems. Then, why and how did Islamist frames by the
Islamist intellectuals successfully resonate with the conservative masses of Turkey? A
follower ofErbakan put his experience with Milestones ofSayyid Qutb and Four Basic

Qur'anic Ter111S'ofMawdudi this way: "Those books came like a shock to us. They were
talking about some terms that we heard, but we had never heard those terms taking such
meanings. We neverthoughtofthe political implications of tawhid(the principle of God's
unity) up to that time" (Yeniglin, 2003). Islamist frames resonated well with the masses
because they became what Benford and Snow (2000) call a "master frame." Yeniglin
maintains that the Islamist frames were inclusive (unlike Turkish nationalism which
excludes Kurds and other ethnic groups), flexible, had a wide interpretive scope, and had a
cultural resonance. The Islamist frames had more resonance because they had more
empirical credibility in that empirical referents seemed as "real" indicators of the
diagnostic claims. For instance, for the adherents of the Islamist movement, Qutb' s 156
diagnosis of the current Muslim societies as jahi/i societies fitted more to Turkey than any
other Muslim country due to Turkey's extremely secularist regime and anti-Islamic stance
of the secular political elites. Besides, the credibility of the frame articulators was high,
because Qutb evidently had an exegesis of the Qur'an, while Mawdudi was considered a

intellectuals. Moreover, experiential commensurability of those frames (their resonance with everyday
experience of the adherents) was evident when lUlder different situations Islamists experienced
discrimination and disdain by the secularists. Also, narrative fidelity, the degree of congruence of the
Islamist frames with Islam, made it possible for the movement organizers to disseminate their messages
with confidence because oflslam's credibility as a source of common values, practices and beliefs among
Muslims. In other words, Islamists were speaking the language of the masses while disseminating their
messages. Thus, adherents folUld the attributes of a master frame in the Islamist frames, and they
resonated well with them (See Clark 2005; and White 2002).
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scholar. Their theoretical strength, which was expressed in a modern language, had clear
superiority over the existing Turkish Islamic literature.
The Clash between the Islamist and Official Frames
The realm of frames is not far from contention. Actually, often times official
Islamic frames and Islamist frames are in a conflict. Dursun (200 1) argues that the idea of
keeping religion and politics seems attractive to everybody, however he maintains "in
reality they do mix whether people like it or not". Dursunalso argues thatthe Friday
sermons (hutbcs) in Turkey have always been secular and in accordance to the
governmental policies because it is not uncommon that certain governmental agencies ask
the DiB to prepare sermons that would foster their policy goals. For instance, several
Friday sermons repeatedly have encouraged citizens to donate money to KlZilayor 1HK157,
or to refrain from using foreign currencies like the Euro or the U.S. dollar. Dursun contends
that topics covered in sermons have to be about religious questions, not about policymakers preferences. Dursun believes that the secularists blame Islamists for using religion
as a political tool; however, he maintains "the secularists also commit the same mistake."
Dursun also argues that the sermons prepared by the DiB staff have no political content, but
the official position of the state, however ironically the director of the DiB often warns the
prayer leaders in mosques not to get involved in politics and political topics. 158
Even a cursory look at the DiB' s Friday sermon database would reveal that on
various issues those sermons advance the government's official position, and they

156

See Chapter 2 for Qutb's conception ofjahiliyyah andjahili societies.
KlZllay (The Red Crescent) is a semi-official relief organization. 1HK (Ttirk Have Kurumu- The
Turkish Aeronautical Association) is a semi-official aeronautical association.
158
According to the Law of Governmental Employees, No. 657 (1965), \\hich is still in effect,
governmental employees can not become members of political parties and can not participate political
demonstrations. The latter part of the law is not enforced, however the first part of the law is still strictly
applied.
157
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encourage citizens to stay away from Islamist currents by arguing that Islam and politics do
not mix. For instance, the Friday sermon compulsorily recited by all imams (prayer
leaders) in all camis (mosques) over Turkey on Friday, 01.31.2003 with the title of"Milli
ve Dini Degerlerimi:i' (Our National and Religious Values) interestingly juxtaposes
nationalism and religion while warning Muslims againstthe dangers of fragmentation,
political polarization and Islamism. The sermon starts with the 103rd verse of the 3rd
chapter (Family oflmran) of the Qur'an 159 advising Muslims to remain united. The sermon
analogously maintains that Turkish citizens must" ... remain united" and" ... shouldnot
credit foreign ideas andopi nions that would threaten the national unity and destroy our
values ... they could also use religion to achieve their goals ... " The DiB always prepares
special sermons for the corrnnemoration national holidays like the Zafer Bayra1111 160
(Victory Day), or Cumhuriyet Bayra1111 161 (Republic Day). 162 Another interesting point
about those sermons is that in many of those sermons, good deeds such as assisting
disabled people 163 are portrayed as "national duties" (milli goreV) as well as religious
ones. From an Islamic point of view, one could understand how assisting the disabled
people was a good deed because helping others is instructed by Islam. However, it is hard
to understand how it could be a national duty.

159

(3:103) ''And hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah (stretches out for you), and be not
divided among yourselves; and remember with gratitude Allah sfavor on you; for ye were enemies
and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren; and ye were on the
brink ofthe pit ofFire, and He saved you from it. Thus doth Allah make His Signs clear to you: That
ye may be guidecf' (Yusuf Ali Translation).
160
Similar to the Memorial Day in the U.S.
161
An official holiday for commemoration of the establishment of the Turkish Republic on 1029.1923.
162
Examples of such sermons are given in the Appendix.
163
The title of that particular sermon on 12.05.2003 is: ''Engellilere Yardtmtct Olmak Dini ve Milli Bir
Gorevdir" (Assisting the Disabled is Both a Religious and a National Duty).
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The DiB's website 164 includes sermons that are sent to the mosques to be recited by
the prayer leaders from September 2003 to March 2008. A wide range of issues are
covered by the sermons. I have grouped the sermons under eight categories. These are:
Social Issues/problems, Piety, Morals and Good Ethical Conduct, National Holidays,
Religious Holidays, Islamic History, Matters ofWorshipping, Creed, and Contemporary
Problems. Under social issues, several social problems were addressed like drug use,
alcoholism, bribery, gambling, prostitution and waste. Qur'anic verses and sayings of
Prophet Muhammed are often used to discourage Muslims to get involved with such
"social ills." Under the category of piety and morals, issues like piousness, morals,
respecting the elderly and helping the disabled people are covered. Again, verses from the
Qur' an and sayings of the Prophet are distributed throughout the text of the sermon. The
third category of national holidays, the heroism and sacrifice of the heroes (recent or
ancient) are narrated. For instance, there are separate sermons for all national holidays like
the Republic Day (October 29), the Victory Day (August 30), the <;anakkale (Dardannels)
Victory (March 15), and conquest ofistanbul (May29). The heroism of the national figures
is often explained by the power of belief (iman giicil). The other category is about the
national holidays and some special holy nights like the hol idayofRamazan (atthe end of
the month of fasting) and of Kurban (at the end of the pilgrimage, the holiday of the
sacrifice), and some special holy nights called the KandHs. Occasionally, stories of
sacrifice, piousness, and sincerity constitute the topic of sermons from the Islamic history
(from Prophet Muhammed's and the Rightly Guided Four Caliph's periodafterthe
Prophet). In the next category, matters ofworshippingare explained to the congregation
such as how to fast ( Oru9) or how to perform the sacrifice (Kurban). In the category of

164

http://www.diyanet.gov.tr
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creed, certain matters pertaining to Islamic creed are explained such as oneness of Allah

(tevhid) or the belief in the doomsday (kiyamet). The last category is the contemporary
issues category. Some controversial issues are briefly tackled in those sermons such as
organ donation and getting bank 1oans with interest (interest- faiz- is forbidden in Islam).
The first three (Social Issues/problems, Piety, Morals and Good Ethical Conduct,
and National Holidays) of the total eight categories constitute about more than fifty percent
of all sermons. All of the sermons have a very formal language and they have no political
content. Indeed, as mentioned earlier in the paragraph above, some of the sermons
juxtapose nationalism and religion, and often use a tone which suggests that nationalism
and being patriotic is a religious duty. Those sermons also often times warn the believers
against the dangers of"political polarization" and "Islamism'' on "national unity and
solidarity'' (milli birlik ve

dayam~ma)

in Turkey. These are what I call official frames,

which are created for the purpose of fighting against politicization of religion.
Politicization of religion and Islamism are perceived as phenomena which are "detrimental
to the national unity" of Turkey. 165

The Debates over the DiB
As in the days of the RP government, an ideological battle about the DiB has
erupted between the Kemalists and the AKP. Since early 2000, around 17,000 state-run
mosques have been lacking imams. This is due to the rapid mushrooming of mosques in
every newly developing neighborhood in big cities like istanbul, izmir and Ankara as well
as smaller cities and even villages. It is not uncommon for Turkish people to read on the
newspaper something like" The disagreement between the two neighborhoods in the toH/11

165

The Friday sermon recited in all mosques throughout Turkey on 01.31.2003 with the title of"Milli ve
Dini Degerlerimiz" (Our National and Religious Values).
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ofX caused the locals to build two mosques in the same neighborhood" Sometimes it is
a matter of pride for the locals to be able to build a mosque or to have the newest mosque
in the neighborhood. Since it is a government policy to control all mosques and appoint
prayer leaders for all newly established mosques by the mosque associations in every
neighborhood, understandably there are a huge number of vacancies in many of those
mosques because ofthe DiB's budgetary limitations. Former President Sezer repeatedly
refused to approve anordertohire new imams, arguing that the AKP was only trying to
place its sympathizers in the DiB in order to "Islamize state and society from above"
(Karaka~, 2007, 34). Similarly, the AKP's plans for reforming the DiB- according to

which it was no longer supposed to be under the control of the Prime Minister, but be selfgoverning- met with resistance from the Turkish President and the opposition CHP. The
CHP argues that an autonomous DiB that is no longer integrated into the governmental
structures would gradually spell the end of the state's monopol yon controlling religion.
Moreover, the CHP claims, the DiB could be more easily subverted by radical Islamists
who could then agitate against the laicist state.
The Alevis have also entered the debate about the DiB. They continue to be treated
as a cultural minority and demand to be recognized as a religious community. The Alevis
asked the DiB also to recognize differing forms oflslam. To this date, their places of
worship- just like those of the Christian communities- only exist as private foundations
and are not supported by the Turkish state. In line with its share of the population, the
Alevis demand 15-20 percent of the DiB' s jobs and of its financial support. The AKP
rejects this demand, as it does the idea of reforming the compulsory religious education
classes in the schools, which up until now are tailored exclusively to Sunni Islam. The

A/evis demand that in the future, classes should also include their faith or that their children
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should have the same right of exemption from religious instruction that was granted to
Christian students following international protests in 1991

(Karaka~

2007, 34).

The Qur'anic Seminaries (Courses)
The February 28 process substantially marginalized the Qur'anic seminaries by
enforcing the pol icy of mandatory 8-year-education. The seminaries that had been teaching
students who did not finish the 8 1h grade were closed. Only summer classes were allowed
to teach graduates of the 5th grade, and students tu1der the age of twelve were not allowed
to attend those summer classes. In their briefings to the media, the military generals
exaggerated the number of students in the Qur' an course as 1,685,000 ("i~te Brifing"

Sa bah, 6.12.1997). According to the data from the DiB, the number of male students
enrolled in the Qur'an courses was 47,291 in 1996. Due to the February 28 policies, the
number decreased to 8,766 in 2000.
In December 2003, the AKP attempted to improve the conditions ofthe Qur'anic
seminaries through a new regulation prepared by the DiB (Kuru 2006, 225-227). The new
regulation included s orne minor changes, such as the authorization to open evening classes,
the reduction of the minimum student requirement from 15 to 10, the removal of time limits
(two months) in summer, and the permission to open dormitories ("Kuran Kurslan
Okullara Giriyor," Radikal, 12.5.2003). These changes resulted in considerable opposition
by the secularists who accused the AKP of harboring a hidden Islamist agenda. President
Sezer, who opposed the new regulation, met with Minister Mehmed Aydm and successfully
pressured him to cancel the regulation.

More restrictions were introduced by the ColUlcil of State for the Qur' anic
seminaries in 2005. In a 16-7 vote, the ColUlcil rescinded a specific regulation, which had
increased the education time from three days to five days a week in summer Qur' an
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courses. Moreover, the Council applied to the Constitutional Court to declare
unconstitutional the law that permitted teaching the Qur'an in summer to students who had
finished 5th grade. According to the Council, it is the duty of the state to educate citizens
loyal to secularism, thus it should not allow anti-secular education. The Court maintained
that religious education, even in summer, will negatively affect a student's secular
education before finishing the

gth

grade (Nazh lltcak, "Laiklik Dinsizlik mi?'' Terciiman,

2.10.2005).

Conclusion
The confrontational policy adopted by the Turkish secularist establishment is
caused by several interrelated developments that took place in the last three decades of the
Turkish political history. First, the Turkish Islarnists' electoral successes and the Islarnist
civil societal groups' gradual strengthening through political activism prompted the
secularists to take legal action to block the Islarnists. As the Islarnist candidates challenged
and later defeated the secularist politicians, the secularist establishment has started to
perceive the Islarnists as a serious political and ideological threat. Second, government
control over religion and the Turkish Islarnists' perception of external threats do not
automatically translate into politicization of the Turkish Islarnists. Indeed, politicization of
the Islarnists is related to the interplay of many factors like how the Islarnists frame
government control over religion and external threats to Muslim identity; how the Islarnists
perceive themselves as a collectivity and the government; and in return how the
government perceives the Islamists as a political movement.
Similar to the Egyptian Islarnists do, the Turkish Islarnists perceive themselves as a
comprehensive movement with the ability to transform both the social and political
spheres. However, the Turkish secularist establishment perceives the Islarnists as a threat
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in regards to the political and ideological realms. The government's position regarding the

Islamists may range from accorrrnodation to confrontation. 166 In their struggle against the
secularist regime, the Turkish Islamists frame their struggle from an Islamic perspective
(politics as jihad-a religious obligation) as well as from a democratic perspective. By
doing those, the Islarnists seek to appeal to two distinct audiences: the Muslim audience,
and the secular audience (both domestic and international). Also, the Islarnists believe that
they have to preserve their Muslimness; and political activism for the purpose of bringing
about an Islamic order becomes one of the main vehicles of preserving the collective
Islamic identity of Muslims. The next chapter will provide a selected historical account of
Islam and Islarnism as they relate to Islamic revivalism and politicization of Muslims
within the context of Egyptian pol itical hi story.

166

There is a wide range of different governmental attitudes towards the Jslamists. Inclusion, like the
Jordanian government's inclusion of the Jordanian Brotherhood could be one. Or, complete exclusion
could be another option like the Syrian government's total exclusion of the Syrian Brotherhood. Also,
over time, government's attitude towards Jslamists may change.
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CHAPTER IV

HISTORY OF EGYPT, MODERNIZATION AND EGYPTIAN ISLAMIST
MOVEMENTS
The Early Islamic Period
With Prophet Muhannned' s death ( 632), the Muslim community was faced with the
problem of succession. Right before his death, Muhannned pointed out Abu Bakr (572634) as the prayer leader in his place which, after Muhannned's death, is interpreted as a
sign by the Muslims of that time for Abu Bakr' s succession. In the wake of Muhammed's
death, Abu Bakr disciplined the rebellious Arabian tribes who renounced Islam and
consolidated Islam in the Arabian Peninsula. Bakr' s reign as the first caliph lasted for only
two years (Donner 1981).
The period (634-644) ofthe second caliph 'Umar (581-644) witnessed the
expansion of the Islamic state. Adopting the title AmirAI-Muminin, "Commander of the
Believers," 'Umar extended the Islamic state's rule over Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Persia.
Thus, within four years after the death ofMuhannned the Islamic state had extended its
sway over all of Syria; and near the River Yarmouk, inAugust636' Umar's army had
defeated the Byzantine army commanded by King Heraclius. The Muslim victory marked
the first great wave oflslamic conquests outside the Arabian Peninsula, and initiated the
rapid advance oflslam into then Christian Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia. This battle is
also considered to be one ofKhalid bin Walid's ('Umar's chief connnander) most decisive
victories. Just one year after the Yarmouk battle, 'Umar's armies conquered Jerusalem; and
through the end of his caliphate 'Uthman's army defeated the Sassanid (Persian) Empire in
194
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the east at the Battle ofNihavand (Donner 1981). 'Umar served for ten years as the caliph
and was assassinated by a Persian slave who is said to have held a personal grudge against
'Umar.
After 'Umar, 'Uthman (580-656) became the third caliph. Libya was added to the
Islamic empire during 'Uthman's caliphate (644-656); and 'Uthman's Syrian Governor
Mu' awiyyah established a navy and engaged in several battles with the Byzantine navy.
Despite the continuing fast expansion witnessed during' Uthman' s caliphate, 'Uthman was
accused of favoritism to members ofhis family-the clan ofUmayyah (Lewis 2002).
Negotiations over such grievances did not succeed and 'Uthman was killed by a group of
rebels who surrounded his residence.
The fourth caliph, Ali (599-661), is considered as the last of the Rashidun (the
rightly guided first four caliphs) by all Sunni Muslims. Ali, during his reign(656-661)
witnessed severe challenges. The legitimacy of Ali's caliphate was questioned, especially
by 'Uthman's relatives who believed 'Ali's caliphate was not legitimate because his
election had been supported by those responsible for 'Uthman's death. Particularly,
Mu'awiyyah, 'Uthman's Syrian Governor, di dnot recognize Ali's election. In Syria,
Mu' awiyyah proclaimed himself as the caliph of Muslims while Ali was still the caliph.
The conflict resulted with the Battle ofSiffin in 657, near the Euphrates River, which
eventually resulted ina major division between the Sunnis and the Shi'a (literally means
the supporters/partisans of Ali) (Cleveland 1994; Lewis 2002). Although the mainstream
Shi'a and the Sunnis agreed upon almost all the essentials oflslam, there was one
prominent difference, which was essentially political rather than religious, and concerned
the election of the caliph or successor of Muhammed.
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The majority of Muslims supported the system of consent(bay'a), which based on
the legitimization of Abu Bakr's leadership after Muhammed's death by the tribal leaders
through the ancient tradition of handshaking with the person for whom the consent was
provided. Both Muhammed's appointment of Abu Bakr as the prayer leader when he was
on his death bed, and the bay'a of the tribal leaders with Abu Bakr rendered him as the
first caliph. People who accepted his caliphate are known as AhlAI-Sunnah Wal-Jama 'ah
(the people of custom and community) or Sunnis, who consider the caliph to be
Muhammed's successor only in his capacity as ruler of the community. On the other hand,
the Shi'a, believes that the caliphate, which they call the imamate or "leadership," is
nonelective and must remain within the family of Muhammed, Ali being the first valid
caliph 167 • Another significant difference between the two major sects oflslam is about the
role ofthe leader. For the Sunnis the caliph is a guardian of the Shari'a, whereas the Shi'a
see the imam as a trustee inheriting and interpreting Muhammed's spiritual power.
After the battle of Siffin, there was a dual authority in the Islamic Empire. Ali,
whose major base of support was in Iraq, was the caliph in his capital (Kufa), and
Mu' awiyyah proclaimed himself as the caliph in Jerusalem. In 661 Ali was assassinated.
His son Hasan became caliph at Kufa; but soon afterward deferred to Mu' awiyyah which
paved the way for the Umayyad dynasty (Mu' awiyyah was of the Umayyad clan) which
would rule for the next ninety years. The already tense relations between the Sunnis and the
Shi'a exacerbated further in 680 when Ali's son Husain was brutally killed at Karbala in
Iraq by the forces ofthe Umayyad ruler Yazid (Donner 1981). His death is still
commemorated by the Shi' a every year during the Islamic month ofMuharram.

167

Ali was Muhammed's son in law and cousin (son of Muhammed's uncle Abu Talib). Muhammed's two
sons passed away when they were toddlers, thus Muhammed's bloodline continued through his daughter
Fatima's marriage with Ali
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After Mu'awiyyah,AbdAI-Malik became the Umayyad caliph in Damascus. AIMalik minted a standard coinage which replaced the Byzantine and Sassanid coins,
expanded the bureaucracy, and established a postal system. Al-Malik also introduced
Arabic as the language of administration, replacing Greek and Pahlavi (ancient Persian).
Under Al-Malik, the Umayyads expanded the Islamic Empire further. To the east they
extended their influence into Transoxania (the north of the Oxus River -AmuD arya- which
stretches from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), and expanded to reach the
borders of China. To the west, they took North Africa, with a campaign led by 'Uqbah bin
Nafi, all the way to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. In Europe, the Arabs passed through
Spain, defeated the Visigoths; and in 713, they reached Narbonne in France. The territorial
expansion brought the Arabs into contact with new ethnic groups (like peoples of India,
North Africa, and the Turkic peoples) who later embraced Islam and influenced the course
oflslamic history significantly (Hodgson 1974). With the exception of'Umar bin Abd AIAziz and Hi sham, the successors of Al-Malik were not successful statesmen. After Hisham,
the Umayyaddynasty gradually declined. The Umayyaddynastywas troubled by internal
dissention partially caused by the policy of Arab exclusivism adopted by the ruling
Umayyad elite by discriminating against the continually growing non-Arab converts to
Islam. The discontent grew into a revolution that destroyed the Umayyad dynasty in 750
and brought to power the Abbasid dynasty (750-1258).
The Abbasid dynasty replaced the Umayyad dynasty after 750 and shifted the
Islamic locus of power from Damascus to Baghdad. During the Abbasid dynasty the
Islamic ummah (the community ofbelievers) developed from an Arab origin to a universal
empire through the Arab conquests (for additional discussion of the Umayyad and Abbasid
dynasties, refer to Chapter 2, section B). The first one and a half centuries of the Abbasid
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Empire was a period of relative political stability and economic prosperity. During the
Abbasid dynasty many other nations were attracted into Islam and they created a rich and
diverse Islamic civilization. The Islamic Empire experienced its golden age under the
Abbasid rule. When the Abbasids were at the peak of their power, simultaneously other
regional Islamic dynasties and cultures were being created. Each of those dynasties formed
their particular synthesis oflocal and Islamic practices. Thus, there was no single Islamic
polity or culture that was tied to the Abbasids in Baghdad. The Abbasid dynasty was
destroyed by Mongols (led by Genghiz Khan's grandson Hi.ilagii) in 1258. T he fall of the
Abbasid dynasty led to political fragmentation, however it did not lead to a total collapse
of Islamic culture and did not cause a power vacuum. A period of stagnation in one
segment of the Islamic ummah could be reversed by an infusion of intellectual, economic or
military energy from another (Turkish-Islamic dynasties were good examples of that
phenomenon). The Abbasid rule continued in distant parts of the Islamic empire (like AlAndulus inSpain,andMamluks in Egypt whoreplacedthe Shi'a Fatimiddynastythere).
During the eleventh century the military power and ruling authority passed from Arabs to
Turks in the central Islamic lands (Cleveland 1994, 16-19; Hodgson 1974).
Islamic Rule in Egypt
Around 31 00 BC the Pharaonic Egypt became a unified state and remained
independent until 332 B C when Alexander the Great conquered Egypt. Egypt was
subsequently ruled by Greek Ptolemaic kings. The Muslim conquest of Egypt took place
between the years of639 and 641 AC when the second caliph 'Umar's commander Amr
ibn Al-As conquered Egypt. Until the Muslim conquest, Egypt had be en under the control
of a series of foreign powers: Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Ottomans, French and
British (Lewis 2002). During the longhistoryofEgypt, Egypt was independently governed
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W1der the Ptolemies, Ikhshidids, Fatimids, Ayyubids, Mamluks, Ottomans, and Muhammed
Ali 168 • However, the rulers of these governments were all non-natives of Egypt.
The Fatimids who had their origins inlfriqiya (moderndayTW1isia) invaded Egypt
in the 10th century and established Cairo (Al-Qahirah) in 969. The Fatimid rule in Egypt
lasted W1til Saladin's (Salah Al-Din) W1cle Shirk:uh invaded Egypt in 1167 by extended the
dominance of the Ayyubid state from Syria to Palestine and Egypt. In the mid 1200s the
Mamluks controlled Egypt W1til the Ottoman invasion of Egypt in 1517 by (Yavuz) Sultan
Selim I. The Ottoman sultans retained the Mamluks as the Egyptian ruling class who
regained much of their influence, however the Mamluk ruling elite technically remained
vassals ofthe Ottomans in Egypt (Lewis 2002, 177-178). When Ottomans conquered Egypt
and most of the Arab lands in 1517, they were recognized as the protectors of the two holy
cities of Mecca and Medina; moreover Sultan Selim I, who conquered those lands,
received the title of caliph and enhanced the Islamic standing of the Ottoman rulers. In fact,
sultans did not use their title W1til the 19th century to obtain Muslim support to drive out
European imperialists. The Ottomans reached their peak W1der the rule of Sultan SUleyman
and at his death in 1566, stretched his empire from the Danube to Yemen, from Albania to
the Crimean shores ofthe Black Sea, and from Algeria to Baghdad (Shaw 1976, 87-111).
When the Ottomans lost their dominance especially after the 17th century, they had
to sign a series of commercial treaties known as the Capitulations including extensive
privileges for European merchants. Besides their economic impact on the empire, the
Capitulations had long-term political implications. Following a series of military defeats
after the Treaty ofKarlowitz in 1699, the Ottomans were on the defensive; the 18th century
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Mehmet (in Turkish) is the equivalent of Muhammed in Arabic. Turkish history books refer to
Muhammed Ali Pasha as Mehmet Ali Pasha. Pasha was a one of the high civilian and military bureaucratic
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was a period of disintegration as Ottomans lost their ability of control their territories
(Shaw 1976, 217-223). The decline of central authority also enabled the local leaders to
gain regional power.
The Modern Period in Egypt
Muhammed Ali's Reign ( 1805 -1848) in Eg,ypt and Eg,yptian Modernization
As Ottomans lost their ability to control their territories gradually, by the late 181h
century Egypt became a de !acto independent state under a revived Mamluk order. After
the French revolution of 1789, Britain and France were in conflict for the domination of
Egypt; and Napoleon invaded the country in 1798 by defeating the Mamluk forces. The
same year British forces defeated the French forces; however the French military remained
in Egypt three more years until a British-Ottoman allied force drove the French out
(Cleveland 1994, 61-63; Wilson 1993, 23-27).
Muhammed Ali was an ethnic Albanian born and raised in the Greek city of
Kavalla. He arrived in Egypt as part of the British-Ottoman allied force as second in
command of an Albanian contingent. Several people competed to fill the power vacuum
left by the French and Muhammed Ali was the successful one. In 1805 Ali was recognized
as the governor of Egypt by istanbul. Ali's basic aim was to preserve his own rule by
building up a large army and navy (Owen 2000, 114-115). Through forty years, Ali
achieved an amazing internal development and imperial expansion for Egypt. Ali
retransformed the army and reorganized the administrative structure, increased agricultural
production and introduced heavy industry. Ali wanted to be independent of the Ottoman
Empire and establish a hereditary dynasty for his family. To increase his power Ali

ranks in the Ottoman political system. The title of pasha WciS typically granted to governors and generals.
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destroyed most of the local Mamluk rulers and further strengthened the armed forces (Shaw
and Shaw 1976, 10-11). Ali sent several educational missions to Europe, established
educational institutions to produce civilian and military personnel and a translation office
and government press to prepare Arabic textbooks for students. The first Arabic language
newspaper was also introduced by him, al J#Jqai al Misriyyah (the Official Gazette), in
1828 (Cleveland 1994, 63-73).
To increase the revenues of the state M. Ali confiscated the iltizam lands. Iltizam
was a tax farming system where tax farmers pay remitted a fixed annual sum to the treasury
and retain the surplus they get from the peasants under their control. The second measure
was to put a heavy tax on the revenues ofthe ooqf(religious endowments) administered by
the ulema. Uitqfwas approved by the Shari'a that permitted the income from a property to
be channeled for charitable purposes. Traditionally, the revenues of the mzqfwere not
subject to tax, and the ulema acted as trustees for those endowments and assigned the
revenues to their designated purposes. Both in the Ottoman Empire and in the Egypt of M.
Ali the centralizing governments of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries sought to
break the hold of the ulema over waqfS and to gain control of the revenues because the
waqfS were outside ofthe states' control. M. Ali granted huge amounts ofland to certain

government officials and to his relatives who were supposed to cultivate the land for some
tax exemptions (Cleveland 1994, 73-74). M. Ali also experimented with new crops; the
most important of them was the long staple cotton which became Egypt's cash crop
quickly. To irrigate more land, M. Ali also introduced forced peasant labor to build
irrigation canals. A program of industrialization was initiated with an emphasis on war
related materials and textiles.

The title, 'Pasha" W<lS equivalent to the British title of 'Lord" as an honorary title.
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Muhammed Ali's first overseas military campaign was against the puritanical
Wahhabi movement in Arabia who had captured the two holy cities. The Ottoman Sultan
Mahmudii (1808-1839) ordered Muhammed Ali to put down the revolt. Ali's adopted son
Ibrahim Pasha led the Egyptian forces and captured the two holy cities in 1811. Ali also
aimed at Sudan and by 1820 captured the entire country. To obtain raw materials and a
large market for Egypt's new industrial output, Ali turned against the sultan and invaded
Syria in 1832. Ali's son Ibrahim led the Egyptian forces and defeated the Ottoman army.
After a treaty Muhammed Ali's son Ibrahim became the governor of Syria in 183 3. In 1841
the European powers imposed a settlement on the Ottoman-Egyptian conflict known as the
Treaty of London. Muhammed Ali was forced to withdraw from all territories he occupied
except Sudan. Although Ali lost a lot of the land he had occupied, he achieved a major
objective. The treaty stated that the governorship of Egypt was to be a hereditary office
held by his family. In fact, Ali's descendants ruled Egypt until 1952 (Cleveland 1994, 7476).
The Gradual Decline of Ottoman Control in Egypt
The 19th century nationalist independence movements (both among the Christian
and Mus lim subjects) within the Ottoman Empire troubled the Ottomans until their de mise
since those independence movements were often manipulated by the great European
powers for their own ends. Serbs and Greeks were the first to revolt. The Ottoman Sultan
Mahmud II ( 1808-1839) invited Muhammed Ali's forces to Greece to assist the Ottoman
troops to quell the Greek rebellion. The revolt was suppressed however in 1827; the Great
Power alliance (i.e., the British, French and Russian) fleet destroyed the newly established
Ottoman fleet in the Battle ofNavarino Bay (Shaw and Shaw 1976, 29-31 ).
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Both for the Ottomans and Egyptians, the first ha If of the 19th century was marked
by various reforms (For an account ofMahmud IT's reforms, see Chapter 2) which
significantly expanded the role of the state. Among others, military and educational reforms
were the most significant (Cleveland, 79-82; Shaw and Shaw Chapter 1 and 2). In Egypt,
Muhammed Ali's sons Abbas and Sa'id, and Ali's grandson Ismail encouraged the
development of a European educated Egyptian elite just like the reformers ofTanzimat in
istanbul. In spite of such an encouragement, the rulers of Egypt remainedauthoritarianand
the royal traditions did not change much. To achieve some gains from the Ottomans, Ismail
( 1863-1879) attempted to bribe Ottoman officials. Sultan Abdiilaziz elevated Ismail's
governorship status to khedive (1867), a Persian title, which literally meant lord or master.
Ismail was able to issue his own decrees without istanbul's approval; he was allowed to
expand its army, to issue its own currency and to contract foreign loans without istanbul's
approval (Shaw and Shaw, 145). The most significant development during Ismail's era
was the introduction ofthe Mixed Courts in 1876. The Capitulations protected the foreign
nationals in the Ottoman territories from the Ottoman law, including the Egyptian law, and
the way of dealing with disputes including foreign nationals was to have the consul of the
foreigner hear the case and make a decision based on the law of the foreigner's country.
However this created many disadvantages for Egyptians. They were dealing with all civil
and commercial cases and they were governed mainly by the French civil code. The

Shari'a Courts remained, however their jurisdiction was limited to the areas of personal
status and waqf. This severely limited the area ofulema legal activity in Egypt (Cleveland
1994, 89-97).
Ismail had the same general aims as his grandfather, Muhammed Ali. These were
building up a moderns tate with a strong army, asserting Egypt's independence against
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istanbul and Europe, and diversifying the economy. Like the Tanzimat reformers, Ismail
had to borrow money from Europe to finance his projects, and Ismail's efforts to use
European capital to build up the state and economy only led to increasing dependence on
Europe (Owen 2000, 115-117). The debt crisis led to creation of the Public Debt
Commission ensuringthatthe Egyptian debt was serviced.Alsothe number of Europeans
in Egypt rose from approximately 10,000 in 1838 to over 90,000 in 1881. The majority
were dealing with the cotton trade or banking and finance. As a result of the Capitulations,
the European community enjoyed a privileged position. Ismail tried to regain Egypt's
financial independence by abolishing the Public Debt Commission, butthe European
powers decided that his rule mustendandcalled upon the Ottoman sultan to exercise his
authority over Egypt. Sultan Abdiilhamid II issued a formal decree deposing Ismail in 1879
andappointinghis son Tawfiq as khediveofEgypt (Owen 2000, 117; Cleveland, 95-97).
Continuing Modernization, the British Rule and the Urabi Revolt
Tawfiq's period was troubled with the Urabi revolt (1879-1882). Colonel Ahmad
Urabi was an Egyptian who had peasant origins. He was not one of the officers educated in
Europe. He studied inAl-Azhar andjoined the army. The Urabi revolt had two aims:
eliminating foreign control of Egypt's finances and curtailing the autocracy of the khedive
by establishing constitutional limits to his authority. Urabi gained the support of the army, a
group of reformist notables and the peasants. For the British and the French the Urabi
movement was a threat. In 1882 the British forces defeated Urabi and his followers. Many
expected the British forces to leave Egypt; however the British remained and Egypt stayed
under British occupation until 1956 (Cleveland 1994, 96-98).
The reforms in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt created an institutional dualism. With
the exception of destruction of the Janissaries (Ottoman) and Mamluks (Egyptian), most
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traditional institutions remained. Although there were new courts and s orne changes to the
legal code were made, they did not eliminate the Shari'a courts and the new elite educated
in Europe an-style institutions coexisted with the graduates of religious schools or with the
ulema. There was also a large gap between the educated officials and the population. The
19th century reforms of the Ottomans and of Egypt brought certain advantages; however,

they also brought economic instability, social disruption and alienation, and political crises
(Cleveland 1994, 97-98).
By the end of the 19th century most of the Muslim lands were under some form of
European control. Those who escaped direct occupation had severely limited sovereignty
and did not have economic independence. Muslim intellectuals and activists argued that
widespread degeneration of the Muslim societies and deviation from the true religion were
the main causes of such defeats. That kind of a self criticism and a reaction against the
adoption of European ways led to an assertion oflslamic values.
Abdlilhamid II (1876-1909) was the last Ottoman sultan who exercised
unrestrained royal authority. In 1878 he suspended the constitution and abolished the
parliament. His period is characterized by cautious reform, conservatism and a reaction
against Europe an institutions and ide as. To maintain the integrity of the empire,
Abdi.ilhamid II stressed the Islamic heritage ofthe empire and instead ofthe idea of
Ottomanism he adhered to Pan-Islamism. Adherence to Pan-Islamismand benefiting from
his title as the caliph of the Islamic ummah were useful diplomacy tools. From a domestic
perspective, Abdi.ilhamid's policies were intended to secure the loyalty of Arab subjects of
the empire. In fact, during his era, many Arab notables enjoyed increasing prestige.
Abdlilhamid's era also marked the increasing German influence in form of army
reorganization and of investment capital in the empire (Cleveland 1994, 113-118).
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Muslim intellectuals were increasingly concerned about the survival of the Islamic

ummah in the Ottoman Empire increasingly dominated and penetrated by European
powers. Although some members of the ulema recommended the rejection of all Western
innovations, some new thinkers like Jamal Al-DinAl-Afghani (1839-97), Muhammed
Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) recognized the importance of
accommodating European achievements in science and technology within the framework of
Islam. Afghani's call for direct action in the name oflslamic solidarity appealed to many
people. For Afghani Islam did not contradict with the spirit of science and technology,
however Muslims had become ignorant of true Islam. To rediscover the true Islam,
strengthening the unity of the ummahwas necessary. Afghani was a believer in PanIslamism and he was especially critical of Muslim rulers who allowed European armies to
invade Muslim territories and permitted European capital to control their economies. Thus,
collective solidarity combined with action was necessary to resist exploitation and to bring
the Islamic revival (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5).
Abduh was educated at Al-Azhar in Cairo, and then became a teacher there. He met
Afghani when he was a student. Abduh became active in Urabi revolt and was exiled in
1882. When he returned to British-occupied Egypt, Abduh reconciled himself to the British
and after serving as a judge he became the mufti (chief Islamic official) of Egypt. In his
proposals and decrees as muflihe sought to demonstrate that Islam was compatible with
modernity and argued that 1ocal superstitions and practices from the earlier centuries had
been accepted as core parts oflslamic doctrine. Abduh argued that the basics of Islam
were found in the Qur'anand the verified hadith (sayings and tradition of the Prophet). The
reformist movement associated with Abduh, the Salafiyyah movement, comes from the
Arabic word for ancestor, salafF or Abduh, the study of the early community of Islam
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provided the best guide for the Muslims, the practices that were created later on were the
products of human reason and were for specific historical circumstances. Therefore such
practices including political theory and judicial practices could be modified by human
reason to meet new circumstances, they were not part of the eternally valid revelation. In
Islamic terms, Abduh was talking about ijtihad, the application of human reason to new
contexts. Abduh was both a conservatist and a reformist. Rashid Rida was Abduh' s most
influential student. Rida conservatively interpreted Abduh's doctrine (Ayubi 1993, 57-58).
After the Young Turk revolution of 1908 in istanbul, the Committee of Union and
Progress (the CUP, ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyet1: established in 1889 by some students in
the military medical academy) deposed Sultan Abdiilhamid and sent him toe xile to
Salonika. The CUP gradually gained the full control of the Ottoman parliament. (Ahmad
125-141). F ollowingArab andBalkannationalism, Turkishnationalismemergedas a
reaction. Two simultaneous trends emerged: i) Pan-Turkism, and ii) Turkism (refer to
Chapter 2 for more details). From the coup of 1908 until the beginning of the First World
War the ittihad ve Terakki successfully silenced Arab nationalism by co-opting leading
Arab dissidents by appointing them to some administrative posts (Shaw and Shaw 1976,
253-263). On October 1914 the Ottoman Empire joined the First World War after it allied
itself with the Germans. At the end of the war, the Ottoman Empire was divided and its
Arab provinces were occupied by Britain, France and Italy. Following the peace
settlement and the establishment of the mandates a new regional state system came into
existence in the Middle East.
The interwar era in the Middle East was a Anglo-French dominance. In the same
period most of the Arab political activity was primarily devoted to achieving
independence from foreign control. The war years did not produce upheaval and the same
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elite that had power and prestige before 1914 continued to maintain their privileges during
the 1920s and 1930s in the Arab world. In fact local political leaders were dependent for
their positions on the discretion of the occupying power. Therefore even as the Arab
political leaders demanded independence, they tried not to upset European authorities too
much. The Second World War accelerated the end of Anglo-French dominance in the
Middle East and led to the emergence of independent Arab states in the region (Cleve land
1994, 140).

The Struggle for Independence andEndofEgyptianDynasty
In the aftermath of the First World War the British had difficulties in retaining their

control over Egypt and Iraq because of the widespread resistance against them. Therefore
the British introduced a system of a limited independence for Egypt and Iraq. The two
countries were granted the freedom to conduct their own domestic politics, but required to
allow the presence of British military on their soil. Although Egypt was not a battleground
during the First World War, its resources were used by the British, thousands of people
were conscripted into civilian labor corps or forced to join the British forces that invaded
Syria. Self determination became a major goal of the Egyptian elite; how ever the British
were not willing to sacrifice their interests in Egypt and the Suez Canal. In 1918 several
Egyptian elites formed a delegation, oofdwhich later became the first political party of
Egypt, and started to rally popular support for full independence of Egypt. The movement
was led by Sa' d Zaghlul, a lawyer and administrator, who demonstrated a special ability to
communicate with rural Egyptians because he was also coming from a rural background.
Zaghlul started a campaign againstthe British refusal for lifting its protectorate on Egypt.
Zaghlul and some leaders of the Wafd were arrested and exiled by the British in 1919. The
Egyptian people showed their support for the Wafd leaders; riots and demonstrations broke
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out in urban centers of Egypt. The events turned into a national upheaval known as the
revolution of 1919. Having difficulties in containing the movement, the British allowed
Zaghlul and his friends to represent Egypt at the Paris Peace Conference (Cleveland 1994,
181-184).
The British lifted their protectorate of Egypt and the Egyptian ruler became the king
of Egypt in 1922. However this did not mean a full independence for Egypt. The Wafd
introduced a constitution in 1923 and elections for the first parliament were held in 1924.
The Wafd got ninety percent of the votes and Zaghlul became the first elected prime
minister ofEgypt. The 1924-1936 period was a short-lived experiment of parliamentary
democracy in Egypt. The constitution gave sweeping powers to the king. The King could
appoint prime ministers and abolish parliaments. The British also did not stop to interfere
in Egyptian politics and Zaghlul was not quite a democrat either. Therefore Egyptian
politics usually revolved around the power struggles between the Wafd, the King and the
British. With the treaty of 1936, Egypt achieved a greater degree of internal sovereignty.
However this did not change the internal dynamics of Egyptian politics substantially. After
Zaghlul' s death in 1927 unpopular leaders who alienated the Egyptian population by trying
to impose European values on the society succeeded him (Cleveland 1994, 184-188).
The educated members of the middle and upper classes ofthe Egyptian society
were living in a totally different universe than that of the traditional and rural segments of
the society. The inability of the party system for not providing the ordinary citizens the
solutions to their economic needs and the cultural alienation turned people to organizations
that operated outside of the formal pol itical system. Many of the voluntary organizations

that emerged during the 1930s were associated with Islamic activism. The most significant
ofthemwas the MuslimBrotherhood.F oundedinthe cityoflsmailiyya in 1928 by Hasan
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Al-Banna AI-IkhwanAI-Muslimin, the Muslim Brotherhood grew rapidly during the 1930s
and by the end of the decade it had five hundred branches in Egypt and tens of thousands of
members. Banna was a school teacher in Ismailiyya which was a highly Europeanized city
at that time. Banna was influenced from Rida' s ideas published in AI-Manar (The
Lighthouse) which was a magazine established by Rida to advocate Salafiyyah movement
(Beinin and Stork 1997, 6; Ayubi 1993, 130-142).

Emergence oflslamism: A Conceptual Framework
Islam is a religion, a way of life and identity for over one billion people around the
world. Husain points outthatin the West, the religious realm, represented by the church,
and the political realm are separate and coexist with their own distinct laws and chains of
authority. In Islam, however, religion and politics are inseparable; the domain of Caesar
and the domainofGodare mutually inclusive. Famous Muslim philosopher and theologian
Al-Ghazali (1 058-1111) depicts this inclusiveness by stating that "religion and temporal
power are twins", they are two sides of the same coin. Islam is more than a set of
obligatory rituals; it is an integrated and holistic belief system which makes no distinction
between religious and political responsibilities. In the modern world, Islam became a
vehicle for political change, and it is mainly due to its historical and organic nature
(Husain 2003, 38-39).
Islam as a Historical and Organic Religion
After the deathofMuhammadin632, during the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs,
Islam spread from Spain to Central Asia and became the second largest of the world's
religions. Islam was not just a spiritual community; rather it also became a state and an
empire. From the time of Prophet Muhammad, Islam developed a religio-political
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movement in which religion was integral to state and society (Esposito 1998, 3-5). In the
western world, the religious realm and the political realm remained mostly separate and
managed to coexist after a long battle. The principle of separating the church and the state
in the West comes from the Christian maxim: "Render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's"(Luke 20:25). Philosophers of the
Enlightenment discussed the separation of church and state. For Europe, it wasn't easy to
implement the idea, sectarianism and bloodshed took place until the principle was
established. However, in Islam, the realm of Caesar and the realm of God are mutually
inclusive, and Islam makes no distinction between religious and political aspects of human
life. In this regard, Islam provides models for both individual and political action (Husain
2003, 38-43).
Islam is a historical religion Unlike ahistorical religions (like Hinduism and
Buddhism), Islam perceives history as divinely ordained. Muslims see the hand of God
purposefully guiding history. Religion explains the beginning, and the end of human history
and the direction it must take. For Islam, particular events in history are crucial acts of
revelation (Smith 1970, 248-249). For example victory in battle is considered as a sign of
God's gift, likewise defeat in battle was God's warning and test. The following verses
(8:7-9) are about the victory of Muhammad in the Battle ofBadr (624):
Behold! Allah promised you one of the two (enemy) parties, that it should be yours: Ye
wished t hat t he o ne unarmed s hould be yo urs, but A llah willed to justify the Truth
according to His words and to cut off the roots of the Unbelievers; That He might justify
Truth and prove Falsehood false, distasteful though it be to those in guilt. Remember ye
implored the assistance of your Lord, and He answered you: "I will assist you with a
thousand of the angels, ranks on ranks."

The following verses (3: 139-142) are about the defeat of Muslims in the Battle of
Uhud, after an initial success the Muslims were driven back and the Prophet was also
wounded:
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So lose not heart, nor fall into despair: For ye must gain mastery ifye are true in Faith.
If a wotmd hath touched you, be sure a similar wound hath touched the others. Such days
(of varying fortunes) We give to men and men by turns: that Allah may know those that
believe, and that He may take to Himself from your ranks Martyr-witnesses (to Truth).
And Allah loveth not those that do wrong. Allah's object also is to purge those that are
true in Faith and to deprive of blessing Those that resist Faith. Did ye think that ye would
enter Heaven without Allah testing those of you who fought hard (In His Cause) and
remained steadfast?

Thus, in hi story such particular events that are considered as acts of revelation set
specific precedents for establishing a social, economic and political order that conforms to
a divine design. Hence, to devout Muslims, what Muhammad did is as important as what
Muhammad said and to the devout believers Muhammad is the most significant role model.
He was a charismatic religious leader, a successful statesman, a just judge, a competent
administrator, a courageous military leader, a loving husband and father and a trustworthy
friend (Husain 2003, 39-40).
Islam is also an organic religion. While some religions emphasize the role of a
well established and well structured clerical organization that has a separate identity from
bothgove rnrnentandsociety, Islam as anorganic religion maintains nos uch church
hierarchy or priestly class. In an organic religion, religion is largely equated with society,
and distinct ecclesiastical organizations are secondary. In organic religions the distinction
between religious and social systems is obscured, in fact the two systems merge. The

Shari'a has something to say about every aspect ofhuman life like marriage, divorce,
hygiene, manners, crime, punishment, economics, politics, war and so forth. The society is
the urnmah (the brotherhood/ community of the believers) and the urnmah is a religious
community and a political society (Husain 2003, 38-43). Thus, in Islam political
institutions are designed to defend and promote Islam, not the state. Those institutions are
supposed to establish and uphold an Islamic system based on the Shari'a. Thus, the
primary loyalty of Muslims is to the urnmah, not to the state, and to the Shari'a, not to the
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ruler. As both a historical and organic religion Islam directly clashes with Western style
secularization (Toprak 1995, 22-23).
Modernization, Secularization and Islamism
The modernization theory assumed that complex economic structure and political
development proceed in tandem; economic specialization leads to political
institutionalization; and the displacement of traditional (usually landed) elites by urban
middle classes leads to the emergence of centralized commercial, bureaucratic and
educational structures. According to this formulation, religion gradually recedes from the
public life. Consequently, the religious establishment is seen as resistant to change. As the
civic order becomes secularized, rational conduct becomes the norm and this leads to
greater political participation or at least political stability. Eickelman and Piscatori argue
thatthe fundamental difficulty with the theory lay in the sharp contrast between two
artificial constructs: modernity and tradition, and the consequent misunderstanding of the
entrenched social functions of tradition (2004, 22-23).
Filali-Ansary (1996, 76-80) argues that Muslim societies did not experience
secularization as an internal or autonomous move; external influences either started the
process or disrupted it. However, currently secularization is a reality in the Muslim world;
no Muslim society today is governed solely with reference to religious law and religious
traditions are no I onger predominant in the Muslim world. Thus, secularization in the
Muslim world happened before religious reformation which is a complete reversal of the
European experience in which secularization was more or less an outcome of such
reformation. Husain (2003) argues that the failure of the Secularists in the post colonial
Muslim states is one of the major factors that fuel Islamism today. During the colonial rule,
the Europeans not only exploited their colonies, but used them as export markets for their
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surplus capital goods and consumer goods. Moreover, Europeans introduced
modernization and Western secular education. The indigenous elite initially both emulated
and cooperated with the European powers, they embraced westernization and
secularization. However it was the same indigenous elite that became the leaders of
independence movements in those countries with the decline of colonial rule after the First
World War (Husain 2003, 131-134). The Europeans never granted independence to their
colonies in the Muslim world in exchange for their cooperation against the Axis nations in
general, and the Ottoman Turks in particular. Nationalism also became a potent force
among the Muslims replacing the loyalty of the Muslim people to the Islamic urnmah.
The Muslim secularist elites filled the political void left by the departing colonial
administrations. The Secularists worked to transform the predominantly rural and
traditional Muslim world into modern urban nation states by pursuing programs of
modernization, Westernization and secularization. Despite the Muslim Secularists' early
popular support, within a few decades their credibility and legitimacy eroded and the
Secularist elites were discredited. 169 Muslim secularists also used Islamic rhetoric and
symbolism in domestic and foreign policy to achieve greater popular support. However,
instead of appeasing the Islamists, the Muslim secularists' political use oflslam
legitimized Islamism and undermined secularization process in those countries. Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat was one of the examples of a Muslim secularist leader who used
Islamic rhetoric and symbolism to gain popular support (Husain 2003, 133-139); however
Sadat greatly contributed to an Islamistrevival in his country during the 1970s in Egypt,

169

The rapid economic growth achieved in some Muslim countries did not significantly benefit the
impoverished majority. Instead, the economic gains were enjoyed mostly by the wealthy elite. Secularists'
modernization project unfortunately did not bring substantial development and wealth to the people.
Muslim secularists used the Western idea of nationalism to integrate and to unify their fragmented
societies and to consolidate their political power.
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and he was assassinated by violentRevol utionary Islamists in 1981 for signing the Camp
David Accords with Israel which meant an official recognition of the state oflsrael and an
end to the hostilities between two countries.
Premodern Islamic Revivalism
The imperial sultanates of the Muslim world (Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal) had
peaked in the 16th century, and by the 18th century their power and wealth were declining
due to various internal and external factors. Political and economic decline were
accompanied by a growing concern about spiritual and moral decay in 18th century Muslim
societies. Both in Sunni and Shi' a Islam there is a belief of reviver oflslam and an
expectation of a messianic leader, the Mahdi. 170 In one of his sayings, Prophet Muhammad
said: If only one day of this time (world) remained, Allah would raise up a man from my
family (the Mahdi) who would fill this earth with justice as it has been filled with
oppression. 171 In another saying, the Prophet said: The Mahdi will be of my stock, and will
have a broad forehead a prominent nose. He will fill the earth will equity and justice as it
was filled withoppr ession and tyranny, and he will rule for sevenyears. 172 Although
perception of the Mahdi by the Sunni and the Shi' a are completely different, in both beliefs,
he is an extraordinary individual who will come in the future to de liver the Muslims and
the rest of the world from oppression and to restore true Islam with justice and prosperity
for all.

170

Abu Dawud's Sunan (one of the six major Hadith collections (Al-Sihah al-Sittah or Al-Kutub alSittah: The Six Authentic or The Six Books), which comprise authentic sayings of the Prophet recorded
during and/or after his death; those six Hadith collections are not part of the Qur'an) has a separate
chapter about the Mahdi. It is the 36th book of Abu Dawud's Sunan, the Promised Deliverer (Kitab AI
Mahdi).
171
Book 36, Number 4270: Narrated by Ali ibn Abu Talib. From: USC-MSACompendium of Muslim
Texts at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSNfundamentals/hadithsunnahlabudawud/036.sat.html#036.4271
172
Book 36, Number 4272: Narrated Abu Said al-Khudri. From: -MSACompendium of Muslim Texts at
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSNfundamentals/hadithsunnah!abudawud/0 3 6 .sat.html#O 3 6 .4 2 71
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The various Islamic revivalist movements sought to transform not just the religion,
but the political and social life ofthe Muslim community. Their major goal was to initiate
the moral reconstruction of Muslim societies through reinterpretation oflslamic law and
the Qur'an. Previous scholars argued that Muslims had to follow the path oflslam as set
forth in the previous Muslim legal and theological writings. The Islamic revivalists of the

18th and 19th centuries rejected this unquestionable following of previous legal or
theological teachings (Esposito 1998, 33-42).
Premodernist Islamic revivalist movements ofthe 18th and 19th centuries (like
Wahhabism of S. Arabia, Shah Waliullah of India, Sanusi and Mahdi movements of North
Africa) largely contributed to the modern Islamic politics, however unlike modern
Islamism, these movements were motivated primarily in response to internal decay rather
than external colonial threat. The premodernist revivalist movements brought into sharp
focus the weakened and disorganized condition of the Muslim ummah. Second, they
provided the causes and solutions of the problems (departure from true Islam, return to true
Islam). Third, they reasserted that religion is integral to all areas of human life. Fourth, they
asserted that Islamic revival requires the rejection of an unquestioning acceptance of
traditions. Fifth, the return to true Islam could only be possible by a new interpretation that
was based on the sole authoritative foundations oflslam, not on the latterly invented
popular beliefs (bid'ah). Sixth and the most important one, these movements emphasized
that the revival of Muslim societies required political action symbolized by jihad
(Esposito 1998, 42).
Atthe beginning of the 18th century many areas ofthe Middle East just like the rest
of the Muslim world increasingly felt the impact of the economic and military dominance
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of the West. By the late 191h century European imperial penetration of the Muslim world
extended from Morocco to Indonesia. The French controlled North, West and parts of
Central Africa and the Levant; the British controlled Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, the
Arabi an Gulf and the Indians ubc ontinent; the Dutch controlled Southeast Asia. 0 nly in the
Ottoman Empire and Iran, the Muslims had self control, however the European powers had
great economic interests in those areas and they established their economic dominance in
those countries through the capitulations. 173 Muslim responses to Europe's dominance
ranged from rejection to adaptation, from Islamic withdrawal to reform (Esposito 1998,

43).
Modernization in the Muslim world started in the early 19th century. Ottoman Sultan
Mahmud II (1808-1839) and Egyptian Governor Muhammad (Mehmed) Ali (1805-1849)
tried to emulate the West by modernizing their armies through new military training schools
staffed by Europeans. Groups of students were sent to Europe to study languages, sciences
and arts. Translation bureaus and printing houses were e stahl ished. In addition to military
modernization, those governments also modernized their central administration, law,
education and economy. 174
Muhammad Ali's son Khedive (Viceroy) Ismail and the Sultans after Mahmud II,
expanded the scope of those reforms and initiated systematic modernization projects.
Mahmud' s son Abdlilmecid challenged the Islamic institutions with new secular schools,
new secular legal codes, and secular courts through the reforms known as the Tanzimat

173
Capitulations are a special kind of treaties, unilateral contracts granted by a state and conferring the
privilege of extra-territorial jurisdiction within its boundaries on the subjects of another state. European
powers received many capitulations from the Ottomans, Persians and Egyptians during the 18th and 19th
centuries due to the economic and military decline of those states. From: Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th
ed.
174
However, modernization did not benefit the whole society because change was adopted by the state and
implemented by a small group of political elites. Therefore these reforms were imposed from above by
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(reorganization) reforms. Opposition to the reforms came from the religious establishment
and the ulcma (religious scholars) who perceived those reforms as nonreligious
innovations ( bid'ah) and deviation from the true religion. Later in 1876 the first Ottoman
Constitution was created and a constitutional monarchy was created with a bicameral
parliament. Ottoman Sultan Abdillhamid II refused to surrender the absolute power because
his commitment to modernization was more military and technological than political and
eliminated the liberals and reformists through authoritarian measures. Abdillhamid II
appealed to Islamism and publicly used his caliphate title publicly and tried to promote
Pan-Islamismagainstthe growing influence of separatist nationalisms in the Ottoman
Empire. The antimonarchy powers, led by the Committee of Union and Progress Uttihad ve

Tcrakki Ccmiyet1) ousted Abdillhamid II, reopened the Ottoman parliament and installed
Mehmed the fifth as the new sultan (Esposito 1998, 46, 47).
In Egypt, Khedive Ismail (1863-1879) just like his father Muhammad Ali tried to
establish secular institutions parallel to their traditional Islamic counterparts. Modern
nationwide secular schools were established alongside with the traditional religious
schools; Islamic law and courts were restricted to family law (marriage, divorce,
inheritance) since the Egyptian state adopted a new legal code primarily based on the
French law. The newly emerging lawyers, engineers, doctors and journalists were
challenging the political, intellectual and social leadership of the ulema. The process of
modernization also bred nationalist sentiments against the British and the French. The
result of the culmination of those nationalist sentiments against foreign domination of Egypt
was the Urabi Revolt (1881) which was led by Colonel Ahmed Urabi. The revolt provided
the pretext for the British to occupy Egypt in 1892 (Esposito 1998, 4 7).

ruling elites and those reforms were responses to the external threat of European colonialism and
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As a result of 19th century reforms in the Middle East, the traditional Islamic basis
of Muslim states was altered by a progressive secularization of society in which the
ideology, law and institutions of state were no I onger legitimated through Islam, but were
indebted to imported models from the West. The result was a division of the society as the
traditional religious and moderns secular schools coexisted and both institutions, secular
and religious, trained two classes with divergent weltanschauungs. The modernization
process also undermined the traditional power basis of the religious establishment and the
ulema as new professional/administrative classes emerged in education, law, and
government positions (Esposito 1998, 47).

Emergence of Modern Islamisms in Egypt
The secular reformers of the Muslim world tried to restrict Islam to the personal
and moral sphere of life, however during the latter half of the 19th century a generation of
Islamic reformers emerged who sought to strengthen Muslim societies through religious
reform. The Islamic reformers recognized the scientific and political power ofthe West
and they avoided the rejectionist tendency of the Traditionalist Islamists. For those Islamic
reformers, modernity posed no threat to Islam and they were opposed to the traditionalism
ofthe Muslimulema, whom theyblamedas the cause of stagnation in the Muslim world.
Early Islamic modernists like Afghani, Abduh and Rida stressed the need in Islamic
civilization to adopt modern science. The reformers argued that the Islamic fundamentals
are fully compatible with science and the basic reason ofunderdevelopment of the Muslim
world was lack of proper understanding of the true nature of Islam. Thus, the reformists
perceived adoption of modern science as an "act of repossession''. For the Islamic
modernists, Islam is more favorable to rationality than other religions (Tibi 2001, 12-18).

expansionism, not to the internal societal pressures for social change.
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Jamal AI Din AI Afghani (1839-1897) is considered as the father or Islamic
modernism. Born and educated in Iran and then in British India, Afghani was a teacher and
a political activist who traveled most of the Muslim world as well as Europe. Afghani
taught in Egypt, served as an adviser to the Shah of Iran and traveled in Europe . Afghani
took up residence in Egypt in 1871 and attracted a group of young people to his ideas of
political and religious reform. His activities were unwanted by Khedive Tawfiq who
deported Afghani to India in 1879. Afghani resurfaced in Paris in 1884 and published an
Arabic newspaper AI Urwah AI Wuthqa (The Indissoluble Bond/The Trustworthy
handhold 175) with one of his disciples, Muhammad Abduh. Later Afghani became an
adviser to Shah Nasir AI Din of Iran; how ever when the shah granted the tobacco
concession of 1890, Afghani became of the leading critics and organizers of the mass
protests against it. He was expelled from Iran but his influence remained strong among
oppositional groups. Afghani spent last five years of his life in istanbul, and Sultan
Abdlilhamid ll who was attracted to Afghani's Pan-Islamic ideas kept Afghani under house
arrest when one of Afghani's former students assassinated Shah of Iran (Cleveland 1994,
118-119). Afghani strongly preached the need for a national unity to resist European
intervention, the need for a broader unity of Muslim people and the need for a constitution
to limit the ruler's power. Thus, anti-imperialism, Arab unity and Pan-Islamismand
constitutionalism are the basic political themes that Afghani advocated besides Islamic
modernism (Esposito 1995, 55-62).
Like many of Afghani's other disciples MuhammadAbduhadamantlyfollowedhis
teacher's path. During the 1870s Abduh published newspaper articles reflecting Afghani's

175

The term actually is one of the references of the Holy Qur'an about itself: (3 :31) "Whoever submits
his whole self to Allah, and is a doer of good, has grasped indeed the most trustworthy hand-hold (AI
Urwah AI Wuthqa): and with Allah rests the End and Decision of (all) affairs."
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views on Islam, and political and social reform. Abduh became involved with Afghani in a
nationalist opposition movement that culminated in Urabi revolt in 1882 against the British.
The British government used the Urabi revolt as a pretext to invade Egypt. Egypt was
invaded and Abduh was sent to exile. Later he joined Mghani in Paris and they started
publishing AI Urwah AI Wuthqa (The Indissoluble Link) which was promoting antiimperialism and the idea of reform and revival in Islam. After returning to Cairo from exile
in 1888, Abduhfocusedon realizing an educational reform in the countrybelievingthata
massive reform was necessary to transform the Egyptian society. In 1898 Abduh and his
disciple Rashid Rida published the first issue of AI Manar (The Lighthouse) which
strongly propagated Islamic reform. One year later, Abduh became the Grand Mufti

176

of

Egypt. A bduh maintained that there was no conflict between religion and reason. Abduh
was promoting a selective integration oflslam with modern ideas and institutions
(Esposito 1998, 51-52).
The early Islamic modernists were precursors of the modern day reformists. Unlike
their secular counterparts, they did not just look to the West; they tried to establish a
continuity between their Islamic heritage and modernism. They both identified themselves
with their Islamic identity and past, and freely borrowed from Western thought and
institutions. Thus, rather than a restoration of the early Islamic practices, the modernists
advocated an adaptation oflslam to the changing conditions of modern society. The
Traditionalists criticized such changes as corrupt un-Islamic innovations (bid'ah). Islamic
modernism established a new outlook toward both the past and the future. Pride in an
Islamic past countered the sense of weakness and subjugation of the Muslims to the West.

176

Mufti is an expert on Islamic Shari'a \\ho has the authority to issue fatwa (religious verdict). However
in Egyptian context, it usually refers to an official position; Grand Mufti is the highest religious authority
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Also, belief in the absolute relevance oflslam and its compatibility to modernity inspired
new reformers throughout many parts of the Muslim world The reformers' path
transformed the meaning of traditional beliefs and institutions thus the future generations of
Islamists started to speak about completely new concepts like Islamic democracy, Muslim
nationalism and Islamic socialism. Additionally, anti-colonialism of early Islamist
modernists assured their continued influence among the new generation of Islamists
throughout the Muslim world. However, Islamist modernism is not a monolith, the
disciples of Abduh, Rida or other modernists diverged ideologically in the following
decades (Esposito 1998, 58-61). After the early modern Islamism, the Muslim
Brotherhood, established by Hasan Al-Banna in 1928, became the dominant Islamist group
in Egypt.

AI Ikhwan AI Muslimin(the MuslimBrotherhood) andHasanAl-Banna
The Brotherhood could be considered both traditional and contemporary. It was
traditional in the sense that Banna believed that the revival of Egypt was closely tied to the
restoration of Islam as the guiding principle. By denouncing the secular institutions of
Egypt, B anna argued that the implementation of the Shari'a could heal the ills of Egyptian
society. However, this was not a mere imitation of the past. Just like Abduh, Banna argued
that the Shari 'a would be open to interpretation and would be compatible with the needs of
a modern society. Banna sought an Islamic based social reform and advocated economic
reforms and land redistribution, welfare programs and domestic investment instead of
foreign investment. The Brotherhood also established close ties with the labor movement
in Egypt and defended workers' demands. The Brotherhood was also active economically,

in the country. Ottoman Turks used the term
Mufti.

~eyhU!islam

(Sheikh Al Islam) instead of the term Grand
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it established enterprises of its ow nand granted workers shareholdingrights in those
companies. As a response to secular education, Banna's followers established primary
schools that combined religious instruction with scientific and technical instruction. The
organization also reached out to the poor with many charitable activities (Mitchell 1969,
Abu-Rabi 1996, 62-91).
Initially Banna announced the organization as a purely religious and philanthropic
society that aimed to spread Islamic morals and to engage in charitable activities. However
the emergence of the Brotherhood was part of a general reaction of the ordinary people
against a number of alarming developments in Egypt in particular, and in the Muslim world
in general. Among those developments one can count colonialization of most of the Muslim
lands, abolishment of the caliphate, penetration of Muslim culture by the West, and
secularization attempts of the governments in power. As a school teacher and gifted orator,
Banna managed to attract various members to his society such as some members of the
local intelligentsia, some artisans, and a few workers from the British camp workshops
(Mitchell1969, 1-11). Abu-Rabi (1996, 77) points out that one of the changes thatBanna
hoped to introduce was the status of the mosque (masjid), bringing it from a place of
worship to a center oflslamic revolution from below. For Banna, a mosque should have
the triple function of i) being the place of worship for people, ii) a place of education, and
iii) a hospital for the spiritually, mentally, and physically sick. In short, for Banna the
mosque " ... denotes a network of signifiers, a whole system of inner-oriented meanings,
and outer-oriented practices and mores." In addition, in Banna's understanding, a mosque
is a "dynamic domain for the propagation oflslam and the preparation of an active Muslim
group ..." (Abu-Rabi 1996, 78).
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Moving to a new headquarters in Cairo in 1932, Banna continued to spread his
message in regular evening sessions which attracted a majority of artisans and minor
merchants. Influenced by the ideas ofRida, Banna called for a comprehensive and activist
Islam. Banna' s ideology revolved around three basic interdependent pillars: i) a
determined leadership, ii) believing workers, and iii) a proper program of action as
contained in the Qur' an and the Sunnah (Abu-Rabi 80). However, Banna did not clearly
specify the extent of that activism; he was not completely clear on the political nature of
that activism. In Banna's days the movement was still young and it did not develop its own
view on politics. For the Brotherhood leaders, assuming political power was not a
possibility and there were more immediate concerns such as the British occupation and the
rising nationalist movement (Ayubi 131). Abu-Rabi points out that Banna was aware of the
rising Third World nationalism, and for Banna wataniyyah (patriotism) and qawmiyyah
(nationalism) do not essentially contradict with Islam (Abu-Rabi 1996, 79).
Banna believed that Islam had a broader meaning contrary to what most people had
thought. For Banna, Islam was a comprehensive religion that involved all affairs of life.
However, the starting point was the moral realm. The realization oflslamic principles
requires strong morals, and all these efforts must be accompanied with a clear Islamic
methodology (minhaJ). If applied properly, the Islamic methodology is capable of healing
all the ills of the society. The Brotherhood did not identify itself as a political party,
although it was organized and run like one. Banna indicated that in achieving their goals,
the Brotherhood would not necessarily require to control the government and would
support whoever ruled by Islamic principles. For Banna, personal piety and good
community based on Islamic morals were the major conditions for a good Islamic state.
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Thus, their more immediate task was toreformsouls and to enlighten minds (Al-Banna
1981; Mitchell1969).
In 1938, the Brotherhood started two weekly, Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin (The Muslim
Brotherhood) and Al-Nadhir (The Warner), and from that date the Brotherhood gained
more of apolitical character and they had around three hundred branches throughout Egypt
(Mitchell 13-16). Banna also developed the concept of"mental colonization" which, for
him, refers to the consequences of Western education in Egypt in particular; and throughout
the Muslim world in general. Banna believed that "the most harmful consequences of
exporting Western ideas to the Muslim people, under the guise of missionary activities and
colonialism, lie in the field of education." Moreover, for Banna, what was even more
harmful was that education was used as a tool by the colonial powers to create an
"indigenous mercenary intellectual class" made up of the Egyptian upper class alone. For
Banna, consequently the masses were deprived of basic education in religious and secular
sciences. Later, Hanna's concept of"mental colonization" picked by the intellectual
leaders ofthe Brotherhood, including Qutb (Abu-Rabi 1996, 80).
The Brotherhood was really careful in not provoking the Palace which appeared to
be supportive of them to counterbalance the popular Wafd Party. The Brotherhood avoided
confrontation with the Britishatanyprice and slowly developed its own organizational
and paramilitary capacity. The brothers also built their own companies, schools and
hospitals. During the 1940s, the Brotherhood started to attack Jewish and British interests
in Egypt because for them those targets represented the Western imperialism in their
country. When the Prime Minister M. F. Al Nuqrashi attempted to stop the activities of the
Brotherhood, he was assassinated by the organization in 1948. The following year the
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leader of the organization, Banna, was assassinated by the Egyptian security forces and the
government dissolved the Brotherhood (Al-Banna 1981; Mitchell 1969).
Despite the most adverse political conditions Banna's Brotherhood was able to
influence large segments of the Egyptian society. However, Abu-Rabi argues, the
Brotherhood was "unable to exert its influence over two broad social strata: i) the
secularized indigenous classes, and ii) the institutionalized [official] ulcma class [of AIAzhar]" (Abu-Rabi, 87). Banna' s career ended abruptly by his assassination; however his
organization continued to grow after his death and took a new shape with the contributions
of other Brotherhood intellectuals, especially Sayyid Qutb' s. Banna and early Brotherhood
leaders did not attempt to revive the philosophical tradition of classical Islam, nor did they
deal with the scholastic theology of Abduh and his disciples' reformist school. The early
Brotherhood leadership simply focused on social and political matters and tried to respond
to such issues through their interpretation oflslam(Abu-Rabi 1996, 90).

The Egyptian Republic and Arab-Israeli Conflict
The Coup of 1952 and Gamal Abd Al-Nasser
Egypt remained under the Britishhegemonyuntil Gamal AbdAl-Nasser's coup of
1952. T he British were not willing to grant independence toE gypt; King Farouq failed to
achieve popular loyalty especially after the defeat ofEgypt in the 1949 Arab-Israeli war.
In January 1952, the masses of Cairo demonstrated for the withdrawal of British forces

from Egypt. The angry mobs attacked British property as well as bars, cinemas, and
nightclubs that were considered as the symbols of corruption and immorality of the
Egyptian upper classes. The complete disorder and chaos hastened the end ofthe old
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regime and a group of young military officers calling themselves the Free Officers (AlDhubbatAl-Ahrar) carried out a coup led by Colonel Gamal Abd Al-Nasser.
The officers were not coming from an elite background but mostly from a middle
class background. KingFarouq was sent to exile and Egypt turned from a monarchy into a
republic. The constitution of 1923 was abolished, the parliament was dissolved and all
parties were banned. Before carrying out the coup, Nasser had managed to convince a
respected senior officer General M. Naguib as their figurehead leader. After the coup,
Naguib became the prime minister and the president, Nasser became the minister of
interior, and the other officers became the members of the cabinet. The main rival of the
new military government for power was the Brotherhood. In fact, most of the officers had
close ties with the Brotherhood and after the coup the Brotherhood was classified as a
society by the Free Officers, not as a party, which enabled the Brotherhood to escape from
dissolution. The Brotherhood leadership hoped to participate directly in government after
the coup; however the military government was not willing to share power. Relations
between the two deteriorated quickly and resulted in a bloody confrontation. The
government outlawed the Brotherhood when a member of it tried to assassinate Nasser in
1954. The Brotherhood has always argued that the assassination was staged by the
government to liquidate the organization. Six of the leaders of the Brotherhood were
executed and thousands of members were imprisoned. The organization went underground
(Mitchell 1969, 96-104).
The Arab-Israeli Conflict
Zionism politically emerged in nineteenth-century Europe. European liberal
nationalism provided for the legal emancipation ofthe Jews. While political and social
developments in Western Europe integrated Jews into nationall ife, the situation in Russia
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and Poland for the Jews considerably different. Active persecution of the Jews intensified
during the last decades of the nineteenth century in Eastern Europe. Many East European
Jews immigrated to the U.S. Zionism developed as Jewish groups were formed in the early
1880s to assist Jewish settlement in Palestine. In 1884 several groups were organized
under a central agency with the name of the Lovers of Zion. The odor Herzl ( 1860-1904)
believed that anti-Semitism in Europe was such a deeply rooted prejudice that it could
never be eliminated by legislation. He saw emancipation as a fa~tade designed to mask
anti-Semitism. With this belief, he wrote The Jewish State in 1896. Herzl's thesis was that
the Jews constituted a nation but lacked a political state. For Herzl, Jews had to acquire
political sovereignty in a state of their own. His book provided Zionism with a clearly
stated political objective. With Herzl's efforts, the first Zionist Congress was convened in
Basel in 1897. The program of the Congress stated that the objective of Zionism was to
secure a legally recognized home for Jews in Palestine. The delegates also agreed to
establish the World Zionist Organization as the central administrative organ of the Zionist
movement. The Congress met annually after 1897. However, the Ottoman Sultan,
Abdi.ilhamid ll, was against the idea oflarge-scale European Jewish settlement in Ottoman
territory; and none of the European powers was enthusiastic about supporting the
movement which had offered no clear diplomatic benefits (Cleveland 1994, 223-225).
When the Ottomans decided to enter the war on the side of Germany during the First
World War, Britain, France and Russia planned for the partition of Ottoman territories if
the Allies gained victory. There were two principal proposals for dividing the Ottoman
Empire among the Allies: The British pledge to SharifHusayn of Mecca and the SykesPicot Agreement between Britain and France. On November 2, 1917, a letter from Arthur
Balfour, the British foreign secretary, was sent to Lord Rothschild, the head of the Zionist
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Federation in Britain. The British cabinet approved Balfour Declaration in sympathy for
Jewish Zionist aspirations. The Ottomans regarded Palestine as part of southern Syria, not
as a distinctive administrative entity. The British capture of Jerusalem in December of
1917 detached Palestine from the Ottoman rule. In 1920, with the San Remo Conference the
British established their mandate in Palestine. The World Zionist Organization created the
Palestine Zionist Executive in 1921 and in 1929 r eorganizedas the Jewish Agency which
later became the quasi-government of the Jewish community in Palestine uncle r the British
mandate. The Jewish Agency was managing a vast array of services that ranged from
banking to health care and immigrant settlement. The chairman of the agency had regular
access to the British high commissioner and other British officials. Jewish communal
affairs were conducted through a hierarchy of representative institutions. The national
assembly, which was an elected body of 300 members, was established in 1920. The
national council was elected among the members of the national assembly. The council was
making administrative decisions for the Jews in Palestine and was recognized as the
legitimate representative of Palestinian Jews by the British mandate government. Jewish
immigration to Palestine accelerated after 1933 when Hitler rose to power. Within three
years about 170,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine, doubling the size of Jewish population
in Palestine, which alarmed the Arab community. Two major instances (1929, 1936-1939)
ofthe communal violence in the interwar years in Palestine were directly related to the
dislocations caused by Jewish immigration and land transfers from Arabs to Jews
(Cleveland 1994, 222-241).
Through the end of the Second World War, the Palestinian Jews undertook a series
of terrorist acts against the British presence in Palestine. In February 194 7 British Foreign
Secretary Ernest Bevin referred the situation to the United Nations to formulate a solution
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to the Palestine mandate. The UN Special Committee on Palestine recommended the
termination of the British mandate and the granting of independence to Palestine. The report
recommended the partition of the mandate into two states, Arab and Jewish, with Jerusalem
as an internationalized city. The report was endorsed by Zionist leaders; it was rejected by
Arab leaders. On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly approved the partition of
Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. Before the approval, the British announced
in September that the Palestine mandate would be terminated on May 15, 1948. In the
period be tween the British announcement and withdrawal, Palestine was in chaos. There
was a period of civil war during which the Jewish forces tried to secure the territory
designated in the partition plan. However, most of that territory was inhabited by an Arab
majority. The weak Arab resistance was no match for well organized Jewish forces.
Throughout the turmoil, the British administration made little effort to provide order and on
May 14, 1948t he lastBritishhighcomrnissioner,Gen.A.CunninghamleftPalestine.A
few hours after the departure of Cunningham, B en-Gurion proclaimed the independence of
the state oflsrael. Israel was immediately recognized by the US and the USSR (Cleveland
1994, 243-248).
On May 15, 1948 units from the armies of Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, Syria and
Iraq attacked Israel which is known as the first Arab-Israeli war. The war ended in
December 1948 and the Arab forces were defeated, Israel enlarged its territory and the UN
proposal for a Palestinian Arab state collapsed. After the ceasefire between Israel and the
Arabs, Palestine was partitioned among Israel, Egypt and Transjordan. Palestinians had no
state; the vast rnaj ority of the Arab population in the territory that became Israel (over
700,000 people) became refugees. The Arab flight from Palestine began during the civil
war and accelerated with Jewish terror against Arabs by April 1948. The displaced
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Palestinians became refugees in destitute and crowded refugee camps in various Arab
states. By the time the last armistice agreement was signed in 1949, about 160,000 Arabs
remained within the borders oflsrael (Cleveland 1994, 248-251).
Authoritarian Reform, Arab Socialism and Pan-Arabism
Nasser believed that Egypt's future prosperity would be secured through a program
of rapid industrialization. The building of the A swan Dam was one of the main pillars of
Nasser's modernization plan. Electric power generated by the dam would stimulate the
economy, provide jobs, and transform the country into a modern industrial country. The
dam would also control the Nile's floods and provide a dramatic expansion ofEgyptian
agriculture. The U.S. promised aid for the construction. In return, the U.S. pressured Nasser
to join the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, also known as the Baghdad Pact) as part
of the containment during the Cold War era. Nasser rejected to join by arguing that the new
alliance was colonialism in a new guise. Clashes between Palestinian fighters seeking
shelter on Egyptian soil and Israeli forces escalated into clashes between Israeli forces and
the Egyptian army at the border. Nasser demanded Western arms to resist Israeli
incursions, but the U.S. refused Nasser's demands. Nasser responded by purchasing arms
from the Soviets through Czechoslovakia in 1955. In response, the U.S. cancelled its aid
for the A swan Dam in 1956. Nasser boldly responded by nationalizing the Suez Canal
immediately to use its revenues to finance his dam project. Israel conspired with Britain
and France to occupy the Suez Canal fearful ofNasser' s growing popularity in the Arab
world. British, French and Israeli forces occupied the canal in October of 1956 which
started the second Arab-Israeli conflict (Palmer 2007, 51-53).
By 1956 the Nasser regime had already secured its power and achieved a popular
loyalty through its land reform program. Additionally, Nasser's defiance of the West
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through nationalization of the Suez Canal made him a hero in the Arab world. Because of
the heavy U.S. and Russian pressure, the three countries quickly had tow ithdraw their
forces from the Sinai Peninsula. Unexpectedly Nasser emerged victorious from the crisis.
Besides being a national hero, Nasser also aimed to make Egypt the center of Arab ism and
he endorsed Pan-Arab ism by creating the United Arab Republic, a union of Syria and
Egypt, as a single state in 1958. However, the union did not last too long; it ended three
years later. Adoption of socialism for pragmatic reasons also did not work. To generate
resources for its developmental projects, the Nasser government decided to take over most
ofthe enterprises in the country. Also starting from 1952, land reforms created a dramatic
change in the distribution efland. Large estates virtually disappeared and small farms
covered more thanhalfofall the cultivated land by 1964 (Cleveland 1994, 300).

In 1962, Nasser issued the Charter for National Action, a document explaining the
new policies. The Charter proclaimed that Egypt's revolution aimed to achieve freedom,
socialism and unity. Egypt was characterized as the leader of the Arab revolution by the
Charter. The instrument through which the goals of the revolution were to be achieved was
the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). The Charter defined the ASU as a revolutionary
organization open to all Egyptians except feudalists and capitalists. By the late 1960s, the
ASU became a huge bureaucratic organization with more that 5 million members. Nasser
headed the ASU and the top bureaucracy of the organization was filled with former military
officers. The ASU was a government organization to mobilize mass opinion in the absence
of political parties and civil society. Most ordinary Egyptians became members ofthe
organization not for ideological purposes, but for patronage. Membership in the ASU
increased one's chances of securing a good position the government sector and provided

wasta (connections) (Palmer 2007, 54-57).
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Nasser's regime expanded education like other modernizing regimes. The purpose
of the government was not only to increase the level of literacy rate, but also to
indoctrinate the young children with the principles of nationalism and socialism. To
encourage students to attend universities, the regime abolished tuition fees in
postsecondary institutions. In 1962 Nasser boldly guaranteed a government job to every
university graduate. During the 1960s , the number of university students nearly doubled.
However the universities were not well equipped to deal with the sudden burden. Nasser
was forced to stuffthe state bureaucracy with the graduates ofthose universities to fulfill
his promise. Such bureaucratic jobs were low-paying and offered few rewards. The lack
of adequate employment opportunities increased the level of discontent among the college
students (Cleveland 1994, 301).
State Islam in Egypt
Rather than diminishing the role of Islam in the Egyptian society, Nasser attempted
to take them under the control of the state and then to use them in the service of the
revolution. Tamir argues that Nasser understood the importance of gaining control over AIAzhar in order to ensure domestic control and promote his foreign-policy objectives.
Nasser wanted Al-Azhar to lend legitimacy to his regime and his nationalist and socialist
program. Subordinating Al-Azhar to the state also would allow Nasser to balance the
influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which threatened to mobilize Egyptians against the
government. Moreover, Nasser believed that Al-Azhar' s influence in the Muslim world as
the most respected and influential institution oflslamic scholarship would be an important
tool in furthering Egypt's leadership of ArabandMuslimcountries. Tamir (2000, 5-6)
argues that Nasser's most ambitious attempt to secure the state's dominance over Al-Azhar
came in a 1961 law that radically reorganized the institution. With the reorganization, AI-
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Azhar was placed under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Endowments. A 11 of the
finances of the tmiversity were to be directed through the appropriate state channels, giving
non-Azhar state officials significant influence over the university. Under the 1961 law, the
Egyptian president and the minister of endowments were also given formal jurisdiction
over important issues of appointment, most notably the appointment of the Sheikh of AIAzhar. Finally, the 1961 reorganization expanded the university fromjustthree colleges
(theology, Arabic, and Shari'a) to include many secular colleges, such as medicine, law,
and engineering. The addition of new secular colleges changed the balance of power in the
Azhar High Council. The changes ensured that an increasing number of deans representing
non-religious colleges would be represented there. The changes made by Nasser
transformed the university from an independent institution to a government-controlled
institution with little autonomy.
Previously, Nasser attempted to undermine the influence of the u!ema through the
1952 land-reform law just like Muhammed Ali had done more than a century earlier. This
law placed all m1qfproperties under the control of the new Ministry of Endowments. In
1955, Nasser also abolished all Shari'a courts, which had operated parallel to the secular
courts established earlier by Muhammed Ali. Tamir continues by pointing out to the fact
that Nasser used his new leverage over al-Azhar to secure fittmJs that supported his
socialist policies, especially to legitimize his land reforms. Moreover, the Nasser
government also established the Supreme Council oflslamic Affairs, which emphasized the
supposed connection between Islam and socialism The Supreme Council's publication,

Min bar al-Islam (The Pulpit oflslam), issued articles like "Socialism and Islam" and
"The Cause ofthe National Charter Is the Cause oflslam" Moreover, Nasser also used
fittmls to advance his foreign-policy objectives in the Muslim world.

In the rivalry
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between Nasser and King Faisal of S. Arabia throughout the 1960s, Nasser used AlAzhar's fi:ttwas to legitimize his policies and encouraged Saudi Arabia's citizens to rise up
against their government. Nasser's regime also broadcasted similar appeals throughout the
Arab and Islamic world on Egypt's international radio program "Voice ofthe Arabs." By
1963, "Voice of the Arabs" was broadcasting in twenty-four languages with approximately
755 hours of weekly broadcasting. Similarly, Nasser financed students from all over the
Muslim world to have their college education at Al-Azhar in order to increase the
university's connections with other religious e stahl ishments and enhance the international
influence of Al-Azhar (Tamir 2000, 7).
Sayyid Outb ( 1906-1966) and Islamism after Banna
Sayyid Qutb's intellectual life spanned a period of three and a half decades during
which he distinguished himself as a literary, social, and religious critic and writer. Not
only during his life, but also after his death, Qutb' s writings inspired a wide group of
Muslim intellectuals and followers. His works can be classified in five major categories:
i) poetry and literature, ii) works on the Qur' an (Qur' anic aesthetics and exegesis), iii)
philosophy of social justice, iv) sociology of religion, and v) Islam and the West. For AbuRabi, Qutb's significance stems from three major factors. First, Qutb was" ... able to
construct a sophisticated and comprehensive system oflslamic thought that presented the
Islamic view on a number of substantive issues and problems besetting Arab and Muslim
societies." Second, in his complicated system of thought, there are still " ... a significant
number ofthemes and motifs that are still shared by a major portion of the contemporary
Muslim intelligentsia." Third, "in addition to defining certain issues for the Muslim
intelligentsia, Sayyid Qutb' s thought constituted the premises of many radical Muslim
groups, especially in Egypt in the 1970s." (Abu-Rabi 1996, 93-94).
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During the interwar years, Qutbwas heavily involved in the literary and
intellectual life ofEgypt. He was known as a literary, cultural, and religious critic. This
stage in Qutb' s life was a secular stage. Gradually through the end of the 1940s, social and
religious themes appeared in Qutb's works. At this stage, he was more committed to the
plight of peasants and workers. By the early 1950s in the eve of the 1952 revolution, Qutb
became ideologically more committed to the Muslim Brotherhood movement over the years
eventually becoming the main ideologue of the movement (See Abu-Rabi, Chapters 4 and

5).
Like Banna, Qutb spent his early life as a schoolteacher. Later he worked at some
bureaucratic positions within the Ministry of Education. He spent two years in the U.S.
( 1946-8) and studied educational administration. On his return to Egypt, Qutb joined the
Brotherhood in the early 1950s. He was a prolific writer who wrote twenty four books and
dozens of articles primarily on religion, politics, education and literary criticism. Qutb's
extensive Qur'anic commentary Fi Zilal AI Qur'an (In the Shade of the Qur'an) and his
most famous work Ma 'a lim Fil Tariq (The Milestones) have contributed significantly to
the ideology of future generation oflslamists (Esposito 1998, 139).
Like many intellectuals in Egypt in the 1940s, Qutb was first attracted to the West.
Later Qutb was disillusioned with the West and the U.S. especially after the creation of
Israel. During his two year stay ( 1948 -1950) in the U.S. Qutb witnessed the widespread
support of the American press for Israel. After Qutb became a member of the Brotherhood,
the harsh crackdown of secularist-nationalist military government of Egypt on the Islamists
pushed Qutb towards radicalism; and his increasingly radical-militant writings made him
the leading ideologue of the Brotherhooddu ring the crackdownofNasser. In 1954, Qutb
was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and released in 1964. Less than a year after the
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publication of Milestones in 1964, Qutbwas tried by Egyptiangove rnmentwith charges of
conspiring against the state. Excerpts from the book were used to incriminate Qutb and he
was found guilty and sentenced to death in 1966. Like Banna, Qutb is referred to as a/

shaheed (the martyr) (Haddad 69).
Qutb' s thought was extensively influenced by Banna and Pakistani Islamic thinker
Mawdudi. Qutb wrote more extensivelythanBanna, so he is the one whoprovidedthe
basic guidelines for the Brotherhood. Qutb's interpretation oflslam was directly related to
his political views. Qutb perceived Islam to be a complete social system. In fact, Qutb was
seeking not only a new government, but also a new society. While the Brotherhood and
Qutb supported the Free Officers in 1952 Revolution, he later distanced himself from the
policies of the new military government ofNasser. In Qutb's view, Nasser's regime was,
destructive to Egypt and Islam, because it was a nationalist-secularist regime which
persecuted Islamists. Qutb had also personally witnessed the cruelty ofNasser's regime in
the form of arbitrary arrests, torture, and deadly violence. In Qutb' s eyes, Nasser
confirmed the reality ofjahiliyyah (ignorance) 177 in the modern Muslim world (Sivan 73).
Qutb is also credited with theorizing approaches to enacting the widespread
Islamic reforms he envisioned. His main vehicle for change was the concept of a Muslim
vanguard who would instruct and lead the masses through the persuasive message oflslam.
Fully formedinhis final work, Milestones, Qutb's vanguard was not explicitly intended as
a ruling class, but was meant to be an elite organization of highly educated and motivated
Muslims dedicated to a unified cause. Qutb established complex, controversial views on
several traditional Islamic ideas like Jahiliyyah, sovereignty of God and Jihad (Esposito
1998, 140).
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One of Qutb's innovations was applying the termjahiliyyah (ignorance), which
traditionally refers to humanity's state of ignorance before the revelation oflslarn, to
modern-day Muslim societies. In Qutb's view, the removal oflslamic law and religious
values had left the Muslim world in a condition of debased ignorance, similar to that of the
pre-Islamic era. In defining the Muslim world as in a state of ignorance, Qutb concluded
that all non-Islamic states were illegitimate, including that of Egypt. What was most
controversial about Qutb's conception of jahiliyyah was his wide application of it. Qutb
believed that all societies ruled by a non-Islamic government were not Islamic. Further,
based on a Qur'anic interpretation of ignorance, Qutb concluded that Muslims living in
such societies were religiously obligated to oppos e the ruling government and to challenge
its authority. In fact, Qutb's theories paired a :fundamentalist interpretation of the Qur'an
with a radical, sociopolitical ideology and among his contemporaries in the Brotherhood,
Qutb' s influence was great on formation of militant Islamic organizations like AI Takfir

Uill Hijra (Excommunication and Emigration) and AI Jihad group (whose members later
assassinated Egyptian President A. Sadat after he signed the Camp David Accords with
Israel) later split from the Brotherhood (Rubin 14). For the Brotherhood neither Western
capitalism, nor atheistic communism could help the Muslim community. The only answer
was a return to true Islam.
Haddad argues that few Muslim thinkers had a significant impact on the
reformulation of contemporary Islamic thought as Sayyid Qutb did. Since his execution in
Cairo in 1966, his writings inspired various revolutionary Islamist groups in the Muslim
world. Qutb's writings captured the imagination and the commitment of idealist
revolutionaries and inspired them to work for the cause oflslam (Haddad 67-69). Haddad

177

Jahiliyyah (Ignorance) is a term first coined by Prophet Muhammad and the first believers which
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maintains that for the young revolutionaries, his life experiences, his writings and his
execution altogether epitomized one of the processes through which a revolutionary passes.
According to Haddad, it is a process:
... through which a revolutionary passes from enchantment with the West to "the
helplessness and marginality that it may inspire in those who find its values and norms
not only foreign but inadequate, and finally the return to the roots where reintegration,
conversion and the human being becomes part of the revolutionary movement aimed at
changing the world and brining a new ethical moral order based on freedom,
brotherhood, and justice for all (67).

Qutb' s thought was heavily influenced by HasanAl-Banna, the founder of the
Muslim Brotherhood, and the writings ofMawlana Mawdudi (leader ofPakistan's

Jamaat-i Is/ami-Islamic Association). Qutb borrowed frequently from Mawdudi in his
assessment of such themes as Allah's hakimiyyah (governance ),jihad, and the
revolutionary character oflslam. Qutb wrote more extensively than Al-Banna, and his
writings became a blueprint for the Muslim Brothers. Esposito argues that Qutbtook many
ofMawdudi's beliefs to their more literal, militant conclusion. Mainly because of harsh
government treatment on the Brotherhood during Nasser years, Qutb moved from an early
phase which spoke of an Islamic alternative to Western systems to a later stage in which an
Islamic alternative became the Islamic imperative that all Muslims were obligated to
implement. As a result, Qutb appealed to the more radical elements among his
contemporaries in the Brotherhood and became a strong formative influence on militant
Islamic organizations in Egypt, including AI-Takfir Uill Hijra (Excommunication and
Emigration), andAl-Jihad whose members later assassinated Egyptian President A. Sadat
(Esposito 1998, 139-140).
Shepard argues that Qutb is important and interesting for more than one reason
(Shepard 2003, 521 ). First, in his last years Qutb wrote several widely read books calling

refers to the pre-Islamic era in the Arabian Peninsula.
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for an Islamic revolution and indeed, he was executed on the grounds that he was plotting
to overthrow the Egyptian government. Thereby, for the revolutionaries he actually became
a martyr (shaheed). Shepard maintains that Qutb was a major influence on the Islamist
"resurgence," which began shortly after his death. Second, Qutb is significant because of
his own pilgrimage in life, which to a degree parallels developments in the Muslim world
as a whole. Almost during half of his adult life Qutb was an educator, poet, and a prolific
essay and literary critic writer with secular views. Only in 1948 did he begin to write
Islamist works which were comparatively moderate at first. After joining the Muslim
Brothers upon his return from the U.S. in the early 1950s, he was put in prison in 1954 and
like many of the Brothers, Qutb remained there for most of the rest of his life. He was
released briefly in 1964-65 and then re-arrested, tried, and executed. It was in prison,
particularly after 1957, that he developed his most radical ideas.
Qutb captured the hopes and dreams of those who struggle to br ingabout change, to
create social and economic justice in society; his writings inspired many Islamist groups
llke Al-Jihad, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and early Iranian revolutionaries especially
after 1971 when Anwar Al-Sadat ( 1918-1981) allowed the Islamists to resume their
activities to counterbalance the socialist opposition against the regime. Q utb joined the
Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and became the editor of its weekly paper upon his return
from the U.S. after completing his studies on educational administration in 1950. Qutb also
served as a liaison between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers led by Gamal
Abdel Nasser who later overthrew King Farouk ofEgypt in 1952. In 1954 Egyptian
President Gamal Abdel Nasser accused the Muslim Brothers of plotting against him and
arrested key leaders including Qutb. Qutb was sentenced to fifteen years in prison; many
Brotherhood members were tortured and died under torture. Qutb wrote most of his latter
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writings which were mainly on Islam while he was in prison (Haddad 1983, 69-73; Husain
2003, 74). Qutb's justification of violence against secularist governments was widely
accepted by violent radical groups throughout the Muslim world.
Qutb became increasingly radical during his imprisonment; later, more radical and
violent revolutionary groups like Muhammed's Youth, Al-Jihad and Al-Takfir extensively
referred to his latter writings which were more radical than his earlier ones. On October 6,
1981, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated by members of Al-Jihad as he
reviewed a parade commemorating the 1973 war. Lt. Khalid Islambuli, the leader ofthe
assassins, cried out: "I am Khalid Islambuli, I have killed Pharaoh and I do not fear death!"
Qutb was arrested in 1954 with many members of the Muslim Brotherhood was tried and
sentenced to fifteen years in prison with the charge of plotting against the I ife of President
Nasser. After serving ten years, Qutb was released from prison by Nasser. When Qutb was
released from prison, he published his most well known work, Ma 'alim Fil Tariq

(Signposts on the Road, also known as Milestones) in 1964. His controversial book which
legitimizes use of violence against secularist rulers resulted in his arrest in 1965. One year
later he was executed by the government (Esposito 1995, 96).
Qutb popularized the concept ofjahiliyyah (ignorance) which is a term used in the
Qur'an 178 to refer to the period of ignorance in which the Meccans lived prior to Islam
Currently the term pejoratively designates all that one considers to be alien to Islam.

178
In fact the Qur'an uses the term literally, and also to refer to the era before Islam. The first reference
below is in regards to the era before Islam, the other references are the literal meaning of the word.
(From Yusuf Ali Translation of the Qur'an) (33:33) "And stay quietly in your houses, and make not a
dazzling display, like that of the former Times ofIgnorance; and establish regular Prayer, and give
regular Charity; and obey Allah and His Messenger. And Allah only wishes to remove all
abomination from you, ye members of the Family, and to make you pure and spotless. "(6: 54) "When
those come to thee who believe in Our signs, Say: ''Peace be on you: Your Lord hath inscribed for
Himself (the rule of) mercy: verily, if any ofyou did evil in ignorance, and thereafter repented, and
amend (his conduct), !of He is Oft- forgiving, Most Merciful." (16: 119) "But verily thy Lord,- to those
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Though for Qutb, it is not a period in history, it is a condition that is repeated every time
society strays away from the path oflslam whether in the past, the present or the future. The
difference between the historical jahifiyyah and the current one is that the latter is more
sinister because it is deliberately created by people who assume the role of God.
Accordingly the older jahifiyyah was based upon pure ignorance; however the current one
depends upon knowledge, complexity and disdain. Shepard argues that Qutb posits a stark
contrast between Islam andjahiliyyah. All societies are either one or the other, and none is
both, so Qutb defines the jahifi society as every other society than the Muslim society.

Jahili societies may be anti-religious or religious in diverse ways, but the only thing that
really matters is whatthey have in common, that they arejahifi (Shepard 2003, 521-545).
Under such circumstances, the believers should be aware that there is a constant
struggle between the Islamic worldview and that ofjahiliyyah. For Qutb, any system that
relegates God and religion to the personal sphere is a product ofjahiliyyah and from that
injunction there is no doubt that all non-Muslim systems belongtojahiliyyah. As
mentioned earlier, Qutb includes the secular Muslim systems into the category of

jahiliyyah because they operate outside the divine instructions, therefore Muslims should
totally reject such systems and struggle against them by Muslims isjihad 179 which is an
essential characteristic of Islam directly commanded in the Qur' an. While evaluating
Muslims in his period, Q utb argues that Muslims were not fighting because they did not

who do wrong in ignorance, but who thereafter repent and make amends,- thy Lord, after all this, is
q[t-Forgiving, Most Merciful."
1 9
Jihad is one of the most controversial terms in Islam. Literally it means struggle, the root of the word
is the verb jahada which means ''to struggle". First of all, jihad signifies the struggle against one's carnal
desires. Indeed, Prophet Muhammed was reported to have told his companions who were returning from a
holy war: "Welcome home to all ofyou who are returningfrom a small jihad to a much bigger jihad".
One of the companions asked: "What is the much bigger jihad 0 Prophet of God?" He replied, ''It is
the jihad against your carnal desires". He further said, ''A true mujahid (one who struggles) is the one
who struggles against his carnal desires in obedience to Allah". (Reported by AI Tirmizi and Ibn
Majah). The second and most well known use of the term is for fighting for the sake of God.
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exist (as a political and economic power both domestically and globally); and Qutb urges
the Muslims not to be embarrassed and not to renounce force. Qutb further contemplates
that Muslims inability to fulfill jihad is a temporary situation. 180
Qutb also argues that the Shari'a was eternal and God-given; how ever through.fiq h
(Islamic Jurisprudence) Muslims can reinterpret the eternal principles to have them
become relevant to modern life, its needs and problems. For Qutb, Muslim people were
alienated from laws issued by their national governments that are borrowed from the West.
Thus, he notes that unless the people appropriate the laws as their own, society is doomed
to disintegration and anomie. For Qutb, neither communism nor Western capitalism would
be a proper ideological guide for Muslim societies, thus a third alternative, the Islamic
alternative, is the only option for Muslims (Haddad 1983, 167-171). Indeed, Qutb posits a
complex view of the West. In short, for Qutb, the West was a reflection of Christianity and
its history, Renaissance and the rebellion against the authority of the Catholic Church,
colonialism, both socialism and capitalism, secularism and the separation of church and
state, and an intellectual orientation (Abu-Rabi 1996, 13 7).
The Six-Day-War (1967)
Jews all over the world celebrated the creation oflsrael in 1948; however
Palestinians refer to it as AI Naqba (the Catastrophe). For a decade after the 1956 Suez
War, Nasser avoided direct military confrontation with Israel while focusing on domestic
issues. Before the Six-Day War, Nasser provoked Israel by forcing the UN forces out of

180

Qutb also discusses the concept of hakimiyyah (sovereignty/governance of God) in regards to
rejecting any type of human sovereignty whether that be of priests, tribal chefs, princes or governors as
well as the concept ofjahiliyyah (ignorance). Shari'ah then is the ultimate guide for humankind. As long
as a certain group of people legislate for all the people equality and absolute dignity can not be realized.
Qutb has a wider view of Shari'ah. It is not just about legal principles but everything that God has decreed
to organize human life. This includes the principles of faith, administration of justice, morality and human
behavior as well as the principles of knowledge.
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the Sinai, remilitarizing the peninsula, and proclaiming a blockade of the Strait ofTiran.
Nasser perceived himself as the leader of Arab nationalism; however Israel perceived
Nasser's actions as equivalent to a declaration ofwar. Israel launched a preemptive air
attack against Egypt and Syria that destroyed their air forces on the ground. Israel then took
the Sinai from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan
Heights from Syria within six days (Husain 2003, 168).
Husain argues that Nasser turned to Islamic themes and ritual observances to
relieve the trauma of the Egyptian people after the defeat as it discredited his secular
socialist ideologies. Nasser after 1967 stopped using socialist rhetoric and resorted to an
Islamic idiom to rationalize the shocking Arab defeat. Nasser stressed Islamic virtues, 1ike
patience and perseverance, in the face ofhardship. On June 19, 1967, Nasser participated
in the festivities marking the birthday of Prophet Muhammed. Nasser also fired his secular
socialist advisors, introduced limited economic liberalization and made fraternal overtures
to the wealthy, traditional, pro-Western, monarchies of the Persian Gulf. Nasser even
relaxed the restrictions on the Muslim Brotherhood by releasing many of its members from
jails and by allowing relative freedom for the Islamists (Husain 2003, 169).
Islamists took advantage of the new freedom, though limited, and offered a simple
explanation for the Arab defeat against Israel: Egypt and other Muslim countries had
strayed from the straight pathoflslamthathad brought progress and glory in the past. By
importing alien Western ideologies like nationalism and socialism, the Muslim world
suffered chronic problems. The Muslim Brotherhood openly declared that the Arab defeat
was a sign of Allah's revenge for the oppression of Muslim by Nasser, and that Allah
punished Nasser since he allied with the atheistic Soviets. The Muslim Brotherhood also
associated Israel's victory over Arabs with the power of faith: the Egyptians, who had
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depended upon a secular ideology, could not defeat Israel, which was a religious state
based upon the tenets ofJudaism (Husain 2003, 169-170).
Anwar Al-Sadat (1918-1981), Al-Infitah and the Brotherhood
Nasser had a heart attack in 1970 and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, his vice
president and a charter member of the Free Officers. Upon assuming office, Sadat's main
goals were economic development, freeing Egypt from Soviet domination, and building a
personal base of support among both the military and the public. At the time Sadat assumed
power, there were about 21,000 Soviet advisors in Egypt. The leaders of the ASU opposed
Sadat and used the ASU to undermine his authority. In 1971, Sadat crushed an attempted
coup by the leftist elements in the ASU. To counterbalance the leftists in the ASU, Sadat
revived the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization was allowed to form branches in
schools and to perform charity activities for the poor (Palmer 2007, 59-60).
For reclaiming the Sinai Peninsula from Israel, Sadat attempted to start negotiations
with both Israel and the U.S. but he did not receive encouragement from neither. On
October 6, 1973, the joint Egyptian-Syrian attack surprised Israelis on the day ofYom
Kippur; Israel was caught unprepared. Oil producing Arab countries, like S. Arabia and
Libya cut their oi 1 exports to the U.S. and Netherlands for their support oflsrael in the
conflict. Although the 1973 war was a military stalemate and the Arabs did not regain the
lands lost to the Israelis in 1967, the conflict began with a successful Arab attack on
Israel's fortified military positions in the Sinai Peninsula. The war added great impetus to
the popularity oflslamism in throughout the Muslim world. The Arab effort was perceived
as a victory, though it was limited. Arabs overcame the widely held myths of Arab di sunity
and military inferiority; the myth oflsraeli invincibility was discredited (Palmer 2007, 61;
Husain 2003, 171).
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Husain argues that religious symbolismduringandafterthe 1973 war in Egypt was
clearly noticeable. First, Sadat intentionally made specific plans to launch the war during
Muslim's holy month of Ramadan. Second, the operational code name for crossing the Suez
Canal by Egyptian forces was Badr, which was a reminder of the first Islamic military
victory of the Muslims uncle r Prophet Muhammed against the pagan Meccans in 623. Third,
the battle cry during the war was Allahu Akbar (God is the greatest). Many Brotherhood
members also volunteered for the war and fought in the front lines (Husain 2003, 171 ). The
U.S. arranged for a withdrawal oflsraeli forces from the Canal Zone in January 1974.
After the Israeli withdrawal, Egypt under Sadat launched his new economic
liberalization policy known as AI-Infitah (the opening). 181 With the Infitah, Egypt would
have a mixed economy and a revived capitalist class in the country would be a
counterweight to S adat' s leftist opponents in Egypt. The infitah heightened the expectations
of ordinary Egyptians; however it did not have any tangible benefits to the disappointed
masses. Sadat faced new difficulties in implementing the Infitah. 182 The major reasons

181

The decade following the October War of 1973 in Egypt witnessed a resource boom caused by Sadat's
infitah. Through the infitah, Sadat attracted foreign investment, stimulated the private sector, and
liberalized foreign trade. However, state spending grew faster than the revenues did; thus, the resulting
budget deficits were financed by foreign debt. In spite of liberalization policies of Sadat, employment in
the government sector grew 6.3 percent between 1977 and 1981, and the government sector
(administrative jobs and the state run industry) remained the largest job source for Egyptians. Sadat also
expanded Egypt's educational institutions. From 1975 to 1985, the country's annual output of university
graduates nearly tripled, rising from around 42,000 to around 116,000 university graduates. Maintaining
the guaranteed employment po !icy by the state was expensive. A heavy burden of wage cost, which was
growing at an annual compound rate of22.8 percent, troubled the Egyptian state. Additionally, the policy
led to severe owrstaffing (Wickham 2002, 37-38).
182
For instance, by the late 1970s, hidden unemployment in the public sector was estimated to be
between 15 and 20 percent. Moreover, there was an average three year period between graduation and
appointment to a government job. The most worrying aspect of the whole program was the steady
decrease of public salaries at a time when wages in other non-public sectors of the economy were rising.
Average annual GDP growth rates of9 rercent doubled per capita incomes from 1974 to 1984 except
public sector jobs. When the new earning opportunities emerged in the areas of petroleum, banking,
construction, and trade; in the public sector the real wages of white collar workers dropped by 8 percent
between 1974 and 1984. Thus, the ear of the resource boom did not mean more wealth for the public
sector employees; the incomes of the degree holders declined relative to those of other groups in Egypt
in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Wickham argues that the grievances of degree holders intensified in
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were that Egypt had a staggering foreign debt, a huge foreign budget, and a high inflation
rate over 20 percent. One of the existing social welfare programs in Egypt was the
subsidization of some basic consumer items like bread, sugar, rice and tea. The subsidies
provided cheaper basic consumer goods to the poor, but they cost the state around $ 1.5
billion per year. Upon the warning ofiMF, in January 1977, Sadat reduced the subsidies on
certain items and cancelled them altogether on others. The popular response was an
outbreak of antigovernment riots in Cairo. Masses attacked government buildings and
police stations. Sadat had to call in the army to suppress the riots. Sadat reluctantly
restored the subsidies after the riots (Cleveland 1994, 338, 339).
Sadat also promised the Egyptians a return to democracy by declaring that Egypt
would have three political parties: a party of the left, a party ofthe capitalist right, and a
party of the center. Sadat disavowed membership in any of the three. However, virtually
all government officials became members of the centrist party. In 1977, the Wafd Party
also resurfaced after a long break calling itself the New Wafd Party. The communists, the
Nasserists, and the Muslim Brotherhood were still proscribed from forming a political
party. In July 1978, Sadat announced the creation of a new political party, the National
Democratic Party (NDP) whose leader would be Sadat himself. Members of the centrist
party resigned from their party and became members of Sadat' s NDP which took over the
buildings and organizational network of the now-defunct ASU (Palmer 2007, 62-63).
On November 20, 1977, Sadat made a speech in Knesset, the Israeli parliament, to
proclaim Egypt's willingness of peace with Israel. Sadat' s address led to the Camp David
Peace Accords sponsored by U.S. president Carter. On March 26, 1979 a formal peace
was signed between Egypt and Israel. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and all the

the 1980s when Mubarak attempted to cut back on the guaranteed employment program (Wickham 2002,
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Arab states, except Oman and the Sudan, broke diplomatic relations with Egypt.
Additionally, the oil producing Arab states cancelled their subsidies for Egypt. Enraged by
Egypt's peace treaty with Israel which still occupied Gaza, the West Bank, and East
Jerusalem, Islamists in Egypt increased the dose of their criticism against Sadat.
Throughout the 1970s , I slamist student organizations gained control of most of the student
organizations of Egypt's major universities.
During Sadat' s reign in the 1970s , the Islamist student organizations (gama 'at) in
the university campuses had attracted many followers who later in Mubarak's period
became the middle-aged leaders of the Islamist movement. As previously mentioned, Sadat
encouraged Islamist groups to organize in Egyptian universities during the 1970s for the
purpose of counterweighing the Egyptian left (especially the ASU), which had be en trying
to undermine his authority. In 1973, t he Islamist student organization at Cairo University
sponsored summer camps for religious education, Qur' anic studies which continued in the
following years. Two years later, the organization gained control of the national
information and publishing committee of the General Union of Egyptian Students which had
elected branches in every university faculty as well as nationwide committees. In 19781979 academic year, the lslamists won a landslide victory in elections for the General
Union's national board. Shortly, Islamist student associations ofthe mid-1970s served as
an important training ground for a new generation oflslamist leaders in Egypt. Through
those associations, the Islamists leaders gained experience providing services,
disseminating Islamist ideology, and outreaching new members. Thus, such experience
made it possible for the Islamist leaders to gain self-confidence and political skills.
Through the end of his reign, Sadatattempted to limitlslamistactivismin the university

39-40).
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campuses through some repressive measures. However, Islamists continued to dominate
student organizations in Wliversities in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, in Cairo
University in the academic year of 1990-1991, the Islamists won 47 of 48 seats on the
student union's board in the science faculty, all 72 seats in the medical faculty, and all 60
seats in the engineering faculty (Wickham 2002, 116-117).

In 1977, members of AI-Takfir took hostage a former minister of religious
endowments by demanding the release of imprisoned members oftheir organization. When
Sadat refused to deal with the kidnappers, they killed the hostage. The regime retaliated by
arresting and executing the leaders of AI-Takfir and imprisoning young Islamist militants
associated with the organization. Agitation by the Islamists led to the cancellation of all
party activity. In September of 1981, Sadat ordered the arrest of more than 1500 political
activists, many of them were Islamists. When Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel in
1979, another violent Islamist organizationAl-Jihad condemned Sadat for surrendering
Jerusalem to the Jews. The organization claimed that Sadat was an infidel and his
assassination is a duty for a true believer. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was
assassinated by members of Al-Jihad in October 1981 (Cleveland 419; Palmer 63).
Conclusion
Husni Mubarak ( 1928- ), Sadat' s vice-president, became president after Sadat' s
death. Sadat appointed Mubarak in 1975, and like his two predecessors Mubarak was a
military officer who hadreceivedhis flighttraining in the Soviet Union. Mubarakwas also
the commander of the Egyptian air force during the October War. Under Mubarak, the
Islamist organizations continued their activities and pressured the government to apply the

Shad 'a. As Bayat (1998, 156) reports, religious observance increased in Egypt since the
early 1980s, and Islamist political activism in the last two decades penetrated a variety of
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civil society associations, media, education, and social services. In addition to the
Brotherhoods unanticipated electoral successes in the parliamentary elections through the
1980s, by the early 1990s, the Brotherhood members took control of major professional
associations such as doctors, engineers, pharmacists, lawyers, and commerce, as well as
the student unions in major Egyptian universities. This came as a shock to the Mubarak
regime; and the regime was not willing to relinquish power (Campagna 1996, 278-280).
Mubarak swiftly changed his accommodationist approach which he had adopted towards
the Brotherhood earlier in the 1980s and started to crack down on the organization.
Mubarak viewed the organization's increasingly visible participation in civil and political
life as a threat to its own declining legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Egyptians. In other
words, the Egyptian regime perceived the Islamists a double threat. One aspect of the
regime's perception oflslamists as a threat was in regards to the political threats that the
Islamists posed. The Brotherhood scored a series of victories in the national and
associational elections throughout the country since the late 1980s. The second aspect was
the regime's perception of the Brotherhood as an ideological threat as Islamism as a
political movement sought to replace secularist principles of the regime. A series of
legislative measures were taken to curtail the Brotherhoods influence in Egyptian
professional associations in addition to initiating a media campaign to " ... discredit the
Brotherhood by labeling it a terrorist organization operating in close coordination with
radical segments of the Islamic movement, despite the Brotherhood's publicly expressed
commitmenttonon-violence in pursuit of its political goals" (Campagna 1996, 280).
Besides the legal measures and the media campaign, the government's response for
the Islamist opposition during Mubarak' s period included other measures. On one hand,
Mubarakincreasinglytried to gain control over Egypt's thousands of mosques. For the
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Mubarak government, private mosques outside the government's control could pose a
serious challenge to the state. 183 On the other hand, the Egyptian government tried to seize
the initiative from Islamist by adopting Islamic symbols and Islamizing some of the laws.
Abaza (2006) argues that Mubarak' s official discourse became more Islamic. On different
occasions the regime responded to the increasing pressures to uphold the Shari'a coming
from the Islamist opposition by pledging to review existing laws to see that they conformed
to the Shari'a. After Sadat, Mubarak became increasingly dependent on Al-Azhar to
discredit radical Islamists on theological grounds (Tamir 2000, 15-16).
The following chapter will discuss the relations between the Mubarak regime and
the Brotherhood by detailing the political activities of the Brotherhood within the larger
context of Egyptian politics after Sadat' s assassination in 1981. By doing that a Gramscian
perspective will be employed; parallels will be drawn between Gramscian "war of
position" and the Islamists perception of politics as jihad. 184 A social movement approach
will be employed to analyze contemporary Islamist political activism in the last three
decades through the concepts borrowed from the literature on social movements such as
structural strains, opportunity spaces, constraints, and framing.

183

Tamir reports that starting from 1952, the governments of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak participated in
an ambitious program of subsidizing and nationalizing virtually all ofEgypt's mosques. Under Mubarak,
the government increased the pace of nationalization of the mosques considerably and curtailed the
number of permits for new private mosques. By 1994, the government controlled approximately 50,000
mosques which is 71 percent of all the mosques in Egypt. In 1982, the number of the state-controlled
mosques was roughly around 6000, which was just 19 percent of all the mosques in Egypt at the beginning
ofMubarak's presidency (Tamir 2000, 7). Along with the nationalization of private mosques, the
government also established specific regulations for controlling who preaches in state-controlled
mosques and what kinds of topic are addressed in the weekly sermons. In each governmental district,
committee composed of the local directors of the Al-Azhar and the Ministry of Endowments, and the
director of education and social affairs, selects the prayer leaders among candidates who are later
screened by the committee for any radical religious or political sympathies. Those who are approved by
the committee receive a license to preach and are assigned to a specific mosque. Moreover, private
mosques are also required by law to have licensed preachers who were approved through the Ministry of
Endowments (Tamir 2000, 8).
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CHAPTERV

ISLAMIST POLITICS IN EGYPT
Islamist politics in the contemporary world is frequently portrayed as threatening,
extreme, and violent. Journalists and news agencies regularly report events and stories of
Muslims that reinforce negative stereotypes. In such coverage, as Milton-Edwards (2004,
3-4) suggests, there is often a failure to recognize Islam's diverse character. Islamic
politics is a multifaceted phenomenon that needs to be explored. Beinin and Stork ( 1997,
4-5) argue that Islamist movements have posed sharp challenges to postcolonial, nationalist
regimes throughout the Muslim World. The current upsurge oflslamism, which can be said
to date from the early 1970s, is not the first Islamist movement to emerge in the modern
era 185 •
This chapter is going to examine contemporary Egyptianislamism with an emphasis
on their political activism as a comprehensive movement from a Gramscian 186 and social
movement perspective. 187 In doing this, government's control over religion and the
Islamists' perception of external threats will be used as independent variables. There are
several recent works that examine Islamism from a social movement perspective. Clark
(2004) and Wickham (2002) discuss the Islamists' involvement into politics from a social
movement perspective. However, these two authors seem to analyze Islamism from what I

184

Jihad literally means struggle (not holy war), and does not essentially have areligious connotation. The
word jihad comes from the wrbjahada which means "to struggle" (indeed,jahada literally means 'he
struggled"; in Arabic, there is no infinitive form for wrbs; instead of the infinitive, the past tense is used).
185
Early modern Egyptian Islamism was discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter, a selective
presentation of the contemporary Egyptian Islamist movements is going to be provided with an emphasis
on their political character.
186
As they relate to Islamist political activism, Gramscian "war of position" and "counter-hegemonic
struggle" were discussed earlier in Chapters 1 and 3.
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call a crisis (Wickham) perspective, and class (Clark) perspective. Although both authors
study Islamist activism from a social movement perspective and use the methods employed
by the social movement theorists, Wickham and Clark seem to overemphasize the impact of
structural strains and class solidarity on politicization oflslamists 188 respectively. Another
author who emphasizes the role of crises in the emergence of Egyptian lslamism is Berman
(2003). Berman identifies factors like the role of economic decline, demographic trends,
unemployment, frustration of the masses, lack of governmental services, and the defeat of
Egypt against Israel as the crises that contributed to the emergence oflslamism in Egypt
(2003, 17-18). Berman (2003, 19) associates the emergence oflslamism with
Huntingtonian assumption( s) on the relationship between mobilization of oppositional
groups and governmental efficacy within the context of modernization:
The result of these developments [crises], in Egypt and across much of the Arab region,
has been the emergence of a classic ''Huntingtonian" gap, as mobilization, aspirations,
and expectations have increased dramatically \\bile existing state and political
institutions have proved unable or unwilling to respond. Accompanying this has been an
estrangement of the region's citizens from their governments.

Although Berman discusses the role of civil society activism in the Islamists'
popular appeal, she fails to mention the fact that civil society activism for the Egyptian
Islamists is mostly not a deliberate choice because establishing a political party based on
religion is forbidden in the Egyptian constitution, thus Islamists resorted to civil society
since they were not allowed to create a political party. However, as Berman points out,
Islamists largely benefitted from civil society activism as they broadened their base of
support by providing services for the people, trained new leaders, and conveyed their
message through the civil society.

187

Please refer to the distinction made between the macro-level and micro-level analyses introduced in
Chapter 3. Also note the rationale of this study in examining Islamism from the Gramscian and social
movement theory.
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Like Berman, Wickham also perceives Islamism as a reaction to crises caused by
factors like authoritarian rule, unemployment, economic crises, center-periphery
conflict. 189 Unlike Berman and Wickham, Clark has a different approach in explaining
Islamist activism For Clark, Islamist political activism is prompted through the
collaborative work and horizontal networks through middl e-el ass solidarity. To a certain
degree, my approach throughout this study recognizes the impact of those crises, and admits
significance of horizontal networks between the movement participants; however by
themselves, the crises and the horizontal networks are not enough in explaining the
emergence oflslamism in both countries. Also, this study does not perceive Islamist
activism as an outcome of solidarity of a particular class.
The Interviewees' Profile
The people whom I interviewed were highly critical of the Egyptian regime and the
secularist leadership ofMubarak's NDP. In fact, majority of my respondents have spoken
more openly as they had been contacted by my personal connections prior to the
interviews, and had been informed about the interview process. Under authoritarian

188

Please see the discussion that I made in Chapter 1 regarding the crisis theories and why such theories
can not adequately help us understand emergence oflslamism in both countries.
189
Early approaches to the study of social movements derived from functionalist social psychology
accounts of mass behavior according to which system equilibrium is a natural societal condition
(Wiktorowicz 2004; 6). According to this approach, societies organically generate institutional
infrastructure that regulates the balance between inputs and outputs in the political system. The responsive
institutions accommodate societal demands and channel and address various interests to produce optimal
policies. In return, those policies alleviate the demands and maintain the system equilibrium. For the
functionalists, system disequilibrium comes from exogenous structural strains that produce new
grievances and diminish the efficacy of institutions and cause political instability. Social frustration and
political disorder (Huntington 1968) take place when political institutions can not accommodate newly
mobilized societal demands. The crisis theories have a similar approach according to which various crises
(structural strains) produce Islamism. A sense of isolation and helplessness was believed to drive people
to Islamism. Thus, those Islamist movements were seen as "escapist coping mechanism through which
individuals regain a sense of belonging and empowerment" (Wiktorowicz 2004; 6). From this type of
approach, Islamist activism is a result of the structural crises produced by the failure of secular
modernization projects (Waltz 1986, Dekmejian 1995, Hoffman 1995, Faksh 1997, Haddad 1992,
Ibrahim 1980, Ansari 1984 ). In addition to the crises, socioeconomic factors are the principle cause and
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settings, respondents might be cautious about disclosing their opinions regarding sensitive
political issues, especially their negative opinions about the government. This could have
been an impediment for my research.
However, this was not the case, because I contacted all of my interviewees through
three of my personal contacts and prior to the interviews, the participants were assured by

my contacts that their names would not be disclosed, and their comments made during the
interviews would be used anonymously. The major reason for not revealing their names is
to not to get them involved in any legal persecution because of their critical statements
about the government and its policies. People could easily be persecuted about their
critical statements about the government and its policies. Moreover, as part of the culture
in the Middle East, interpersonal trust, friendship networks, and connections ( WcJsta) could

be very important in gaining the trust of others. Thus, through the help of my connections, I
was able to gain the trust of the interviewees. After completing my interviews, my contacts
pointedoutthatmybackgroundalsohelpedme connect with the interviewees at a personal
level.
As indicated above, snowball sampling was used since I had contacted the
interviewees through my personal connections in Egypt which facilitated trust between me
and my interviewees. Some of my interviewees appeared to have a significant deal of
information about the political events in Turkey. Those were generally the older
interviewees. They indicated that they had been following several different satellite
networks in Arabic (including the Al-Jazeera network) which, accordingtowhatmy
interviewees thought, had happened to spend more time in covering the political events in

they emphasized the common socioeconomic background oflslamist activists (Ibrahim 1980, Munson
1986, Ansari 1984).
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Turkey 190 • However, the younger interviewees did not appear to be knowledgeable about
the political climate in Turkey as much as the older interviewees.
I conducted a total of thirty-seven interviews in Cairo, and several larger
neighborhoods of Cairo like Al-Agouza,Al-Mohandessin,Al-Dokki, lmbaba, Giza,
Lazughly, andAl-Abbesseya. I used an interpreter, who was working for a prominent
Egyptian publisher translating non-Arabic books into Arabic, for roughly 70% of my
interviews. Many of my interviews were in public places; however in some cases, I was
invited to the office ofthe interviewees for the interview. I also had a chance to interview
some prominent Egyptian scholars and discuss with them various issues regarding religion,
politics and government in Egypt. Four out of thirty-seven interviewees described
themselves as non-Islamists. One of them voted for the Tagammu party, the left wing party.
Two of them voted for the Tomorrow Party, and the last interviewee stated that he did not
vote, however, he indicated that he would vote for the New Wafd Party. He also mentioned
that he was closely following the activities of the Kifaya (Enough) movement which
recently emerged in Egyptian pol itics. I did not have any unfinished interviews. After
finishing my interviews in Egypt (and then in Turkey), from late August2007u ntillate
April 2008, I conducted additional seven interviews with people whom I got in touch
through my contacts in Egypt. The reason for having those additional seven interviews was
to arbitrarily complete the total number of my Islamist respondents to forty after having
thirty-three face to face interviews with the Islamist interviewees. Three ofthose
additional interviews were phone interviews and I did the interviews in English with

190

The same conclusion is often stated by my personal friends who are from different Arab countries and
have access to Al-J azeera network through the satellite. Many of them attribute the abundance of news
items about Turkey in different Arab satellite programs to the Islamist AKP's rise to power after 2002.
This could also be a topic of another interesting research for a researcher who is interested in studying
the media.
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interviewees who were fluent in English. Four of those additional interviews were done by
one of my contacts in Egypt in Arabic and later were translated into English and were
transliterated.
Sixteen interviewees had four-year college or two-year vocational school degrees;
seventeen of them had high school degrees, and the remaining seven had either the basic
elementary or secondary school education or were high school dropouts. Six of the forty
interviewees were graduates of Al-Azhar University. Eighteen of the forty were of rural
origins (recentlymovedtothe city for finding a new job or for pursuing his/her education).
Three of the forty were female interviewees; and all of the female interviewees described
themselves as Islamists. It was harder for me to contact and convince prospective female
interviewees since they abstained to give interviews which could be about cultural,
religious or personal reasons.
There was an uneven distribution of the interviewees' age. I am using the same age
categories that I arbitrarily created for my interviewees in Turkey. Just like my interviews
in Turkey, as snowball sampling was used, age was not used as a determinant of who
would become an interviewee. Nine interviewees were between the ages of 18-24; fifteen
were between 25-34; nine were between 35-44; five were between 45-54; and the
remaining two were above the age of 55. The following sections will discuss the
emergence oflslamism, the Islamists' perception oftheir struggle as a comprehensive
religious struggle (politics as jihad), and the Muslim Brotherhood's involvement in
national and associational politics through the civil society.
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Islamism in Egypt
Emergence oflslamism
The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood( Al-Ikhwan Al-Mus/imun 191) Hasan AIBanna was born in a small village in the Nile delta. His father was a student at Al-Azhar
University during the time of Muhammed A bduh. After finishing a Ioc al teacher training
college, Al-Banna went to Cairo to study; and there, he contacted Rashid Rida and his
Salafiyyah (Salafist) movement. Al-Banna was a devoted reader of Al-Manarpublished

by Rida and his associates. Al-Banna was particularly influenced by Rida's writings on the
political and social aspects oflslamic reform, the need for an Islamic state, and the
introduction oflslamic law (Shari'a). During his career, Rida became gradually more
conservative, and Al-Banna encountered the later Rida who emphasized the selfsufficiency oflslam and the dangers of Westernization (Esposito 1998, 136).
Besides his early Islamic learning and his encounters withRida's thought, two
other factors played a crucial role in Al-Banna' s intellectual formation. The first is the
anti-British revolt of 1919; the second is his membership in several Islamic associations.
These associations emphasized individual religious and moral reform and a commitment to
preaching and spread oflslamic message to others. After completing his studies in 1927,
Al-Banna started to work as a primary school teacher in the city oflsmailiyya where he
later created several Islamic discussion groups. One year later, Al-Banna organized the
participants of those discussion groups into an association establishing the Muslim
Brotherhood (Mitchell 1969).

191
The Arabic word of ikhwan is the plural of akh which means brother. The Qur'an refers to believers as
a single brotherhood (49: 10): "The Believers are but a single Brotherhood: So make peace and
reconciliation between your two (contending) brothers; and fear Allah, that ye may receive Mercy."
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When the Brotherhood was established, Egypt was still under the British
occupation. Al-Banna, like Rida concluded that Westernization was one ofthe major
threats to Egypt and the Islamic identity of the Egyptians.Al-Banna believed that the best
way to thwart this challenge was to return to true Islam. However, unlike Islamic
modernists, Al-Banna highlighted the comprehensiveness and self-sufficiency of Islam.
Starting from that premise, Al-Banna called for a return to the Qur' an and Sunnah
(Tradition) of Prophet Muhammed as the main sources for establishing an Islamic political
and social system. Like other early Muslim puritans (like MuhammadibnAbdAl-Wahhab
and Ibn Taymiyyah) Al-Banna believed that Muslims should bypass all historical periods
and return to the early normative period of the Prophet and the four Rightly Guided Caliphs

(Al-Khulafa 'Al-Rashidun) 192 (Mitchell 1969).
Politics as Jihad: The Muslim Brotherhood (AJ-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun) as a Comprehensive
Organization
During the first decade, the Brotherhood focused on preaching and educational and
social welfare projects. The Brotherhood members ran small hospitals, neighborhood
mosques and schools and opened local social clubs. By 1949 the Brotherhood had about
two thousand branches throughout Egypt, their members were estimated around five
hundred thousand. In 1933, Banna moved the center ofthe Brotherhood to Cairo. Banna
described his movement as "a Salafiyyah message, a Sunni way, a Sufi (mystic) truth, a
political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic
company and a social idea."(Mitchell1969, 14). In Our Message, Al-Banna (in the
chapter titled Our Islam) described the Muslim Brotherhood as a comprehensive
movement:

192

The four Rightly Guided Caliphs are the four caliphs who immediately followed prophet Muhammad:
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Our mission is one described most comprehensively by the term 'Islamic', though this
word has a meaning broader than the narrow definition understood by most people. We
believe that Islam is an all embracing concept regulating every aspect of life, prescribing
for everyone it concerns a solid and rigorous order. It does not stand helpless before
life's problems, nor the steps that must be taken to reform mankind. Some people
mistakenly understand that Islam is restricted to religious practices or spiritual
exercises. Thus they limit their understanding to these narrow lines.
On the contrary we understand Islam broadly and comprehensively, regulating the affairs
of men, in this world and the next. We do not indulge in this claim this nor extend upon
it on the basis of our own prejudice; rather it is what we have understood from the Book
of Allah and the lives of the early Muslims. If the reader wishes to understand the
mission of the Muslim Brotherhood in a sense broader than the mere word 'Islamic', let
him take the Qur'an and free himself of any preconceived ideas and judgments. Only
then will he understand what the Qur'an is about, and see in it the mission of the Muslim
Brotherhood.

Al-Banna also perceived jihad comprehensively. In The Message of the Teachings
(in the chapter titled Jihad), Al-Banna stated:
By jihad, I mean that divinely ordained obligation which is reflected in the following
saying of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) and which Muslims are to carry out until the
Day of Judgment: "Whoever dies without struggling in the Way ofAllah, or wishing
to do so, dies a Pre Islamic Jahiliyyah death." Its weakest degree is the heart's
abhorrence of evil. and its highest degree is fighting in the Way of Allah. Between these
two degrees are numerous forms of jihad, including struggling with the tongue, pen, or
hand, and speaking a word oftruth to a tyrannical ruler. This call (to Islam) cannot
survive without Jihad. The more lofty and far reaching the call, the greater the struggle in
its path. The price required to support it is huge, but the reward given to its upholders is
more generous. ''And strive in the Way ofAllah as you ought to." (Surat-al-Hajj (22),
Ayah 78) By this, dear brothers, you know the meaning of your slogan "Jihad is our way."

My interview data confirms with how Al-Banna described his movement. For
instance, like other Brotherhood members, Dr. Tariq, one prominent Brotherhood
member 193 argued that the Brotherhood was a "comprehensive organization." Tariq further
associated the comprehensiveness ofthe organization with the comprehensiveness of Islam.
Tariq also contended that one of the major reasons that enabled the organization to endure
many hardships since Banna was that the Brotherhood was a comprehensive organization.
He :further associated the success ofthe Brotherhood with its comprehensiveness since, he
argued, "the Brotherhood was established by Banna to address a variety of the needs of the

Abu Bakr, Umar b. Khattab, Uthman b. Afwan and Ali b. Abu Tali b.
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Egyptian people." Tariq believed that since its establishment, Egyptian authorities tried to
reduce the organization to a merely political group which they perceived as a political
group trying to challenge the secularist regime. For Tariq, this would be a caricaturization
of such a comprehensive organization I ike the Brotherhood.
Hisham, a young brotherhood member, who was a university student, also
expressed similar views. Like Dr. Tariq, Hisham believed that the Brotherhood was not
justa religious and political group; however it was a comprehensive organization trying to
provide the Egyptians with a wide range of social and educational services. He proudly
announced "we won't stop until Islam dominates every aspect of life in Egypt." Hisham
greatly respected Al-Banna, and believed that Al-Banna established the Brotherhood for
the sole purpose of disseminating Islam and serving Muslims.
Hisham's views were parallel to Al-Banna's views on the comprehensiveness of
the Brotherhood which depends on their interpretation of Islam being an all-encompassing
religion. My interviewees believed that unlike other heavenly religions 194 Islam had the

Shari'a which governed every aspect of human life. Hisham contended that in other
heavenly religions, the religion was reduced to only spirituality, thus, for instance,
Christianity would not have something to say about the daily affairs of its believers or
prescribe certain guidelines and restrictions for the mundane deeds of its followers.
Hi sham thoughts ince Christianity was reduced to a mere spiritual religion, unlike a
Muslim, a Christian would be saved only by his/her faith without paying attention to deeds.

193
Dr. Tariq is the head of a professional organization in Egypt. Tariq is not his real name, like all
interviewees here in this study, the real names of individuals were not disclosed. Please see my reason(s)
below in the main text for opting anonymity under the section of"'Ihe Interviewees' Profile".
194
He was referring to Judaism and Christianity. According to the Qur'an, both Judaism and Christianity
are heavenly religions, and followers of those religions have a special status in the Shari'a. Jews and
Christians are known as Ahl Al-Kitaab, People of the Book (members of the other Abrahamic faiths), and
in the Shari'a they are called the Dhimmis.
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Hishamargued that a Muslim would be saved by his/her faith and deeds 195 which is also

another indication oflslam being anorganic religion 196 in whichordinarymundane deeds
could easily become religious deeds according to the intentions of the person who
performs those deeds. 197 Just like other Brothers, Hisham's statements were reflecting his
view of the Brotherhood being equal to Islam.
Dr. Naguib, a prominent scholar at the Ibn Khaldun Center 198 of Dr. Saad Eddin
Ibrahim

199

also argued that the Muslim Brotherhood was a comprehensive organization:

The Muslim Brotherhood is a comprehensive movement. The Brotherhood deals with a
wide range of issues simultaneously including nationalist, Islamist, cultural, political,
religious and charity issues ... The Egyptian state could not deal with the Muslim
Brotherhood because in general, the states' ability to confront such comprehensive
organizations is highly limited. Indeed, states are scared of such comprehensive
organizations like the Brotherhood. States just interact with political and economic
195

Actually, this is one ofthe oldest debates among the Muslim scholars. There is a consensus among the
scholars that one person can not achieve eternal salvation by only his/her deeds, indeed, the faith ( iman)
comes first, however, the good deeds (amal salih) complement (or strengthen) the faith.
196
See the discussion oflslam as an organic and historical religion in Chapter 1 and 3.
197
For instance, if someone washes his/her hands before meals and intends to perform a Sunnah
(tradition) of prophet Muhammed while doing it, that person would be rewarded for his/her deeds
(Muslims believe that washing hands before meals is one of the Sunnah).
198
(From: http://www.eicds.org/)The Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies (ICDS) is a nongovernmental professional institution, registered in Cairo since 1988. ICDS has its own research,
advocacy, and development programs, but it also conducts commissioned research, provides consultation
and training services to governmental and non-governmental organizations on issues of public policy. The
Center carries out supportive activities related to its objectives, including organizing seminars,
conferences and the publication and dissemination of information. On the night of June 3Oth 2000, the
founder of the Center and 27 of its researchers and associates were arrested, detained for several weeks,
interrogated, indicted and tried twice before state security courts. They \\ere sentenced to various prison
terms ranging from one to seven years of hard labor. After serving about 15 months of these sentences, all
were released when Egypt's highest Court of Cassation over-ruled the lower courts. The Court acquitted
the defendants of all charges and asserted the Center's constitutional rights to conduct research, receive
grants and freely publish at home and abroad. This historical ruling was a vindication of the Ibn Khaldun
Center and, more importantly, a forceful victory for Civil Society in Egypt. The Center reopened with a
series of public discussions about the future on June 30th2003. ICDS is named after the great Arab
thinker Abdel-Rahman Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), \\flo WclS the founder of Arab Social Science. Ibn
Khaldun's travels and public service in several Arab countries (what is now Tunisia, Morocco, Andalusia,
Egypt, the Higaz and Syria) allowed this outstanding intellectual to provide major creative insight into
both the theoretical and applied aspects of social science. This is amply demonstrated in his famous study
Al-Moqaddemah, which is considered a classic authoritative work on society and the state. For more
information visit http://www.eicds.org/english!introduction!about.htm
199
Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim is the Chairman of ICDS Board of Trustees, and Professor of Political
Sociology at the American University in Cairo. Dr. Ibrahim is also the founder of the Arab Organization
for Human Rights. Dr. Ibrahim was arrested and sentenced to seven years in prison in 2000 for using
European Union funds for election monitoring, and for allegedly defaming Egypt's image abroad. Dr.
Ibrahim served 15 months in prison (see the footnote above).
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organizations like interest groups at political and economic levels; it W>uld be an
exhausting task to fully interact with the Brotherhood, because it requires mobilization
of huge resources which the Egyptian government does not have ... Thus, states, including
the Egyptian state, would greatly want those comprehensive organizations to identify
themselves as one type of organization [i.e. interest groups, parties, religious or nonreligious foundations ... ]. As a result, states consider such comprehensive organizations
as enemies, and perceive the opponents who are members of such organizations as
contenders who try to undermine the state authority piece by piece ...

Politics as Jihad: The Brotherhood Goes Underground
In Cairo, the Brotherhood became a well organized religious and political

organization with a wide network of branches and smaller cells. The Brotherhood
followers were mainly from merchants, teachers, doctors, lawyers, civil servants, the
military and university students. After the establishment of the Israeli state, the Brotherhood
sent volunteers to fight in the war in Palestine between 1948 and 1949. In December 1948,
KingFarouk's Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha disbanded the organization and arrested
some of the key leaders of the Brotherhood except Al-Banna. Additionally, the assets that
belonged to the organization were confiscated by the government (Esposito 1998, 138).
KingFaroukwas "concerned with the increasing assertiveness and popularity of the
Brotherhood, as well as with rumors that it was plotting a coup." Within three weeks, the
prime minister was assassinated by a member of the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood
claimed that they were not involved with the assassination; how ever the government
blamed the organization. Martial law was declared in the country and more Brotherhood
members were arrested. Shortly after the assassination ofNuqrashi Pasha, Egyptian secret
police shot Al-Banna to death in February 1949, when Al-Banna was 43 ("Hasan AIBanna" 2007).
After the Free Officers' overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952, the junta
led by Nasser let the Brotherhood to reorganize since the Brotherhood earlier had
supported the Free Officers. Indeed, it was Anwar Al-Sadat, who would later become the
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president of the cotu1try after Nasser's presidency, was the Free Officers' liaison with the
Brothers. Subsequently, the relations between the junta and the Brotherhood got sour
because Nasser had no intentions of either establishing an Islamic state or sharing power
with the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood withdrew its initial support ofNasser's regime.
Nasser used an unsuccessful assassination attempt on his life in 1954 as an excuse to crush
the entire Brotherhood or ganization; the organization was banned, and thousands of
members were arrested and the key leaders were executed. After 1954, the Brotherhood
became an tu1de rground organization. During those years tu1de r severe government
repression, the Brotherhood became more radical. Sayyid Qutb 200 ( 1906-1966) became the
main ideologue of the organization after the mid 1950s.
The Brotherhood tu1der Nasser and Sadat
Before Anwar Al-Sadat, Nasser preempted the rise oflslamist activism "by
subordinating potential agents, sites and targets of mobilization to state control" (Wickham
2002; 21). Nasser banned all opposition groups and co-opted educated, lower-middle
class youth through his pol icy of providinggovernmentjobs for every high school and
college graduate of Egypt (known as the "graduates pol icy"). Through that kind of a
preemptive strategy, Nasser was planning to diminish the prospects for mobilization for the
Islamists. It was only after the effectiveness of this strategy declined (and was subsequently
abandoned by Sadat) that Islamismre-emerged after Nasser 201 (Palmer 2007; 51-53).
Nasser chose to silence Egypt's educated youth by their economic, political, and
ideological incorporation by the regime. However, regime's co-optation of the educated
youth became unsustainable in the long rllll. Sadat, after Nasser, gave up the co-optation

20

°For Qutb's life and Islamist ideology, please see Chapter 4.

201

Wickham uses the term "authoritarian populism" to characterize the Nasser era (Wickham 2002, 22).
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pol icy and tried to formulate new means of achieving legitimacy through the infitah 202
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(opening-the regime-led limited economic and political liberalization). However, by the
infitah Sadat was not able to mobilize the educated youth; in Sadat' s Egypt, Islamist
groups came back stronger after the period of suppression that took place under Nasser
(Esposito 1998; 235-244).

Islamism under Mubarak
The 1980s: Electoral ism And Selective Accommodation Of The Brotherhood
When Husni Mubarak became president in October 1981 after Sadat' s
assassination, initially he adopted an accommodative approach towards the non-violent
Islamists while firmly confronting the violent groups (Esposito 1998, 248). Mubarak
released the 1500 political prisoners detained during Sadat's last month in office,
permitted open criticism of government policies, and eased government control on the
media. This was actually what Bianchi (1989, 93-94) termed a policy of"selective
accommodation and selective repression" to diffuse tensions and to consolidate his own
position. Several other factors informed Mubarak toward the Islamists. First, Mubarak
probably did not regard Islamist private voluntary associations such as charity
organizations, schools, and health clinics, as particularly threatening. In fact, Mubarak's
regime may have viewed such institutions as contributing to social stability in poor areas
since the government did not have enough funds to meet the basic social and economic
needs. Second, the authoritarian regime tended to evaluate Islamist groups according to
how much they directly threatened the security in the country. Thus, the regime did not

202

For more information on Sadat's infitah policies, see Chapter 4.
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perceive groups such as reading circles for memorization of the Qur'an or charity
organizations as potentially dangerous for the security of the regime (Bianchi 1989).
By the mid-1980s the government's flexible response to Islamist activism began to
change. In 1985, when the Brotherhood and other Islamist groups called for the
implementation of the Shari'a, Mubarak responded harshly by placing all the private
mosques under the aegis of the Ministry of Religious Endowments (MRE). The Brothers
also intensified their political activities through electoral alliances with secular parties.
The first coalition took place in the May 1984 elections. Before the elections, in February,
the Brotherhood made a deal with the Wafd Party (Esposito 1998, 249). The Wafd
provided a legal channel while the Brotherhood offered a popular base. Out of 448 seats,
the Wafd slate received 58 seats, 8 of which went to the Brotherhood candidates in
addition to two independent Islamist candidates (El-Ghobashy 2005, 378). 203
By 1987, the Brotherhood had grown their junior-partner status in the Wafd
alliance and wagered on the weaker and more ideologically flexible Labor Party as a base
oftheir political operations. In 1987, the Brotherhood formed a new electoral alliance with
the Liberal (AI-Ahrar) and the socialist Labor Party. The alliance paved the way for the
progressive Islamization of the Labor Party and their mouthpiece, AI-Sha 'ab. The tripartite
alliance won 17 percent of the vote which corresponded to 56 seats; 36 seats went to the
Brotherhood. The alliance became the major opposition block in the parliament dominated
by Mubarak's National Democratic Party (El-Ghobashy 2005, 379).

203

The controversial Electoral Law ( 114/1983) prohibited candidates of different parties from running on
the same lists, in effect deterring parties from pooling their efforts. Additionally, the law also created a
high national threshold of 8 percent of the national wte for a party to have representation in the People's
Assembly. Votes to opposition parties that received less than 8 percent of the wtes "Were automatically
transferred to the ruling NDP. Thus the restrictions of the Parties Law and Election Law impelled the
Wafd and the Brotherhood to make a coalition. Only the Wafd-Brotherhood alliance passed the threshold,
by receiving 15.1 percent of the wtes.
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The chain of the Brotherhood's victories in associational elections started in 1986.
Through its effective mobilization of constituents, the Brotherhood took control of the
Medical Association. By the end of the 1980s, it had achieved similar success within
associations for engineers and pharmacists, and subsequently would exert control over all
of the main professional associations (except the journalists association) by 1992, when it
captured a majority in the prestigious, and formerly secular-dominated bar association.
These electoral victories were particularly significant in terms of the Brotherhood's
increasing prominence in civil society. The associations, at this time, represented one of
the few avenues for organization independent of the state. The Brotherhood's gradual
control of these institutions indicated symbolically that the group had for the first time
gained control of"legitimate" channels to further its own political goals. This represented
a significant challenge for the regime, particularly because of the weakness of the existing
legal opposition parties. With their significant victories through professional associations,
the Brotherhoodc ouldeffectivelyfill the void in Egypt's stagnant political system. The
Brotherhood also expanded its activities regarding social services throughout the country.
With its roots firmly planted within important sectors of society, the group was in a
position to mobilize broad-based support and offer a potent challenge to the Mubarak
regime (Campagna 1996; 281-282). 204

204

There is no directory giving the exact number of civil society organizations in Egypt. The total number
is estimated to be somewhere between 14,000 Ibrahim (2003) and 22,000 (Clark 2004). Ibrahim (2003)
reports that 8000 of a total 14000 private wluntary associations in Egypt \Wre Islamic. Some of those
PVOs focus on purely religious functions like maintaining and renovating local mosques, establishing
Qur'anic schools for memorization of the Qur'an, organizing pilgrimage trips to Mecca, and providing
charity to the needy families. Other organizations provide social services such as health care, day care,
education and job-training programs. Many Islamic PVOs operate under a mosque or a religious
foundation ( waqj) which gives them access to charitable donations collected and distributed away from
government supervision. Membership of Egyptian civil society organizations in 1992 was approximately
3 million, and the same year, the number of beneficiaries was estimated at approximately 5.5 million
Egyptian citizens (Clark 2004, 50).
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For most of the period from 1984 to 1989, the Mubarak regime generally pursued a
consistent policy of non-confrontation. By 1989, however, the changes were already
visible. For instance, in April 1989, then- Interior Minister Zaki Badr issued a public
statement criticizing the non-violent Brotherhood :fOr its alleged links to radical Islamist
groups ina foreshadowing of language that would abound in the coming decade: "[T]he
extremists are in fact a secret organization of the Muslim Brotherhood for assassinations.
There is no conflict between the two tendencies, as some want to believe, and they are in
fact a single association."( quoted in Campagna 1996, 285) After the Brotherhood's
electoral victories, the state actively sought to confront the organization in response to its
noticeably more independent and high-profile opposition to the regime.
The 1990s: Associational Politics and Increase ofGovernmental Pressures
By the 1990s, the Brotherhood was exceptionally attuned to the rules of the
authoritarian politics in Egypt. In 1990, the Wafd Party announced their boycott of the
national elections because ofthe concerns offairness, and the Brotherhood followed the
Wafd. The basic purpose of the boycott was to delegitimize the government's electoral
engineering. The Brotherhood also raised its concerns in regards to the 1991 Madrid peace
talks between the parties of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Brotherhood indirectly
condemned the Egyptian government's active mediation in the talks 205 (Campagna 1996,
287-288).
The Mubarakregime also tightened its grip on the Muslim Brotherhood's activities
in civil society through Law 32 of 1964. Law 32 regulated voluntary associations.

205

On 25 October, the Brotherhood organized a mass meeting in Helwan under the heading "Islam does
not sanction peace with usurpers oflslamic lands and holy places", and Supreme Guide Hamid Abu AlNasr published additional critical statements about the peace talks. The Brotherhood-controlled Medical
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According to the law, prospective societies had to apply to the MSA for a license. 206 The
Minister of Social Affairs could dissolve the board of a society and appoint his own
nominees for a maximum period of three years. His appointee who was usually a ministry
official had control over the association's funds. The minister also had the power to
dissolve an association, or unite it with another which he judged to have similar goals. In
such a case, the association had to submit to the Ministry all the records, documents, and
funds of the association. Moreover, Law 32 gave the Minister the right to appoint
representatives of his Ministry to the boards of any association, up to a half of its
membership, for an unlimited period, and to annul any resolution passed by the association
ifhe judged it contrary to public order (Zubaida 1997, 55).
The year 1992 was a turning point in the government's approach to the
Brotherhood. Through their increasing influence within professional associations, the
Brotherhood alarmed the Egyptian regime. In September 1992, it gained a majority of seats
(14 out of25) on the board ofBar Association which in the past had been a close ally of
the ruling NDP by serving to 1egitimize government legislation and other policies. The
same year, the Brotherhood candidates achieved another significant victory in the elections
of Medical Association. The Brotherhood also outshone the government's inefficient and
delayed response to the devastating Cairo earthquake in October 1992. In response to the
Brotherhood's efficient pooling of funds to the victims, the prime minister issued Military

Association also organized a mass rally with about 20,000 supporters. Following those events, 185 ~ople
were arrested on charges of distributing leaflets opposing the peace talks and disturbing peace.
206
It is estimated that in 1995, there were about 8,000 Islamist NGOs officially registered with the
Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA) as opposed to just 6,000 secular ones (Talhami 2001, 311-324 ).
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Decree 411992 which required government approval for the collection of donations (ElGhobashy 2005, 381). 207
Within those associations, the Brotherhood expanded its strategy of social welfare,
implementing various programs for members such as affordable individual and family
health insurance. Other similar services included projects for the construction oflowincome housing for professionals, cash loans to members, and various educational
programs. Moreover, the Brothers gained access to enormous financial resources by
controlling associations for mobilizing members. Campagna points out that according to
some estimates in 1995, total assets (including investments) added up to approximately$
15 million (Campagna 1996, 291-292).
In October 1994, the younger generation ofthe Brotherhood organized a two-day
conference in Cairo on freedoms and civil society at the medical association (Conference
on Freedom and Civil Society). This was a direct result of the efforts of the young
Brotherhood activists like Essam Al-Aryan and Abu AI-Ela Madi, through a well planned

207

The Military Decree was not the only form of governmental interference over the Jslamist civil
society. For instance, through Law 100 of 1993, the Mubarak regime further tightened its grip on the
associational activities of the Brotherhood beyond the existing limitations. The government spokesman in
parliament defended the law as an effort to combat the "dictatorship of the minority," a clear reference to
the effective electioneering of the Brotherhood in associational politics. The law (Law for the Guarantees
of Democracy in Professional Associations) required a fifty percent quorum of registered members in
board elections. With the law, the government hoped to force a greater participation of mters in order to
reduce the group's chances for success. Moreover, the law also banned fundraising for stopping the
organization's ability to use money for its social and political activities. Professional unions immediately
mobilized against the law, and the majority of members, regardless of their ideological orientations,
opposed it (El-Ghobashy 2005, 382). This was not the only example of the government becoming harsher
on the Jslamists due to their victories in Egypt's associational politics. For example, in May 1993, the
government placed the Engineers Association under official control by court order in response to
allegations of financial mismanagement of its funds. The government also made various amendments to
the Egyptian Universities Act in June 1994 to weaken the Brotherhood's strong presence in university
faculty clubs. The Brotherhood gained majorities in the governing councils of university faculty clubs in
Zaqaziq, Asyut, and Cairo. The new amendment significantly reduced the autonomy by repealing the
election of faculty deans. After the amendment, the deans were appointed by university presidents who
were directly appointed by the government, rather than through elections by faculty members. The
university councils, which had been mostly composed of elected members in the past, were now
controlled by government appointees. Through such measures, the Egyptian government established a
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alliance building with other middle-aged activists of varying political commitments. The
event brought together hundreds of prominent activists and intellectuals, including
government figures, to reach a consensus on basic rights and freedoms. Also, a delegation
from the conference visited Naguib Mahfouz in the hospital to express support and
condemnation of his stabbing by a militant Islamist. In the early 1990s, the Brotherhood
issued press releases condemning every attack by militant Islamists on government figures
and tourists, and even brokered a cease-fire between the radical Islamists and the
government during the UN's Cairo Population Conference (El-Ghobashy 2005, 382).
As the November 1995 parliamentary elections got closer, the Egyptian state's
repression against the Brotherhood further accelerated. In January, 82 ofthe Brotherhood's
leadingactivistconveningthe Brotherhood's Shura (Consultative) Council were arrested
and detained by the government in a series of a large crackdown unseen since Nasser's
time. They were charged with plotting to overthrow the government and sent to a military
tribunal. On 26 June, a failed assassination attempt on Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
further exacerbated the relations between the Brotherhood and the Egyptian government.
On 23 November, just one week before the parliamentary elections, the military tribunal
sentenced 54 Muslim brothers to three to five years in prison. Despite the arrests of
prominentBrotherhoodc andidates since January, abouthundredBrothers ran as
independents in the 29 November election and the 6 December runoffs. The Brotherhood
secured only one seat after the most violent elections in Egyptian history resulting in 61
dead and 1,313 injured (El-Ghobashy 2005, 384). 208

more centralized university management under appointed pro-government administrators for the purpose
of subverting Brotherhood influence in the Egyptian universities (Campagna 1996, 294-295).
208
Between 15 November and 6 December 1995, authorities arrested 1,392 Islamist campaign oorkers,
supporters and poll-watchers. The Cairo-based Center for Human Rights Legal Aid found that the
government purposefully restricted political expression of Muslim Brotherhood and its ally, the Labor
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The state's targeting of the Brotherhood's middle-aged activists in 1995 took a
serious toll and the Brotherhood showed organizational stresses. From 1995 to 2000 the
most active members of the organization were imprisoned. Left in the hands of the old
guard, the organization's common ideological front built by the younger generation of
activists gradually eroded

209

•

Organizational discontent became visible when a young

group of Muslim Brothers led by Abu Al-Ela Madi, who disapproved some of the actions
of the old guard, petitioned to form the Center Party (Hizb AI misat).

Limits ofRegime Control: From Accommodation to Confrontationlli

An important character of the Islamist sector is about its organizational structure.
The Islamic sector is extremely decentralized with thousands of independent mosques,
firms, welfare organizations, hospitals, clinics, and schools, which complicates the
regime's efforts at regulation and control. Besides physical dispersion of those institutions,
it is often hard to track their funding and de spite the high risk, some Islamist associations
simply chose not to register with the government at all and operate without a permit.

Party, to prevent their representation in the People's Assembly. Members that attempted to disseminate
protest literature were targeted for arrest. The Law for Practicing Political Rights (Number 73 of 1977)
precludes people who were previously arrested for similar charges from serving on the boards of
~rofessional associations for a period of double their sentences after release (Campagna 1996, 299-302).
09
After the death of ailing fourth general guide Muhammad H. Abu AI-Nasr in 1996, Mustafa Mashour
became the leader of the organization. Contrary to the rules of the Brotherhood, a tightly knit circle
composed of Guidance Bureau members Mamoun AI-Hudaibi and Mas hour announced Mashour as the
new general guide without election or consultation with Shura (Consultation) Council members. Mashour
and Hudaibi justified their action with the security clampdown on the last Shura Council meeting in 199 5.
Previously, Mashour was a member of the Brotherhood's controversial paramilitary wing, the Special
Apparatus (Al-Nizam Al-Khas), formed in 1940. Mashour had been imprisoned in 1954 by Nasser and
later emerged in the 1970s as a key decision-maker in the organization during the tenures of general
guides AI-Tilmisani and Abu AI-Nasr. Moreover, Mashour's confidant Ma'mun AI-Hudaibi carved out a
high-profile position for himself as ''official spokesman," though this position did not exist in the bylaws
of the organization. Such arbitrary actions created a rift between old and young generations within the
Brotherhood (El-Ghobashy 2005, 387).
210
The phrase "From Accommodation to Confrontation" is the subtitle of an article written by Joel
Campagna on the current political activism of the Brotherhood. Campagna, Joel. (1996). "From
Accommodation to Confrontation: The Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak Years" Journal of
International Affairs Vol.50 No. 1, pp. 278-304.
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Mobility enhances institutional autonomy, as Islamists were able to relocate their activities
to other places when their activities are prevented and/or limited by the authorities. For
instance, when the government took over a mosque or restrict activities there, the Islamists
could evade the state by moving to another site. In 1992, the Egyptian regime initiated a
plan to tighten its control over private mosques in the country. Law 175 of 1960 granted the
Ministry of Religious Endowments the authority to incorporate those mosques; however the
Egyptian government had to deal with a shortage of manpower and funds to do so.
Beyond the shortage of manpower and funds, the regime's ability to control the
Islamists was impeded by the fragmented nature of the state itself. Egypt is an enormous
bureaucratic state employing an estimated 5 million people in the 1990s with branches in
nearly every district, town and village. Although the state apparatus is enormous in size
and function, it remained inefficient for implementing the regime's major goals. In the
1960s, the Nasser regime lowered the requirements for entering to the civil service and
added millions of employees to the state bureaucracy as the regime had become worried
about the political consequences of high unemployment. This also had been a direct result
of Nasser's socialist principles of economic and bureaucratic management In the 1980s
and the 1990s, most state employees were poorly paid; the enormous size of the Egyptian
bureaucracy, a long with chronic budgetary problems, mismanagement and lack of
technology, hampered the regime's efforts to facilitate major achievements regarding its
objectives. Finally, laws issued in Nasser's era had made it difficult to fire a civil servant.
(Wickham 2002, 108).
As Islamist ideas and institutions grew outside the state, they began to influence the
orientations of the state employees at various positions. At the same time, various
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opportunities emerged for the emergence of linkages between state employees and
Islamists based on kinship or friendship, mutual economic interest, or shared ideological
positions. Despite the fragmented and mostly anecdotal evidence, it appeared that some
Islamists have secured the tacit cooperation of state authorities, including the staffs of the
very ministries intended to control them The MSA officials reportedly enjoy close ties
with some of the Islamists associations under their jurisdiction. Moreover, MSA officials
are included on the executive boards of some Islamist associations, for which they are paid
a salary. These officials are reported to favor Islamist associations over non-Islamist ones.
The MSA officials are also alleged to favor Islamists when issuing operational licenses
and fundraising permits. Islamist activists also increased their ties with the local municipal
councils despite the fact that those councils are dominated by the regime's NDP.
Additionally, some of the senior religious authorities and other government officials
developed ties with Islamists based on economic self interest (Wickham 2002, 109-11 0).
For example, several Al-Azhar sheikhs served as Islamic advisors for Islamic banks and
investment companies with generous compensations. Some Islamic investment companies
hired influential politicians as consultants like Al-Rayyandidwhenithiredformer
Minister of Interior Nabawi Ismail.

The 2000s: Electoral Participation and Closing the Rift between the Old and New
Generations within the Brotherhood
As parliamentary elections approached in the fall of2000, the government arrested
20 would-be candidates and sentenced by a military tribunal in November 2000. Despite
the government clampdown, the independent Brotherhood candidates were able to secure
17 seats. In February 2001, the Brotherhood gained majority in the first elections at the Bar
Association. In the parliament, the Brotherhood candidates primarily dealt with culture and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

275
identity issues as well as cases of abuse by security forces and bread and butter issues,
unemployment being the major issue on their list. In the meantime, most of the young
Brotherhood activist cadres detained in 1995 returned from prison in 2000. Those young
members upon their release from prison patched up the Wasat split and reestablished
organization's ties with other political groups (El-Ghobashy 2005, 389).
The passing away ofMashour in 2002 and of AI Hudaibi in 2004, as the last of the
influential old guard, was the most significant opening for the further transformation of the
Brotherhood. Younger brothers took positions as two deputy general guides stipulated by
Brotherhood's bylaws. When he was elected as the general guide of the Brotherhood in
January 2004, Muhammad Mahdi Akefrepeated their desire to operate as a political party.

In a press conference on 3 March 2004, Akef announced the Brotherhood's vision for a
republican, civil government bound by law. For the first time in its history, a general guide
of the Brotherhood officially announced ideas developed by the comparatively young
members ofthe organization. Indeed, Akefs message was intended for several audiences:
the Egyptian government, opposition parties, and independent intellectuals, and foreign
parties demanding Arab reform, principally the Bush administration and its "Greater
Middle East Initiative." El-Ghobashy (2005, 390) interprets Akefs new stance first as an
attempt to heal the rift between old and new generations, and reestablish a coherent
ideological position for the members.
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Sites ofMobilization and New Opportunity Structures
Civil Society as an Outlet in the Mubarak Era?
When he became president after Sadat' s assassination in 1981, Mubarak had
serious problems to tackle. One major problem was the economy. 211 Despite the budget
gap, M ubarak cautiously maintained providing newer public jobs for young Egyptians.
Egypt's labor force grew by about 2.2% per year between 1976 and 1986, whereas supply
of graduates grew by 7.4 % per year in the same period. Thus, the waiting period for a
government job increased from approximately three years to about nine years from 1979 to
1985 (Wickham 2002; 42-62). Mubarak simultaneously attempted to increase employment
and reduce the budget deficit. However, fulfilling those two at the same time proved to be
impossible, thus Mubarak chose to extend the time between graduation and appointment
and allowed the wages for new government employees to lag behind inflation. The greatest
grievance among the new graduates is the growing perception that success depended more
on connections (wasta) and I uck than on merit and hard w ark.
Faced by such serious economic problems, Mubarak sought to maintain a policy of
controlled liberalization after being suspended just before Sadat' s assassination in October
1981. 212 The Egyptian constitution defines the Egyptian regime as a republic. The executive

211

Egypt's aggregate debt exceeded 115% ofGDP by 1988 since Mubarak responded by increasing its
borrowing abroad to address the ''twin gaps" between investment and savings and between imports and
exports. Deficit financing increased the annual inflation rate which was between 15 to 25 %annually
during the late 1980s. In order to reduce the deficit, Mubarak cut back on the public spending which
decreased from 63.5% ofGDP in 1982 to 41.1 % ofGDP in 1989. Also, state employment continued to
increase rising from 3.78 million in 1986 to 4.62 million in 1991 (Wickham 2002, 41-42).
212
In fact, by the mid-1980s, a number of opposition newspapers, which were openly critical of the
regime, were established. Additionally, the judiciary displayed a substantial measure of independence as
in a series of decisions challenging the constitutionality of the legislation introduced by the NDPcontrolled parliament. Indeed, the multiparty system was further institutionalized under Mubarak's first
decade. Parliamentary elections were held in 1984, 1987, and 1990, and Mubarak attempted to
accommodate non-violent Islamists. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to have national
offices, and to make public statements, and to have its own journal. However the Brotherhood was not
allowed to establish a political party (Fahmy 1998; 557-558).
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branch consists of the President who is nominated by the People's Assembly for a six-year
term, and the Prime Minister and his cabinet who are both appointed by the President. The
Presidential nomination must be validated by a national, popular referendum. Mubarakhas
served as president since 1981, he was elected for a fifth term in the recent (2005)
presidential elections. 213 The bicameral legislative branch consists of the People's
Assembly (444 elected and 10 presidentially-appointed members); and the Shura
(Consultative) Council (176 elected members, and 88 presidentially-appointed). The
Egyptian legal system is based on a combination ofEnglishandFrenchcommon law.
Family law is primarily based on the religion of the individual concerned, which for most
Egyptians is Shari'a law. The judicial branch consists of the Egyptian Supreme
Constitutional Court and the lower courts.
In order to justify his heavy-handed policy towards the oppositional groups,
Mubarak emphasized that Egypt's priority was to have economic reform which would
happen under national unity rather than debate anddi ssension. In his May Day speech of
1989, Mubarak called on" ... all democratic parties and groups to put aside, even
momentarily, their differences over public work so that all patriotic efforts could be
focused on positive cooperation to achieve the undisputable national goals, over which
people should not differ" (quoted in Wickham 2002; 67). Mubarak also claimed that
neither the masses nor the opposition parties were mature enough to function in an open
democracy. Thus, Egypt's I imited political reform and liberalization designed not to
transform the authoritarian regime but to preserve it because introduction of the multiparty
system as intended to strengthen the authoritarian system by enhancing its capacity to
contain and moderate dissent.
213

For a brief discussion of the 2005 Presidential elections, candidates and issues, see Chapter 1.
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The Brothers believe that a genuine democracy would directly benefit their
movement, not the NDP leadership 214 • Many Brotherhood members believed that the
Mubarakregime was not willing to have democracy as it has been implemented in
democratic countries because they believed that "under democracy Mubarak' s NDP would
definitely lose." Zaki, a Brotherhood member, who worked for the Ministry of Culture in
Cairo as a junior bureaucratic official, shared the views of other Brotherhood members.
Zaki argued thatMubarakhadno intention of having a democracy in Egypt. Zaki also
thought that Mubarak would transfer power to his son Gamal Mubarak as he thought
"Mubarak was grooming his son to be the next Egyptian president after he leaves office 215 ."
Zaki, by referring to the Egyptian regime, further commented that a regime would not be a

214

For example, see Dr. Ahmed Fahmy's letter at the Foreign Policy website at: Current Articles: Letters:
''Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood" November/December 2007
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/storv!cms.php?storv id=40 11 Fahmy is a leading member of the
Brotherhood and the Chief Executive Officer of the Ikhwanweb website (http://www.ikhwanweb.com)
which is the official website of the Brotherhood in English.
215
Zaki was voicing the debates among the Egyptian people that had been revolving around the issue of
Mubarak's succession. Indeed, there have already been some developments that would indicate Mubarak's
willingness to prepare his son to succeed him. See the following section from Abaza (2006, 2) ... starting
in 2004 WlS the rise of a new elite within the ranks of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). The
new guard, led by President Mubarak's son Gamal, effectively started to take control of the ruling party
and to erode the power of veteran party leaders. No clear presidential successors to Mubarak have
emerged in the current government. Given the increased political involvement of the president's son,
many have begun to speculate in earnest about his political future. Both the president and Gamal Mubarak
have denied that they are aiming to create a Syrian-style ''republican monarchy." Nevertheless, much
attention has been devoted to the implications of the first Nazif cabinet for Gamal. Two key members of
the old guard were removed from the cabinet. NDP hearyweights YoussefWaly and Safawat al-Sherif,
vice president and secretary-general of the party, respectively, lost their powerful portfolios (for deputy
premier and agriculture, and information, respectively) after having served in them for more than two
decades. Curtailing the power of the old guard and replacing some of its members with younger figures
who are friendlier to Gamal Mubarak almost certainly empowers him and increases his influence over the
cabinet. Moreover, seven of the new ministers are members of the influential NDP Policy Committee,
which is chaired by Gamal Mubarak. The second Nazif cabinet continued curtailing the power of party
veterans by replacing them with younger, dynamic technocrats closer to Gamal Mubarak. Hence, even if
some of the new cabinet members do not support his ascension, they are not in a strong enough position
to challenge him. The new cabinet could therefore represent a means of bolstering Gamal Mubarak's
authority.
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democracy if its president remains in power for five consecutive terms and later his son
replaces him216 •
Interestingly, what Zak:i and other Brotherhood members' perception of democracy
would be considerably different than what people who live in democracies would
understand. The Brotherhood members were appreciative of what we might call the
"procedural" aspects of democracy pertaining party politics, campaigns, elections, and
political activism. However, they were not appreciative of some of the liberties if those
liberties contradict with the Islamic precepts. For instance, things like consumption of
alcohol, gambling, and prostitution would be completely unacceptable for the Islamists.

217

The Brothers also believed that the US was not sincere in her attempts to promote
democracy in the Middle East. Badri, a middle aged Brotherhood member, argued that the
US was not completely sincere in her efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East
because he believed that a country that was sincere about promoting democracy would not
support an oppressive regime (i.e., the Egyptian regime). Besides other aforementioned
legal and practical obstacles that prevent political groups from operating, another major
obstacle that hinders the popular outreach of political movements in Egypt is the existing
emergency laws since June 1967. 218

216

Later I learned from a Brotherhood member that in Egypt, Islamists (Brotherhood members and
others) labelled Mubarak "the last pharaoh of Egypt" for two reasons. First, Mubarak has been in power
since 1981 and has not been willing to relinquish power; second, according to the Islamists, he is not
willing to implement the Shari' a.
217
This topic will be elaborated in Chapter 6. The Brothers unanimously agreed that such things
prohibited by the Qur'an (haram) could not be made permissible (halal) legislation. Thus, the Islamists
argued, human reasoning (making laws through legislation) could not replace the rules and bans in the
Qur'an. According to this view, something clearly forbidden in the Qur'an by God (like gambling) could
not be legalized by the people (i.e., legislators) no matter what reasoning those people put forward for the
lefalization of it (like tax revenues and/or employment).
21
Emergency Law No. 162, enacted in 1958, the emergency laws have to be renewed by the Egyptian
parliament every two to three years; they were renewed in 2006 (Daniel Williams, May 1, 2006, ''Egypt
Extends 2 5-Year-Old Emergency Law'' http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdvn!content/article/2006/04/30/ AR200604300 1039 .html). The Mubarak regime recently renewed the
emergency laws for an additional year on May 25, 2008 (Joseph Mayton, May 25, 2008, ''Emergency

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

280
Under such authoritarian measures combined with severe economic problems,
ordinary Egyptians appear to remain indifferent towards politics. Voter turnout rate in the
parliamentary elections is one of the indicators of widespread political alienation and
abstention among the Egyptian electorate. Political reform under Mubarak attempted to
accommodate political opposition without easing the tight grip of the Mubarak regime on
power. Mubarak's multiparty system in Egypt included several opposition parties that
functioned primarily as parties of opinion with minimal influence over politics and weak
ties to the masses. Official estimates of participation in parliamentary elections under the
Mubarak regime (1984, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005) range between 40 and 50
percent.

219

When one looks at voting behavior, it is found that most people who voted did

so as a means to secure access to government services. Thus, as Palmer (2005) and
Wickham (2002) note, elections chiefly served as a mechanism for renewing patron-client
relationships between the masses and the politicians of the government's NDP rather than a
mechanism for a genuine contest among different political and ideological alternatives.
In Egypt, all associations are subject to state control according to the law 32 of
1964 .. According to the law, all prospective associations must apply to the Ministry of
Social Affairs (MSA) for a license. The MSA can also intervene the functioning of existing

Laws Extended Another Year In Egypt" http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7011058385). The
emergency laws give the Egyptian state the authority to monitor, arrest and detain those suspected of
activities deemed threatening to national security. The government can arrest suspects at will and
detaining them without trial for prolonged periods as well as referring civilians to military or state
security courts \\hose procedures fall far short of international standards for fair trial (HRW Documents
On Egypt, "Egypt's Emergency without End" 2003). The authoritarian measures originating from the
emergency laws also restrict the exercise of the freedoms of speech and assembly guaranteed by the
E~tian constitution.
21
· These percentages could be misleading because they indicate the portion of eligible citizens registered
to mte \\ho actually did vote. When we consider the fact that roughly only half the adult population over
eighteen was not even registered, the actual participation rate drops to roughly 20 to 25 percent of the
adult population. Wickham (2002, 85-92) notes that in 1984 md 1987 parliamentary elections actual
voter turnout rate was slightly more than 25 percent in rural areas and between 10 and 18 percent in urban
areas.
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Law 84/2002 enables the government to prohibit independent political or

trade union activities. The regulations in articles 24 and 25 state that NGOs "may not
undertake or fund election-related activities, or represent employees in discussions with
employers." Article 11 gave the security forces and the government "wide powers to
harass activists and dissolve civil society groups" ("Egypt: Margins of Repression" HRW
Report, 2005).
Unlike the professional associations, Mubarak did not consider the Islamic welfare
organizations and health clinics as particularly dangerous for the regime (Sparre and
Petersen 2007, 59-68). In fact, they may have perceived those organizations as contributing
to social stability in poor areas where state services were not sufficient. However, as the
Islamist associations became successful, Mubarak regime attempted to reclaim the space it
had ceded to Islamist groups. Berman notes that the Islamists' involvement in the civil
society "helped the Islamists build a more powerful, flexible, and responsive movement"
as well as "recruit and train new leaders" and "build a sense of community and collective
identity" (2003, 15-16). However, Berman does not appear to be optimistic about the
benefits of associationalism through the civil society because she believes that those
benefits "can be turned to antidemocratic as well as democratic ends." She exhibits her
pessimism by drawing parallels between the Egyptian case and Weimar Germany by noting
that "where existing political institutions are weak and the regime is perceived as
ineffectual and illegitimate ... civil society may become an alternative to traditional
politics" (2003, 20). Shortly, Berman seems to appreciate what Islamist activism through
the civil society contributed to the Islamist movement in general; however she does not

22

°

For instance, the MSA can appoint members of an association's board, demand written reports of its
activities, and supervise the collection of funds and their uses. Moreover, it has the right to dissolve the
association and seize its assets.
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discuss how the Islamists successfully molded their rhetoric into Islamist frames which
resonated better than other available frames. Berman also does not seem to be optimistic
about the democratic component oflslamist civil society activism Moreover, Berman fails
to demonstrate how Islamists have conflicting views on the procedural aspects of
democracy (like elections, rule of law, constitutionalism) and liberal democratic
freedoms. 221

Civil Society as a Mechanism to Promote Islamism and Islamist Networks
Islamist activism goes hand in hand with Islamic consciousness in Egypt.
Accordingly, when analyzing the resurgence of political Islam, one has to look atthe
increase in Islamic consciousness at the societal level. Islamic resurgence at the societal
level can be evidenced by a rise in religiosity: growing mosque attendance, growing
observance of fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, a noticeable increase of women
wearing the hijab (Islamic headscarffor women), and the proliferation oflslamic
literature. In addition, in Egypt hundreds of rooms in private homes have been converted
into small prayer rooms; Qur' anic reading sessions and religious discussions also take
place in houses as well as prayer. Additionally, networks oflslamic hospitals, schools,
and welfare centers as well as Islamic banks and businesses emerged as models of proper
Islamic social relations (Hafez 1997; 301-302).
Many people first got involved in the Islamist movement by participating in various
social, religious, or cultural activities organized by a neighborhood mosque, religious
reading circles, or Islamist associations. For instance, they began by participating religious
lessons (dars) ina mosque,j oining an informal study group, or goi ngto prayer services in
221

A discussion oflslamists' perception of democracy and their differentiation of the procedural aspects
of democracy (like elections, rule of law, constitutionalism) and liberal democratic freedoms will be
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observance of an Islamic holy day. Having a religious character, such activities provide
socially acceptable venues for people to participate, which in turn create a positive
connotation of exemplary religious behavior attached to those events and activities
(Wickham 2002; 152). My interviewees indicated that they had first met with the
organization through friends, family members or through the mosque. For instance, Abbas,
a middle aged Brotherhood member, stated that he had his first contact with the
organization in his highschool years, when one of Abbas' friends whom he met in the
neighborhood mosque invited Abbas to a weekly dars in his neighborhood given by a
Brotherhood elder 222 • Islamists also drew on preexisting ties among relatives, friends, and
neighbors, whichembeddedislamistnetworks into the existing social structures. Often
times close social relationships between activist and non-activist peers continued. Such
social networks also provided opportunities for movement participation detached from the
realm of politics.
Islamists sometimes deliver their messages explicitly, for example, when they
delivered their services, they did those according to Islamic norms (i.e., loans with no
interest, gender-segregated health care). Islamists also used schools, tutoring, and other
educational services to inculcate their views. At the same time, Islamist student groups
provided students with services such as cheaper photocopied textbooks, lecture notes, and
more importantly cheaper housing. While providing services, the Islamists combined
practical services with the inculcation of moral standards. For instance, as a response to
terribly overcrowded public transportation system, those associations purchased minibuses
for female students. After this service became increasingly popular, Islamists limited it to
women with the hijab (SullivanandAbed-Kotob 1999, 73-74). In fact, Islamists have been

provided in chapters 6 and 7.
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extremely successful in running these organizations and using them to provide services. By
combining their message with concrete social action and offering a real alternative to the
existing regime, the Islamists bolstered their standing and appeal among various social
sectors in Egypt.
Islamist activism in Egypt also prompts the government to alter its policies towards
religion. For instance, to counter the Islamists, the Egyptian regime seeks "to portray itself
as almost as Islamic as the Islamist opposition" (Abaza 2006, vi). 223 Although, in certain
cases, the Islamists pushed the Egyptian government to make some concessions, the
Egyptian government deliberately chose to concede for the sole purpose of
counterbalancing the Brotherhood by displaying signs of piety or making pol icies that
would please the Islamists. Abaza (2006, 15-19) and Berman (2003, 16) report that the
government television started to air more religious programs, and legislation giving more
prominence to the Shari'a was enacted by the government. 224 The Al-Azhar ulema (Islamic
scholars) began to be consulted on political, social, cultural and even economic matters.
Abaza (2006, 18) notes that throughout the presidencies of Sadat and Mubarak different
reasons were behind the state's attempt to re-Islamize: "in the 1970s the aim was to
counter the left; in the 1980s there was an attempt at co-opting Islamists ... and in the 1990s
there was an attempt at containing the Islamists challenge, as well as legitimizing
authoritarian politics." This was a strategic move on the side of the Egyptian regime as the

222

In Chapter 3, a similar account was provided.
The Brothers believe that this happened due to their continuous pressure and Islamist activism. For
instance, Akram, who is a manager at a small convenience store in Giza, argued that over the years the
Egyptian government became more conservative because of the efforts of the Brotherhood. Akram
believed that the Brotherhood's political activism "brought the government in line with Islamic values and
principles" as he believed that political activism forced the Egyptian government to gradually Islamize; he
did not believe that it was a deliberate effort of the Egyptian government to counterbalance the Islamists.
224
In fact, even before the climax of Islamism in the late 1980s and mid-1990s, in 1980, a constitutional
amendment made Shari' a the source for legislation instead of being the main source for legislation
(Abaza 2006, 16).
223
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NDP officials led by Mubarak tried to diffuse the Islamists' criticisms regarding the
Islamists' allegations that the Mubarakregime was unwillingtoapplythe Shari'a. One
such case was the case of Abu Zaid, a university professor who was accused by the
Islamists for publishing blasphemous works. The Islamists chargedZaid with heresy and
also argued that he could no 1onger remain married to his Muslim wife 225 as a heretic. In
1995, the Appellate Court agreed with this charge and ordered Zaid to divorce his wife. A
few weeks later, the couple decided to flee to the Netherlands (Murphy 2002, 201-210;
Abdo 2000, 167).
Singerman ( 1995) argues that social networks serve as resources for movement
building. The use of informal institutions for Islamists becomes vital as regimes often limit
channels of formal politics, and strategies of control, cooptation, and repression rather than
inclusionary politics is mostly adopted by the Middle Eastern regimes. In Singerman's
account, through these informal mechanisms, Islamists mobilize and construct collective
identities that generate solidarity within the group in an authoritarian/repressive political
context. Social networks play their most significant role in terms of movement participation
and recruitment. 226 As a result, people who are part of such networks are more likely to
perceive a greater chance of a positive outcome from social action than those who are not,
thus they are more likely to get involved. In other words, social networks pull participants
into action.

225

According to Shari 'a Muslim women can not marry non-Muslim men; and Muslim men can only marry
Christian and Jewish women. For instance, a Muslim man can not marry a Buddhist or a Hindu woman.
226
Research on recruitment patterns from social movements around the world strongly indicates that
individuals are drawn into participation not by the force of the ideas or even the individual attitudes but as
the result oftheir embeddedness in associational networks that render them structurally available for
protest activity. Social networks make people available for recruitment, make them more inclined to join,
and make them the targets of recruitment. Interpersonal ties encourage the extension of an invitation to
participate and they ease the uncertainties one experiences when joining a new group, in the same fashion,
social bonds help potential members overcome the perceived costs of participation into a new group
(Clark 2004, 22-25).
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Government Control over Religion
Earlier, the Egyptian regime's attempts to portray itself as Islamic as the Islamist
opposition were discussed. During this process, Al-Azhar, the official religious
establishment, significantly benefitted from the gradual increase of conservatism in Egypt
as an institution. Berman notes that the power of Al-Azhar expanded greatly "in exchange
for conferring Islamic legitimation on the state" (2003, 16). Additionally, Berman notes
that the Al-Azhar scholars promoted the Islamization of school curricula and oversaw the
religious broadcasting on the government media as religious broadcasting on the
government controlled media increased by 50 percent between 1975 and 1990 (2003, 1617). Although Berman discusses the increased role of Al-Azhar in the Islamization of the
Egyptian regime in 1ength, she fails to di scuss the role of governmental control over
mosques and how it politicizes the Islamists. Similarly, Berman also fails to demonstrate
the role of frames (Official Islam's frames vs. Islamist frames) on how the Islamists recruit
members and convey their Islamist rhetoric through the three types of frames (diagnostic,
prognostic, motivational).
Tamir (2000, 14) reports thatAl-Azhar achievedsignificantgains by forming loose
alliances with some state actors who share its conservative vision. A recent ruling of
Majlis AI-Dawla (Council of State, an administrative court that deals with questions about
jurisdiction within the executive branch) is one of the most significant examples of
Islamists who managed to push forward their agenda within the government. In July 1993,
the SheikhAl-Azhar submitted a letter to the Majlis AI-Dawla asking which institution had
jurisdiction over the censorship of audio and visual material related to Islam By February
of 1994, the court arrived at a decision in favor of Al-Azhar. Thus, Al-Azhar became the
final arbiter in the assessment of such materials. Tamir (2000; 14-15) notes that the most
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astonishing aspect of the court ruling was that for the first time Al-Azhar' s decisions would
be binding upon the Ministry of Culture. This was a clear dilemma for the Mubarakregime.

On one hand, the regime haddependedon Al-Azhar to discredit the Islamists on
theological grounds. How ever, on the other hand, the gove rnment clearly understood t hat
tightgove rnmentcontrol of the institution lends support to the Islamist's contention thatthe
secular state is manipulating Islam for maintaining its power.
The Egyptian Constitution provides for freedom of belief and practice under
Article 46. At the same time, Islam is the official state religion, the Shari'a is the primary
source of legislation; and religious practices that conflict with the government's
interpretation of the Shari'a are prohibited. In general, members of the non-Muslim
religious minorities generally worship without legal harassment; however, members of
other religious groups that are not recognized by the government, (for instance the Baha'is
or the Shi'a) continue to experience hardships. All religious groups have to be recognized
by the government, and for a religious group to be officially recognized, it must submit a
request to the Religious Affairs Department within the Ministry of Interior. The Department
determines whether the group would "pose a threat or upset national unity or social peace"
("Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007"). In making its decision, the
Department consults the leading religious figures in the country, particularly the Pope of the
Egyptian Coptic Orthodox Church and the Sheikh of Al-Azhar. The registration is then
referred to the president, who issues a decree recognizing the new group, according to Law
15 of 1927. 227 The Egyptian regime alsostrictlyprohibits religious groups from engaging

227

If a religious group bypasses the official registration process, participants are subject to detention and
could also face prosecution and punishment under Article 98(F) of the Penal Code, which forbids the
"denigration of religions."
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into political activities. 228 The Article Five of the Egyptian constitution prohibits the
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establishment of political parties based on religion. The regime argues that Article Five
ensures the separation of religion and politics. However, critics argue that Article Two of
the Constitution contradicts with the principle of separation of religion and politics as
Article Two continues the Shari'a the basis for legislation229 •
The Islamic Research Center (IRC) at Al-Azhar University has legal authority to
censor and recommend confiscation of any media (religious or non-religious) based on
Islamic criteria. The IRC has the legal right to recommend confiscation, but the actual act
of confiscation requires a court order. In 2003 the Ministry of Justice issued a decree
authorizing Al-Azhar to confiscate publications, tapes, speeches, and artistic materials
deemed inconsistent with Islamic principles. With the 2003 decree, the Government
permitted greater authority to Al-Azhar in decisions of confiscation and censorship, and
acted on its recommendations ("Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007").
The Egyptian government's approach to groups that are perceived as un-Orthodox
Muslims is also harsh. The government at times prosecutes members of religious groups

228

Politics is not the only area in \\hich people are discriminated on the basis of their religion.
Government practices discriminated against Christians in hiring for the public sector, staff appointments
to public universities, and in barring them from study at Al-Azhar University (a publicly funded
institution). The government pays the salaries of Muslim prayer leaders, but not Christian clergy. There
are few Christians in the upper ranks ofthe security services and armed forces. Usually, public university
programs training Arabic language and literature teachers bar non-Muslims because the curriculum
involves study of the Qur'an (From: ''Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007").
229
For example, the application of family law (legal matters including marriage, divorce, alimony, child
custody, and burial) is based on an individual's religion. The government recognizes only the three
'heavenly religions" (namely, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) in the practice of family law. Muslim
families are subject to Shari'a, Christian families to Canon Law, and Jewish families to Jewish law. In
cases of family law disputes involving a marriage between a Christian woman and a Muslim man, the
courts apply Shari 'a. The government does not recognize the marriages of citizens adhering to religions
other than Christianity, Judaism, or Islam. Under Shari'a as practiced in the country, non-Muslim males
must convert to Islam to marry Muslim women, but non-Muslim women need not convert to marry
Muslim men. Muslim women are prohibited from marrying Christian men. Under Shari 'a, converts from
Islam lose all rights of inheritance. However, because the government offers no legal means for converts
from Islam to Christianity to amend their civil records to reflect their new religious status, inheritance
rights may appear not to have been lost (From: ''Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007').
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whose practices are deemed to deviate from mainstream Sunni Orthodox Islamic beliefs.
For instance, between March and June of2007, the Egyptian police arrested five men
affiliated with the Qurani movement. 230 Also in 2004, Hussein El-Derini was arrested due
to his affiliation with Shi'a Islam, and later was released in June 2005, after spending 15
months in administrative detention without charge or trial

231

• Although the

Christians can

practice their religion freely, the government does not recognize conversions of Muslims to
Christianity or other religious groups. 232 Under Shari'a, a non-Muslim wife who converts
to Islam must divorce her non-Muslim husband (because according to the Shari' a a Muslim
woman cannot marry a non-Muslim man). Upon the wife's conversion, local security
authorities ask the non-Muslimhusbandifhe is willingtoconvertto Islam; ifhe chooses
not to, divorce proceedings begin immediately and custody of children is awarded to the
mother ("Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007"). 233
Despite some negative implementations, there have been some improvements in
respect for religious freedom For instance, a Coptic Christian woman was among 30

230
The Qurani movement is a small group of Muslims who rely largely if not exclusively on the Qur'an as
authoritative for Islam, to the exclusion of the Prophet Muhammed's traditions (Sunna) and other sources
of Islamic law. There are several cases involving the Egyptian government's intimidation against people or
groups that are perceived to be un-Orthodox Muslims. For instance, in May 2006 public prosecutor
Maher Abdul Wahid ordered two Azharites, Abdul Sabur al-Kashef and Mohammed Radwan, to be tried by
a low-level criminal court on charges of blaspheming Islam. Kashef was prosecuted for claiming to have
seen God while Radwan was prosecuted for denying the existence of heaven and hell. Al-Kashefwas
sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment while Radwan received 3 years. In mid-January 2007 El-Gamaleya
Misdemeanor Court of Appeals reduced Kashef's sentence to 6 years' imprisonment and upheld the
earlier ruling of 3-years for Radwan (From: "Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007'').
231
Martial Law is still in effect in Egypt since former President Sadat's assassination in 1981. Suspects
can be held for longer periods, they can also be referred to the Military Courts which are known to be
harsher than the non-military courts. The Martial Law was recently extended for a year. See footnote 27.
232
This constitutes a serious problem regarding civil rights of citizens because in the absence of a legal
means to register their change in religious status, some converts resorted to soliciting illicit identity
papers, often by submitting fraudulent supporting documents or bribing the government clerks who
process the documents. In such cases, authorities periodically charged converts with violating laws
prohibiting the falsification of documents (From: ''Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report
2007").
233
In April2005 the Family Court granted the divorce ofWafaa Riffat Adly, a Christian woman who had
converted to Islam, from her Christian husband, Said Farouk Adly, after he refused to convert (From:
''Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007").
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women judges appointed to the bench in early April2007. Moreover, the government took
positive steps in response to an April 2006 sectarian attack in Alexandria that led to mob
violence against Coptic Christians and punished the local police officers in Alexandria
who, in negligence, did not properly respond to the violent events. Recently, Al-Azhar held
a small number of interfaith discussions both inside the country and a broad. The head of
Al-Azhar, Sheikh Tantawi, who is a government appointee, and the Pope of Egyptian
Coptic Orthodox Church, Pope Shenouda III, participated in joint public events during
Ramadan and Easter and in a Christian-Muslim dialogue in June 2006. Indeed, Christians
and Muslims in Egypt share a common culture and live as neighbors throughout the country
("Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007'').
Government Control over Mosques
All mosques must be licensed by the government (government-controlled or
private). The government appoints and pays the salaries of the imams who lead prayers in
government-controlled mosques and monitors their sermons. It does not contribute to the
fimding of Christian churches. The Ministry of Religious Endowments (MRE) reported that
there were 95,000 mosques and small dedicated prayer areas called "zawiyas' nationwide
as of August 2006. T he government annexes new mosques 234 every year but cannot keep
pace with new mosque construction. A 2004 decree from the MRE removed the authority
to issue permits to build mosques from governors and placed mosques in private homes
under the Ministry's administrative control. Approximately 5,000 mosques and zawiyas
remain unsupervised by the Ministry ("Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report
2007'').

234

Law 175 of 1960 granted the Ministry ofReligious Endowments the authority to incorporate private
mosques.
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Earlier, in 1992 the MRE declared that the government wanted to incorporate
10000 private mosques per year. Indeed, this was a very ambitious program considering
the I imitations that the Egyptian government had to overcome. The Ministry hade nough
money to incorporate just 400 mosques per year due to acute budgetary constraints.
Moreover, in 1992, the Ministry needed 40000 imams (prayer leaders), however it could
only employ 3000. As ofthe mid-1990s, the majority of private mosques remained outside
of governmental oversight. In 1991, the Ministry of Religious Endowments claimed that
about25000 (45 percent) ofthe 45000 private mosques and 10000 .znliyas (small prayer
rooms, usually at the basements of buildings) had be en taken under the government's
control. As one Egyptian newspaper observed: "In many cases, if you take their mosques,
they proceed to the zawiyas in the basement of buildings and meet there ... " (quoted in
Wickham 105). In 1993, the MRE launched a new campaign to incorporate all ofEgypt's
mosques under the Ministry's control. The announcement came only five weeks after the
Ministry declared that all Friday sermons at state-controlled mosques must be approved by
government appointed officials, and its intention to curb the building of private mosques
(Mattoon 1993). Since the early 1990s, the Egyptian government has accelerated the
process of incorporating private mosques under the government's control.
In addition to the ambitious campaign to control the mosques, in July 2004, the
MRE announced that the same official sermon would be delivered in 88,000 governmentcontrolled mosques across Egypt. According to the new regulations, the sermons would be
prepared by Al-Azhar scholars and distributed by the MRE officials to the mosques.
Preachers who do not stick to the text would be deprived of bonuses and will be subject to
an investigation by the Legal Affairs Department at the Ministry. The new plan also
required the preachers at all newly appropriated mosques to attend state-run religious
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indoctrination courses. Preachers would only be appointed after clearing an examination
and passing a security test ("Egypt: 88,000 Mosques, One Sermon" 2003).
Legitimizing Islamist Activism through the Islamic Concept of Da 'mz
How do Islamists respond to government control over religion? Indeed, Islamists
believe that the government should serve Islam, it is not the other way around, and they find
government control over religion unacceptable because they believe that this would
eventually corrupt the true nature oflslam. 235 However, the Islamists' disapproval of
government control over religion does not directly translate into political activism. To
mobilize the believers towards the establishment of Shari 'a and to make the government
subservient to religion (not the other way around), Islamists carefully (re)frame the already
existing Islamic concept of da'wa (call to God, dissemination oflslam).
The Egyptian Islamists, through the medi urn of da 'oo, Islamist activists engaged in
an ideological projecttowin the hearts and minds of ordinary Egyptian citizens. By
promoting a more activist conception oflslam, the Islamists claimed that it was fardh 'ayn,
an Islamic duty for very Muslim, to participate in the Islamic reform of society and state.
Such participation is considered as a thaoob (religiously defined/encouraged good deed)
by the Islamists. 236 Thus, by doing this, the Islamists challenged dominant patterns of
political alienation and abstention by promoting a new ethic of civic obligation. The entry
of movement participants into the Islamist activism was a gradual process in which lowrisk activism was preceded high-risk activism. As "rational actor" models of participation
would predict, many participants joined those groups because of various social,
psychological, and emotional benefits. This may explain participation into low-risk forms

235
236

See the earlier debate on this issue in Chapter 3.
More details will be provided for the significance of da'wa in Islarnist activism in Chapter 6.
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of activism (Wickham 2002, 120). However, it cannot clearly explain high-risk forms of
activism. Framing activism as a moral-religious obi igation by the Brotherhood de manding
self-sacrifice and commitment facilitates the shift of the new members from low-risk
activism to high-risk activism.
Clark(2004, 14) points out that da 'wa becomes the very act of activating Islam
through deed in all spheres of life and also a vital component of practicing Islam. Thus,
da 'wa becomes incumbent upon all Muslims. In this regard, Clark reminds, the Islamist

project is an attempt to create a web between religion, politics, and all forms of activism.
Muslims efforts should reinforce each other and create public virtue and personal piety.
All sorts oflslamist institutions (social, economic, and political) in this regard are a form
of putting da 'wa into practice. Participating, volunteering, or donating to an Islamist
institution becomes a form of religious deed, and an expression of Islamist identity. In
simple terms, for an Islamist, the major necessity of Muslims today is to heal the ills of
Muslims through imitating the example of the golden era oflslam. The expected outcome of
such an effort pertains to both this world and the other (hereafter). On this world, an
Islamic system will be created through such an effort and the ills of Muslims will be
healed; in the hereafter, such an effort will place a true believer in heaven.
My interviews suggest that the concept of da 'wa is one of the crucial frames that is
actually derived from an already existing concept oflslam. Prophet Muhammad describes
any deed that is useful to other people as a sadaqa (charity) such as removing an obstacle
from a road that hinders traffic or smiling to others. Thus, according to the niyyah
(intention) of a person, an ordinary action becomes a good deed which will be rewarded
by God. Thus, i fone's intention is to serve Islam, any act for realizing that intention
becomes a good deed. Islamists believe that if someone participates to any activity or
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effort for the sake of implementing Islam as an all encompassing system, the participation
itself becomes an act of da 'wa which at the same time for many Islamists is a type ofjihad.
Therefore, da 'wa becomes central to the process of disseminating and implementing Islam
as an all-encompassing system By promoting a more activist conception oflslam, the
Islamists claimed that it was fardh 'ayn (an Islamic obligation for all), to participate in the
Islamic reform of society and state. By the Islamists, such participation is considered as a

thawab (religiously defined/encouraged good deed). 237
Depending upon one's degree of involvement in a social movement organization,
under new bonds of friendship, movement participants work together to achieve a goal
under da 'oo. Thus, increased levels of activism translate into the participants' gradually
developinganactivistunderstandingof da 'oo (Clark 2004, 29). New participants usually
do not identify themselves as Islamists, rather what were once perceived as acts of
religiously inspired good deed gradually become forms of activism under the umbrella of

da 'oo. Later, often unconsciously, an increasingly greater sphere of activism is perceived
as part of religious practice. This transformation of perception has a huge impact upon
participants' sense of community and may also alter their self-identity since allows
participants to perceive political activism as a religious duty. In sum, the underlying
motive behind this perception is that Islamists, by drawing on the respected tradition of the

da 'oo, adapted the concept to new purposes. First, they shifted the target audience from

237

Qutb makes no difference between Islam and the method to revive it. Thus, Qutb directly associates
any act that contributes to the revival of Islam with Islam. This could also be related to the Islamists'
understanding of Islam as a comprehensive ''way of life"The concept of"Islamic obligation for all" could
be related to Qutb's understanding oflslamic struggle to establish the Shari 'a.ln Milestones, (Chapter
2 ), Qutb states: "Islam and the method of revival of Islam are both equally important; there is no
difference between them [emphasis belongs to me]. Any other method, however attractive it may be,
cannot bring about the establishment oflslam. Other methods can work for the establishment of manmade systems, but are incapable of establishing our system. Thus it is as necessary to follow this
particular method for the establishment of Islam as it is to obey the way of life it outlines and to believe
in its articles of faith."
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non-Muslims to the ordinary Muslims whose understandingandobs ervance oflslamwere
viewed as faulty or incomplete. Second, a new content was introduced to the message of
the da 'oo: Religion cannot just be confined to matters of private faith and ritual, it is rather
an all-encompassing be lief system incorporating both the faith and the organization of
society and state according to the precepts of the Shari'a (Wickham 2002, 126). 238
How Does the Islamists' Perception of External Threats Relate to Political Activism?
Perception of external threats may change based on the changing circumstances,
thus how people perceive external threats is not absolute. The process is also related to the
way that the movement leaders frame issues and shape the movement's collective identity.
A good example would be how the Islamists perceive the US as a threat in relation to the
foreign policy options adopted by the US foreign policy makers regarding the Middle East,
and the degree of military presence ofthe US in the region. For instance, anti-Americanism
has been on the rise since the US military involvement in Iraq after 2003. Other events also
shape how people perceive external threats; for instance after Israel's military operation in
southern Lebanon in summer of2006, Hezbollah's leader Hasan Nasrallah and Irainan
leader Mahmud Ahmedinejad became highly revered figures among the Sunni Arab youth
as those leaders defied the US in the region.

238

Thus, a new and more activist Muslim identity is presented by the Islamists through the concept of
da 'wa. For those Islamists, the Islamic reform of society first begins with a transformation of the
individual. The iman (faith) prompts change in the private conduct of the individual. After the first step,
the reform would ultimately expand outward in "concentric circles" to include every sector of society.
The Islamists, thus, make a distinction between an ordinary Muslim and a committed Muslim. An ordinary
Muslim is born into the faith and is more or less observant, but does not realize ~at a full commitment
to Islam entails. On the other hand, a committed Muslim understands the norms of Islamic conduct and
applies them in practice. Thus, one of the major functions of the da 'wa for an Islamist is to encourage
ordinary Muslims to become committed Muslims (Wickham 2002, 126-128). Accordingly, a committed
Muslim should monitor and correct the behavior of others around him/her if possible through persuasion.
An often quoted phrase by the Islamists from the Qur'an is "al-amr bi 'l-ma 'rufwa 'l-nahy 'anil-munkar"
which is commanding the good and forbidding the evil.
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Another way for the Islamists to frame external threats is their linking of secularism
with moral corruption and religious laxity. Islamists often perceive secularism with social
engineering239 • In short, social engineering refers to the efforts of the government or private
groups to influence popular attitudes and social behavior on a mass scale. Islamists often
perceive such projects with suspicion, disapproval and opposition as they believe that the
secularist government's vision of ideal society does not completely match the ideal society
envisioned by the Shari'a. In this regard, the application of the Shari'a, as da 'oo,
becomes a highly controversial debate (almost a war in the Gramscian sense) waged
through symbols regarding the ideal vision of society by each side. In both countries,
Nasserism and Kemalism tried to marginalize and as well as to control Islamic institutions.
However, such top-down efforts by the regimes did not lead to the disappearance oflslam
from the public realm. As Kadwglu (1998) and Tamir (2000) suggest, such attempts rather
paved the way to Islam's politicization in both countries.
Regarding the application of the Shari'a, the Brotherhood members whom I
interviewed believed that Mubarak was not doing enough to implement the Shari'a. An
overwhelming 92% of the interviewees believed that the government was not doing
enough to implement the Islamic I aw. Unlike Turkey, secularism ( AI-Aimaniyyah) is not a
big de bate among the Egyptian Islamists; and unlike Turkishlslamists, relatively speaking,
Egyptian Islamists did not believe that Islam was under oppression. 240 Only 12% of the
interviewees believed that Islam was under oppression by the government. However,
Egyptianlslamists highly believed thatthe government in Egypt did not have an issue with

239

Earlier in Chapter 3, concepts of social and political engineering were discussed.
More discussion of how Turkish and Egyptian Islamists perceive secularism will be provided in
Chapter 6.
240
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Islam, but against the political expression of Islam. 241 Indeed, 92 % of my interviewees
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believed that the Egyptian regime did not want the political expression oflslam.
Additionally, 68% of the interviewees argued that governmental control over religion
existed in Egypt. For instance, 74 %of the interviewees mentioned governmental control
over religious education (throughAl-Azhar), government's attempts to incorporate private
mosques, and the delivery of sermons to the government-controlled mosques by the
government. Like the Turkish Islamists, Egyptian Islamists also perceive politics as a zero-

sum game. This game entails the waging of a Gramscian counter-hegemonic war of
position which has to be won for final victory. Additionally, 1ike Turkishislamists, the
Egyptian Islamists appear to perceive politics not as a means to work out the optimal
solution(s) for a variety of problems, but as a kind ofwar (in the Gramscian sense). 242
Islamists perceive their war as an all-out war waged at every front against the
secularist regime which, according to the Islamists, pays only a lip service for
implementing the Shari'a. One youngislamistwas curiously wondering why a true Muslim
would not vote for the Islamist candidates in elections. Since the Islamists perceive their
political program in terms of religion, voting and political participation becomes a
religious virtue, even a good deed (thawab) sanctioned by the religion243 • For the Islamists,
political activism becomes a religious deed since politics, for the Islamists, would be used

241

The interviewees' responses can be related to the organic nature of Islam W!ich W<tS discussed earlier
in Chapter 3 and parts of this chapter. In Toprak's (1981, 23) words, in an organic religion"... religion is
largely equated with society". Husain (2003) points out that that in an organic religion the distinction
between religious and social systems is obscured, indeed the two realms actually merge. In Islam, this
merger is prescribed by the Shari'a, and the Islamists often emphasize this.
242
This topic will be elaborated later in Chapter 6.
243
Two examples might illustrate my point here. Imam Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran perceived political
participation as a religious duty and a responsibility upon Muslims (since theoretically their mtes
determine who comes to power which according to Khomeini, associated with the fate of the nation) and
equated political participation withjihad. Similarly, Necmettin Erbakan of the RP is known to have said:
''The ones who did not vote for our party [the RP] are of the potato religion" [i.e., they are not true
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to implement the Shari'a. In sum, Islamists often believe that if someone has a higher noble
cause, the means to achieve that higher cause must also be noble. Muhsin, a young
Brotherhood member, stated: "Our [the Brotherhood] struggle is all about establishing the
true Islamic order in Egypt. . .It [bringing about the Islamic order] must be the purpose of
all Muslims around the world ... " Accordingtothe Brotherhood's way of understanding
their struggle, anything that wouldconfronttheir movement would be an act of preventing
them from establishing their noble cause which is establishing the Shari'a. Moreover, any
perceived threat that would destroy the Muslim identity (or Muslirnness) of the people
would be a serious impediment for the Islamists to implement the Shari'a, because
according to the Islamists, when the Muslim identity is under threat, Muslims become less
committed to the goal of establishing the Shari' a. This "perception of threat" then urges
Muslims to protect their Muslirnness, or their Muslim identity as political activism and the
Islamist impulse to protect Muslim identity usually go hand in hand.
The Content Analysis
Discussion of the Islamist frames represented in the Islamist literature will be
evaluated via content analysis. The content analysis includes counting the frequencies of
the themes taken from Yilmaz (2002) in selected books of Hasan Al-Banna and S ayyid
Qutb which are still widely read by the Brotherhood members. Islamist journals, like AISha' ab, in Egypt have be en frequently and heavily censored by the government and many
Islamist journals like Al-Sha' ab were indefinitely closed down by the Egyptian regime.
Since the Islamist journals were either closed down or confiscated by the regime because
of governmental censorship, I was unable to have access to copies of them. Instead, I made

Muslims] implying that i) a Muslim has to vote for the Islamist party, and ii) voting is a religious
obligation.
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the content analysis on the selected books of Al-Banna and Qutb since those two authors
are still the most widely read Islamist writers among the Brotherhood members. A second
reason for choosingAl-Banna and Qutb for the content analysis is that first, both authors
were prolific writers and their works heavily emphasized issues like Muslim identity or
Muslimness, Islamic consciousness, Islamic zeal/passion and the ideal course of action for
political activism. Second, as mentioned earlier, both authors still have a wide range of
reader base. As my interviewees indicated the Brotherhood members frequently read
passages fromAl-Banna's andQutb's books in their weekly dars(religious lecture) in
their homes or dormitories, and interpret the current events and problems in the light of the
selected passages from them.
In order to count the frequencies of theme categories as elaborated by Ytlmaz
(2002), this study included two ofH. Al-Banna's books, Between Yesterday and Today
and Our Message, and S. Qutb's Milestones. 244 Since the literature reviewed in this section
is limited, my approach here is will not be recording the frequencies of the theme
categories developed by Ytlmaz (2002, 76-78). Ytlmaz's categories will still be used;
however, my approach will be to look at whether Al-Banna's and Qutb' s arguments fit into
the theme categories. Afterwards, just like I did in the corresponding section of Chapter 3,
I will see what my interview data suggests regarding the theme categories laid out here.

244

The influence ofQutb and his work extends across the whole spectnnn oflslamism. Alongside notable
Islamists like MawlanaMawdudi and Hasan Al-Banna, Qutb is often considered one of the most
influential Islamic activists of the modern era He is recognized for his application of Islamic ideology to
current social and political problems, such as Westernization, modernization, and political reform. Qutb's
work also expanded many themes now common in Western discourses on Islamism, including the theory
of inevitable ideological conflict between Islam and the West, the notion of a transnational ummah (the
brotherhood/unity of believers), and the comprehensive application ofjihad in wrious spiritual, political,
and social contexts. In terms of politics, Qutb also left a significant mark on the Muslim Brotherhood,
which is still influential today. Qutb's theoretical work on Islamic advocacy, including emphasis on social
justice and education, has become a cornerstone of the contemporary Brotherhood. His interpretation of
jihad and its application for societal change has influenced many later Islamist activists, both violent and
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Ideologically, Qutb's thought differs from that of Al-Banna' s. In this section some
ofthose differences (as well as the similarities) will be laid out. Similarities include
Qutb's advocacy of an Islamic system as the only legitimate system for the state,
significance ofjihad in the struggle against non-Islamic governments to establish an
Islamic order, and an uncompromising opposition to Western culture and values. However,
among other differences, Qutb's conceptualization of the current Muslim societies and
governments as jahili constitutes the major difference between Qutb and Al-Banna. Qutb
despised modernity and saw the current world as jahiliyyah245, the barbarous and ignorant
condition existing before Muhammad. For Qutb,jahiliyyah did not allude to the particular
time period in Arabia prior to the rise oflslam, as the term is traditionally interpreted, but
to an antithesis of an Islamic utopia. Brothers still read Qutb's writings in addition to AlBanna's writings. Dr. Sa'id, one of the prominent Brotherhood members, pointed out that
Qutb completed his radical writings under heavy torture and that was the poi ntwhen
Qutb's writings took a radical turn. Dr. Sa'id believed that Qutb's radical writings, like the
ones in his Ma'alim 5 al-Taric/46 (Milestones), should be evaluated within that historical
context. 247 He also noted that later starting from the mid-1970s the Brotherhood distanced
itself from radicalism; and HasanAl-Hudaibi 248 , the former spiritual guide of the

non-violent. Also, Qutb's imprisonment and execution has led some to consider him a martyr (shaheed).
For a detailed discussion ofQutb's ideas and the impact of his thought on other Islamists, see Chapter 4.
245
Jahiliyyah literally means ignorance,jahili means ignorant. Indeed, Prophet Muhammed used the
term to refer to the period before Islam. For a discussion ofQutb's conception ofjahiliyyah, see Chapter

4.

246

Ma'alimfi a!-Tariq literally means Signposts on the Road, it w.IS translated into English with the title
of Milestones.
247
Dr. Sa'id argued that Qutb was more than just a radical writer, and his radical writings constituted only
a small portion of his works. Dr. Sa'id reminded me that Qutb had an extensive commentary on the Qur'an
named In the Shadow of the Qur'an (Fi Zilal Al-Qur'an) in thirty volumes which he wrote before
Milestones. Dr. Sa'id pointed out that Qutb never got formal religious education, thus he educated himself
about Islam to the point that he was able to write an extensive commentary about the Qur'an in thirty
volumes.
248
Hasan Al-Hudaibi (1891-1973) led the Brotherhood between 1951-1973 after Al-Banna's
assassination. His son Mamoun Al-Hudaibi ( 1921-2004) was the Brotherhood's sixth general guide
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Brotherhood, wrote a book (Du 'ah, fa Qudah, 1977, Inviters, not Judges) for a rebuttal of
radical views in Qutb's later writings.
InAl-Banna's and Qutb's works, the first and the second theme categories seem to
appear together because both authors directly link moral erosion of Muslims directly to
European (Western) influences. The first two categories are the perceived immorality or
moral erosion and Western cultural influences and perceived cultural degeneration due to
Muslims' imitation of Western culture and values 249 • Perceived immorality is one of the
most frequently repeated themes in the Islamist writings including criticism of non-Islamic
lifestyle or actions considered immoral from an Islamic viewpoint. According to Al-Banna
immorality is an outcome of the heavy influence of"the materialistic European
civilization'' in addition to Muslims' religious laxity and blind imitation of the West (AlBanna, Between Yesterday and Today, The Chapter titled: The Tyranny of Materialism on
Muslim Land). Al-Banna is highly critical aboutthe European civilization. In Our
Message, Al-Banna argues that:
" ...they [Muslims] have been assailed on the sociological side by lewdness of manners
and morals, through the sloughing off of the restraints of the humanitarian virtues they
inherited from their glorious, fortunate ancestors; while through imitation of the West,
the viper's venom creeps insidiously into their affairs, poisoning their blood and
sullying the purity of their well being (Al-Banna, Our Message, the chapter titled To the
Cure).

Al-Banna cites four sources of moral weakness and corruption and relates them to
the Western cultural influences over the Muslim societies. Those sources are: apostasy

(murshid a! 'aam), and at the time of his death had held the position for 14 months. He served as a judge
in Cairo's Appeals Court and won a seat in Parliament in the 1987 elections.
249

Interestingly, in the Turkish case (see Chapter 3), those two categories did not seem to go hand in
hand. Turkish Islamists, unlike their Egyptian counterparts, seem to perceive moral erosion as a relatively
isolated issue. A discussion of this point will be made in Chapter 6 which will compare the two countries.
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(disbelief in God and materialism), lust (one's devotion to his/her carnal desires, and
promiscuity), individual greed, and usury. According to Al-Banna:
These purely materialistic traits of European society have corrupted the spirit, devalued
morality, and made them sluggish in the war against crime, all this and the problems have
multiplied, destructive ideologies have made their appearance, devastating and damning
revolutions have burst forth, economic, social, and political institutions no longer stand
on firm foundations. Nations have been torn apart by sects and parties, while greed and
hatred have driven people to cut each others' throats. This modern civilization has
substantiated its complete impotence in securing peace, tranquility and safety within
society. It has failed to grant happiness to man, despite all the doors of science,
knowledge, wealth and opulence it has left open for them, and despite the power and
authority it enjoys throughout the earth, and even though it has not been in existence for
so much as a century (AI-Banna, Between Yesterday and Today, The Chapter titled:
Social Struggle).

Qutb's approach to immorality and moral erosion is based on his concept of

jahiliyyah delineating the differences between a Muslim and a non-Muslim society. Qutb
perceives the society of true believers and the jahil/50 societies in a dichotomous
relationship. For Qutb, the jahili (ignorant) society is the antithesis of the Muslim
society

251

•

In that regard, Qutb argues that jahili society is a society "whose aim is to block

Islam." (Milestones, Chapter 3) For Qutb, moral erosion and immorality are direct results
of the jahJ1i society. Qutb argues that in the jahili societies, morality is not a priority:
" ... in the Islamic society material comforts are not made into the highest value at the
expense of'human' characteristics-freedom and honor, family and its obligations, morals
and values, and so on- as is the case injahili societies" (Milestones; Chapter 8).

252

Qutb

is also against blindly imitating the West and argues that:

250
251

Jahili is the adjective form ofjahiliyyah.

For a discussion of Qutb's understanding of the concept ofjahiliyyah and thejahili societies, see
Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 of Milestones, Qutb argues: "The jahili society is any society other than the
Muslim society; and if we want a more specific definition, we may say that any society is ajahili society
which does not dedicate itself to submission to God alone, in its beliefs and ideas in its observances of
worship, and in its legal regulations."
252
In Qutb's understanding, the reference point for the moral values should not be human understanding,
rather they have to be based upon the Qur'an and the Shari'a prescribed in it: In Chapter 8 of Milestones,
Qutb argues: "[In an Islamic society] moral standards are not determined by the environment and changing
conditions; rather they are fixed criteria above and beyond the difference in environments. One cannot say
that some moral values are 'agricultural' and others 'industrial', some are 'capitalistic' and some others
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A Muslim cannot go to any source other than God for guidance in matters of faith, in the
concept of life, acts of worship, morals and human affairs, values and standards,
principles of economics and political affairs and interpretation of historical processes.
It is, therefore, his duty that he should learn all these from a Muslim whose piety and
character, belief and action, are beyond reproach (Milestones, Chapter 8).

Al-Banna and Qutb often associated moral erosion to religious laxity and weakness
of faith. The most frequently suggested solutions by Al-Banna against moral erosion were
learning about Islam and prophet Muhammed's life, practicing the religion (i.e., performing
the daily prayers, fasting, and avoiding sins) andassociatingwithdeath and thinking about
the hereafter (i.e., thinking about the rewards and punishments in the hereafter). However,
Al-Banna and Qutb have completely opposite views regarding the extent of European
influence in Muslim societies. As stated earlier in Chapter 4, in Qutb's view, all societies
are jahili societies (Muslim and non-Muslim) without any exceptions. In Chapter 5 of
Milestones, Qutb argues " ... all the societies existing in the world today are jahili.. .all the
existing so-called 'Muslim' societies are also jahili societies." However, for Al-Banna,
there are varying degrees of European (Western) influence in Muslim societies. Al-Banna
in Between Yesterday and Today (the chapter titled The Tyranny of Materialism on
Muslim Land) divides the Muslim nations that were affected by "the materialistic
civilization'' into three categories:
1) Countries in which this influence has reached serious proportions: Not only is this
seen outwardly but has gone so far as to penetrate the minds and feelings of the people.
Among these countries are Turkey and Egypt, where the slightest trace of an Islamic
ideology has disappeared from all walks of life, banished to mosques and Sufi retreats.
2) Countries which have only been influenced outwardly: Emotions and feelings
however remaining intact. Such as Iran and North Africa
3) Countries which have not been influenced by this civilization, except for a particular
class consisting of the well educated and the ruling group, to the exclusion of the
common people and the masses: Such as Syria, Iraq, the Hijaz, many sections of the
Arabian Peninsula, and the remaining Muslim countries.

'socialistic', some are 'bourgeoise' and others 'proletarian'. Here, the standards of morality are
independent of the environment, the economic status, and the stage of development of a society; these are
nothing but superficial variations."
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Like the Turkish Islamists, Egyptian Islamists maintain that the secular regime and
intellectuals are the main vehicle of such influences, as the regime and the secular elites
are believed to impose Western norms through the secular law and educational institutions.
For the Islamists, another source of perceived moral erosion is the secularist media. Islam,
according to the Islamists, is perceived as the main source of social identity, values and
norms, and imposition of the strict secular policies by the state elites undermines the
Muslim identity.
The third theme category is domestic suppression oflslam. Islamists argue that by
secularizing Muslims, the secularist elites try to undermine Islamist movements. Al-Banna
in Between Yesterday and Today (in the chapter titled Our Mission is One of Reawakening
and Deliverance) points out that there would be obstacles for people who are working to
establish the Shari'a, and argues that:
The ignorance of the people as to \\hat constitutes true Islam will remain an obstacle in
your path, and you will find among the religious body and the official scholars those
who will regard your understanding oflslam as outlandish, denouncing your campaign.
Chiefs, leaders, and men of rank and authority will hate you. Every government without
exception will rise against you, each one trying to limit your activities and hinder your
path ... The oppressors will use all the mechanisms to oppose you and extinguish the
light of your mission. To that end they will invoke the aid of weak governments, dirty
tactics and the help of those who seek their affection, while displaying animosity
towards you. They will arouse suspicion and unjust accusations about your mission,
trying to endow it with every possible defect and displaying it before the people in the
most repugnant possible guise. They will rely on their strength, authority, wealth and
influence.

Unlike Al-Banna, for Qutb, there is noway of compromising with the j ahili society
and the onlywaytoestablish Shari'a is to directly confront the jahili regimes. In
Milestones (Chapter 5), Qutb argues that " ... the jahili society chooses to fight and not to
make peace, attacking the vanguard oflslam at its very inception, whether it be a few
individuals or whether it be groups, and even after this vanguard has become a well-
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established community." Qutb also believes that the jahili society and the Muslim society
cannot coexist (Chapter 5):
It is clear, then, that a Muslim community cannot be formed or continue to exist until it
attains sufficient power to confront the existingjahjjj society. This power must be at all
levels; that is to say, the power of belief and concept, the power of training and moral
character, the power to organize and sustain a community, and such physical power as is
necessary, if not to dominate, at least to hold itself against the onslaught of the jahili
society.

In Qutb's account, there is a direct relationship between secularist regimes and
oppression. Qutb argues that:
.. .Jahiliyyah is based on rebellion against God's sovereignty on earth. It transfers to
man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely sovereignty, and makes some men
lords over others. It is now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient
Jahiliyyah, but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate
rules of collective behavior, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without
regard to what God has prescribed. The result of this rebellion against the authority of
God is the oppression of His creatures (Qutb, Milestones; Introduction).

Al-Banna and Qutb disagree on how to introduce the Shari 'a. Al-Banna is in favor
of gradual political, social and economic reform to bring about the Shari'a. However,
Qutb is for direct confrontation and action since he believes that there would be no
compromises between the jahili society and the Muslim society.
The fourth theme category is the economic challenges. Islamists argue that mainly
due to their selfishness, corruption, unresponsiveness, and their ignorance of Islamic
principles pertaining socioeconomic justice and equality, the secularist elites kept ignoring
the economic development oftheir country. Al-Banna and Qutb are aware ofEurope's
scientific and economic ascendancy. Qutb admits that Muslim countries are backward; he
also appreciates European253 culture and civilization. Qutb (Milestones, Introduction)
states that " ... Europe's genius created its marvelous works in science, culture, law and
material production, due to which mankind has progressed to great heights of creativity and
material comfort. ... the 'world of Islam' is completely devoid of all this beauty." Here, by
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the term beauty, Qutb refers to the advanced level achieved by Europeans in the realms of
sciences, law, and economic development. However, for Qutb Muslims' backwardness
could be eliminated by adhering to the principles of the Shari' a; Qutb (Milestones, Chapter
7) believes that:
A society which places the highest value on the 'humanity' of man and honors the noble
'human' characteristics is truly civilized. If materialism, no matter in \\hat form, is given
the highest value, whether it be in the form of a 'theory', such as in the Marxist
interpretation of history, or in the form of material production, as is the case with the
United States and European countries, and all other human values are sacrificed at its
altar, then such a society is a backward one, or, in Islamic terminology, is a Jahili
society'.

In Between Yesterday and Today (in the chapter titled Our Mission is One of
Reawakening and Deliverance), Al-Banna relates backwardness ofEgypt (and other
Muslim countries) to European colonialism254 :
Recall too that there are more than 320 foreign companies in Egypt, monopolizing all
the public utilities and important facilities in every sector of the country; the wheels of
commerce, industry, and all economic institutions are in the hands of profiteering
foreigners; our wealth in land is being transferred with lightning speed from our hands to
those of others ... Egypt is still backward, with no more than one fifth of the population
possessing any form of education, and of these more than one hundred thousand have
never gone further than the primary school level. Recall that crime has doubled in Egypt,
and that it is increasing at an alarming rate to the point that there are more people
coming out of prisons than schools; that up to the present time Egypt has been unable to
properly outfit a single army division; These symptoms and phenomena may be observed
in any Islamic country. Amid your aims are to work in reforming education; to fight
poverty, ignorance, disease, and crime; and to create an exemplary society deserving to
be associated with the Islamic Shari'a.

BothAl-Banna and Qutb believe that under the SharFa with determination and hard
work of Muslims, and with the principles of justice (social and economic), Muslim
countries would be able to solve the problem of backwardness.
The fifth theme category is Western imperialism. Al-Banna, Qutb and other
Islamists perceive the European (Western) countries as imperialist powers whose aim is to

253

BothAl-Banna and Qutb use the concepts of Europe and West interchangeably.
Here, it is important to note that Al-Banna was writing in the 1930s, thus Egypt was still under British
rule. Unlike Qutb's writings, in Al-Banna's writings, in addition to his elaboration of his thoughts about

254
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exploit and control the Muslim world. The vehicles of Western imperialism are specified
as Western military presence in Muslim coWitries, economic dependency on the West, and
the cooperation of the ruling elites with the West. In Our Message, Al-Banna criticizes the
leaders of Muslims leaders at his time:
They [Muslim Societies] have been assailed also through disorder in their policy of
education and training, which stands in the way of effectively guiding their present
generation, the men of the future and those who will be responsible for bringing about
their resurgence. They have been assailed on the spiritual side by a death dealing despair,
a murderous apathy, a shameful cowardice, an ignoble humility, an all pervading
impotence, a niggardliness and an egocentricity which prevent people from making any
effort, preclude self-sacrifice, and thrust the nation from the ranks of earnest strivers
into those of triflers and gamesters (Al-Banna, Our Message, the chapter titled To the
Cure).

Al-Banna is also critical of the East (The East is an wnbrella term in Al-Banna's
writings indicating all non-Western countries including Muslim countries). Al-Banna
argues that the West:
... has injured their [the East] dignity, their honor, and their independence; as well as
exploited their wealth and shed their blood; and wherever they are suffering under the
Western yoke which has been forced upon them, they are trying to free themselves with
whatever strength, resistance, opposition, and endurance they can muster (Al-Banna, Our
Message, the chapter titled Patriotism).

The authors generally asswne that it is in the interests of the West to keep Muslim
coWitries backward and weak so that the Western powers could exploit the resources of
Muslim coWitries with ease. For Qutb, all Western systems are essentially bad, because
they are not based upon divine rules and principles. Qutb (Milestones, Introduction) argues
that:
... the humiliation of the common man under the communist systems and the
exploitation of individuals and nations due to greed for wealth and imperialism under the
capitalist systems are but a corollary of rebellion against God's authority and the denial
of the dignity of man given to him by God.

various aspects of the 1slamist movement, there are wry powerful nationalist, liberationist and anticolonialist undercurrents.
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For Al- Banna and Qutbthe best way to eliminate Western imperialism is to reject
it and strive to establish the Islamic law. In Between Yesterday and Today (under chapter
titled Our Mission is One of Reawakening and Deliverance), Al-Banna argues that
members of the Brotherhood have two fundamental goals:
1) Freeing the Islamic homeland from all foreign authority, for this is a natural right
belonging to every human being which only the unjust oppressor will deny.
2) The establishment of an Islamic state within this homeland.

Qutb argues that the Shari'a is the best among the alternatives because it comes
from God. For Qutb, the laws of God's creatures (people) can hardly be compared to the
laws given by God himself But for Qutb (Milestones, Chapter 2), this point is not the basis
of the Islamic call. Qutb argues that "the basis of the message is that one should accept the

Shari'a without any question andrejectall other laws in any shape or form. This is
Islam... One who is attracted to this basic Islam has already resolved this problem; he will
not require any persuasion through showing its beauty and superiority. This is one of the
realities ofthe faith."
The last theme category is the Muslim's lack of self esteem. In their statements,
Islamists frequently claim superiority oflslam as a social, political and economic system
against Capitalism and Communist/Socialist systems which for Muslims are Western in
origin (Please refer to Al-Banna's and Qutb's criticism of the West presented earlier under
this section). Islamists, in general, frequently portray Capitalism as an excessively
materialistic, competitive, exploitative and therefore inherently immoral system. Socialism
is viewed as another type of exploitative unjust political system where peoples' rights are
severely limited. Both Al-Banna and Qutb agree that since the decline oflslamic empires
of the Middle Ages, Muslims had lost their self esteem and their hopes. In Between
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Yesterday and Today, Al-Banna urges Muslims to give up desperation and work hard for
their ultimate goal:
Love one another, and make sure you guard your unity, for this is the secret of your
strength and the buttress of your success. Stand fast until Allah judges justly between
you and your people, for He is the best of Judges. Listen, and obey your leaders both in
duress and comfort, in good times and bad, for this is the token of your conviction and
the bond of solidarity between you (from the chapter titled Duties) ... But these shackles
shall not endure forever: time is change, and in the twinkling of an eye Allah changes
things from one state to another. The directionlessness shall not remain so forever;
guidance comes after bewilderment, and stability after anarchy, for Allah's is the
command before and after! Therefore we never despair the wrses of Allah (SW1) 255 ,
256
the Traditions of His Apostle (PBUH) , His Sunnah (SW1) as regards the teaching of
nations and the exaltation of peoples, and all He has related to us of these matters in His
Book all of these proclaim an immense hope for us, and guide us toward the path of a
genuine resurgence, for the Muslims know this if they have studied (from the chapter
titled To the Cure).

Qutb also urges Muslims to be steadfast and optimistic. On the issue of self
confidence, Qutb cites the following verse from the Qur'an (3: 139) and advices Muslims
to remain positive: "Do not be dejected nor grieve. You shall be the uppermost if you are
Believers."
The Content Analysis and the Interview Data
As stated earlier, the first and the second themes (moral corruption and Western
influences) appeared together in the writings of Al-Banna and Qutb. My interview data
also suggests that Egyptian Islamists also relate moral corruption and Western influences.
According to my interview data, 78% 257 the interviewees believed that non-Islamic
publications or media are the major causes of immorality in Egypt. The interviewees
seemed to complain about the satellite channels 258 , foreign movies, and particularly the
internet. Respondents frequently criticized the secular media (Egyptian and non-Egyptian)

255

SWT (Subhanehu wa Ta'ala) is an expression of respect meaning "praise and glory be upon him
(Allah)"
256
PBUH, Peace be upon him.
257
The percentages are rounded to integer numbers.
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by contending that especially the visual media was encouraging the public to commit
immoral acts like drinking, gambling, or having pre-marital sex. 46% of the interviewees
believed that families were not providing enough moral education to their children in
accordance to Islamic principles. Regarding the second theme, the Western influence, 82%
ofthe interviewees believed that blindly imitating the Western style of life was causing
immorality. In parallel to Al-Banna's and Qutb' sway of argumentation, the respondents
mostly agreed that Muslims should be aware of their Muslimidentity(Muslimness), and
instead of blindly imitating the West, they should promote their own values to preventthe
corrupting influence of the Western culture and media.
The third theme is Western imperialism. As laid out earlier in Chapter 3, the
vehicles of Western imperialism are specified as Western military presence in Muslim
countries, Muslims' economic dependency on the West, and the secularist Muslim elites'
cooperation with the West. This theme is different from the Western cultural influences and
the Muslims' imitation of the West because it relates to the Western influence in Muslim
countries other than the cultural influences 259 • The interviewees associated Western
imperialism with concepts like colonialism, foreign rule, military intervention and
economic dependency. 88% of the interviewees believed that the secularist rulers of
Muslim countries could remain in power only because of Western support. Indeed, many
interviewees stated that "the secularist rulers were the puppets of the West." 78 %of the
interviewees perceived the West as a military threat and argued that the Western countries
could pose a security threat for Muslim countries to maintain their interests in the Middle

258

Many miced their concerns about Western satellite channels, there were also some Jslamists
complaining about "immoral programs" on the Lebanese satellite channels. In Egypt, satellite dishes are
very popular.
259
Please see the discussion in Chapter 3 under the section titled The Content Analysis and the Interview
Data.
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East (Almost all of the interviewees brought up the ongoing US invasion oflraq since

2003).
The fourth theme is domestic suppression oflslam. The interviewees carefully
distinguished between two types of suppression. One is suppression oflslam as a religion
The other is about suppression of the political expressions oflslam (i.e., Islamism). Before

my interviews in Egypt, I was expecting to see a higher percentage of Egyptian Islamists
believingthatthe Egyptiangovernmentwas suppressinglslamas a religion. However, my
expectation turned out to be inaccurate. Indeed, only 26% of the interviewees believed that
Islam was under suppression in Egypt. I believe this could be explained by the Egyptian
regime's attempts to portray itself as an Islamic alternative to the Islamist opposition by
making conservative legislation and appealing to the conservative segments of the Egyptian
population. 260 However, regarding the suppression of the political expression oflslam, 96
%of the interviewees believed that the Egyptiangovernmentwas using every available
means to suppress Islamism. All ofthe interviewees found those governmental efforts as
antidemocratic and unjust.
The last two themes are economic challenges and Muslim's lack of self esteem. My
interview questions did not directly handle those topics. However, in our dialogues, and in
my interviewees' responses to the open ended questions, a sizable group of interviewees
voiced their concerns and complaints about these issues. In general, the interviewees
believed that the economic challenges were a result of governmental corruption, and
mismanagement of the economy and the waste of resources ofEgypt by the politicians. The
interviewees were severely critical of the politicians, and they argued that the politicians

260

Please refer to the earlier discussion of under the section Govermnent Control over Religion. Unlike
the Turkish state, the Egyptian state implements the Shari'a in matters of family law regarding issues like
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were only mindful of maintaining their status and wealth, they were not responsive of
people's demands. The interviewees put Islam forward as a solution to those problems
while emphasizing the importance oflslamic concepts of socioeconomic justice and
solidarity of the ummah as a solution to economic challenges. The interviewees also
complained about defeatism and believed that Muslims should have self esteem to succeed
in their struggle. Jamil, one older gentleman who has been a member of the Brotherhood
since his early adulthood, stated that "every birth is painful, thus the birth of the Islamic
society will also be painful." Jamil and other Brotherhood members believed that Islam
would be triumphant; 261 however, Muslims have to struggle for it. Like J amil, many other
Brotherhood members did not perceive the coming of the Islamic rule as a utopia, because
they believed that Muslims in "the golden days of Prophet Muhammed and the Rightly
Guided Four Caliphs" had actually had an Islamic rule which had to be a blueprint for the
current Muslims for creating such an order for a second time.
Culture and Framing: Creation of and Battle over Meaning
Since the 1980s, social movement theorists (Moris and Mueller 1992; Larana et al.
1994; Johnston and Klandermans 1995) have been interested in the role of ideational
factors including creation of meaning, and culture. Besides the structural and strategic
dimensions of social movements outlined in RMT and the political process model, social
movement literature has increasingly addressed how movement participants perceive
themselves as a collectivity, how potential participants are recruited, and the ways in
which meaning is produced and di sserninated through the activists.

marriage, divorce, and inheritence. Also, unlike the Turkish constitution, the Egyptian constitution
recognizes the Shari 'a as the primary source of legislation, and Islam as the official state religion.
261
Several Brotherhood members cited one of the verses in the Qur'an (21: 105) which says: "My servants
the righteous, shall inherit the earth"
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In simple terms, frames are designed to mobilize participants and support. Frames
represent interpretive schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense
of the experiences and events in the social and political environment in which the social
movements operate. Social "movements must articulate and disseminate frameworks of
understanding that resonate with potential participants and broader publics to elicit
collective action." Although ideas or ideologies may underlie contentious action, they are
socially processed through interpretive lenses that create intersubjective meaning and
facilitate movement goals. In short, the term framing is used to describe this process of
meaning construction (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988 and 1992; Benford and
Snow 2000; Williams and Benford 2000).
Snow and Benford (1988) distinguish three major steps of framing for social
movements. First, movements create frames which identify a situation as a problem that
needs to be remedied. This process includes attributions of responsibility and targets of
blame. Second, movements offer solutions to the problem. And third, movements provide a
rationale for collective action262 • The would-be movement participants may share common
understandings about reason and solutions to a particular problem, however certain frames
need to be created by movement organizers to convince potential participants to engage in
activism. In order to mobilize potential participants, one of the most critical dimensions of
the framing process is frame resonance. Benford and Snow (2000; 619-622) also argue that
the ability of a movement to transform a mobilization potential into actual mobilization
depends upon the capacity of a frame to resonate with potential participants. The success
of frame resonance depends upon not just its compatibility with cultural (or religious)

262

Diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames. These frames are discussed earlier in Chapters 1 and

3.
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norms, but also the reputation of the group creating the frame, the personal significance of
the frame for potential participants, the strength, consistency and credibility of the frame.
Framing Within Islam
Like many other social movements, Islamists are also heavily involved in the
production of meaning and framing processes. The core imperative oflslamist movements
is to create a society governed by the Shari'a, and the control and reconstruction of state
institutions may be an effective instrument for accomplishing this transformation. However,
it is only one of many routes for change. In this regard, the state is a means for the
production of meaning, not en end. I slamists wage struggles through society and cultural
discourse rather than state institutions or government decision-making bodi es. Through
such efforts, the Islamists aim to challenge dominant cultural codes and create a shared
meaning a bout the proper functions of society, groups, and the individual. However the
framing is not just related to culture and politics, in fact it is a multifaceted process that
also involves how Muslims perceive themselves, their problems, and others. Another
significant issue regarding the frames is that Islamist frames are in a position to compete
with alternative frames, especially the official Islamic or secularist/nationalist frames, to
win the hearts and minds of ordinary people.
Islamist framing involves what Eickelman and Piscatori (2004) refer to as the
"invention of tradition". Islamists regard the period of Prophet Muhammad and the first
four caliphs after him as the golden age oflslam. Islamists believe that the weak state of
current Muslims was caused by the separation of din (religion) and dawla (state)secularism- and the aforementioned Western plot (as perceived by the Islamists) to weaken
Muslim societies. Thus, in this way of thinking, the onlywayto correct Muslim societies'
current ills is to close the gap between religion and state and reject Western imperialism in
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Muslim colllltries. In this regard, Islamist frames legitimize the idea of regarding Islam as a
complete social, economic, political and religious system encompassing all spheres of life.
The frames also present political activism as a religious duty through the concept of da 'wa.
Clashing Frames and Frame Resonance
The realm of creating frames is not far from contention. Indeed, Islamist frames and
official frames are often in constant conflict. Bayat (1998) points out that the alternative
social and cultural sub-systems created by social movements usually coexist, though with
tension, within the dominant order. 263 Islamist frames often compete with official frames as
most regimes in the Muslim world utilize Islam as a form of political legitimization. Unlike
Islamism, official Islam, as represented through the institution and cadres of Al-Azhar,
presents Islam as a private faith designed to guide moral values of the individual believer
and as a spiritual faith that focuses on good deeds rather than politics (Palmer 2007, 94).
Through Al-Azhar, the Egyptian regime routinely invokes Islamic imagery and ide as to
legitimize their rule and to defend themselves against Muslim critics. This process
"involves the competition and contests over both the interpretation of symbols and control
of the institutions, formal and informal, that produce and sustain them" (Eickelman and
Piscatori 2004, 5). The official frames do not call for general social and political
transformations, but rather emphasize individual piety and concern for salvation. This is a

politically dormant version oflslam (Tamir 2000;Wiktorowicz 2004).
In this "war of frames" Islamist intellectuals play a leading role in (re)creating and
(re )interpreting frames. According to Gramsci ( 1971) intellectuals play an essential role in

263

Bayat maintains that unlike insurrectionist movements, social movements try to accomplish
Gramscian 'passive revolution" or a '\var of position" \\hich aims not just capturing state power, but
focuses on the gradual capture of the society "by exerting moral and intellectual leadership over civil
institutions and processes." (Bayat 1998, 141).
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the society because they are the vehicles of domination by the ruling class. Gramsci ( 1971)
argues that the organic intellectuals develop organically with the dominant social group,
the ruling class; and the organic intellectuals are their "thinking and organizing element."
Gramsci believes that the organic intellectuals were produced by the educational system to
perform a function for the dominant social group in society. Through the organic
intellectuals, the ruling class maintains its hegemony. Gramsci urges the working class
movement to produce its own organic intellectuals to transform the consciousness of the
working class. 264 The significance of Gramsci' s conceptualization of organic intellectuals
lies in his belief in the organic intellectuals as unifiers of belief and action; they also play a
crucial role in conducting the war of position. In a similar vein, Islamists also recognize
the significance of intellectuals. For instance, Qutb emphasizes the significance of
movement leaders (Qutb calls them the vanguard) in establishing the Muslim society by
rejecting the jahili societies. 265 In Mlestones (Chapter 3), Qutb points out to the role of the
vanguard in bringingaboutthe Shari'a and urges the Muslims to follow the vanguard.

266

Another aspect that determines the success of frames in convincing the movement
members to participate is trame resonance. In other words, for the prospective movement

264

Gramsci believed that that the organic intellectuals must have an active role in the society: "... the
mode of being ofthe new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence ... but in active participation in
practical life, as constructor, organizer, ''permanent persuader" and not just a simple orator ... " (Gramsci
1971, 10).
265
Indeed, in the introduction of Milestones, Qutb states "I have written 'Milestones" for this vanguard,
which I consider to be a waiting reality about to be materialized."
266
In Milestones (Chapter 3) Qutb emphasizes the role of the vanguard as follows: "It is therefore
necessary that Islam's theoretical foundation-belief-materialize in the form of an organized and active
group from the very beginning ... The center of this new group should be a new leadership, the leadership
which first came in the person of the Prophet-peace be on him- himself, and after him was delegated to
those who strove for bringing people back to God's sovereignty, His authority and His laws. A person who
bears witness that there is no deity except God and that Muhammad is God's Messenger should cut off his
relationship ofloyalty from the jahili society, which he has forsaken, and fromjahili leadership, whether
it be in the guise of priests, magicians or astrologers, or in the form of political, social or economic
leadership, as was the case of the Quraish [Prophet Muhammed's tribe] in the time of the Prophet-peace
be on him. He will have to give his complete loyalty to the new Islamic movement and to the Muslim
leadership."
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participants to become mobilized, there must be some "degree of resonance" between the
interpretive frames of the leaders of the social movement and individuals (Snow et al.
1986, 4 77). 267 Islamist frames resonate well among the Islamist constituency because
creators ofthe Islamist frames consider the point that "the frame must rely on the existing
traditions and values of the constituency" which, in the literature of framing, is known as

fiame fidelity. Islamist frames also have an evidential basis and they are directly related
with the current problems of Muslims (frame fidelity and experiential commensurability)
since the frame creators (Islamist movement leaders and intellectuals) successfully
diagnose the pr obi ems of Muslims through diagnostic fiames; and later they put forward
solutions created through prognostic fiames in the light oflslamic principles. Finally, the
frame creators motivate the believers towards making positive changes through

motivational fiamesby claimingthatworkingfor the establishment of the Shari'a is
thawab (a good deed) which will, for the Islamists, eventually create a society based on
the principles oflslam and people who work for its establishment will be rewarded by
God.
Conclusion
Upon the Islamists' electoral successes, and political and social activism through
the Egyptian civil society, the Mubarak regime switched from an accommodationist
approach to a confrontational one. Government control over religion and the Islamists'
perception of external threats do not automatically and immediately cause the Islamists to
be political. Indeed, politicization of the Islamists is directly linked to many factors like

267

Snow and Benford (1988; 2000) maintain that there are three major conditions for frame resonance:
(1) ideational centrality/narrative fidelity: the frame must rely on the existing traditions and wlues of the
constituency; (2) empirical credibility: the frame must have an evidential basis; and (3) experiential
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how the Islarnists frame government control over religion and external threats to Muslim
identity, how the Islarnists perceive themselves and the government,andinreturnhow the
government perceives the Islarnists.
The Islarnists perceive themselves as a comprehensive movement with the ability to
transform both the social and political. In return, the government perceives the Islarnists as
a threat on two separate but related realms: the political and ideological. The government's
position regarding the Islarnists may range from accommodation to confrontation (There is
a wide range of different governmental attitudes towards the Islarnists. Inclusion, like the
Jordaniangovernment's inclusion ofthe Jordanian Brotherhood could be one. Or, complete
exclusion could be another option like the Syriangove rnment's total exclusion of the
Syrian Brotherhood). Islarnists frame their struggle from an Islamic perspective (politics as

jihad and da 'wa) as well as from a democratic perspective to appeal to two distinct
audiences: the Muslim audience, and the secular (both domestic and international)
audience. Although the Brotherhood has no problems with the electoral politics (we may
call this aspect of democracy as the procedural aspect), they have many reservations in
regards to liberal democratic freedoms as they believe that fulfilling some of those
freedoms would be detrimental to the Muslims' social identity (Muslimness). The next
chapter will compare and contrast both movements in regards to the points indicated
above.

commensurability: the social problems that the frame addresses must be relevant to the constituents'
problems.
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CHAPTER VI

A COMPARISON OF THE TURKISH AND EGYPTIAN ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS
This chapter will compare the Turkish and Egyptian Islamist movements based on
five major criteria: i) the Islamists' self-perception, ii) governments' perception of the
Islamists, iii) governments' position regarding the Islamists, iv) the Islamists' perception
of external threats, and v) the relationship between lslamism, democracy-democratization,
and the way that Islamists frame their message. Under the five points mentioned above, the
similarities and differences between each movement in Turkey and Egypt are going to be
provided. The following conclusionary chapter (7) will briefly discuss the prospects of
Islamism and possible direction(s) that Islamism may take in both countries.
The Islamists' Self-Perception
In order to fully understand how the Islamists operate in the political realm in both
countries, one has to look at how i) the Islamists perceive themselves as a movement, and
ii) how both secularist governments perceive the Islamists. The way that both the Islamists

and the state perceive each other has larger repercussions in the political system since their
mutual perceptions determine how they (re)position themselves in regards to each other in
the political realm. Indeed there is a wide array of options for both sides that range from
confrontation to cooperation. In addition to perceiving politics as such, the secularist
governments perceive Islamists as a serious threat on ideological and political grounds
(these points will be discussed in the following sections respectively). Perceiving politics
as a zero-sum game, and mutual distrust stimulated by the ideological and political
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conflicts make it further difficult for them to find the middle ground which then can
potentially escalate into severe political crises.
Another important point to reiterate here is that perceiving politics as a zero-sum
game fits perfectly well into the Gramscian notion of perceiving political activism in terms
of a counter-hegemonic war ofposition that has to be waged by the revolutionary forces
for a final victory to destroy the hegemony of the state based on culture and ideology. In
this type of war, political struggles are often times waged through politically-emotionally
charged symbols what Eickelman and Piscatori call "Muslim politics" (Eickelman and
Piscatori 2004). Both the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists perceive politics as a kind of
war; and accordingly, any strategy that the Islamists employ can be understood in terms of
gaining strategic posts (or strongholds) to conductthe "war of position." The secularistbureaucratic elite and Islamists in both countries are alike in regards to their perception of
politics, which can be summarized as "politics is war." 268 This is a highly contentious and
polarized conception of political activism and just like other contentious political
movements do, Islamists in both countries wage their political war over identity, religion,
and culture, in addition to the conventional political venues.
The following sub-sections will focus on how the Islamists perceive themselves as
a collectivity in regards to the comprehensiveness of the Islamist movements, the Islamists'
perception of politics as jihad269 and war ofposition in the Gramscian sense.

268

Earlier in Chapter 3, parallels between Gramscian war of position and Machiavellian realism were
discussed in a footnote. Please see the footnote.
269
Cihat in Turkish. Please refer to the discussion en Chapter 1 on how the concept was interpreted by
the Islamists. Pay attention to Husain's threefold categorization ofjihad.
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Comprehensiveness
The Turkish and Egyptian Islamists perceive their movement as a comprehensive
movement, and this was related to the Islamists' perception oflslam as a comprehensive
religion (see Chapters 3 and 5). For example, in Our Message, Al-Banna (in the chapter
titled Our Islam) makes the following statement about the comprehensiveness oflslam: "On
the contrary we understand Islam broadly and comprehensively, regulating the affairs of
men, in this world and the next." Ina similar vein, Al-Banna also perceivedjihad270
comprehensively. Indeed, for Al-Banna any type of struggle (political, social, economic,
scientific ... etc.) for the purpose of establishing the Shari 'a 271 is included in the concept of

jihad (In the following sections, this will be discussed under the concept of da 'wa 272 ). In
The Message of the Teachings (in the chapter titled Jihad), Al-Banna explains what he
understands from the concept:
By jihad, I mean that divinely ordained obligation which is reflected in the following
saying of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) and which Muslims are to carry out until the
Day of Judgment: "Whoever dies without struggling in the Way ofAllah, or wishing
to do so, dies a Pre Islamic Jahiliyyah death." Its weakest degree is the heart's
abhorrence of evil, and its highest degree is fighting in the Way of Allah. Between these
two degrees are numerous forms of jihad, including struggling with the tongue, pen, or
hand, and speaking a word of truth to a tyrannical ruler. This call (to Islam) cannot
survive without Jihad.

My interviewees also had a similar way of understanding their struggle. Indeed,
they believed that politics should not be a realm that was completely detached from other
realms oflife. For them, Islam was not simply a relationship between a man and his
creator; in addition to that relationship, it was indeed a complete way of life that regulated
every aspect of human life. 273 For the Islamists, politics was just one aspect oflife as it
270

In Arabic, Jihad literally means struggle; contrary to popular assumptions it does not mean "holy war"
(harb muqaddes) which is not used in the Qur'an.
271
Serial in Turkish.
272
Dava or davet in Turkish.
273

Please refer to the interviews in Chapters 3 and 5 with the Islamists (for example, my interviews with
Dr. Tariq and Dr. Neguib).
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related to individuals as a collectivity; and as my interviewees understood, politics was
just part of their general struggle to make Islam dominate every aspect of Muslims' lives.
The interviewees in both countries expressed the major motivation that attracts them to
politics and Islamist activism through the civil society was to have "an opportunity to make
Islam the essence of people's lives in their countries, to weave faith into life, and revive
Islam and the Islamic consciousness of their fellow citizens."
The Islamists whom I interviewed believed that the secularists could not
adequately understand the nature of the Islamist movement, and they believed that the
secularists simply reduced Islamism into an ordinary political movement. In fact, the
Islamists ascribed many characteristics to their movement which, for them, appeared to be
above and beyond politics. They believed that their mission was to transform their
societies in accordance to the Islamic principles. Among other things, the Islamists whom I
interviewed assumed a missionary-like role for themselves which would give them a
chance to completely transform other individuals, and the social, political and economic
institutions that exist in their societies. They believed that given the current non-Islamic and
lax condition of their societies, a complete transformation was necessary. The Islamists
believed that the transformation of the individual was essential to establish an Islamic
order; however, it was not enough by itself to bring about that order. Thus, they agreed
upon where this transformation should start (the individual), but they haddi fferent opinions
about the extent of that transformation. They also believed that every good Muslim should
have Islamic consciousness and zeal like a missionary and that sort of sense of
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responsibility in regards to himself/herself, and then towards his/her family, friends and
relatives. 274
What Dr. Tariq, a prominent member of the Brotherhood, thought about their
movement exemplifies the points that I introduced above. He argued that reducing their
struggle into a merely political movement would be to caricaturize the Islamist movement.
He believed that Islamism was just more than politics; it was about creating a community
of people who strongly adhere to the principles oflslam and apply its principles firmly in
every aspect of their lives including politics. One important point that was revealed during
my interviews was that the Islamists were not very pleased to be labeled as Islamists.
Muharrem, a Turkish Islamist whom I interviewed, voiced his disappointment as to how
the secularists portrayed them. He argued that the secularists often portrayed them as
people who would deal with nothing but politics. He promptly stated that Islam was a
religion, not an ideology. Thus, he was upset about the term Islamist (jslamcl in Turkish)
as, he believed, it was labeling them with something which did not properly describe what
they actually were. In short, he thought it was like comparing apples and oranges. I
inquired how he would prefer to be labeled. He said "if it is really necessary to find a
label for us, then I would prefer to be labeled as a concerned Muslim who tries to do
somethingaboutthe condition of the [Turkish] society."
Another important outcome of the comprehensiveness of the Islamists was their
ability to interact with people at multiple levels since the comprehensiveness of the

274

In our interview, one Islamist pointed out that the first wrse that was revealed to Prophet Muhammed
was an order which was the order to read (iqral). The very second revelation was another order to Prophet

Muhammed to warn his tribe and to disseminate the message. Thus, he argued, it is the responsibility of
every Muslim to become knowledgeable about his de en (religion) and then start disseminating the
message to others starting from the individuals \\ho are family members, friends and relatives. Despite
the fact that as a religion, Islam regulates every aspect of human life, (in Sunni Islam) there is no
organized church and missionary organizations (for instance like that of the Catholic Church). Thus, the
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lslamists allowed them room for being flexible and deal with a variety of different issues
at once. This eventually allowed the Islamists to interact with people at multiple levels on
a variety of different issues. Amr Al-Chobaki (2007, 1) of Al-Ahram Centre for Political
and Strategic Studies (Cairo, Egypt), points out the comprehensiveness and flexibility of
the Brotherhood, and argues that:
The Muslim Brotherhood had a flexible political and intellectual reference that gave it a
comprehensive conception oflslam. This conception allowed members of the Muslim
Brotherhood to be politicians if they wanted, callers for good behavior if they wished,

preachers on the pulpits, parliamentary members, Sufis, or revolutionists.

Similar to the Egyptian Islamists, in the 1990s Islamist politicians ofTurkey were
politicians, parliamentarians, mayors, preachers, members oflslamist foundations and

think tanks, charity workers, and activists. $evki Yllmaz of the RP would be a good
example of such an Islarnist politician. Most Turkish people know Ytlmaz not just as a
former mayor, and a politician, but a passionate preacher as well. Yllmaz's audio and
video cassettes, which were highly critical of the secularist regime and Kemal Atati.irk,
were highly popular among the followers of the RP in the 1980s and 1990s. The Islamists
whom I interviewed in both countries worked as party and associational activists,
volunteers, recruiters, protestors, charity workers, religious mentors and lecturers
(delivering religious lectures at homes on a regular basis, dars-ders in Turkish).
Another determinant of how the Islamists position themselves in regards to the
secularist regimes is related to both regimes' official position towards the Islamists. In
other words, the regimes' attitudes towards the Islamists have a direct impact on how the
Islamists perceive themselves as a group. In Turkey, despite several closure cases by the
Turkish Constitutional Court (the highest court in Turkey) against the Islamists, the Turkish
regime does not completely exclude the Islamists from the political process (This issue

Islamists believed that every Muslim should have a high Islamic consciousness and act like a missionary

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

325
will be discussed in length in the following sections: Government's Perception of the

Islamists and Government's Position Regarding the Islamists). My interviewees in both
COlllltries do not completely trust their governments. They also believe that the judiciaries
in their countries are not neutral. 275 All the respondents who responded to the question of
whether they would trust their governments or the judicial system in their countries in
regards to equal treatment oflslamists indicated no as an answer.
The way that the secularist regimes' perception of the Islamists also influence the
way that Islamists articulate their pol icy positions. Since the Turkish Constitution prohibits
establishment of political parties based on religion and ethnic identity, 276 the Islamists
create their party arolllld a secular policy platform. However, this does not necessarily
mean thatthe Islamists' party platform is devoid of religious lllldercurrents. Indeed, the
partyprogramofthe AKP includes the party's approach to the solution of Turkey's
problems, and the religious lllldercurrents can easily be noticed after careful reading. For
instance, the introduction of the AKP's party program purports "lllleven distribution of
wealth" as a social problem that needs to be addressed. The program also addresses social
solidarity as "an asset and an expression of the Turkish people's national and religious
character." 277 The party program278 also outlines the AKP' s views on religion: "Our party
considers religion as one of the most important institutions of humanity, and secularism as a

to disseminate the religion.
275
My interviewees reported some instances of injustice committed by their governments in regards to
official-bureaucratic procedures and by the judiciaries. The cases ranged from some well known cases
like the case ofMerve Kavak91 and Isaam AI-Aryan to some narratives that were reported by friends and
relatives of the Islamist activists.
276
The Turkish Constitution, witten after the military coup of 1980, intends to eliminate the two biggest
perceived threats by the secularist establishment by that article. Those two threats are ethnic separatism
(fueled by Kurdish nationalism) and Islamism.
277
The party program of the AKP can be found at (in English):
http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html and (in Turkish):
http://WMV.akparti.org.tr/program.asp?dizin=O&hangisi=O The citations above are taken from the
Introduction of the Party Program.
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pre-requisite of democracy, and an assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience. It
also rejects the interpretation and distortion of secularism as enmity against religion." The
subsection of Section 2 of the party program states that the AKP "considers the attitudes
and practices which disturb pious people, and which discriminate them due to their
religious lives and preferences, as anti-democratic and in contradiction to human rights and
freedoms." As evident in the statements above, the AKP and its supporters believe that
secularism is used against religion. My interviewees also voiced their disappointment
regarding discrimination and unfair treatment of the pious people.
Regarding the social policies, the party program279 assumes that "the government is
a vehicle for serving the public" and states that the AKP " ... shall conduct social policies
to assure the welfare and happiness of all our citizens, rather thanjust one class ... " The
concepts of"serving the public" and "welfare of the whole society" strongly indicate
Islamic undercurrents in the AKP's party program with a strong concern on socioeconomic
equality and general welfare of the society. One should not assume that the AKP has a
"state oriented" economic policy. Indeed, the party program emphasizes free market
economy and benefits ofprivatization280 ofthe state economic enterprises (SEE) run by the

278

In the subsection "Fundamental Rights and Freedoms" under Section 2-Fundamental Rights and
Political Principles, at: http://eng.akparti.org.tr/englishlpartyprogramme.html#2
279
The first subsection (Our Perception of Social Policy) under Section 5-Social Policies, at:
http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html#5
286
The subsection on Privatization under Section 3-The Economy states (at:
http://eng.akparti.org.tr/ english/partyprogramme.html#3 .3 ):
Privatization is important for the formation of a more rational economic structure. Privatization is a
vehicle to increase productivity in the economy and to take the State out of activities \Wich could disturb
the full competition environment. Our Party:
· Shall make the legal and administrative arrangements to allow a fast privatization to provide the related
social benefits.
· Shall carry out a fast and transparent privatization.
· Privatization transactions shall be subjected to the auditing of the Supreme Council of Public Accounts.
· The shares of the Establishments to be privatized shall initially be offered to employees of the said
establishment, regional population and the concerned professional associations and their shares shall be
traded in the stock exchanges.
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government. The subsection on privatization suggests offering the shares of the SEEs to be

privatized "to employees of the said establishment, regional population and the concerned
professional associations" which is similar to the Islamic concept of kar paylaszmz (profit
sharing).
In Egypt, the 88 Brothers who were elected as independents, challenge Mubarak' s
NDP on a variety of different issues that range from inflation and unemployment to social
and cultural issues. Since the 1980s, those independent deputies have been pressuring the
Egyptian regime to Islamize the legal systeminaddi tion to emphasizing cultural and
identity issues. Among the list of issues, the ones that are frequently voiced are lack of
democracy and human rights, unemployment, the state of the economy (recently,
governmental subsidies on food is a big issue after the global rise of prices ofbasic food
items like wheat, rice, and corn), cases of abuse by the security forces.
Politics as Jihad
The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 by Hasan Al-Banna, a schoolteacher,
had two major purposes: i) for the ultimate goal of establishing the Shari'a, orchestrating
the Egyptian Muslims' efforts under the leadership of the Brotherhood elders to increase
people's Islamic consciousness, and organizing them around social, political and economic
institutions thereby making them a powerful force in Egyptian society and pol itics; i i)
ousting the British from Egypt and challenge all sorts of imperialism including cultural
imperialism, and moral corruption which, according to Al-Banna, was a direct result of
the secularist elites' blindly imitation of European (Western) attitudes, values, and way of

·The required environment of confidence shall be achieved, and our citizens living abroad shall be
encouraged to participate in privatization processes.
· National strategic preferences and priorities shall be taken into consideration in the privatization of the
critical sectors.
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life. Al-Banna was not an Islamic scholar; however, he was coming from a deeply
religious background and in his teenage years Al-Banna received his first religious
education from his father, SheikhAhmedAl-Banna, who was a revered local imam (prayer
leader) and teacher of religion at the local mosque, educated at Al-Azhar (Lia 1998, 22-

24).
Before establishing the Brotherhood, Al-Banna was active in several different
religious groups like the Association to Prevent the Forbidden, and Al-Hasafiyyah
Charitable Association. Being influenced from Al-Afghani, Al-Kawakibi and Rida's ideas,
Al-Banna, inspired by the golden days oflslam (the era of Prophet Muhammed followed by
the first four Rightly Guided Cali phs), strongly believed that Muslims should reject
secularism, turn to Islam and start implementing the Shari'a, oust the British and cleanse
the Egyptian society from European values. Since the early 1930s, the Brotherhood became
a major political force in Egyptian politics.
For the Islamists,jihad is not just fighting in the way of God; there are different
degrees ofjihad. The Islamists whom I interviewed in both countries shared similar views
about the concept. Similar to what Al-Banna understands from the concept, the Turkish and
Egyptian Islamists believed that working for the establishment of an Islamic order would
indeed be jihad as jihad should not be understood only in terms of fighting in a war. 281 A
Turkish Islamist whom I interviewed poi nted out that throughout the history of Muslim
empires there were periods of war and peace. He believed that in times of war, fighting
was the most important type of jihad as it was necessary for defending one's country
against the enemy; and in times of peace, da 'wa (call to God, dissemination of Islam) was

281

On different types ofjihad, please refer to the discussion of Husain's three-fold classification of
jihad provided in Chapter 1.
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the most importantjihad. 282 Thus, as opposed to the conventional understanding of the term,
for the Islamists,jihad meant struggling in the way of/for the sake of God. In this regard,
fighting ina warwasjustonetype of jihad.
My interviewees believed that there were several circles of responsibility that
surround Muslims; and the individual was always at the center. They believed that the
family resided in the second circle; the relatives and friends and then the whole society
came after the family. Indeed, both the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists I interviewed had the
similar views. As discussed in the previous sub-section, Islamists had a missionary-like
outlook, and believed that for a Muslim, there were certain Islamic responsibilities that
had to be fulfilled in regards to themselves as individuals, as family members, friends and
citizens. Thus, a good M us lim should not ignore those responsibilities; otherwise the
whole society would eventually suffer collectively as a result ofMuslims' negligence of
those responsibilities defined in Islamic terms.
The role of politics or the relationship between politics and religion for an Islamist
starts at this point. Because jihad and da 'wa are interconnected, and there are varying
degrees of responsibilities in those "circles of responsibility," the Islamists claim that
there are certain duties of true Muslims that are incumbent upon them for the establishment
of an Islamic order. Indeed, the Islamists in both countries strongly emphasized the concept
of responsibility by making direct references to Islamic sources. For instance, several
Islamists brought up one of the sayings (hadith) of Prophet Muhammed about peoples'
responsibilities as an example:

282

Also, Al-Banna discusses the different types ofjihad. In the Message of Teachings (in the chapter
titled Jihad) Al-Banna lays out his conception ofjihad as follows: "Its weakest degree is the heart's
abhorrence of evil, and its highest degree is fighting in the Way of Allah. Between these two degrees are
numerous forms of jihad, including struggling with the tongue, pen, or hand, and speaking a word of truth
to a tyrannical ruler."
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Each one ofyou is a shepherd. And each ofyou will be asked about your flock. A ruler
also is a shepherd and he will be asked about his flock. And every man is a shepherd to
his family. And every woman is the custodian of her husband's house and his children.
Thus each one of you is a shepherd and each one will be asked about his flock. [Narrated
in Bukhari and Muslim, from Abdullah ibn Umar]

The Islamists also believe that under an Islamic state ruled by the Shari 'a, Muslims
do not need to worry about the "circle of responsibility" as it corresponds to the Muslims'
responsibilities towards their society because those responsibilities would be carried out
by the state and its institutions that abide by the rules of the Shari'a. However, the
Islamists argue that because the Shari 'a was not applied by their secularist states,
Muslims, therefore, have a greater responsibility to establish an Islamic order as this
responsibility is indeed completely antithetical to a secularist state as the secularist states
clearly separate religion and politics. During my interviews with the Turkish and Egyptian
Islamists, they elaborated on these issues by relating two distinct terms borrowed from
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh 283 ) with the necessity of jihad and da 'wa in contemporary
Muslims ocieties for bringing about the Shari 'a through different forms of political
participation and activism. Those two concepts are the concepts oflslamic jurisprudence:

fardh 'ayn (individual obligation) andfardh kifayah (collective obligation). 284
Here, I do not have the intention to enter a theological debate about those Islamic
concepts; however I would like to briefly summarize what I understood from the Islamists'
comments about those concepts and my own readings from some of the Islamic sources.

Briefly,fardh 'ayn285 is a compulsory duty on every single Muslim like the five pillars of
Islam (i.e., profession of faith, praying, fasting, pilgrimage, alms). Fardh kifayah is also an
obligatory duty; however, if performed by some, the obligation falls from the rest. Also, if

283

Fzkzh in Turkish.
Indeed, the word kifayah means sufficiency; however in this context, it is proper to translate it as
collective, please see the discussion above.
285
Farz-t Ayn and Farz-t Kifaye in Turkish.

284

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

331
there are not enough people that respond to fardh kifayah, then all the people become
responsible for not performing it; and if a sufficient number of people respond, the
obligation falls from the rest. For example, if in a neighborhood, one wealthy Muslim,
among the other wealthy Muslims, feeds a poor Muslim, the fardh kifayah would be
fulfilled, and the responsibility falls from the other wealthy Muslims in that neighbor hood.
However, if that poor Muslim starves to death or becomes sick because of malnutrition,
then all of the wealthy Muslims in that neighborhood would be responsible, meaning that
they will be questioned by Godin the hereafter for ignoring their larger responsibility that
falls upon them. In a similar way of reasoning, the Islamists argue that since the secularist
regimes do not have the intention to establish an Islamic order and to implement the Islamic
laws (which would naturally be implemented under the Shari'a), the responsibility of
establishing an Islamic order falls upon every Muslim; and under a secular government,
Muslims become collectively responsible because the Islamic rules are not applied. The
Islamists also believe that any mundane deed (including politics) performed for the
purpose/with the intention 286 of bringing about an Islamic order would be a good deed that
God will reward in this world and in the hereafter because Muslims believe that God
rewards peoples' intentions as well as their deeds. The Islamists believe that the worldly
reward ofbringing an Islamic order would be the benefits of living under the Islamic
order; and the otherworldly reward would be going to heaven (jannah) 287 and gaining
God's satisfaction (ridha). 288

286

My interviewees recited a \\<ell-known saying of Prophet Muhammed about intentions: 'The deeds are
according to the intentions."
287
Cennet in Turkish.
288
The word ridha is translated as contentment or satisfaction. 48: 18 "Allah's Good Pleasure was on the
Believers ... " Rtza in Turkish.
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The Islamists are also against the state's control over religion, and they put forward
two interrelated reasons for their discontent with it. First, the Islamists believe that the
state's control over religion corrupts Islam as the state designs religion as it fits into the
state's priorities (which are not necessarily Islamic), not the other way around. The
Islamists believe that the secularist states have no intention of implementing the Shari'a,
however they use religion (official Islam as a response to political Islam) to maintain their
power and to appear as if they were respectful of religion. They believe that this is
insincere and deceptive; they also argue that a state should uphold Islam, not the other way
around. Second, the lslamists believe that the state control over religion seeks to pacify and
to depoliticize the Islamists who, for the secularists, are the major political and ideological
threats against the secularist regime (This topic will be discussed in the section titled:
Government's Perception of the Islamists). The Islamists believe that there are two ways to
tackle this problem: either to overthrow the secularist regimes or to struggle to transform
them into Islamic regimes through social and political activism. 289 As opposed to the
violent terrorist Islamist groups, the mainstream non-violent Islamists believe that violence
is out of the question since it leads to fitna (turmoil/corruption), and they point out that
Islam instructs Muslims to obey the rulers unless they openly commit a clear haram
(forbidden) and force Muslims to commit the same action. Thus, through political activism
and participation, Muslims have the power to bring about the desired changes as voting is a
powerful tool to carry Islamist candidates and their policies to power.

289

Please refer to the ideological differences among the Brothers in the late 1970s. The ones who
favored the overthrowal of the secularist regimes split from the mainstream Brotherhood and established
terrorist groups. The majority of the Brotherhood elders rejected violence.
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Politics as War ofPosition
According to the Egyptian ConstiMion, s irnilar to the Turkish Constitution,
establishing parties based on religion and class is forbidden. 290 Based on that article, the
secularist establishment in Egypt has been preventing the Brotherhood from establishing a
political party. However, the Islarnists have been running as independents and in the recent
2005 parliamentary elections, 88 Brotherhood members who ran as independents were
able to secure seats from different electoral districts throughout the country. As opposed to
Turkey, the secularists in Egypt have completely excluded the Muslim Brotherhood from
the political process since its establishment. Unlike the Turkish Islarnists, the Brotherhood
has never had official recognition of the Egyptian regime (technically, the Brotherhood is
still an illegal organization), this pushed the organization to expand their bases of
operations and permeate into available spaces that are both politically and socially
acceptable by many. In other words, unlike their Turkish counterparts, the Egyptian
Islarnists were not allowed to participate into politics through the electoral means as an
organized group (i.e., political party), they eventually pushed through the venues that would
be perceived as less politically dangerous for the secularists than challenging the regime
by establishing a political party. Those available venues were the professional
organizations, student unions, mosques, neighbor hood associations, charities, and Islarnist
private organizations. This led the Egyptian Islamists to emphasize the comprehensiveness
of their ideology and organization and compete with the government in the realm of
providing services to the people. In other words, because the venues of electoral politics
were all blocked for the Brotherhood, the Brothers redirected their efforts through other

290

This article of the Egyptian Constitution, similar to \\-hat the Turkish Constitution does, mles out the
Communists and the Islamists which are perceived to be the two biggest threats by the secularist
establishment.
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available venues which would be perceived as politically less dangerous by the
secularists. Thus, since the late 1980s, the Brotherhood members gained significant
victories and became highly active in the Egyptian professional organizations, student
unions, and the Egyptian civil society.
Penetration of the Islamists into the civil society can be best understood in
Gramscian terms. Gramsci (1971) distinguishes two different types of wars: war of

manoeuvre, and war ofposition. The war of manoeuvre is a frontal attack performed for
the purpose of a quick victory. Gramsci believes that this type of strategy is recommended
for societies with a centralized and dominant state power without a strong hegemony within
the civil society (like the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917). As opposed to the war of
manoeuvre, the war of position becomes essential to take control ofthe civil society,
confront the dominant hegemony of the power holders, and to gain control through ideology
and culture since it is the ideal strategy for the dominant state with a strong cultural and
ideological control over the civil society.
The TurkishandEgyptianlslamists' struggle fits well into the notion of war of
position as laid out by Gramsci because in both countries the Islamists wage their war
through identity and cultural politics with a strong emphasis on political activism through
the civil society. Comprehensiveness oflslamist activism, the Islamists' understanding of

jihad and da 'wa comprehensively, and the debates around responsibilities of Muslims
within the context of the concepts offardh 'ayn andfardh kifayah all fit perfectly into the
Gramsciannotion of counter-hegemonic war of position.
Sayyid ( 1997, 73) argues that the ideological vacuum that exists in Muslim
countries was filled by the Islamism, mainly because Islam was articulated into a counterhegemonic discourse by the Islamists. 0 ne Islamist whom I interviewed described their
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struggle as "a struggle to build up an Islamic civilization," (jslami bir medeniyet kurma

mucadelesi), not just a mere political struggle. In this regard, fur many Islamists politics is
not an end, but a means to bring about an Islamic order, an Islamic civilization, and to
revive the golden age oflslam that was realized during the time ofProphetMuhammedand
of the four rightly guided caliphs. Thus, the Islamists assign a special value to politics as it
becomes the means for them to bring about an Islamic order. This point becomes perfectly
telling when it is placed next to the Islamists' perception of their political activism as a
comprehensive movement and politics as a form ofjihad (Please see the discussion above
under two separate sections). Thus, the Islamists perceive politics as an all-scale war that
has to be won to bring about an Islamic order; they also perceive contributing into this war
effort as a religious duty.
Governments' Perception of the Islamists
When Turkey's firstislamist party (the MNP) was established in 1971 by N.
Erbakan, the secularists did not perceive the Islamist party as a big threat due to the fact
that the share of the votes that the MNP got in the upcoming parliamentary elections had
been insignificant until the late 1980s. Before the 1980s, the Turkish secularist regime did
not perceive the Islamists as a serious political threat; however they were considered as a
serious ideological threat by the secularists and the Islamist party was closed down two
times until the· establishment ofthe RP. After the late 1980s, as the RP increased its share
of votes among the electorate, it became a double threat by the secularists. It was only after
the military coup of 1980 when the RP had significant successes in the local elections
followed by its successes in the parliamentary elections. In addition to being perceived as
an ideological threat by the secularists due to its Islamist orientation, the RP was also
perceived as a political threat due to its electoral successes which eventually prompted

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

336
the secularists to close down the party through the Turkish Constitutional Court. The
Islarnists whom I interviewed also realized this case of double threat. They believe that the
secularists do not want to lose their privileged position as the Islarnist opposition
increasingly became a serious political threat for the secularist regimes. They also believe
that the secularists do not implement a democratic version of secularism as it is applied in
liberal democracies; accordingly, in their view, the state perceives the Islarnists as a
serious political threat.
The official approach of the Egyptian regime towards the Egyptian Islarnists has
varied since the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood. I nitially King F arouk of Egypt
did not directly confront the Brotherhood from its establishment in 1928 until the
organization vastly expanded whenAl-Banna moved the headquarters of the Brotherhood
from Ismailiyya to Cairo in 1933. Later the relations between the Brotherhood and the
Egyptian monarchy got sour as the Brotherhood de manded the e stahl ishment of the Shari 'a;
andAl-Banna was assassinated in 1949. The Brotherhood initially supported the Free
Officers led by Nasser who ousted King Farouk and established the republic as the
Brotherhood elders hoped to achieve what they had been unable to achieve. However,
Nasser had no intentions of establishing the Shari 'a, thus Nasser used an alleged
assassination attempt on his life as an excuse to crush the Brotherhood and push it
underground. Sadat later approached the Brothers to balance out the leftists at the Arab
Socialist Union who were atthattime trying to undermine Sadat's authority. Mubarak
initially chose an accommodative approach towards the Brotherhood. However, as the
Brotherhood achieved significant gains in the parliamentary elections and at the
professional associations, Mubarak gradually became harsher on the Brotherhood.
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The Turkish and Egyptian governments' perception of the Islamists can be analyzed
on two separate, but related realms: ideological, and political. On the ideological base, the
secularist regimes perceive the Islamists as a major threat as they find Islamism completely
antithetical to secularism Both regimes' constitutions prohibit the establishment of
political parties based on religion. Although the Egyptian constitution recognizes Islam as
the main source of legislation and allows some room of the implementation of the Shari'a
in the matters of family law, the Egyptian regime, like the Turkish regime, seeks to keep the
Islamist out of politics completely. The Turkish constitution does not allow any room for
the Shari 'a, and the secularist nature of the regime is strongly emphasized in the Turkish
Constitution.
On Ideological Base: Threat for the Secularist Regime
The Turkish Constitutional Court (Supreme Court of Turkey) closed down the
Islamist party many times after it resurfaced under different a different name. 291 Sayan
(2002, 20) relates the increasing ideological polarization of Turkish politics since the
early 1990s largely on the tension between the secularists and the Islamists. 292 Indeed,
during the closure case against the RP, the indictment prepared by then Chief Public
Prosecutor Vural

Sava~

argued that Islam was not compatible with democracy and the

Islamic identity was a threat to Turkish national identity (Kocac10glu 2004, 449).
Sakalhoglu ( 1996, 235) argues that according to the Kemalists, Islam constituted a major
threat, because "Kemalist Westernization relied primarily on changing the attitudes of
individuals whose communal self-identity and emotional security had heretofore been

291

Currently, there is an ongoing case at the Court regarding the closure ofthe AKP, the ruling party.
As discussed in Chapter 1, political parties in Turkey perceive politics as a ''zero-sum game" where
one's gain is another's loss, not necessarily as a mechanism for collective decision-making through which

292
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provided by Islam" In other words, in line with this type of perception of politics, any
victory of the Islamist ideology is a loss or retreat of secular Kemalist ideology; consensus
was often perceived as a sign of weakness and as a terrible concession. Cizre and <;mar
(2002, 31 0) express the severe opposition between Kemalism and Islamism as follows:
Since the inception of the [Turkish] republic, Kemalism [Atatiirkism] has comprised its
guiding vision. It is in essence a Westernizing/civilizing ideology whose
incontrovertible maxims are secularism, understood as the separation of religion from
political rule; a modern/Western identity and lifestyle; and the cultural homogeneity and
territorial unity of the nation. Because the Kemalist Westernization project has relied
more on symbols than substance, it has associated publicly visible instances oflslamic
identity with reactionism. The ideology is also marked by a visible distaste for politics
as a societal activity, and an ambivalent attitude toward the notion of popular legitimacy.
Over time, it has been adjusted, at times stalled, but never abandoned or discontinued.

During the February 28 ( 1997) process, the generals of the Turkish military forced
the RP-DYP coalition to expand teaching on Atati.irkism to cover almost all courses, scrap
the secondary school system for the jmam Hatip schools, introduce strict age limitations
for the Qur' anic seminaries, appoint staunch Kemalists as university presidents, cleanse the
government bureaucracy by firing suspected Islamists, continue the strict enforcement of the
ban on headscarves for females. ( Cizre and <;mar 2002, 31 0-312) . In the upcoming months
after the declaration of the February 28 decisions at the monthly MGK meeting, subsequent
pressure from the military through the MGK and the civilian component of the secular
establishment (the bureaucracy, judiciary, and secular media) led to the collapse of the
coalition government in June.
I find it very important to note that the MGK' s press declaration defined secularism
as "a way of life." 293 This is curiously similar to how Islamists define Islam: a religion,
and a way oflife. Thus, it appears that it is not just a political and ideological rivalry

various societal groups with different ideologies and identities work out the best solution for their
r,roblems by consensus.
93
MGK's Press Declaration, February 28, 1997, accessed at the \\eb site of the MGK at
http://www.mgk.gov.tr/basinbildiri 1997 /28subatl997 .htm September 16, 2007. The 18 p;>licy decisions
of the MGK on February 28, 1997 are provided in the Appendix.
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between the secularist states and the Islamists, it is also a clash of lifestyles between the
two. The Turkish regime is completely exclusionary when it comes to Islamic demands of
Turkish citizens. The Turkish civil code is translated from the Swiss civil code in the late
1920s. However, the Egyptian regime partially incorporates the Shari 'a into its legal
system and the government appears to promote pious behavior officially. Similar debates
were made between the secularists and the Islamists during the recent presidential
elections (2007) and parliamentary elections (2007) after which Abdullah Giil, an Islamist,
became the president of Turkey, and the IslamistAKP won the elections by receiving47
percent of the votes under R. Tayyip Erdogan's leadership. It appears that these debates
will not end as there is a current closure case for the AKP at the Turkish Constitutional
Court, and recently (June 5, 2008) the Court overturned two amendments passed by the
Turkish parliament to make wearing headscarves permissible for females in public and
private universities.
Egyptian and Turkish Islamist intellectuals also discuss secularism to a great length
and they argue that the idea of separating religion and state that originated the West was a
reaction to the Catholic Church's dominance over every aspect of human life; and secular
European rulers became more powerful as the authority of the Catholic Church diminished
as a result of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Thus, they argue, in the West, a general
consensus appeared 1inking enlightenment, development and modernization with
secularism. However, they argue, in the Muslim world, Muslims were able to dominate the
whole Middle East and establish powerful empires as they remained faithful to their
religion. They believe that the Islamic civilization produced its masterpieces in sciences,
arts and literatures as long as Muslims remained faithful to Islam. In short, they believe that
secularism was a product of historical experience of Europe, and the Europeans became
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advanced as they distanced themselves from religion and separated religion and politics. 294

However, according to the Islamists, this would not work well in Muslim countries
because as opposed to Europeans, Muslims excelled as they got closer to Islam and kept
the unity between religion and pol itics.
The TurkishandEgyptianislamists believe thatthe notion of secularism is a
foreign concept for Muslims. They also believe that as secularism has been applied in their
countries, it is not simply about separating religion from politics; indeed, they believe that
over the years, it has been used as a tool to prevent the Islamists from coming to power.
Islamists also believe that secularism, as arbitrarily implemented by the secularists, is
ideologically charged and legitimizes the indiscriminate use of non-democratic measures to
crush the Islamist opposition. The Islamists believe that secularism cannot be a way of life;
in fact it is a principle of designing a government. They also believe that in a Muslim
country, it would not be easy for the secularist politicians to be openly against Islam, thus
they use secularism as a tool to shield their anti-Islamic sentiments.
On Political Base: Challengers for Power
The secularist regimes perceive the Islamists as a challenge on the political base as
the major challengers for power. In both countries, as the Islamist became politically more
active and scored victories against the secularist regimes the secularist establishment in
both countries became more sensitive and reactionary towards the Islamists. Among other
methods of intimidation, to prevent the Islamists from becoming more powerful the
secularist regimes primarily used methods like mass arrests of the Islamists, clamping
down on the Islamist associations and charity organizations, confiscating the assets of

294

Also, to support their arguments, several Turkish and Egyptian Islarnists made references to the
Spanish inquisition and the punishment of scientists like Galileo because they contradicted with the
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Islamist parties or associations, closing down Islamist parties and temporarily banning
their leaders from politics, sending the arrested Islamists to military courts that are known
to be harsher on the Islamists, and the like.

In Egypt, the Brotherhood is still technically an illegal organization and it is not
allowed to form a political party. The 88 independent Brothers in the Egyptian parliament
created a platform to criticize the Egyptian government's lack of adequate policies in
addressing the country's major problems. As of Turkish politics, three recent problems
exacerbated the relations between the secularists and the Islamists. The first is the election
of the new president in 2007, the second is the electoral success of the Islamists in July
2007 elections, and third is the Islamists attempts to change the constitution for more
educational rights for females with headscarves, and for the future, to make a new
constitution. 295
The election of the president by the parliament296 became a serious crisis from May
to August 2007 when Sezer's presidential term ended in April. Erdogan, nominated his
Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah GUI for the office. The secularist establishment
mobilized to stop the process because for the secularists the presidency is not only "the
house of Atatlirk" but also the ultimate protector of their version of secularist Turkey. Due
to the absence ofthe opposition CHP and of some other non-AKP deputies, the parliament
had no quorum to elect Gill as President on April 26, 2007. One day later, the generals
issued a powerful statement (which is known as the April 27M emorandum) on the official

teachings of the Catholic Church.
The AKP conveyed a special convention to prepare a draft constitution which, they argued, will be
more democratic than the 1982 Constitution prepared under the military rule (1980-1983). The AKP
approached non-partisan secular constitutional law professors like Ergun Ozbudun and Zafer Dsktil to lead
the project for a new constitution which the AKP labeled "civilian constitution." However, recently (fall
of2007) the headscarf issue resurfaced again and the AKP indefinitely postponed its intention to draft a
new constitution.
296
In the parliamentary system of Turkey, the president is elected by the TGNA
295
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website of the Turkish Armed Forces that threatened to overthrow the government if
necessary to protect the secular nature of the Republic. 297 One day after the memorandum,
the oppositional CHP took the results of the first round of presidential election to the
Constitutional Court. The Court annulled the results of the first poll. 298 To avoid further
exacerbating the crisis, GUl withdrew his candidacy. Erdogan called for early elections
scheduled for July 22, 2007 which were supposed to be in November of2007. 299 During
the crisis, a number of secularist civil society associations joined forces and organized
mass rallies known as cumhuriyet mitingleri (republican rallies) in major cities. After the
AKP's landslide victory in the July 22 elections, A. Gtil was elected as the president of the
country on August 22, 2007 who will serve for the next seven years because Gtil' s election

297

Their statement is as follows: "The problem that has emerged in the presidential election process is
focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry
out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable charactaristics of the Republic of
Turkey. It has been observed that some circles have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb
fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, and have increased their efforts
recently. Those activities include requests for redefinition fundamental values of the Republic, and
attempt to organize alternative celebrations instead of our national festivals symbolizing the unity and
solidarity of our nation. Those who carry out the mentioned activities, which turned into an open
challenge against the state, do not refrain from exploiting holy religious feelings of our people, and they
try to hide their real goals under the guise of religion ... Those who are opposed to the great leader
Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk's understanding ''How happy is the one who says I am a Turk" are enemies of the
Republic of Turkey and will remain so. The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to
carry out their duties stemming from laws to change the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of
Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute." (Quoted in Yavuz and Ozcan 2007, 120-121).
298
According to the decision of the Court, two thirds of the deputies, (i.e., 367 of550) must be present
for presidential elections.
299
The AKP leadership also proposed constitutional amendments which will make it possible to have
popular election of the president for five years with the possibility of reelection for another five years
instead of the current single seven-year presidential term. The proposals also included reducing the tenure
of the parliament to four years and lowering the quorum requirement from 367 to 184 (1/3rd of the
deputies). Parliament passed the proposed changes, however Sezer \etoed the legislation on May 25,
2007. When parliament wted for the legislation for a second time, President Sezer sent it out for a
referendum and also applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the legislation (the
secularist CHP also applied). However, the Constitutional Court ruled against both applications and a
referendum took place on October 21, 2007 after the parliamentary elections took place on July 22,
2007. In the referendum, Turkish people overwhelmingly voted yes on the changes by 6 8.9 %. Voter
turnout rate was also high: 67.5 %.
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to the presidency was before the national referendum on constitutional amendments (see the
footnote below).
Despite pressure from the military and its secularist hard-line allies, the AKP
substantially increased its share ofthe votes and maintained its control of the parliament
after the July22 elections by getting47% of the total votes. Out of550 seats in the Turkish
Parliament, the AKP secured 341 seats (Barkey and c;ongar 2007, 65). The AKP also
significantly increased its votes through the Kurdish areas. The Kurdish party, D TP, only
has 20 deputies from the Kurdish provinces, whereas the AKP shared the Kurdish votes
with the CHP. The MHP does not have any significance in the Kurdish areas because of its
highly nationalist ideology.
The third contentious issue was the controversial headscarfban which has been in
effect since the late 1980s. 300 The Turkish secularists believe that head scarves and other
religious symbols should be totally eliminated from the public sphere. For example, Tezi9,
the head of the Higher Education Council (YOK) which oversees all universities (public
and private), controversially argued that civil servants could not wear headscarves even on
the street (Tezi9's interview with Nur Batur, Hurriyet, 2.10.2006). 301 The headscarfissue

300

Public surveys indicate that supporters of the ban on headscarves at universities constitute only 21 %
of the population while 79% oppose the ban. Additionally, the ban on headscarves for female civil
servants is supported by 24% of the people, whereas 76% are against such a ban (1ESEV's 2006 survey
in <;arkoglu and Toprak 2006, 75). Although the President Giil recently appointed a moderate director for
the YOK (Prof. Dr. Yusuf Ziya Ozcan), the remaining board members (of the YOK), who are
predominantly secularists, refused to cooperate with him. Several secularist university directors followed
the secularist board members and issued inflammatory remarks through press releases by proclaiming that
they would not allow a religious symbol (i.e., the headscarf) in their institutions despite the new
constitutional amendment.
301
In May 2004, the AKP passed a legislative bill that removed Tezi9 and reorganized the YOK. The AKP
for the first time attempted to remove the ban by changing the director of the board. The bill passed in the
Parliament on May 13, 2004; no. 5171. Secularist President Sezer wtoed the bill, and the AKP \WS
hesitant to pass the legislation again due to the secularist media's campaign and the intense protests of the
YOK. As a response, recently, the AKP passed a constitutional amendment in the TGNA about basic rights
and freedoms with the support of some oppositional parties including the MHP on February 22, 2008.
The amendments are done by making some additions to the 101h and 42nd articles of the Turkish
Constitution by further clarifying the extent of basic rights and freedoms stated in those articles. In his
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seems like a double-edged sword for the AKP. On the one hand, its constituency demands
an active policy to solve this problem. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of the AKP
deputies (including Erdogan and GUl) have wives and daughters who wear the headscarf.
On the other hand, the AKP could not attempt to solve the headscarf problem because the
Constitutional Court took that issue as one of the reasons for the closure of the RP and the
only reason to dissolve the FP (Kuru 2006, 219).
Government's Position Regarding the Islamists
Government's position in regards to the Islarnists may change over time due to
several factors such as whether the regime perceives the Islarnists as a serious threat or a
leverage to be used against other groups or movements that are perceived as threats by the
government, or to what extent the Islarnists expect the government to apply the Shari 'a.
Depending upon the political climate, the Islarnists were perceived as a threat either
ideologically or politically (or both). In different periods, both the Egyptian and Turkish
regimes used Islam to counterbalance the leftists. 302 However, Islam promoted by the
official religious establishment and the official educational system was, according to the

official opinion above his approval of the amendment President Giil stated: "It has been understood that
the proposed additions to the 101h and 42nd articles of the Constitution have a purpose of strengthening the
right to education and equality before the law [equal protection of the law] by further explaining and
reaffirming the rights and freedoms that already exist in the Turkish Constitution." Upon the new
amendments, some university administrations allowed female students wearing headscarves into the
classes while some did not. The oppositional CHP challenged the constitutional amendments by applying
to the Constitutional Court of Turkey on February 28,2008.
302
As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, after the military intervention of 1980, through the Turkish-Islamic
Synthesis, the government appointed by the generals of the junta, actively used a carefully "sanitized"
blend of Turkish nationalism and Islam to counterbalance the leftists. A similar thing happened in Egypt
under Sadat's presidency. Sadat used the Islamists to counterbalance the leftists who were trying to
undermine Sadat. Indeed, it was Gen. Kenan Evren who made it mandatory for all of the high schools in
Turkey to have a one credit class named "Culture of Religion and Morals-Din Kiilturu ve Ahlak Bilgist'
for all levels. The textbooks for the class were prepared by the Ministry of Education, and included the
basic information about major world religions as well as Islam. The basic information covered a brief
history of the major world religions (Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Brahmanism
and Mrican Religions) and briefly covered the basics about major prophets-founders of those religions of
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Islamists, a "sanitized" version oflslam which heavily emphasized morals (but not
necessarily politics and designing life according to Islamic principles), like paying charity,
being respectful towards elders, avoiding crime, and more importantly being an obedient

citizen.
Inclusion/Accommodation
Sadat' s liberal lnfitah (opening) policies paved the way for a less confrontationist
approach towards the oppositional groups in Egypt in the 1970s including the Islamists and
leftist groups. However, through the mid-1970s, Sadat became increasingly concerned
about the growing power of the leftists in Egypt, and the leftists at the ASU, a party-like
organization originally established by Nasser before Sadat. Sadat eased official limitations
on the Brotherhood, allowed them to operate freely in universities, eased censorship on the
Brotherhood's publications and let the Brothers to open up more branches across the
country. After Sadat' s assassination in 1981, Mubarak initially adopted an
accommodationist approach towards the Islamists. However, as Islamists pushed harder
for the implementation of the Shari 'a, and more importantly, as they scored victories in
national elections as independent candidates and in professional associations and student
unions, Mubarak quickly substituted his accommoda tionist approach with a confrontationist
one. Security forces cracked down on the Islamists, harsher measures were taken to
prevent the Islamists successes in professional associations, and arrested Islamists were
sent to military tribunals that are known to be harsher on the Islamists.
As the lslamists became a more potent force outside the state, they began to
influence the orientations of the state employees at different positions. Also, various

the world. In the textbook more space was devoted for Islam and its prophet, Muhammed, and the students
were required to memorize about 9-10 short prayers in Arabic.
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opportunities emerged that prompted the state employees and Islamists to tacitly cooperate
on various issues motivated by kinship, friendship, mutual economic interest, or shared
ideological positions. For example, the MSA officials reportedly enjoy close ties with
some of the Islamists associations under their jurisdiction. Moreover, MSA officials are
included on the executive boards of some Islamist associations, for which they are paid a
salary. These officials are reported to favor Islamist associations over non-Islamist ones.
Islamist activists also became more influential over the local municipal councils that are
dominated by Mubarak's NDP. Also, several Al-Azhar sheikhs served as Islamic advisors
for Islamic banks and investment companies (Wickham2002; 109, 110). 303
Exclusion/Confrontation
When Islamists achieved successes in elections (at associational, local or national
levels) both regimes changed their inclusionary-accommodationist policies with
exclusionary-confrontationist ones towards the Islamists. As the governments perceive the
Islamists as a double threat (ideological and political) they start implementing an
exclusionary/confrontationist policy towards them. The secularist regimes perceive
Islamism tolerable until the Islamists achieve electoral or organizational successes. A
sharp turn in Mubarak' s policies towards the Islamists in the late 1980s, and several
closure cases against the Turkish Islamist party (after which the Islamist party resurfaced
under different names) demonstrate that the secularists cannot tolerate the Islamists and
would take extreme measures to prevent them from challenging the secularist regime
through political channels either directly (for example through electoral activism) or
indirectly (through the media or the civil society). Exclusionary policies can also be

303

Some Islamic investment companies hired influential politicians as consultants like Al-Rayyan did
when it hired former Minister of Interior Nabawi Ismail.
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related to the earlier discussions ofboth sides' perception of politics as a zero-sum game
and as a struggle between different ways of life. Additionally, when these factors are
added to the intolerance and severe politicization and polarization on both sides, the
exclusionary and confrontationist policies follow.
Perception of the External Threats by the lslamists
The Islamists perception of external threats varies through time, circumstances, and
how the movement organizers and intellectuals interpret the outer world and frame issues.
Even though the Turkish andEgyptianlslamistmovements emergedandevol ved
differently, evolutionary processes, there are significant similarities between the two as to
what they consider as external threats. In addition, the two movements are similar in
regards to how they should react to those external threats. Both movements perceive the
secularist regime as one of the biggest threat against the Muslim identity (or Muslinmess);
the lslamists also tend to associate moral corruption with the secularist elites as they
believe that the secularists are the agents of moral corruption and Westernization oftheir
countries. Islamists believe that the secularists have a particular agenda to secularize the
Muslims' collective identity and culture. Islamists in both countries voice their concerns
regarding the corruption ofMuslinmess, and mainly blame the secularist elites and the
media for that. 304
In Islamists' way of interpretation, the secularists' attempts to secularize Muslim
societies serves two major fi.mctions: social engineering (top-downshapingofthe
societies), and political manipulation. In other words, Islamists believe that the secularist

elites' efforts to secularize Muslim societies serve two main purposes: i) ideologically,
through secularization the society would be less susceptible to the appeal of the Islamisrn,
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and ii) politically, secularization would eventually create a more homogenized society
which would be easier to rule as it would be easier to mobilize the society towards
common policy objectives and to legitimize policy options adopted by the secularist elites.
Powerful Nationalist Undercurrents
Islamism in both countries also has powerful nationalist undercurrents. Al-Banna
established the Brotherhood for two main purposes: to revive the golden days oflslam
through a revival oflslamic consciousness of the Egyptians with a very strong emphasis on
piousness and strengthening Muslim identity, and to oust the British from Egypt. As
opposed to Qutb (because Qutb despised nationalism as he believed that nationalism was a
kind of poi son tow eaken the Islamic ummah ), to a certain degree Al-Banna can be
considered as a nationalist. The commercial/financial presence of the Europeans in Egypt,
and the secularist elites' adoption of European values and customs "irritated Egyptian
sensibilities and nurtured anti-European sentiment and a desire to curtail foreign influence"
(Commins 2005, 126). In 1923, whenAl-Bannalefthishometown,Mahmudiyyah,for
Cairo to attend Dar Al-Ulum (the teacher training college in Cairo), he "experienced
Egypt's cultural westernization which he equated with atheism and immorality" (Commins
2005, 130).
It is important to note that AI-Banna' s nationalism was different than terri to rial
nationalism. Indeed, de spite the very strong nationalist undercurrents inAl-Banna's
Islamism, Islamic nationalism305 promoted by Al-Banna "repeatedly emphasized the

304

See the interview data in Chapters 3 and 5.
Al-Banna, in To What Do We Invite Humanity? points out to the significance of Islamic unity: 'The
second fruit is that Islamic brotherhood compelled every Muslim to believe that every foot of ground
supporting any brother who held to the religion of the Noble Qur'an was a portion of the larger Islamic
homeland. It was the duty of every single Muslim to work for its protection and prosperity. The result was
that the horizons of the Islamic homeland expanded and transcended the bounds of mere geographical and
ethnic patriotism to one of lofty principles, pure, accurate articles of belief, and truths ooich Allah set

305
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universal characteristics of the Islamic faith" by rejecting territorial nationalism (Gershoni
and Janowski 2002, 80). What Al-Bannacame upw ithwas, in Gershoni and Janowski's
words, "supra-national Egyptian nationalism" which, unlike territorial nationalism,
allowed the Islamists to have "multiple identifications and loyalties". 306 However, all
other loyalties and identifications were "subordinate to a primary religious identity and
allegiance" (Gershoni and Janowski 2002, 83). Thus, Al-Banna's strong emphasis on Islam
in his understanding of nationalism did not necessarily mean a total rejection of other
loyalties.
Indeed, in his writings Al-Banna often mentioned "patriotism of affection" which
was a term that he sued to refer to patriotism that emanates from one's love of homeland.
My interviewees also revealed their nationalist feelings when they were talking about
historical topics like the British presence in Egypt or the Turkish independence war. They
associated colonialism and war with concepts like "greed of Europeans" or
"expansionist/imperialist policies of the West" as well as "anti-Islamism of Europe."
When compared, I found the Turkish Islamists to be more influenced by nationalist
sentiments than the Egyptian Islamists. This can be a topic of a different study and have

down as a guiding light for the \\Urld. For Islam, \\hen it points this concept out to its people and fixes it
firmly within their souls, imposes upon them the unavoidable obligation to protect the territory of Islam
from the attack of the aggressor, to deliver it from occupation, and to fortify it against the ambitions of
the transgressor." (From the chapter titled 'Horizons of the Islamic Homeland")
306
Al-Banna, in Our Message, clarifies his views regarding patriotism: The bone of contention between
us and them is that \\bile we define patriotism according to the creed of Islam, they define it a:: cording to
territorial borders and geographical botmdaries. For every region in \\hich there is a Muslim saying:
'There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.', is our homeland, inviolable and
sacred, demanding love, sincerity, and sincere effort for the sake of its welfare. All Muslims in these
geographical regions are our people and brethren: we are concerned about them, and share their feelings
and sensitivities. Advocates of patriotism alone are not like this, since all that concerns them lies within a
specific and narrowly defined region of the earth. This obvious difference is manifested whenever any
nation desires to expand itself at the expense of others, for we would not approve ofthis at the expense of
any Muslim nation. We only seek power so that we may all share it. But the advocators of fanatical
patriotism see problem in this; and as a result, bonds of amicable relationship are snapped, power is
dispersed, and the enemy strikes out by pushing each one against the other. (From the chapter titled
''Patriotism")
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multiple causes. However, for the purpose of brevity I have to point out that the dose of
secularism in the newly established Turkish republic was heavier than the dose of
secularism in the newly established Egyptian republic. Secularism relies on the idea of
modern citizenship which is a byproduct of modern nation-state. Also, the early Turkish
republican elites completely rejected the cultural/historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire;
thus they based the ideology of the new republic on the concept of homogenous nation-state
with a homogenous culture and united nation under the secular regime. In the early Turkish
republic, politics was completely out of the public realm (even visually). Because the
Egyptian case did not completely abolish the Shari' a, Islam and the blending of Islam with
nationalism remained or survived alongside the official ideology in Egypt.

307

The pioneers of the Islamistmovement of Turkey were also highly nationalist. For
instance, Mehmed AkifErsoy (1873-1936)/08 a prominent Islamist ofthe late Ottoman and
early Turkish republican era, blended Islamist and nationalist ideas in his poems. Indeed,
as <;etinsaya (1999) points out, Turkishnationalismandislamismhave been closely linked,
they were both influenced by the same intellectual sources, and those who rejected
Islamism among the nationalists and those who rejected nationalism among the Islamists

307

The topic of social engineering is also relevant here in this discussion. I find the early republican
Turkish elites to be more willing to employ policies towards social (and political) engineering to
completely transform the Turkish society than the Egyptian elites. Egyptian elites did not follow an
enthusiastic policy of completely transforming the Egyptian society, instead they focused on
transforming the governmental institutions and expected the society to follow suit. In other words, unlike
the early Turkish elites, transforming the Egyptian society was not a huge priority for the Egyptian
secularist elites.
308
M. AkifErsoy is the author of the Turkish National Anthem which was embellished with a blend of
nationalist and Islamic themes. For example, Ersoy refers to the Turkish flag as the crescent (hila[),
which appears on the Turkish flag. The crescent is also considered as the symbol oflslam. Later, in the
anthem, Ersoy mentions the phrase ''my courageous race" by referring to the Turkish nation. Interestingly,
Ersoy uses the concepts of race (trk) and nation (millet) interchangeably. The national anthem has ten
quatrains, however only the first two quatrains of Ersoy's ''Independence Anthem" (istiklal Mar~ I, Turkish
National Anthem) were composed and those first two quatrains are sung in official ceremonies.
Originally, Ersoy was of Albanian origin, not ethnically a Turk. Through the end of his life, Ersoy moved
to Egypt as a result of a self-imposed exile since Ersoy and Atatiirk completely disagreed on the role of
religion in the newly established Turkish Republic ( 1923 ). Ersoy died in Egypt.
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were the exception. 309 For example, Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924) 310 believed that Islam could
be incorporated into Turkish nationalism and culture as Gokalp perceived Islam as a force
that would enhance solidarity among the masses, and the religious ties would strengthen the
Turkish nation. 311 Indeed, Gokalp' s formulation of Turkish nationalism can be summarized
in his well-known statement: "I am a member of the Turkish nation (millet), the Islamic
community ( iimmet) and Western civilization (medeniyet)." Prominent Turkish nationalists
of the early 1900s, like Peyami Safa, Hilmi Ziya Ulken, and Ahmet Agaoglu, like Ziya
Gokalp, emphasized the role oflslaminprovidingnational solidarity and unity among the
Turkish citizens.
YenigUn (2003, 2) argues that" ... it was not possible to identify an Islamist
discourse clearly distinguishable from nationalism fifty years ago ..." He points out that the
convergence between the two movements during the single-party era in Turkey(19231950) happened because Islamism was under the heavy pressure of the secularist singleparty regime; thus, YenigUn (2003, 36) argues, "nationalist discourse became the only
means to express Islamic ideas." In other words, as YenigUn (2003, 37) puts it succinctly,
during the single-party era "deprived of its Islamist discourse, Islamic views sought refuge
in the nationalist discourse ... which would never cease to be an ideological part ofthe
broader Islamic movement during the subsequent periods."

~etinsaya

(1999) and YenigUn

(2003) argue that after Turkey embraced the multiparty era after 1950, many Islamist
writers like Necip Faztl Ktsakiirek (1905-1983), Osman YUksel Serdenge<;ti (1917-1983),

309

Please refer to Chapter 5 for a discussion of the MGH's (The National Outlook Movement) blending
of lslamism with nationalist views.
310
Z. Gokalp is the founder of Turkish nationalism through the end of the Ottoman Empire. Gokalp's
ideas deeply influenced M. Kemal AtatUrk's views on Turkish nationalism.
311
Another prominent Turkish nationalist was Yusuf Akc;ura ( 187 6-193 5) who, like Gokalp, argued that
Islam and nationalism can enhance each other; and Islam could be an important factor in the construction
of Turkish nationality. For a detailed discussion of early Turkish nationalists and their views on Islam, see
the article written by <;etinsaya (1999).
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Cevat R!fat Atilhan, Hi.iseyin Hilmi I~1k and Nurettin Top9u (1909-1975), did not give up
nationalist sentiments; and they heavily continued using nationalistthemes in their writings.
Islamists of that period were expressing their opinions indi fferentjournals like Biiyiikdogu
(the Great Orient) and Serdenge9ti magazines. Those magazines were similar to the ones
published during and after the single-party era such as Sebiliirre~ad, Buyuk Cihat (Greater
Jihad), Hur Adam (Free Man), and Selamet (Salvation). In the early 1970s there did not
seem to be huge differences between the nationalists and the Islamists. For example,
Alparslan Ti.irkef s "Nine Lights" and Necmettin Erbakan' s blending of the national ( milli)
and sacred (mukaddes) were actually similar in many ways. In a gradual fashion, after the
1970s, Islamists and nationalists crystallized into two distinct movements. However, both
movements continued to heavily borrow from each other in the following decades. 312
<;etinsaya (1999, 376) succinctly points out that the mainstream Turkish Islamists "have
always reached an accommodation between Islam and nationalism." The organization of
"The Intellectuals' Hearth" (Aydznlar Ocagz) was used to promote this aforementioned
official blending oflslam and nationalism by the secularist elites. 313 However, the
organization could not reach the masses and have a large scale impact on the people. Later,
in the late 1970s, as a result of translations of prominent Islamists' works into Turkish (like
Mawdudi and Qutb's works) the Islamist youth in Turkey became more radical and the
distinctions between the Islamist youth and the nationalist youth became clearer. Another

312
Later in the late 1980s, a big debate took place within the ranks of the nationalist party (the MHP)
regarding the role of religion in the nationalist movement, and in 1992, the more conservatist group
within the MHP split and formed their own party (the BBP, Bi.iyi.ik Birlik Partisi, The Grand Unity Party)
under the charismatic leader Muhsin Yazicwglu.
313
Especially after the military coup of 1980, the secularist elites attempted to use a careful blending of
Islam and nationalism under the umbrella of the "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" (TIS) to counterbalance the
growing power of the extreme right and the emergent Islamists as well as to depoliticize the masses by
creating an apolitical version of Islam and nationalism. The TIS WciS also intended to neutralize the leftists
as the military rule established after the military coup of 1980 attempted to counterbalance the secularist
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commonality between the Islamist and nationalist youth was their strong anti-communist
sentiments. Y enigUn (2003, 44) argues that the translated works of the prominent nonTurkish Islamists "had found a wide appeal in a highly politicized environment of the late
1970s among the jmam-Hatip educated students, whose political aspirations were hardly
met by the traditionally apolitical or nationalist comnunities or [predominantly apolitical]

Sufi orders."
Although Islamism and nationalism are currently two separate ideologies
represented by different political parties, there are still some overlapping areas between
the two ideologies. The group among the Islamists, what Y enigUn calls "universalist
Islamists,"

314

appears to be minority among the general body of the Islamists in Turkey.

Despite their differences from the nationalists, the majority of the Turkish Islamists today
still define themselves in nationalist terms. 315 The GUlen movement, which is considered as
the largest Islamist community in Turkey, can be counted as another example. The leader of
the movement, F. GUlen (1938- ), uses a heavy nationalist rhetoric in his sermons and
books which is evident in his frequent references to the Ottoman period as the golden days
of the glorious ($anlz) Turkish nation motivated by Islamic zeal. Here, it is important to
note that in general, the Islamists' notion of nationalism is similar to the official secular
nationalism with one big exception. While secular Kemalism (AtatUrkism) forms the basis
of the official nationalism, lslamists in general have a nationalist approach without
Kemalism. In other words, Islamists' nationalism and the secularists' nationalism are
similar in many ways except the Kemalist ideology. Those two types of nationalism also

leftist opposition. The generals believed that a mixture of non-political religion and nationalism would be
an antidote against the leftists.
314
This is a minority group within the Turkish Islamists who believe in the tmity of the Islamic ummah.
They have distanced themselves from nationalism; and they perceive nationalism as a divisive ideology
which caused the demise of the Islamic empire(s) of the past.
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differ in their approach towards the past. The Turkish Islamists' nationalism embraces and
glorifies the Ottoman period, while Kemalist (Atatlirkist) nationalism simply ignores and
even condones that period, and focuses on the pre-Islamic ancient Turkish hi story.
Despite the nationalist undercurrents in the Islamist thought, as Y enigUn (2003, 50)
points out, after the mid-1990s a segment of the Islamists in Turkey, which is still a
minority among the Islamists, were ideologically able to detach themselves from
nationalism As a result of such a detachment, Islamists in Turkey developed an Islamic
solution to the Kurdish problem, which was completelydifferentthan that of the
nationalists'. This new group within the general body of the Turkish Islamists maintained
"a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural view of society" on ethnic issues which significantly di tiers
from the official-Kemalist view of society.
Conservative Protectionism of the Muslim Identity (Muslimness)
Since the late 1970s, due to the proliferation of means of communications and the
growing access of the Islamists to the media, lslamists have been increasingly concerned
about preservation of their social identity (Muslim identity or Muslimness). The current
debates on Islamism, though useful, often revolve around the concepts of security,
democracy, or stability. However, those debates often times ignore how Islamists' concern
for preserving social identity against perceived external threats contribute to their
politicization. Moreover, the current debates on Islamism do not generally link Islamist
political activism to Islamist frames which are vigorously used by Islamists to call people
to take a stance against those threats and the state control over religion as they relate to the
Muslim identity.

315
Earlier in Chapter 5, Erbakan's highly nationalist perception of the Turkish history and his reference to
the Turkish-Ottoman period in history were discussed.
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Diani defines social movements as "a network of informal interactions between a
plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural
conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity" (1992, 13). Social identity refers to
the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their social relations
with other individuals and collectivities. Jenkins (1996) argues that a consequence of
defining the other is the imposition of"negative and putative characteristics" on a
collective other, whose politics, culture and lifestyle must be resisted and repelled. 316

Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue that the group members aim to preserve group identity and
unity, and ultimately self-purity due to self-attachment to the group. For the Islamists, the
outgroup norms can be non-Islamic values, attitudes, lifestyles and practices, Western
power and dominance (i.e., cultural and/or military), Western culture and symbols, and
secularism (Ozbudun 1976; Mardin 1973; Narh 1999; Carkoglu 2002; Toprak 1981,
1996). Tarrow (1998, 119) maintains that building a movement around strong ties of
collective identity does much of the work that would be normally done by the organization,
but it cannot do the work of mobilization, which depends on framing identities so that they
will lead to action, alliances and interaction.
The way that the Islamists frame the external threats and the proper response to
eliminate those threats can be best understood by using Gramscian theory, because
Gramscian theory is "distinctively effective in explaining the political implications of
oppressive as well as liberatory ideologies" (Simms 2002, 564). In many ways, the
Turkish and Egyptian Islamists perceive Islamism as a liberatory ideology challenging
secularism and the secularist elites through a Gramscian war of position. It was Erbakan' s
MGH which first explicitly articulated the Islamic identity in the political dormin (Yavuz
316

Refer to the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1, pay attention to Tajfel and Turner's ( 1986) discussion
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2003, 207). Yavuz points out that through this new identity formulated by Erbakan and the
ideologues of the RP, "devout Muslims evoked Islamic symbols and institutions to express
their discontent" and " ... to construct their own vision of modernity by reactivating Islamic
tradition" (Yavuz 2003, 221). 317 Clark (2004) and White (2002) maintain that identity
demands and Islamic solidarity through horizontal networks are the two most significant
aspects oflslamist civil society in Turkey. Additionally, Keyman (2007) points out that as
Islamic identity claims have become more and more pluralized and multi-dimensional; they
have also begun to operate mainly as group-based demands for religious rights and
freedoms. For Keyman, Islamist identity claims are a "politics of identity operating within
modernity and demanding recognition" (2007, 217).
Secularist political and social arrangements are perceived with suspicion by the
Islamists as the Islamists perceive group identity that has to be protected from any external
threat including the secularistthreats. The content analysis done in Chapter 3 and 5 suggest
that anything that would threaten the Muslim way of life or Muslims' daily practices or
their religious or social obligations is perceived as a direct threat against Muslim identity.
Additionally, the Islamists believe that Islam constitutes (or should constitute) the main
source of social identity, values and norms, and the imposition of strict secular policies by
the secularist state elites undermines the Muslim identity. Thus, the secularist states'
attempts to control religion and Western cultural influences (as they lead to moral
corruption) constitute the biggest concerns for the Islamists. 318 This "perception of threat"
then urges Muslims to pr otecttheir Muslimness, or their Muslim identity. The Turkish and
Egyptian Islamists shared similar concerns and perceived the external threats in a similar

of the formation and maintenance of social identity.
317
Please see the debate of the Adil Diizen (Just Order) of the RP in Chapter 3.
318
Please refer to the interview data and the content analysis in Chapter 3 and 5.
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fashion. Another important finding of my interviews is that Islamists in both countries use
Muslim identity and their national identity equivocally (and often interchangeably).

319

In my

interviews with the Islamists, the respondents raised their concerns in regards to the threats
on Muslimness which I believe is an outcome of a mental situation which I call "the siege
mentality." They believe that both Islam and their Muslimness is under a serious threat and
they are besieged the secular external threats.
Another finding of my interviews is that both the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists
perceive the Muslim's imitation of the West as the primary source of perceived moral
erosion, and corruption of Muslim identity. The Islamists also maintain that the secularist
regimes and intellectuals are the main vehicle of such influences, as the regime and the
secular elites are believed to impose Western norms through the secular law and
educational institutions. The Islamists' criticism ofthe secular media revolves around two
major points. First, for the Islamists, the secular media is one of the powerful agents of
perceived moral erosion; and second, as the Islamists argue, the secularist media and the
secularist elites often cooperate to attack the Islamists and portray them in a negative light
(i.e., reactionaries).
As a response to the secular external threats, the Islamist frames, created by the
Islamist movement organizers and intellectuals, link those perceived threats to political
activism through the need for preserving Islamic social identity with a protectionist
viewpoint. The reach of this type of protectionist approach extends from protecting Islamic
way of life to preserving some of the social attitudes recommended by the religion which
often reside in the gray area between religion and culture. In other words, with a great

319

This could be related to the nationalist undercurrents in both Islamist traditions. Please refer to the
relevant subsection in this chapter.
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enthusiasm, the Islamists seek to protect the religious, and the cultural which is in many
ways an expression of religion. 320
Another aspect of the Muslim identity is related to the political means that the
Islamists employ to protect it from the perceived threats. My interviewees believed that as
individuals, Muslims are obliged to protect their Muslim identity; 321 however, the Islamists
argued that there were certain things that would be impossible to carry out by Muslims on
an individual basis. Here, as they argued, the government comes into the picture. They
believed that on the individual level, people should be pious. However, if the government
does not fulfill its responsibilities to protect the Muslim identity, the individuals'
piousness would not be enough to protectthe Muslim identity from those external threats.
My interviewees also believed that under a secular regime Muslims could be pious;
however, they would not be fully living according to the precepts oflslam since Islam was
also about designing the social, economic and political life according to its teachings. They
believed that the government, as an umbrella organization over all of the social
organizations, should protect the Muslim identity and make it possible for Muslims to
practice Islam to the fullest extent by using its power.
Parallel to what Wickham argues (2004, 127-128), my interviewees believed that
the Islamic transformation of society was essential. This transformation first begins with a
renovation of the individual. The iman (faith) brings about serious changes in the life of the
individual. After the first step, the transformation would gradually but ultimately spread out

°For example, one Egyptian Islamist was complaining about the modern city life because he believed
that it prevented Muslims from strengthening their ties with their neighbors. He argued that in a big city, if
someone's next-door neighbor dies, he/she would not be aware of it. He pointed out that Islam instructed
Muslims to pay attention to their social obligations including those towards their neighbors. He also
argued that Islam aims to improve social solidarity to the extent that if a Muslim sleeps on a full stomach
while his/her neighbor is hungry, he/she would not be a mature Muslim.
321
One ofthe Islamists whom I interviewed recited a well known saying of Prophet Muhammed: ''The one
who imitates a [non-Muslim] nation is of them."
32
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to incorporate every sector of society.
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359
The Islamists, thus, c Iearly distinguish an ordinary

Muslim and a committed Muslim The Islamists believe that an ordinary Muslim is "born
into the faith" and is somewhat observant, but does not completely comprehend how a
complete/mature Muslims should live by the precepts of Islam My interviewees referred
to such a Muslim as a "Muslim by culture." However, the Islamists believe, a committed
Muslim fully absorbs Islamic values and applies them in his/her life without any laxity, and
more importantly struggles for the implementation of those norms and practices on the
larger societal scale. My interviewees referred to such a Muslim as a "mature/complete
Muslim" 323 Thus, one of the major functions of the da 'wa for an Islamist is to encourage
first the self, and then other ordinary Muslims to become committed Muslims. A committed
Muslim should monitor and correct the behavior of others around him/her if possible
through persuasion (iqna '). Islamists often refer to the following Qur'anic verse, "al-amr

bi'l-ma 'rufwa 'l-nahy 'anil-munkar," which is commanding the good a ndforbiddingthe
evil. For them, commanding the good and forbidding the evil, which is a form ofjihad (the
concept of ummaic jihad discussed in Chapter 1), could be done "with the hand, the
tongue, and the heart." 324 The hand refers to the actions, the tongue refers to the words, and
the heart refers to prayers and intentions of the Muslims. In this regard, s trugglingfor the
dissemination of religion is considered the highest form of da 'wa, and struggling for the
establishment of a political and social order, where Muslims practice their religion and the

322

Please refer to the concept of "ummaicjihad" discussed in Chapter 1.
Other labels were used for the two types of Muslims. For the ordinary Muslims, my interviewees used
the terms like lax, weak, unconscious, and superficial. For the committed Muslims, they used the terms
like dedicated, loyal, faithful, and devoted. One interviewee distinguished between faith by imitation and
faith by investigation. He argued that faith by imitation belongs to the ordinary Muslims as they imitate
their families and frieds. Thus, they are Muslims by culture. However, faith by investigation belongs to the
committed Muslims as they absorb the faith and sincerely apply the Islamic principles in their lives, and
thus work for the establishment of an Islamic order with determination.
324
Actually, this is another saying of Prophet Muhammed which is often used by the Islamists.
323

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

360
government promotes Islam, and protects the Muslim identity, is perceived equally
important by the Islamists.
My interviewees expressed similar views regarding the significance of the da 'wa
in bringing about an Islamic order earlier highlighted by Wickham (2004) and Clark
(2004). Similar to what Wickham expressed, Clark (2004, 14) points out that through the
deeds of concerned Muslims, da 'wa becomes the act of establishing Islam as the main
source of norms in all spheres of life so that Islam could be fully practiced by its adherents.
Thus, according to the Islamists, da 'wa becomes incumbent upon all Muslims. Clark also
reminds that the Islamist project, for the Islamists, is an attempt to create a web between
religion, politics, and all forms of political and social activism. In a similar vein, my
interviewees believed that Muslims efforts should reinforce each other for the ultimate
goal of establishing an Islamic order. From this type of understanding of da 'wa, all sorts of
Islamic institutions (social, economic, and political) become a form of putting da 'wa into
practice. Participating, volunteering, or donating money and time to an Islamist institution
becomes a form of religious deed, and an expression oflslamist identity. More importantly,
as the Islamists perceive the secularist elites and the state as an obstacle to their goal of
establishing an Islamic order and as cultural agents corrupting Muslim identity, struggling
against the secularist state and waging an all-inclusive war of position becomes a form of
religious deed. My interviews with the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists identically revealed
that for the Islamists political activism is more than just a political act, in fact (since it is
actually da 'wa), it becomes a religious act as well. 325

325

Remember one of the references regarding Imam Ayatollah Khomeini's description of political
participation as a good deed sanctioned by Islam (thawab) in one of the earlier chapters.
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The Relationship between Islamism and Democracy-Democratization
Since its establishment, the Brotherhood remained as an illegal organization
because neither the Egyptian monarchy under the auspices of the British, nor the new
republic established after the military coup of the Free Officers ofNasser recognized the
Brotherhood as a legal political group. 326 The Brotherhood remained highly political and
went underground during the Nasser period. Later, Sadat allowed the Brotherhood to
operate for counterbalancing the leftists in ASU. In the late 1970s, several violent radical
factions within the Brotherhoods plit from the organization and created terrorist groups like
the Egyptian Jihad andAl-Takfir. The Brotherhood elders most of whom represented the
mainstream Brotherhoods trongly denounced violence. Thus, the split was caused by the
denunciation of violence by the elders and the disagreement between the elders and some
young members of the Brotherhood on how to br ingaboutthe Shari'a. The majority of the
elders believed thattransformingthe society from below andsimultaneouslyworkingfor
the introduction of the Shari 'a by social and political activism would be the best way to
follow. However, the violent radical groups which split from the Brotherhood believed
that the introduction of the Shari 'a could only be possible through a violent revolution, and
forcibly removing the secularists from power. 327

Islamism and Democracy-Democratization
Shahin (2007, 1) argues that the Muslim Brotherhood "made a clear and deliberate
departure from its traditionally cautious approach." Until the early 1980s, the Brothers
"rejected the idea of getting directly involved in the political process," and focused their

efforts on building the bases of their organization. However, starting from the early 1980s,

326

For a detailed discussion of the relations between the Brotherhood and the consequent regimes, see
Chapters 4 and 5 .
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the Brotherhood, focused its efforts on electoral and associational politics. The
organization was not allowed to create a political party; thus, its participation into politics
took place through the independent candidates of the organization or through electoral
alliances with other political parties which included Brotherhood members under their
electorallists.

328

A parallel strategy of the Brotherhood was to get involved in the

associational politics ofEgypt. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Brotherhood took
control of the most significant and politically active professional associations like the
lawyers, engineers, doctors, and pharmacists associations. 329 Ismail (1995, 45) argues that
" ... in a context in which political parties have been virtually ineffective, the syndicates
were appropriated as political space by those denied admission through regular channels."
Ya~ar

(2006, 167) argues that the professional associations "acted like opposition parties

in a political system characterized by weak political parties." In addition to limited
electoral activism and associational involvement, the Brotherhood also focused on
providing social services through hundreds of charity and social service organizations.
Through those services, the Brotherhood became widely popular among the people who
directly benefitted from those services. As

Ya~ar

(2006, 170) points out the network of

services created by the Brotherhood" ... gives a sense of community to neighborhoods by
helping citizens obtain food, jobs, and healthcare ... free textbooks, housing and
transportation ... "

330

As Shahin (2007, 2) points out, the reform initiative of2004 and the electoral
platform of the Brotherhood during the campaign period for the 2005 parliamentary

327

For a discussion of the disagreements among the ranks of the Brotherhood, see Chapter 4.
The Brothers first made an electoral alliance with the New Wafd Party in 1984 elections. Later in
1987 elections, they made an alliance with the Socialist Labor Party.
329
See Fahmy's (1998) and Campagna's (1996) articles on the Brotherhood's performance in the
Egyptian professional associations.
328
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elections marked a major turning point for the Brotherhoodr egardingthe organization's
willingness to embrace democratic values and principles. Hawthorne (2004) reports that
the initiative called on the Egyptian regime to repeal the emergency law and the restrictions
on political activity. The initiative also called for "reducing the military's role in politics,
privatizing Egypt's economy and reforming it according to Islamic principles, purging nonIslamic material from Egypt's media, fostering an independent judiciary ... " Shahin (2007,
2) summarizes the Brotherhood's 2004 reform initiative and 2005 campaign messages in
regards to their relationship to democracy:
In essence the documents and statements reassert a commitment to the civic nature of
political authority, notwithstanding their adherence to the principles of the Shari' a and
respect for the basic values and instruments of democracy; respect for public freedoms;
acceptance of pluralism; transfer of power through clean and free elections; sovereignty
of the people; separation of power; rejecting the use of violence and adopting gradual
and legal means to achieve reform; acceptance of citizenship as the basis for rights and
responsibilities for Muslims and non-Muslims; and support of human rights, including
those of women and the Copts.

The changes within the ranks of the Brotherhood towards a highly receptive attitude
regarding democracy could be ascribed to the efforts ofthe Brothers since the mid-1990s
"to rebuild their structures and better position themselves to engage in the political process
and interact with other political actors" as a younger generation oflslamists carrying
varying political experiences "with a more proactive political culture" were able to affect
the Brotherhood's orientations (Shahin2007, 2). 331

330

See the detailed discussion of the extent of the services provided by the Brotherhood in Chapter 5.
Indeed, in 1995, as a result of some of the Brotherhood elders' uncompromising stance, several young
members split from the organization forming the Wasat Party. As discussed earlier in Chapter 5, after the
passing away ofMashour in 2002 and of Al-Hudaibi in 2004, as the last of the influential old guard, the
most significant opening for the further transformation became possible for the Brotherhood. Muhammed
Mahdi Akefbecame the general guide of the Brotherhood in 2004 and younger Brothers took positions as
two deputy general guides stipulated by Brotherhood's bylaws. When he WcJS elected as the general guide,
Akefrepeated their desire to operate as a political party. Indeed the reform initiative was prepared under
the auspices and encouragement of Akef. As El-Ghobashi (2005, 390) points out, for the first time in its
history, a general guide of the Brotherhood officially announced ideas developed by the comparatively
young members of the organization. Indeed, Akefs message was carefully devised for the intention of
appealing to several audiences: "the Egyptian government, opposition parties, and independent
331
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Given the authoritarian conditions uncle r which the Brotherhood ope rate and
participate into politics, the results of2005 elections can be interpreted as an impressive
victory for the Brotherhood. Indeed, 88 of the Brotherhood members running as
independent candidates became members of the Egyptian parliament. This translates into
approximately 20 percent of the seats in the lower camera (Majlis Al-Sha 'ab) of the
bicameral Egyptian parliament (Khalil 2006, 44). Contrary to the general asstunptions, the
Brotherhood candidates voiced mundane concerns ofthe electorate as well as their
demands for the implementation of the Shari 'a. In other words, the Brotherhood members
were paying attention to bread and butter issues as well as the Holy Scripture. My
interviews also indicated the same. For example, one member of the Egyptian parliament
from the Brotherhood whom I interviewed emphasized the same point. He was elected as
an independent deputy from a small rural area north of Cairo. As he indicated during our
interview, during his electoral campaign, he went door to door and explained his plans on
how to solve the rural community's problems like increasing the government's investment
on the irrigation system, enhancing various existing governmental subsidies for farmers,
quality of public schools in the area, sanitation, governmental health services and the like.
Regarding the democratic model as applied in the Western democracies, the
Islamists whom I interviewed believe that although some fundamental universal principles
of democracy exist (like free and fair elections, one man one vote principle, the rule of
law ... etc.), application of democracy may change from one context to the other. Two high
rank Brotherhood members whom I interviewed emphasized this point while they were
expressing some of their reservations about Western democracies. They believed that
western democracies were designed according to the culture and religion of the western

intellectuals, and foreign parties demanding Arab reform, principally the Bush administration and its
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cotu1tries; thus, they argued, it would be a huge mistake to identically "copy and paste"
western democratic models onto Muslim societies. One of the Egyptian Islamists gave the
example of Richard Gere who, during his vi sit to India, kissed an Indian celebrity on the
TV. This then caused a lot of controversy in India because kissing in public is illegal there.
The Islamist referred to this incident and argued that India was a parliamentary democracy
and they had be en maintaining their democracy for a longtime without any major problems,
however they still respect their cultural and religious values. 332 Thus, Islamists believe that
they can take what would work best for themselves from democracy and leave out the rest.
A Turkish Islamist whom I interviewed said: "we want a democracy that is respectful of
religion and our Islamic demands ... "

Framing Islamism from a Democratic Point of View and Vice Versa
Even a cursory reading of the Islamist books, newspaper articles and opinion
pieces on different blogs would show that within the last three decades, the Islamistjargon
on democracy and democratization has significantly expanded. Islamists have increasingly
started to use concepts borrowed from the democracy-democratization literature and in
both coillltries, at least for the last three decades they have been framing their struggle from
a democratic point of view. Islamists also frame democracy from an Islamist point of view.
In this section, first, I will discuss how and why the Islamists frame their struggle from a
democratic point of view, and second, I will discuss the Islamists' framing of democracy
from an Islamist point of view.
The Islamists tend to differentiate two different aspects of democracy. As Shahin
(2007, 4) succinctly points out, although the Egyptian Islamists "explicitly declare their

''Greater Middle East Initiative."
I also reminded him that in many states in India, slaughtering a cow is a serious crime.
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commitment to democracy", they "distinguish between democracy as a system of values
and de moe racy as a pol icy instrument." As Shahin highlights, most lslamists have no
problem with the latter (like respect for human rights, freedom of expression, free and fair
elections ... etc.); indeed they urge their governments to expand democratic rights and
freedoms, and to assure free and fair elections. However, they have reservations with some
of the values on which Western liberal democracies were built upon. For example, the
Islamists are completely against things like gambling, prostitution, and consumption of
alcohol that are allowed in liberal Western democracies. The Turkish Islamists also share
the views of the Egyptian Islamists. The Islamists whom I interviewed were supportive of
democracy as a policy instrument; however like their Egyptian counterparts, they believed
that through collective decision making, the parliamentarians did not have the right to
change what is permissible (halal) 333 and what is forbidden (haram) 334 that were clearly
stated in the Qur' an. Islamists believe that the Qur' an, being the major authoritative source
of the Shari 'a, 335 is absolute and human reasoning (i.e., 1egislation) cannot challenge it. For
example, gambling is strictly prohibited by the Qur'an. Thus, accordingtowhatthe
Islamists think, the parliament cannot make it legal through legislation, on the basis of
liberal freedoms or of some benefits of gambling for the local community like local taxes
or creation of jobs.

333

Helal in Turkish.
Haram in Turkish.
335
There are four major sources of the Shari'a (Islamic law). First is the Qur'an. Second is the Hadith
(sayings of Prophet Muhammed recorded in 6 separate volumes known as Kutub Sitta) and the Sunnah
(tradition ofprophet Muhammed). Third is ljma (a group of scholars issuing afatwa-religious wrdict- on
a question). Fourth is Qiyas (independent reasoning through analogies ).ljma and Qiyas can not contradict
with the Qur'an and Sunna/Hadith. In the Shari'a, when answering a legal question, the Muslim
jurisprudent first has to consult the Qur'an, then if an answer is not available there, the Sunna and the
Hadith collections haw to be consulted. If there is still no answer for the question, then the jurisprudent
can consult other scholars or use his independent reasoning by looking at precedents.
334
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Islamists also relate democracy and Islam by drawing parallels between the two.
They are always cautious about comparing the two, because the Islamists believe that Islam
is a religion, and a complete way of life; however for them, democracy is a set of
principles that evolved over the years based on the shared experiences and lessons of the
people who created it. They argue that the concept of Shura (consultation) in Islam has a
democratic essence; indeed they believe that Islam instructs Muslims to solve their
problems through consultation. Additionally the Islamists frequently point out the election
of the caliphs by the tribal leaders after Prophet Muhammed's death. 336 One Islamist
critically stated: "the Umayyads and Abbasids steered away from the example set by the
first four caliphs and introduced monarchies ... Today, after fourteen hundred years we still
discuss the same matters that actually had been resolved by the first four rightly guided
caliphs."

Conclusion
In order to understand how the Islamists and the secularist regimes interact, one
first has to look at how the Islamists and the secularist regimes define: i) themselves, ii)
politics, iii) threats, and iv) each other. Indeed, in regards to how both sides perceive each
other, there is a wide range of options from confrontation to cooperation. In both countries,
perceiving politics as a zero-sum game and mutual distrust between both sides make it
further difficult for them to compromise which then can potentially escalate into severe
crisis situations. Moreover, both sides perceive politics as a kind of war which is a highly
contentious and polarized conception of politics
The Islamists in both countries define their movements in terms of
comprehensiveness of their movement defined by the Islamic terms of da 'wa and jihad.
336

This topic was covered in Chapters 2 and 4.
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The interviewees in both countries pointed out "the opportunity to make Islam the essence
of people's lives and to bring about an Islamic order" as the major motivation that attracts
them to politics and Islamist activism. They believed that their mission was to transform
their societies in accordance to the Islamic principles. They also believed that given the
current non-Islamic and lax condition of their societies, a complete transformation was
necessary. For them, the societal transformation would start with the individual
transformation; however, it was not enough by itself to bring about the Islamic order.
Islamist politicians/parliamentarians have multi-issue policy platforms with
powerful Islamic undercurrents. They gain the confidence of ordinary citizens by framing
through Islam (regarding the three types of frames-diagnostic, prognostic, and
motivational). For the movement participants, jihad is not just fighting in a war; there are
different degrees ofjihad. Similar to what Al-Banna understands from the concept, the
Turkish and Egyptian Islamists believed that working for the establishment of an Islamic
order would indeed be jihad.
All Islamists (movement organizers and participants) emphasize the significance of
recognition of7respect for their basic rights by the government. However, in their
relationship with their rank and file, they more focus on the responsibilities of Muslims
than the rights. The Islamists also distinguish between the two types of Muslims (ordinary
and committed). They believe that since jihad and da 'wa are interconnected, and there are
varying degrees of responsibilities for each and every Muslim; the most important of those
would be being a goodM uslimatthe individual level and struggling for the establishment
of an Islamic order at the collective/societal level.
My interviewees also argued that because the Shari 'a was not applied by their
secularist states, Muslims, therefore, have a greater responsibility to establish an Islamic
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order as this responsibility falls upon every Muslim and it becomes completely antithetical
to secularism (please refer to the discussion offardh 'ayn andfardh kifayah made earlier
in the chapter). The Islamists whom I interviewed were also against the state's control
over religion, and they put forward two interrelated reasons for their discontent with it.

First, the Islamists believed that the state's control over religion corrupts Islam as the state
designs religion as it fits into the state's priorities (which are not necessarily Islamic), not
the other way around. Second, the lslamists also believed that the state control over
religion sought to pacify and to depoliticize the Islamists who, for the secularists, were the
major political and ideological threats against the secularist regime. Here, I consider it
very important to note that the Turkishlslamists believe that the Turkish state is openly
against Islam; however, the Egyptian Islamists make the very nuanced argument about their
state that the Egyptian state is not necessarily against Islam, but definitely against Islamism
(please refer to the debates in Chapter 3 in regards to the Egyptian state's attempts to

Jslamize itself as a response to Islamism; however, the Turkish state chose a complete
confrontationist approach in regards to the Turkish Islamists).
The Turkish and Egyptian Islamists whom I interviewed believed that secularism
was not an indigenous Muslim concept. For them, secularism was not simply about
separating religion from politics; indeed, over the years, it had been used as a tool to
prevent the Islamists from coming to power (in addition to this point, the Turkish Islamists
believe that secularism, as arbitrarily implemented by the secularists, became a tool of
oppressing Islam in Turkey). My interviewees also believed that secularism legitimized
and masked the arbitrary use of authoritarian measures to squash the Islamist opposition.
As opposed to the secularists, the Islamists believe that secularism cannot be a way of life;
in fact it is a principle of de signing a government.
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Both movements are similar in regards to how they should react to those external
threats. Both movements perceive the secularist regime and religious/cultural corruption
and blindly imitation of the West as the hi ggest threat against the Muslim identity (or
Muslimness). For the Islamists, the secularists are the agents of moral corruption and
Westernization of their countries. My interviewees also argued that the secularist elites'
efforts to secularize Muslim societies serve two main purposes: i) ideologically, through
secularization the society would be less susceptible to the appeal of the Islamism, and ii)
politically, secularization would eventually create a more homogenized society which
would be easier to govern.
My interviewees also revealed their nationalist feelings and associated colonialism
and war with concepts like "greed of Europeans" or "expansionist/imperialist policies of
the West" as well "anti-Islamism of Europe." When compared, I found the Turkish
Islamists to be more influenced by nationalist sentiments than the Egyptian Islamists
because Islam was completely erased from the public realm during the single-party era in
Turkey, thus Islam found nationalism as the only vehicle toe xpress i tsel£
Most of my interviewees had a state of mind which I would call "the siege
mentality." They believed that both Islam and their Muslimness were under a serious threat
and they were besieged by the external threats. They were also highly critical regarding the
secularist media and mostly blamed it for the moral corruption and misrepresentation of
Muslims. They believed that the best way of getting out of the siege was to Islamically
transform their societies. For them, this transformation first begins with a renovation of the
individual. The iman (faith) brings about serious changes in the life of the individual. After
the first step, the transformation would gradually but ultimately spread out to incorporate
every sector of society.
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My interviewees also believed that although some fi.mdamental universal principles
of democracy existed, application of democracy might change from one context to the other.
They voiced their demands for an "Islamic democratic option" that would respect their
beliefs and allow them to practice their faith without any obstacles. They also appeared to
make a distinction between the procedural aspects of democracy and liberal democratic
principles. They had no problems with the first part; however they had serious reservations
with the second part. The Islamists also appeared to frame their issues within the
democratic jargon; they also claimed that Islam was compatible with democracy (at least
with the procedural aspect of democracy). Furthermore, regarding the aspect of democracy
as it relates to liberties, my interviewees had serious reservations; however, although they
did not seem to be well articulated on this issue, they believed that a middle ground was
possible by making democracy more compatible with/respectful oflslam.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION
Since the collapse ofthe Soviets, the prospects for a worldwide third wave of
democratization have become one of the major questions of those who are students of
politics .. The democratic transformation of the former Eastern Bloc took place incredibly
fast; however, the Middle East appears to be exceptional in regards to democratization
with long lastingdictatorships/authoritarianregimes, and a poor record of human rights and
rule oflaw.
The political expression(s) of religion is not something new; indeed, globally the
relationship between religion and politics is one of the most contentious topics of
contemporary politics and governance. In some regions of the world, religious revivalist
movements coincide with the formation of more democratic political systems; in other
areas, the two forces are in conflict. One of the crucial issues determining the political
future of Muslim countries is the relationship between the secularist governments and the
Islamist movements' increasing participation into the political processes (Esposito and
Voll 1996).
Unfortunately there has always been a certain confusion of concepts both in the
West and in the Muslim world due to the interchangeable use of the terms such as Muslim,
Islamist, Salafist, fundamentalist, radical, extremist and terrorist. Besides lack of proper
understanding of the Islamists and of the politics of Muslim countries, one possible reason
for this interchangeable use of the concepts above is the mistaken idea that Islamist groups
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throughoutthe Muslim world are a monolith. In fact, the Islamist resurgence is
characterized by factions that diverge on their approach to major themes such as how the
nature of ideal Muslim society should be; relationship between Islamist activists and the
political system; method of solving socioeconomic problems; ideology; interpretation of
the mutual relationship of religion and state; and organization of social life according to the
Islamic law. More radical or militant of these groups follow a violent revolutionary path337
that must be imposed from the top, while more moderate groups call for gradual change that
musthappenfrom within the system through widespread support ofthe masses. Far from
being a monolith, the mainstream Islamist movements in the Muslim world differ greatly
from the extremist ones at the margins (Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999). Another possible
reason for the interchangeable use of the concepts is the influence Orientalism, which was
discussed earlier in this study (For categorization of the Islamists, and the similarities and
differences between them, see Table 1, 2, and 3 in the appendix).
Islamist revivalist movements are not a new phenomenon; in fact there are several
examples of revivalist movements in Islamic history. The Kharijitcs are considered to be
as the first revolutionaries/revivalists in the early days oflslam. The 181h and the 19th

337

Tibi (1998) points out that according to the rationale of the top-down violent revolutionaries, all
secularist regimes are illegitimate because they represent or are direct products ofjahiliyyah which is
the other extreme of God's hakimiyyah (sovereignty). For them, only Allah rules, humans can have no
sovereignty and Islamic revelation takes precedence over the reason-centered view of the V\Orld.
Following the footsteps of Qutb, current violent revolutionary Islamists consider the struggle to be their
ultimate duty against secularist Muslim governments and against those individual Muslims who have fallen
into jahiliyyah, and only jihad can bring the nizam Is/ami (Islamic order) to the Muslim world. They also
accuse their fellow Muslims not only of being infected by secular modernity and thus to have lapsed into
jahiliyyah, but also of kufr (heresy). Thus, according to this notion, current Islamic societies are
generally characterized as a mix ofjahiliyyah and kufr; true Muslims should retreat from these societies
by emulating Prophet Muhammad's hijra which is the retreat of the small group of Muslims including
Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622, marking the beginning of the Islamic calendar.
Accordingly, going underground for battling the secularist regimes becomes a modern version of hijra as
well as jihad. The Muslims who question and reject these arbitrary interpretations of the violent Islamists
are renounced as infidels. Egyptian violent Revolutionaries ridiculed even the dignified former Sheikh
(head, director) of Al-Azhar, Jadulhaq, who denounced violence in his various statements (Tibi 1998, 5659).
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centuries witnessed significant Islamic revivalist movements like those of Muhammad Ibn
AbdAl Wahhab(Wahhabism), SayyidMuhammadibnAli Al Sanusi (Sanusi Movement)
and Sayyid Ahmad Barel vi (the Barel vis) in different parts of the Muslim world (Husain
2003, 63-64). However, contemporary revivalist movements differ from those of earlier
times in that they are modern, not traditional, in their leadership, ideology, and
organization. Thus, it would make more sense to characterize the current Islamist
movements as neo-fundamentalist or neo-revivalist for they look to the sources oflslam,
the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet not simply to replicate the past, but to respond to
a new age (Esposito 1998, 129).
Another important point to reiterate is that being Muslim and being Islamist are not
synonymous (Ismail 2004, 614-631). Thus, the assertion of a Muslim identity does not
necessarily represent an endorsement of these movements. For Ismail, Islamism entails a
political ideology articulating the idea of the necessity of establishing an Islamic
government, understood as a government which implements the Shari'a. However,
Islamization signifies a drive to Islamize the society which involves a process through
which "various domains of social life are invested with signs and symbols associated with
Islamic cultural traditions." Islamist politics both diverge and converge with the process of
Islamization. Thus, Islamists and Muslims who seek Islamization of their societies may not
necessarily be the same group of people. Ordinary practicing Muslims may be interested in
Islamizing their societies, however the project oflslamization would mainly focus on
social institutions and practices, not necessarily on political institutions. 338 As opposed to
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The wrsion oflslam proposed by the Islamists in general has heavy political overtones. For the
Islamists, Islam is a holistic W<lY of life, not just a religion, \\hich encompasses every aspect of human
life. As a result, Islamists plead to redesign the state by implementing the Shari'a, despite the fact that
among the Muslims, v.:trious interpretations of the Shari'a exist. Islamism in the modern sense basically
grew as an aspiration to have a government based on Islam and it manifests itself in three different
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the violent Islamists, the bottom-up Islamists are puritanical, preaching, and populist, who
seek to re-Islamize the society and establish the Shari'a by social and political action.
Their basic purpose is to transform the society from within. They strongly believe thatthe
ultimate end-Islamization of the society and government- does not (and should not)
legitimize violence because they believe that the means through which you achieve your
end should be justifiable and non-violent as well as the end (Fuller 2002; Esposito 1995).
The TurkishandEgyptiancases represent most different political systems with
their different backgrounds (history, language, national identity, and politics) However,
both countries have been witnessing Islamism Thus, casual observers might associate the
emergence of political Islam in both countries with the popular appeal oflslamist
revivalist movements in the twentieth century. However, this appears to be a tautological
assumption. Neither does political Islam emerge in every Muslim society, nor do all
political Islamist movements share the same characteristics.
The evolution of political Islam in Egypt is very similar to the evolution of political
Islam in Turkey although as countries they have very different backgrounds. Indeed,
Egyptian Islamism emerged earlier than its Turkish counterpart did. Thus, the Egyptian
Islamist movement lags behind the Turkish movement. I associate this lag with the
differences between the two countries' level of democratic inclusiveness and
institutionalization. Turkey embraced the multi-party system in 1950 and allowed Islamism

dispositions: Revolutionary, Traditionalist and Modernist (Husain 2003). Although all Islamists (not

necessarily all Muslims) would like to have an Islamic state and prefer living under an Islamic state to
living under a secular state, they greatly differ in their willingness, determination and methods for
achieving that ultimate end. Therefore, Islamists do not constitute a monolith in many aspects. For
instance, the Modernist Islamists and the Traditionalist Islamists would be more active regarding
Islamization of their societies than politically pursuing programs for the establishment of the Shari'a.
Other Muslim groups such as sufis (mystics) do not advocate Islamism at all although they would be
willing to Islamize their societies. Inside the same society, several types of Islamist movements can often
be found, and those separate movements usually hardly cooperate (Husain 2003, 261-285).
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to organize politically. 339 However, Egypt did not experience a similar process, and this
created severe political constraints on the institutionalization oflslamism by excluding the
Islamists from the electoral politics. 340
This study contributes to our understanding of Is lamism and state-society relations
in Egypt and Turkey in two major aspects: the causal aspect and the conceptual aspect.
Causally, this study relates the government control over religion with pol iticization of the
Islamists within the context of state-society relations. Conceptually, this study relates
Islamism with social movement literature, frames, and Gramscian struggle of antihegemonic war of position.
In regards to the causal aspect, through a critique of the dominant conceptual

models (i.e., modernization and crisis theories), this study provides better explanatory
tools to understand Islamism because such theories generally interpret the rise oflslamism
as a reactionary response to deteriorating socioeconomic and political conditions in
Muslim societies. The adherents of crisis theories often fail to focus on many crucial
aspects oflslamist activism such as how the Islamists create their frames and discourses,
build alliances, initiate and get involved in grassroots social and political activism, and
recruit members. In regards to the conceptual aspect, this study analyses Islamism in both
countries through a selective reading of the social movement theory because it provides
better explanatory tools than those of the Modernization and/or (Neo )Orientalist theories.

339

In fact establishing a party purely on grounds of religion or race is unconstitutional in Turkey;
however, the MNP, the first Islamist party in Turkey was established in 1971. Earlier during the singleparty era (1923-1950), various external and internal pressures forced the single party government in
Turkey to create a multi-party system: the pressures from the U.S. and some of the European states, the
prospective NATO membership for Turkey in the forthcoming years-1952- and a strong internal dissent
under the single-party rule of the Republican Peoples' Party).
340

Islamism is not an institution, but I have borrowed the terminology here for clarification. One might
argue that if the constraints on the Egyptian Islamists \\<ere eliminated in Egypt, the path that the Islamists
follow would be very similar to the path followed by the Turkish Islamists.
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Also, there is abundant literature on identity politics and political activism in various
Western contexts; however such studies are lacking within the context of Middle Eastern
societies. Thus, another contribution of this study is analyzing political activism in nonWestern contexts. Additionally, being an in depth cross-national and cross-cultural
comparative study, this dissertation of two culturally and politically different countries of
the Middle East becomes a significant contribution to the literature on Islamism.

The Struggle Continues: Turkey
The Islamist struggle and the tension between the secularists and Islamists in
Turkey seem to be far from over; and it is expected that the struggle will continue in the
following years. The next parliamentarian elections are scheduled for November of20 11.
It is not unwise to assume that the lslamists will try to maintain and de fend the positions
that they have taken up to this point; whereas the secularists will attempt to de feat the
Islamists in this Gramscian war of position because both sides perceive politics as a
"zero-sum game." The Islamist AKP managed to elece41 its Foreign Minister A. Gill as the
new president and it should be expected that through President GUI, more appointments
will be done for critical bureaucratic positions from the ranks of the AKP. One should also
expect a continuous resistance from the secularist establishment, i.e., the secularist media,
judicial system, major public universities, public bureaucracy and military. It is not
difficult to guess that AKP's priority in its second parliamentarian term will be on
strengthening its position in the judiciary by appoi ntingjudges who are more sympathetic to
AKP's ideological position. It should also be expected that the AKP will continue its
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Under the Turkish parliamentarian system, the National Assembly elects the president for one sevenyear period. In the fall of2007, the AKP initiated a national referendum which was favorably voted by the
Turkish citizens. The current president's term ends in 2014, and after that date, there will be popular
elections of presidents \\flo will be able to serve for five years for two terms (if elected).
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political struggle through a more democratic discourse since that strategy worked out well
since 2002 due to the fact that the AKP was able to pull some liberal secularists to their
lines and get their consent on a variety of pol icy issues, thus creating a larger consensus
through its emphasis on democratic freedoms and rights.
In the upcoming years, it seems that the AKP will focus its efforts on completing the
preparation of a new constitution which is labeled as a "civilian constitution." Turkish
Constitutions (1924, 1961, and 1982) have typically subordinated the individual to the
state, instead of protecting individual from the state. 342 However, preparing a new
constitution is going to be a contentious process as the secularist establishment and the
oppositional parties regard the AKP's motives for change as suspicious (Barkey and
<;ongar, 67). The headscarf debate, which is one of the most symbolic and contentious
ideological/political fight between the two camps, is unlikely to disappear. On one hand,
the conservative constituency of the AKP increasingly pressures the second Erdogan
government to relax the ban; on the other hand, the secular establishment is upset about
such a relaxation as they strongly believe that such a relaxation would be against the
secularist nature of the Turkish regime. 343
It should also be expected that the AKP will be more sensitive to the expectations
ofTurkishKurds in the easternandsoutheasternregions of Turkey. The Kurds' show of
support for the AKP in the recent elections means that there will be more demands coming
from the Kurds for greater cultural freedoms and governmental investments to industrialize
the region. However, the nationalist military and the oppositional nationalist MHP have
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The last two of the three Turkish Constitutions were prepared under the auspicies of the junta regime
after the coups of 1960 md 1980.
343
Currently, there is a closure case against the AKP in the Turkish Constitutional court going on. In a
separate case, the Court overturned two constitutional amendments making it possible for Muslim
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been uncompromising on providing more cultural freedoms to the Turkish Kurds. The
overtly pro-Kurdish DTP's poor record in local and national elections can be attributed to
"its inability to offer a realistic vision for the future ofTurkey's Kurds" (Barkey and
<;ongar, 68).
Turkey's most important recent foreign pol icy challenges have been Turkey's
prospective membership for the EU and Turkey's policy regarding Iraq after the 2003 US
invasion. Turkish foreign pol icy-makers' major concern since the Gulf War of 1991 has
beendirectlyrelated to Turkey's difficulties with her own Kurdish population in the
southeastern region. The Kurdish separatist PKK ( Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan -KurdishKurdistan Workers' Party) has been using northern Iraq as a base of operations for the last
three decades. In fact, Turkish foreign pol icy makers and Turkish military have been highly
concerned about Iraqi Kurds moving towards a federal structure as this would set an
example for the Turkish Kurds. During the last week ofF ebruary 2008, t he Turkish military
carried out a brief military operation344 against the Kurdish PKK guerillas in northern Iraq.
Anti-Americanism345 is also on the rise in Turkey mainly due to the course of American
foreign policy after September 11, and the Iraq war and its impact on Kurdish ambitions in
northern Iraq.
Regarding Turkey's membership for the EU, several opinion polls revealed that the
support for Turkey's EUmembershipamongthe Turkish citizens has dropped from roughly
75 percent to 60 percent in the last decade. In the last decade or so several important
domestic and foreign policy issues have overshadowed Turkey's EU membership (i.e., the

females with headscarves to be able to attend universities without being forced to take their headscarves
off.
344
In fact, this is not the first military operation against the PKK guerillas in northern Iraq. There have
been 25 other similar military operations since the early 1980s.
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US invasion oflraq, Iran's nuclear ambitions, the resurfacing of the Kurdish separatism).
However, as <;avdar (2006, 488) argues the AKP government is committed to Turkey's EU
/ accession unlike the RP's earlier anti-EU stance because the AKP realized that the EU
could play a critical role in achieving some domestic political objectives. It is the AKP's
hope that the EU would help achieve civilian control over the military and enhance
religious freedoms 346 • <;avdar also maintains that the AKP government takes Turkey's EU
membership as a vehicle for greater political action and the promotion ofhumanrights and
religious freedoms. Indeed, many legal changes and their implementation have resulted
from Turkey's wish to comply with the EU standards (2006, 496). Regarding Turkey's Iraq
policy and Turkey's prospective EU membership, the military and the nationalist right (the
MHP and BBP) and left (the DSP and CHP) joined forces in accusing the AKP politicians
for being overly conciliatory and following a pro-US and pro-EU foreign policy.
However, this does not mean that the AKP intended to pursue a pro-American foreign
policy. Indeed, the AKP elaborated a new foreign policy that sought to improve relations
with the Middle East and Russia without abandoning its ties with the US and the EU.
It is also expected that the Cyprus and Armenia issues will continue to be among

the significant foreign pol icy issues for Turkey. Although Cyprus is a member of the EU,
Turkey still does not recognize the Cypriot government. Thus, Turkey still has not fulfilled
its commitmentto Brussels by extending to Nicosia Customs Union provisions, such as the
use of ports. The Cypriot government also has not done muchtohelpthe situation by
rejecting an internationally recognized solution in2004 pr opos ed by the Turkish Cypriots
in the north and Turkey. The Armenian issue was complicated more by the US, in an earlier
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See the PEW Research Center report at: http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportiD=252
released on 06.13.2006.
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attempt by the Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, to pass an Armenian Genocide
resolution (Barkey and <;ongar, 72).
As suggested by <;avdar (2006), Islamists of Turkey have been in a process of
political learning. Although <;avdar only focuses on the AKP's reignregardingthe learning
process of the Turkish Islamists, it would be more appropriate to date back this learning
process to the early 1970s when Islamists of Turkey for the first time emerged as an
organized political movement. As <;avdar argues, the Turkish Islamist model is marked by
"electoral participation and moderation" and it is a unique model since " .. .it is the specific
product of a transformation based on a set of distinct political and economic conditions"
(478). It is highly debatable whether the AKP model could be exported to other Muslim
countries; however the AKP' s political learning process seems to be far from being
complete. Indeed, it also appears that the political learning process of the AKP will be
shaped by a combination of dorrestic and international policy issues which will likely to
challenge the secondAKP government until the end of its tenure in 2011

347
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The Struggle Continues: Egypt
2004 and 2005 witnessed an "unprecedented opening of the political system" in
Egypt. Mubarak announced a new plan to make a legislative reform to amend article 76 of
the Constitution in February 2005. With the new amendment, despite some restrictions, the
first ever multi-candidate presidential election became possible in September 2005 (Antar
2007, 54).
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Abaza (2006, 5) argues that the Brothers in parliament "supported other

346

It is ironic that the secularist elite who earlier initiated the process of joining the EU now resist
Turkey's EU membership.
347
This could be ewn earlier because early elections can take place before 2011. Indeed, against the
ongoing closure case at the Turkish Constitutional Court, the AKP
348
Originally, article 76 of the Egyptian Constituton stated: ''The People's Assembly shall nominate the
President of the Republic ... The candidate who wins the two thirds of the votes of the Assembly shall be
referred to the people for a plebiscite." For a discussion of the restrictions, see Abaza (2006). The new
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opposition members of parliament in their protest against the amendment, describing it as
not conducive to free and fair elections." For the firsttime in Egypt's history, some
opposition leaders were able to freely address the Egyptian people with their concerns and
criticisms in regards to a wide range of issues. The two main contenders, Nooman Gomaa
(WafdParty) andAymanNour (Al-Ghad Party), were able to organize large-scale rallies
in the Nile Delta, Cairo area, and upper Egypt (Abaza 2006, 9). The Brotherhood did not
have a particular preference of the candidates, however M. Akef, the leader of the
Brotherhood, advised the Brotherhood members to review the different candidates'
platform and decide which vision would best serve the Egyptian people. 349
In November 2005 parliamentarian elections, 88 of 150 Brotherhood members,
which translates into 20 pe rcent of the lower house, running as independents were elected
to the lower house of the Egyptian Parliament only two months after the presidential
election.

350

Antar (2007, 55) argues that the first multi -candidate presidential election had

an impact on the Brotherhood's success because the introduction of competition into the
presidential elections "showed that the regime had reached an unprecedented impasse and
was eager to prove its legitimacy." Also, the Egyptian regime sought to counter the recent
emergence of secular opposition movements, like the liberal-secular Al-Ghad (Tomorrow)
Party and the secular Kifaya (Enough) movement.

amendment provides few opportunities for challengers because of various restrictive provisions. For
instance, eligibility for presidential candidacy is limited to the executive bodies of political parties,
excluding party members who lod no leadership positions. Article 2 of the law regulating the rpesidential
elections hardly makes it possible for an independent to run. The candidate would need the backing of250
elected members of the lower and upper houses of parliament as well as the municipal councils, and those
signatures need to be obtained from bodies controlled by the ruling NDP. Only parties with 5 percent of
the legislative seats can filed a presidential candidate.
349
For a more detailed discussion of the election results, see Chapter 3.
350
As stated earlier in Chapter 5, the Brothers did not run in all of the electoral districts. They ran only in
150 districts and 88 of them were able to win. This translates into a 59 percent success as to the number
of elected parliamentarians. The independent Brotherhood candidates got 20.7 percent of the votes, and
Mubarak's NDP got 69.7 percent.
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Following the Brotherhood's success after the 2005 parliamentarian elections, the
Mubarakregime tightenedi ts grip on the Brotherhood by pos tponingthe local elections
two years which were supposed to be held in 2006. In the spring of2006, the government
arrested numerous members of the Brotherhood as well as freezing their assets in Egyptian
banks and later confiscating them altogether. In February 2007, Mubarak ordered the arrest
of 16 prominent Brotherhood members to be tried at the military tribunals. Additionally,
the NDP hastily amended article 179 of the Constitution, a counter-terrorism article, which,
after the amendment, provided sweeping powers for the regime making it easy for the
Egyptian government to crack down on the suspected Islamists, refer the suspects to the
military courts at speed, and arbitrarily arrest the suspects. As discussed earlier, these
measures strongly indicate that the Egyptian regime does not tolerate the Islamists if they
start having political successes and begin to challenge the authority of the government
(either in the political realm or in the ideological realm).
An important part of the Brotherhood's success lies in its ability to e stahl ish a
powerful grassroots base with its capability to successfully mobilize people. This is due to
the "horizontal networks" and grassroots activism based on the Brotherhood's strong
presence in the Egyptian civil society. Antar (2006, 56) reports that forty percent of the
people in Egypt live below the poverty line. Under such circumstances, providing social
services in various areas proves to be essential in gaining support of the people. Also, as
discussed earlier, the Brotherhood successfully frames its message in a religious fashion
which is the common language among the masses. The Brotherhood's framing of their
messages through a religious rhetoric could be best understood considering the fact that
Egypt's history and political culture lacks genuine democratic experience and acquaintance
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with liberal democratic values, and the adult illiteracy rate is quite high (28.6 percent). 351
This could be a topic of another study; however, it appears that religion seems to be the
only common language through which the Egyptian Islamists could transmit their message
across the masses. The Brotherhood's success mostly stems from its organizational
abilities and their success over the years in expanding their organizational base while
carefully adapting to changing political climate. Although the core Islamist message of the
Brotherhood still remains the same, its "message and rhetoric have evolved and adapted to
the social and political realities ofEgypt" (Antar 2007, 58).
Egyptian secularist critics argue that despite the fact that the Brotherhood has been
undertaking to participate through peaceful venues in the political process, it is not clear
whether it is genuinely a democratic movement or will use democratic means to pursue an
authoritarian agenda. Another criticism is about the compatibility of the Shari'a with
democracy. Although the Brotherhood argues that the Shari'a does not contradict with
democracy, they are not completely clear on the application of the Shari'a in regards to
complex social, political and economic problems. Their policy platform does not lay out
the details regarding the implications of the Shari'a within the context of larger secular
political system. Here, some important questions still remain to be answered.
As discussed earlier in Chapters 5 and 6, the Brotherhood does not have an issue
with the procedural aspects of democracy like elections, popular representation, and
collective decision making. However, they have strict reservations in regards to the liberal
freedoms in democratic systems. Thus, the following questions have to be satisfactorily
answered by the Brotherhood. For instance, does the Brotherhood plan to abolish liberal
freedoms once they come to power because some of the liberal freedoms contradict with

351

"Human Development Report: Egypt-The Human Development Index" Prepared by the UNDP,
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Islam (like consumption of alcohol, gambling or pre/extra marital sex)? In other words,
once they come to power, will they force Muslims 352 to abide by the Shari'a? And, will the
Islamists allow the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) to participate into politics?
Throughout the Islamic history, Jewish and Christian minorities were not allowed to have a
say in the political process (they were completely excluded from the political process;
however, they were free to practice their religion) and had a special status in the Shari'a

(Dhimmis-the ones who are under protection). They were not also required to serve in the
military; however, they had to pay higher taxes in return Uizya tax) because Muslims
considered the defense of the Muslims lands as a religious obligation. Thus, according to
this logic, one could not force non-Muslims to perform an Islamic obligation. For these
reasons, the Dhimmis did not serve in the military and they were denied political
participation. In regards to modern democratic standards of citizenship, this could create
an enormous crisis of political participation in regards to religious minorities in Egypt if
the Brothers were to follow the same principles, and the Brotherhood is silent about what
would happen to the religious minorities under their rule.
Similar concerns, as discussed above, also occupy the minds of the secularists in
Turkey. As the Turkish secularists often define secularism as a "way of life," they are
highly concerned a bout the pos sibilitythat the Islamists would interfere with their secular
way of life by introducing restrictions on alcohol consumption or banning it altogether, and
discriminating against the secularists. The Islamists respond to such criticisms by arguing

available at: http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country fact sheets/cty fs EGY.html
352
Islam recognizes Jews' and Christians' (The People ofthe Book) freedom of religious practice, thus
they can not be forced to convert to Islam; and the People of the Book have their own legal system
separately exists and applied by them under the Shari 'a. Muslims believe that forcing people to convert
would create hypocricy, and they often recite verses from the Qur'an like: " ...there is no compulsion in
religion" or ''your religion is to you, and my religion is to me."
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that the AKP had been in power since 2002, and they have not done anything to interfere
with the secular way oflife.
Recently, Alevis 353 have intensified their criticism of the AKP. Indeed, being
largely an unorthodox secular group, A levis have always been critical of the Turkish
government's policies in regards tor eligion. For example, since the be ginning of the
Turkish republic, the government has be en buildingS unni mosques in A levi villages and
towns. Over the years, this official practice has raised intense criticisms from the Alevis.
Alevis do not pray in the mosques as they have their own places of worship known as

cemevis (in Turkish cemevi literally means house of gathering). They don't fast in the
month of Ramadan since they fast only for ten days in the month of Muharrem for
commemoration ofKerbela victims. 354 Alevis believe that the government's policy of
building mosques in Alevi villages and towns is a deliberate policy of converting Alevis
into Sunnis (Siinnile~tirme, literally Sunni-zation). As discussed earlier in Chapter 3,
Alevis also criticize the Turkish government and the DiB because through the DiB the
government pays the salaries of prayer leaders in mosques; however there is no such
policy designed for the Alevi clergy. The Alevi cemevis are maintained completely by the
Alevi citizens, and the Alevis are not represented in the DiB. 355

353

The Alevis are an offshoot of Shi'a Islam, however there are significant differences between the Shi'a
and the Turkish Alevis. Turkish Ale vis have their own religious hierarchy (actually there is not one single
Alevi authority representing the Alevis, there are several) \\hich has no association with the Iranian Shi'a,
or any other Shi'a religious hierarchy. The Turkish Alevi belief system depends upon an oral tradition that
has passed over the generations. Alevis are known to be more secular than the rest of the population and
they predominantly mte for the leftist Republican People's Party. The Alevis' criticism of the D1B was
rrovided in Chapter 3.
54
In Kerbela (Karbala), members of Ali's (the fourth caliph after Muhammed) family including Ali's son
Imam HUseyin, Hiiseyin's son and cousins were massacred in 680 by Caliph Yezid I's forces (Yezid I is
Muaviye's son, Muaviye fought against HUseyin's father Ali in S1ffin in 657). The day of the massacre was
the tenth of the month ofMuharrem.
355
However, this seems to be a complicated debate because some Alevis claim that if Alevis are
represented in the DiB and the government appoints religious leaders for cemevis, then the Alevi
community will lose its autonomy. In short, Alevis claim that the AKP has a secret agenda to dominate
and transform the Alevi community in Turkey.
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What Can Possibly Happen?
The tension between the Islamists and the secularist establishments in both
countries are far from over. Given the direction of the current events in both countries, it
appears that the conflict between the two sides is going to be around in the following years.
Both sides have their own opposing scenarios: the optimistic and the pessimistic.
According to the optimistic scenario by the Islamists, through piecemeal achievements by
conducting the Gramscian war of position, they will be able to achieve more power and
gradually transform their societies into Islamic societies. The pessimistic scenario of the
Islamists is that they fail in the social and political sense either because they give up their
Islamic goals due to laxity or because they are crushed by a violent secularist takeover.
The secularists' optimistic scenario is that they will either maintain the status-quo or be
able to reverse the Islamist achievements over time. Their pessimistic scenario is that the
Islamists will become so powerful that they will not be able to maintain their struggle
against the Islamists and eventually the Islamists will win.
The current course of events provides us some hints regarding the possibilities for
the future. In both countries, the secularist establishment, be ingprompted by the Islamists'
recent political gains, has moved on to reverse them. Indeed, in both countries, the
secularists appear to be heavily relying on the legislative process to reverse the Islamist's
recent gains. For instance, M ubarak' s regime has tightened its grip on the Islamists by
legislating harsher laws on the Islamists, and the Turkish secularist establishment has
challenged the AKP through the Turkish Constitutional Court which is known to be highly
secularist. As a response, the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists have come up with an
emphasis democratic values and principles as they believe that democratic venues would
provide more openings for them in the political processes in the upcoming years.
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APPENDIX A

Turkish National Security Council Decisions
February 28, 1997
(28 Subat MGK Kararlan)

1-There shall be no compromise to the anti -regime activities that target the Turkish Republic, which
is a democratic, secular, social, and law-based state. The Revolution Laws defended by the arti cle
174 of the Constitution should be implemented without a compromise. It is the government's duty
to make its policies compatible with the Revolution Laws.
2-The public attorneys should act against violation of the Revolution Laws. The tarikat lodges that
violate the Revolution Laws should be closed.
3-It i s observed that weari ng sank (turban) and cloak is encouraged. T hose whose dresses
contradict the Revolution Laws should not be honored.
4-The abolishment ofthe article 163 ofthe Constitution created a legal vacuum and that resulted in
the strengthening oflsl amic reactionary movements and anti-secular attitudes. There should be new
legal regulations to fill this vacuum.
5-The education policies should again be compatible with the spirit of the Law on the Unification of
Education,
6-0bligatory education should increase to 8 years.
7-The Imam -Hatip schools were open to sati sfy a soci etal need [ofi mams]. The Imam-Hatip
schools which are beyond this need should be converted to vocati onal schools. Additionally, the
Qur'an courses con trolled by fundamentalist groups should be closed and their schools should be
regulated by the Ministry of Education.
8-There is an ongoing fundamentalist infiltration into the state bureaucracy and municipalities, the
government should stop this infiltration.
9-All actions, which aim to abuse
purposes should be ended.

religious issues (such as mosque construction) for political

10-The pump rifles should be taken under control and, if it is necessary', the sales of the pump
rifles should be banned.
11-lran's attempts that ai m to destabilize the regime in Turkey should be c1 osely watched. There
should be policies to prevent Iran to intervene Turkey's domestic affairs.
12- The regulations, which maintain effective working of the judiciary, guarantee judicial
independence, and protect it from the activities of the government, should immediately be created.
13-Recently, there is a huge increase of provocations that target the members of the Turkish Armed
Forces (T AF). These provocations have resulted in discontent in the T AF.
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14- The officers and petty officers who were expelled from the T AF because of their involvement
in Islamic reactionary activities have been hired by the municipalities. That should be prevented.
15- The speeches and behaviors of parties' mayors, regional chairmen, and town chairmen should
be accountable by the Law on P olitical Parties.
16- The tarikats' economic strengthening through their fmance institutions and foundations should
be carefully monitored.
17- The messages transmitted by the TV channels and particularly the radio stations, which have
anti-secular attitudes, should be carefully monitored and these broadcastings should adapt to the
Constitution.
18- The illegal money transfers of the National Outlook Foundation to some municipalities should
be stopped.
Source: Milliyet, April27, 1997

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

390
APPENDIXB
Selected Sermons
31.01.2003- MiLLi VE DiNi DEGERLERiMiZ
Aziz Mtisliimanlar!
isiam Dini, "tevh!d" esasma dayanrr. Tevh!d, alemlerin Rabbi Ytice Allah'm varhgma, birligine, zat,
stfat ve frillerinde e~i, benzeri ve ortagJ. bulunmadtgma ve yalmz O'na ibadet etmek gerektigine
inanmak demektir. Boyle bir imant telk!n eden islam D!ni, Mtisltimanlar arasmda sevgi ve saygtyt,
birlik ve beraberligi emreder. Renk, rrk, dil, bOlge ve dti~tince farkhhgmt, s;e~itli ktilttir ve
medeniyetler kurma, tan~ma ve geli~me vesilesi sayar. Hep uyumlu ve uzla~tct olmayt ister. Ancak,
toplumun dini ve milli degerlerini sarsmaya yonelen her ttirlti bozgunculugu, aymmcthgJ. ve
boltictiltigti kesin olarak reddeder. Ytice Allah, bu geryegi ~u ayetlerde dikkat vekici bir tislupla
ortaya koyar ve bizi uzla~maya davet eder: "Hep birlikte Allah'm ipine Kur'an'a) slffistkt sarlhn.
Pars;alamp boltinmeyin... "[l], "Allah'a ve Resulti'ne itaat edin ve birbirinizle s;ek~meyin. Sonra
gev~ersiniz ve giiciiniiz elden gider".[2] "Kendilerine apas;tk deliller geldikten sonra pars;alamp
aynhga dii~enler gibi olmaym"[3].
Degerli Mii'minler!
Gortildiigti tizere bu ayetlerde vurgulanan esaslar, millet ve devlet olmanm birer geregidir.
Mtisltiman bir millet olarak, milli hasletlerimize ve dini inanvlarlffitza ters dti~en gorii~ ve iddialar,
kimler tarafmdan ortaya atthrsa attlsm, bunlara itibar etmemek gerekir. Fikir ve inans; ozgiirliigti, bu
tiir gorii~ ve iddialarm ortaya attlmast is;in bir gereks;e olamaz. Zira ftkir ve inans; ozgiirltigti, her akla
geleni soylemeyi, toplumun birlik ve beraberligi sarsacak iddialar ortaya atmayt degil, bilakis
ba~kalarma faydah olacak dengeli ftkirler iiretmeyi gerektirir. Ytice Allah, her giizel konu~an ve ho~
goriinen k~iye, dogruluguna emin olmadan inamlmamast konusunda bizi uyarmakta ve mealen ~oyle
buyurmaktadtr:
"insanlardan oylesi de vardrr ki, diinya hayatma ili~kin sozleri, senin ho~una gider. Bir de
kalbindekine (soztintin oziine uyduguna) Allah't ~ahit tutar. Halbuki o, dti~manhkta en amanstz
olamdrr. 0, (senin yanmdan) ayrthnca yerytiziinde bozgunculuk yapmaga, ekin ve nesli yok etmeye
s;a~rr. Allah ise bozgunculugu sevmez. O'na "Allah'tan kork!" denildigi zaman gururu O'nu daha
da giinaha siiriikler. Arttk bOylesinin hakkmdan cehennem gelir. 0 ne kotii yerdir!".[4]
Aziz Cemaat!
Unutmayallm ki, bizi ayakta tutan, milli ve manev'i degerlerimizdir. DOn oldugu gibi bugiin de, birlik
ve beraberligimizi bozmaya, kutsal degerlerimizi sarsmaya 9ah~anlar bulunabilir. Bunlar, kendi sinsi
emellerine ula~mak i9in her ~eyi mubah goriir, her kthga biiriiniir, hatta bu ama9la dini bile
kullanabilirler. Son giinlerde bazt yorelerde, incil'i tamtmak, insan severlik ve diinya bar~m1
saglamak gibi maskeler altmda bazt boliicii propagandalarm ortaya ytkttgJ. s;e~itli haber
kaynaklarmdan ogrenilmektedir. Bunlar, "Diinya bar~mm saglanmast, insanltk aleminin birligi,
geryegin ara~tmlmast, din birligine gidilmesi, peygamberlerde ilahhk stfatmm bulundugu, diinyanm

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

391
son bulmayacagJ, k1yametin kopmayacag1, cennet ve cehennemin hirer sembol oldugu ve namazm
da sabah, ogle ve ak~am vakitlerinde kalben Allah'1 anmaktan ibaret bulundugu ... " gibi batll ve
hayan iddialarla, aziz milletimizin nezih inancm1 bulandrrmaya ve bOylece birligimizi bozmaya
ugra~maktadrrlar.

Bunlar, sagduyu sahibi milletimizin saglam ve sarsllmaz imant kar~tSmda elbette tiikeneceklerdir.
Ciinkii Miisliiman milletimiz, kesin olarak bilmektedir ki, son ilah'i kitap Kur'an-1 Kerim, son
Peygamber de Hz. Muhammed (s.a.v.)'dir. Kur'an-1 Kerim'de Cenab-1 Hak mealen, "i~te bu, benim
dosdogru yolum. Arttk ona uyun. B~ka yollara uymaym. Yoksa o yollar, sizi parc;a parc;a edip,
dogru yoldan ayrrrr. i~te bunlan, sakmasmtz diye Allah size emreder"[5] buyurarak, Kur'an'm
c;izdigi dosdogru yolu gostermi~ ve bu yoldan sapmanm, parc;alanarak haktan sapmak oldugunu
bildirm~tir.

[1] Al-i imran, 3/103

[2] Enfal, 8/46
[3] Al-i imran, 3/105
[4] Bakara, 2/204-206
[5] En'

am, 6/153

Source: http://www.diyanet.gov. tr/turkish/hutbe.asp?h id=54 at:
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkishldefault.asp
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29.08.2003- VAT AN, MiLLET, DEVLET ... iLELEBET
Muhterem Miisliimanlar!
Agustos ayt, ~anh tarihimizde zaferler ayt olarak bilinir. Bu ayda kazamlan iki biiyiik zafer, diinya
tarihine altm harflerle yaztlm~trr. Bu hafta Malazgirt Zaferi'nin 932'nci; Ba~komutanhk Meydan
Muharebesi'nin 81 'nci yildoniimlinii kutluyoruz. Hepimize kutlu olsun ...
Aziz Karde~lerim!
Bu mtibarek vatanda, asrrlar boyu yan yana, goni.il goniile beraber ya~tyoruz ... bundan sonra da;
karde~c;e, hep birlikte y~amaya devam edecegiz. Yiizyillarca beraber aglaytp beraber giildiigumiiz
bu aziz vatanda, her ~ey bizim istedigimiz ~ekilde olmayabilir. ic;inde bulundugumuz ~artlarm geregi,
maddi ve manevi stkmttlar zuhur edebilir. Elbette biitiin bu stkmttlar ge~ticidir. Milletimiz gec;m~ ve
gelecegi ile bu cennet vatanda daimi ve ebedidir.
Vatan ve millet sevgisi, sevgilerin en ylicelerindendir. Dinimiz; vatan sevgisini, imandan saym~trr.
<;unkii iman olmadan vatanm; vatan olmadan da varhgnmzm hic;bir anlam ve ktymeti yoktur. Bu
sebeple; bir insanm, hayatta kar~Ila~abilecegi en biiyiik zorluk, vatanstz kalmaktrr. Vatan bizim
canrrntz, kanrrntz ve mayamtzdrr. Kederlerimizin sevince, ideallerimizin gerc;ege donii~mesi, ancak
ve ancak vatanrrntzm bagrrnstzh@ ile miimkiindiir.
Bundan 81 ytl once vatanrrntzm bagrrnstzh@na, milletimizin hurriyetine kasteden dii~manlara kar~t
milletimiz Mustafa Kemal AT ATURK' On onderliginde ayyil.dtzh bayragrrntzt, canrrntzdan aziz
bildigimiz vatanrrntzt koruyarak dii~manlan yurdumuzdan kovmu~, ozgiirltigumlizti ve
bagrrnstzhgrrntzt yeniden tesis etrn~tir.
Degerli MO'minler!
Dzerinde ya~adtgrrntz bu aziz vatan, sadece mutlu giinlerimizin ve mi.ireffeh zamanlarrrntzm topra@
degildir! 0; ak giinlerimizin oldugu kadar, kara giinlerimizin de vatamdrr ... Biz, sadece bu iilkenin
nimetinden faydalanmak ic;in degil; aym zamanda kiilfetini c;ekmek, hatta ugrunda canrrntzt feda
etmek ic;in de ya~tyoruz. <;tinkti bu iilkenin, sadece gtindtizleri degil; geceleri de bizimdir! .. Biz;
~ehitlerimizle beraber ya~ayan bir milletiz!.. Birimiz hepimiz; hepimiz birimiz ic;indir!.. Ben, sen, o
yok; sadece biz vartz .. ! Zira bizler, Peygamber efendimizin: "Allah'm yardrrnt, topluluk iizerinedir."
hadisinin ~uur ve bilincindeyiz.
Ylice Allah'rrntz ve Sevgili Peygamberimiz, bizi birlik ve beraberlige 9agrrtyor ... Di.i~manlar ise;
si.irekli bizi boli.ip parc;alamak ic;in ugra~tyor! .. Sakm olaki dii~manlara aldanmayahm! Bizden
gorlinerek ic;imize stzan bozguncu ve k~klrttctlarm tahriklerine kapdmayalnn! Huzur ve giiven
ortammm bozulmasma frrsat vermeyelim.
Millet ve devletin i.isti.inli.igu; maddi giicii, birlik ve beraberligi, vatan ve millet biiti.inliigu nispetinde
artar veya azahr. Bizler, tarihin en parlak medeniyetini; 9a~ma azmini, adaleti, insan ve millet
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sevgisin~

once tilkemizin hudutlan; sonra da kainatm boyutlan kadar btiytitttigumtiz zaman
olacagJz; .. !

kurmu~

Rabbim, milletimizi; tilkemizi her ttirlti tehlikeden korusun.
Milletimizi; ikinci bir Kurtulu~

Sava~I

vermekten muhafaza buyursun.

Bu vesileyle, topragm kara bagrma dti~en btittin
minnetle yadediyoruz.

~ehitlerimizi

rahmetle amyor, kahraman gazilerimizi

Source: http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/hutbe.asp?h id=24 at:
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/default.asp
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24.10.2003- CUMHURiYET BAYRAMI
Muhterem Cemaat!
Dzerinde ya~adtgirmz cennet vatanimiZ, atalarimtzm bize en biiyiik emanetidir. Onlar, Anadolu
cograzyasm1 vatan edinmek is:in ellerinden geleni yapm1~, bu ug.uda mallanyla canlanyla sava~m1~
ve asrrlar boyu bu topraklan korumak is:in, olaganlistli gayret gostermi~lerdir. Ne var k~ "su uyur
dli~man uyumaz" atasozlinde vurgulandtgt gibi, Miislliman TUrk Milletinin dii~manlan his;
uyumam~, hep sinsi emeller beslem~, birinci diinya sava~mda da bize, yedi cepheden saldrrrn~ ve
hemen anayurdumuzu payla~maya kalk~m~lardrr.
Her zaman oldugu gibi bu asil millet, istiklal ve hiirriyetini, vatan ve mukaddesatm1 korumak is:in;
Gazi Mustafa Kemal AT ATURK onderliginde ~ahlanarak, her tiirlii yokluga ve olumsuzluga
ragmen, biiylik bir istiklal mlicadelesi vererek, namusu saydtgi vatanmt, dii~man ~galinden
kurtarm~trr. Asrrlardan beri hakim oldugu Anadolu topraklarmda, milli egemenligini aynen korumu~,
Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti adtyla yeni bir devlet kurmu~ ve 29 Ekim 1923 tarihinde de bunu, biitiin
diinyaya i.Ian etm~tir.
Degerli Mliminler!
80. yli donlimlinli idrak etme mutlulugunu ya~adtgtmiZ, Cumhuriyet, s:ogunluk sistemine ve milli
iradeyi temsil etme esasma dayanan, yarat~tan insanlarda var olan s:e~itli kabiliyetlerini ortaya
koyabilmelerine, dii~lince ve inans:larmt serbests:e ifade edip ya~amalarma imkiin veren, ist~areye
dayah bir idare ~eklidir.
islam din~ ist~areye biiylik onem verir. Yiice Allah, bu konuda Hz. Peygamber (s.a.v.)'e ve bize,
~oyle emreder: "i~ konusunda onlarla mli~avere et. Bir kere de karar verip azmettin m~ artlk Allah'a
tevekklil et, (Ona dayamp giiven). ~liphesiz Allah tevekkiil edenleri sever"[1].
Dlinya ~lerinin diizene konmast, vatan ve millet is:in yararh olanlarm belirlenmesi maksadtyla
ist~arede bulunulrnast ve sonucunda da, s:ogunluk gorli~linlin esas ahnmas1, islam'a uygun bir
davran~trr. Nitekim Hz. Peygamber'in ashabm ve dort biiyiik halifenin diinyevi uygulamalan da,
hep isti~are ile olrnu~tur. Cumhuriyet de bu uygulamayt ongoren bir idare ~eklidir.
Aziz Miisliimanlar!
Cumhuriyeti kuran milli irade, insanlarm dini inans: ve ya~ay~larmda serbest brraklimasmt, diinyevi
~lerde ise, vatan ve milletin yararma yonlendirilmesini ve diizenlenmesini amas;lam~trr.
Bize dii~en gorev, cumhuriyet ruhunu gayesinden saptrrmadan, devletimizi liyakatli ellerde
ylikseltmek, yliceltmek ve bu mukaddes emaneti bizden sonraki nesillere, en iyi ~ekilde devretmek
olmahdlr.

[1] Al-i imran, 3/159
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Source: http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish!hutbe.asp?h id=l75 at:
http://www .divanet. gov. tr/turkish/default. asp
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05.12.2003- ENGELLiLERE YARDIMCI OLMAK DiNi VE MiLLi BiR GOREVDiR
Muhterem Miisliimanlar!
Her toplumda, engelli veya ozurlU diye tammladtgJnuz insanlarm bulunmast dogaldlf. Engellilik
dogu~tan olabilecegi gib~ sonradan ortaya ~Ikm~ da olabilir. GUnumuzde ~ ve trafik kazalan, sigara
ve alkol kullammt gibi <;e~itli sebeplerle engelli sayiSt<;ogalmaktadrr. Bu yuzden her ge<;en gUn,
engelliler i<;in zorunlu olan egitim ve rehabilitasyon merkezlerine olan ihtiya<; daha da artmaktadrr.
Aziz Mii'minler!
OzurlU karde~lerimizin ya~adtgJ zorluklar sadece kendileriyle smrrh degildir. Bu durum, anne, baba
ve karde~ler ba~ta olmak uzere, bullin yakmlarmt etkilemekte, onlan uzunlli ve stres i<;inde
ya~amaya mahkum etmektedir. inanlf ve biliriz ki, hastalik ceza degildir. insanm oldugu her yerde
hastalik, dert, sikmti ve musibetlerin bulunmast dogaldlf. Belki de k~inin sablf ve tahammUle yonelik
ger<;ek cevher~ bu imtihan ve denemeden sonra ortaya ~Ikacaktrr. Bir ata sozunde: "Altm ate~te,
insan mihnette {siktnti anmda) belli olur''l denilm~tir. Hepimiz her an bir imtihan ile kar~t
kar~tyaytz. Sagiikh giinlerimiz olabilecegi gibi, stkmtth ve zahmetli giinlerimiz de olacaktrr.
Yuce Allah;
"Andolsun ki sizi biraz korku ve a~hkla; bir de mallar, canlar ve iiriinlerden eksilterek
deneriz."2"Ey Peygamber! Sabredenleri miijdele."3 buyurmu~; Peygamberimiz (s.a.v) de bu
hususu:
"Mii'mine isabet eden her yorgunluk, hastahk, iiziintii, s1kmt1 ve hatta ayagma batlp
rahats1z eden diken bile eger Allah yolunda ~ah~tyorsa, giinahlanna keffaret olur."4
Degerli Mii'minler!
Toplum bir bUtiindiir. Peygamberimiz Hadis-i $eriflerinde: "Birbirlerine merhamet etmede,
birbirlerini sevmede ve dayam~mada mii'minleri bir beden gibi goriirsiin. 0 bedenin
uzuvlanndan biri rahatstzlandigmda diger organlan da aym rahatsizhgi hissederler."5
buyurmu~tur. Bu itibarla engellileri topluma kazandirmak i<;in elimizden geleni yapmahytz.
Engellileri topluma kazandirmanm ii<; basamagJ bulunmaktadrr: Birincisi, agir bir stres ve yuk altmda
bulunan ailelerin sikmttlarmm hafrfletilmesi. ikincisi, engellinin de ya~ama hakkmm oldugu, aynca
diger sosyal imkanlardan da yararlanmast gerektigi bilincinin ge~tirilmesi. U<;iinciisii; engellilerin
yetenek ve becerilerinin ge~tirilerek, toplumsal uretime katklda bulunmalarmm saglanmastdrr.
OzurlUlugu bir talihsizlik kabul ederek bu insanlarrrntzt toplum dt~l brrakmak yerine, onlarm da
bakrrn, egitim ve duzenli bir hayat haklan oldugu unutulmayarak onlara gerekli hizmeti vermek
gerekir. Bu bilincin, toplumun her kesimince benimsenmesi ve desteklenmesi <;ok onemlidir.
Engelliler konusunda aile ve okul ba~ta olmak iizere, bUtUn kurumlar kendilerine dU~en gorev ve
sorumlulugu yerine getirmelidirler. Bu ama<;la kurulan vaktf, demek, egitim, sagiik ve rehabilitasyon
merkezlerine maddi manevi a<;tdan ve ozellikle ara<; ve gere<; yoniinden yardrrnct olmak, dini ve

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

397
insani bir gorevdir. Engellilerimiz, beceri ve kabiliyetlerine gore ilj imkam saglanarak top1uma
kazandmlm.ahdrr. Daha da onemlis~ sevgi ve ilgiye muhta9, bu insan1ar sik sik ziyaret edilerek,
kendilerine manevi destek verilmelidir. Unutmamak gerekir ki, on1arm da dunyanm nimetlerinden ve
giizellik1erinden yararlanmaya haklan vardrr.

1- BuhariRikak1; TirmiziZuhd 1, (2301)
2- Tirmizi, Davat, 105, 128; ibn-i Mace Dua 5; Buhari Cihat, 112, 156; Muslim Cihad 20
3- Bakara, 155.
4- Muslim Birr H. No: 2573
5- Buhari Edeb, 27
Source: http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/hutbe.asp?h id=182 At:
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/default.asp
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APPENDIXC
Principles ofDava
Man of Service
Man of service must for the sake of the cause he has g iven his heart to be resolved to cross over
seas of filth. When he has attained his object he must be so mature that he wi 11 attribute everything
to its Rightful Owner and be respectful and thankful to Him. His voice and each breath are spent in
the glorification and magnifying of God the Sublime Creator. He holds everyone in high regard and
esteem. He is so balanced and faithful to God's will that he will not tum into idols those whom he
praises for their services. He knows himself first of all to be responsible and answerable for work
left undone. He has to be considerate and fair-minded to everyone who comes to his aid and
support the truth. He is extraordinarily resolved and hopeful even when his institutions have been
destroyed his plans upset and his forces put to rout. He is moderate and tolerant when he has taken
wing anew and soared to the summits. So rational and sagacious that he admits in advance that this
path is very steep. So zealous persevering and confident that he can pass through all the pits of hell
that he may encounter on his way. So faithful to the cause to which he has devoted his life that
deeply in love with it he can sacrifice his life and all that he loves for its sake. So sincere and
humble that he will never bring to mind all that he has accomplished.
Source: http:l/en.fgulen.com/content/view/2548/41/

People of Service
People of service must resolve, for the sake of the cause to which they have given their heart, to
cross over seas of 11 pus and blood. 11 When they attain the desired object, they must be mature
enough to attribute everything to its Rightful Owner, and be respectful and thankful to Him. Their
voices and breaths glorify and magnify God, the Sublime Creator. Such people hold everyone in
high regard and esteem, and are so balanced and faithful to God's Will that they do not idolize those
whom they praise for their services. First of all, they understand that they are responsible and
answerable for work left undone, must be considerate and fair-minded to everyone who seeks their
help, and must work to support the truth. They are extraordinarily resolved and hopeful even when
their institutions are destroyed, their plans upset, and their forces routed. People of service are
moderate and tolerant when they take new wings and once again soar to the summits, and so
rational and wise that they admit in advance that the path is very steep. So zealous, persevering,
and confident are they that they willingly pass through all the pits of hell encountered on the way.
Such people are so faithful to the cause to which they have devoted themselves that, deeply in love
with it, they willingly sacrifice their lives and whatever they love for its sake. So sincere and humble
are such people that they never remind others of their accomplishments.
Source: http://en.fgulen.com/contentlview/11 05/411
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Appendix D
Tables

Table 3.1-Rural v. Urban Population
Year

Total Population

Rural Population

Urban Population

1950

20,947,188

15,702,851

5,244,337

1960

27,754,820

18,895,089

8,859,731

1970

35,605,176

21,914,075

13,691,101

1980

44,736,957

25,091,950

19,645,007

1990

56,473,035

23,146,684

33,326,351

2000

67,803,927

23,797,653

44,006,274

Source: TurkiSh StatiStical Institute

Table 3.2-The Percentage of the National Budget Reserved for the DiE.

1924-% 1.01

1940-%0.25

1956-%0.89

1972-%0.94

1988-%0.62

1925-%0.92

1941 -%0.23

1957-%0.85

1973-%0.85

1989-%0.71

1926-%0.84

1942-%0.22

1958-%0.55

1974-%0.92

1990-% 1.23

1927-%0.92

1943-%0.19

1959-%0,15

1975-%0,83

1991-% 1.16

1928-%0.83

1944-%0.16

1960-%0.85

1976-%0,81

1992-% 1.1

1929-%0.76

1945-%0.18

1961-%0.76

1977-%0.66

1993-% 0.9

1930-%0.74

1946-%0.15

1962-%0.76

1978-%0.58

1994-% 1.0

1931-%0.34

1947-% 0.24

1963-%0.21

1979-%0.77

1995-%0.9

1932-%0.36

1948-% 0.23

1964-%0.90

1980-%0.85

1996-%0.6

1933-%0.36

1949-% 0.23

1965-% 1.15

1981-%0,69

1997-%0.8

1934-%0.33

1950-% 0.20

1966-% 1.89

1982-%0.69

1998-%0.7

1935-%0.31

1951-%0.61

1967-%1.78

1983-%0.71

1999-%0.6

1936-%0.29

1952-% 0.67

1968-%0.85

1984-%0.60

2000-%0.6

1937-%0.26

1953-% 0.69

1969-%0.76

1985-%0.63

2001-%0.7

1938-%0.24

1954-%0.68

1970-%0.72

1986-%0.65

2002-%0.6

1939-%0.24

1955-%0.74

1971 -%0.04

1987-%0.62

2003-%0.5
2004-%0.7

Source: Between 1924-1991 Tarhanh (1993) p. 137-138, between 1992-2004 Maliye Bakanhgz
istatistikleri, (Ministry of Economy Statistics)
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Table 3.3-Number ofMosques
Years

Number of Mosques

Years

NumberofMosques

1971
1973
1981
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

42744
45152
47645
54667
57060
59460
61532
62947
64675
66000
66674
68202

1993
1904
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

68675
69523
70213
71293
72418
73772
74356
75002
75369
75941
76445

Source: DIE, APK Istatistikleri

Table 3.4-Number ofthe DiE Personnel Between 1970-2004
Year

Number of Personnel

Year

N urn ber of Perso nne I

1970
1973
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1991
1992

25 236
30 970
43 197
44 369
46 665
49 784
22 380
61 929
65 361
70 099
74 930
74 789
76 232

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

75 090
74 772
75 043
76 087
81 492
79 685
77 795
75 433
76 037
74 368
74 108
74 114

..

Source: DIE, APK Istatzstzklen
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Table 3.5-Directors of the DiB Since the Establishment of the Organization
Director
Mehmet Rtfat Borekc;i
Serafettin Y altkaya
Ahmet Hamdi Akseki
Eyiip Sabri Hayrrhoglu
Orner Nasuhi Bilmen
Hasan Hiisnii Erdem
Mehmet T evflk Gen;:eker
ibrahim Bedrettin Elmah
Ali Rtza Hakses
Liitfli Dogan (By Proxy)
Liitfti Dogan
Siileyman Ate~
Tayyar Alttkulac;
Mustafa Said Yaztctoglu
MehmetNuri Ylirnaz
Ali Bardakoglu

To
03.05.1941
04.23.1947
01.09.1951
06.10.1960
04.06.1961
10.13.1964
12.16.1965
10.25.1966
01.15.1968
08.25.1972
07.26.1976
02.07.1978
11.10.1986
01.02.1992
03.18.2003
Currently Presidinf(

From
04.04.1924
01.14.1942
04.29.1947
04.12.1951
06.29.1960
04.06.1961
10.15.1964
12.17.1965
10.25.1966
01.15.1968
08.26.1972
07.28.1976
02.09.1978
06.17.1987
01.02.1992
05.31.2003

Table 3. 6-Number of Qur 'anic Seminaries
Year

1980
1981
1882
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Number of
Qur'anic
Seminaries
2 610

Number
Closed
Down

1992

2 773
2 946
3 047
3 047
3 355
4 033

4 058
4 420
4 715
4 998
4 557
Source: DIB APK Statrstrcs

Year

889

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Number of
Qur'anic
Seminaries
4 783

Number
Closed
Down
831

4 925
4 985
5011
5 241
4 980
3 705
3 498

998
1 059
1 507
1 146
1 624
2 851

3 119
3 774
3 664
3 811
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3 189
3 022
3 153
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APPENDIXD
The Leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
1234567-

Founder & First Leader: Hassan Al-Banna
Second Leader: Hasan Al-Hudaibi
Third Leader: Omar Al-Tilmisani
Fourth Leader: Muhammed Hamed Abu Al-Nasr
Fifth Leader: Mustafa Mashour
Sixth Leader. Mamoun Al-Hudaibi
Seventh and Current Leader: Muhammed Mahdi Akef
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APPENDIXE
The Sheikhs of Al-Azhar

(from: http://www .sunnah.org/history/Scholars/mashaykh azhar.htm)
1. [ ???? - 1690 ] Shaykh Muhammad al-Kharashi
2. [ 1690- 1694] Shaykh Ibrahim al-Baramawi
3. [ 1694- 1708] Shaykh Muhammad al-Nasharti
4. [ 1708 - 1711 ] Shaykh Abd al-Baqi al-Qillini
5. [ 1711 - 1720 ] Shaykh Muhammad Shannan
6. [ 1720- 1724] Shaykh Ibrahim al-Fayyumi
7. [ 1724- 1757] Shaykh Abd-Allah al-Shabrawi
8. [ 1757 - 1767 ] Shaykh Muhammad al-Hifni
9. [ 1767- 1768] Shaykh Abd al-Ra'uf al-Sijjini
10. [ 1768- 1776] Shaykh Ahmad al-Damanhuri
11. [ 1778 - 1793 ] Shaykh Ahmad al-Arousi
12. [ 1793- 1812] Shaykh Abd-Allah al-Sharqawi
13. [ 1812- 1818] Shaykh Muhammad al-Shanawani
14. [ 1818- 1829] Shaykh Muhammad al-Arousi
15. [ 1829- 1830] Shaykh Ahmad al-Damhugi
16. [ 1830- 1834] Shaykh Hassan al-Attar
17. [ 1834 - 183 8 ] Shaykh Hassan al-Quwaisni
18. [ 1838- 1847] Shaykh Ahmad Abd al-Jawwad
19. [ 1847- 1860] Shaykh Ibrahim al-Bayguri
20. [ 1864- 1870] Shaykh Mustafa al-Arousi
21. [ 1870 - 1882 ] Shaykh Muhammad al-Abbasi
22. [ 1882- 1882] Shaykh Muhammad al-Inbabi
23. [ 1882- 1886] Shaykh Muhammad al-Abbasi
24. [ 1886- 1895] Shaykh Muhammad al-Inbabi
25. [ 1896- 1900] Shaykh Hassouna al-Nawawi
26. [ 1900- 1900] Shaykh Abd al-Rahman al-Nawawi
27. [ 1900- 1904] Shaykh Selim al-Bishri
28. [ 1904 - 1905 ] Shaykh Ali al-Biblawi
29. [ 1905- 1909] Shaykh Abd al-Rahman al-Shirbini
30. [ 1909- 1909] Shaykh Hassouna al-Nawawi
31. [ 1909- 1916] Shaykh Selim al-Bishri
32. [ 1916- 1927] Shaykh Muhammad Abu al-Fadl al-Gizawi
33. [ 1928- 1929] Shaykh Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi
34. [ 1929- 1935] Shaykh Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-Zawahri
35. [ 1935- 1945] Shaykh Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi
36. [ 1945- 1947] Shaykh Mustafa Abd al-Raziq
37. [ 1948- 1950] Shaykh Muhammad Ma'moon al-Shinnawi
38. [ 1950- 1951] Shaykh Abd al-Majid Selim
39. [ 1951- 1952] Shaykh Ibrahim Hamrush
40. [ 1952- 1952] Shaykh Abd al-Majid Selim
41. [ 1952- 1954] Shaykh Muhammad al-Khidr Husayn
42. [ 1954- 1958] Shaykh Abd al-Rahman Taj
43. [ 1958- 1963] Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut
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44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

[ 1963 - 1969 ] Shaykh Hassan Ma'moon
[ 1969- 1973] Shaykh Muhammad Muhammad a1-Fahham
[ 1973- 1978] Shaykh Abd a1-Halim Mahmud
[ 1979- 1982] Shaykh Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Bisar
[ 1982- 1996] Shaykh Jadul-Haqq Ali Jadul-Haqq
[ 1996 - Currently ] Shaykh Muhammad Sayid Tantawi
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APPENDIXF
Tables
Table 7.1-The differences between the top-down violent Islamists and the bottom-up non-violent
Islamists

Major Issues

Top-down violent Islamists

Bottom-up non-violent
lslamists

1-Achieving political
power

Through violent revolution; they
do not value political activism for
achieving political power.
Top-down; after achieving
political power, first thing to be
done is the Islamization of society
through force.

Through parliamentary elections
and political activism.

2- Transformation of
society

3-Application of the
Shari'a
4-Popular Sovereignty

5- End Justifies the
Means?
6-The nature of holy
struggle

It is indispensable; a Muslims
cannot be a true Muslims unless
they 1ive under the Shari 'a.
Completely reject popular
sovereignty as it is the complete
opposite of sovereignty of Allah.

Yes
All societies today are jahili
societies, therefore violence
against secular Muslims and
Muslims who do not accept the
sovereignty of Allah is justifiable
in Islamic terms.
Violent destruction ofjahili
societies is the only way towards
the Shari'a.
Define jihad narrowly only in
terms of material conflict.

Bottom-up; transformation
(Islamization) of society has to
happen to have an Islamic rule.
Islamization of society has to
happen from within.
It is the ultimate goal; however
Islam can be fully practiced under
any type of political system.
Cautiously accept popular
sovereignty; however does not
completely reject sovereignty of
Allah.
No
The best way to approach people
would be through enlightening
and winning their minds and
hearts. To establish the Shari'a,
violence is not justifiable in
Islamic terms.
Social and political activism is
the only way towards the Shari'a.
Define jihad as it is described by
Prophet Muhammad in one of his
sayings both as at the social and
personal level in a larger context.
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Table 7.2-Examples of the two types of Islamists

Top-down
Violent

Non-violent

Al-Jihad
•
AI-Takfir wal Hijra
•
IBDA-C
•
Turkish
Hizbullah
•
Governments that implement the
Shari 'a like:
Iran (Shi'a)
•
S. Arabia(Sunni)
•
Pakistan
under Gen. Zia
•
ul-Haq

Bottom-1!)!
Non-existent

•

The Muslim Brotherhood
The MGH (Milli Goril~ HareketiThe Nationalist View Movement)
Groups that follow Said-i Nursi
•
including Fethullah Giilen Movement and
Y eni Asya Movement
The Tabligh Movement
•

•
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Table 7.3-Three Types oflslamists (Slightly modified from Husain 125, Table 5.1).
Major
Characteristic
s
1-Beliefin the
basics of Islam

2-Degree of
Devoutness

3-Influence of
non-Islamic
ideas

4- Clerical
Affiliation
5- Normative
Periods

6-Tradition vs.
Change
(Taqlidvs.
Ijtihad)
7-

Secularization

8- Islamic
State

Traditionalist
Islamists

Modernist Islamists

Revolutionary Islamists

All three believe in the basics of Islam such as tawhid; the attributes of Allah
such as the omnipotence, omnipresence, justice, and infinite mercy of Allah;
prophethood of Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet among other prophets of
Allah starting from Adam and including Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus; the
Qur'an as the last of Allah's holy books along with the Torah and the Bible; the
angels Gabriel being the archangel; and the day of judgment.
Practicing; extremely
Practicing; extremely
Practicing, devout to
devout; relatively
very devout; eclectic,
devout; austere, and often
dogmatic and orthodox, and not rigid or
puritanical.
but tolerant offolk
puritanical.
Islam.
Almost none, often
Significantly influenced Minor influence of some
reject non-Islamic (e.g., by non-Islamic
non-Islamic ideas and
Western) ideas and
practices among the
(especially Western)
practices.
adherents in the modern
ideas and practices.
period.
Virtually all are from
Some from the ulema,
Not exclusively from the
the majority are nonulema, many non-clerics
the ranks of the ulema.
among them.
clerics.
A. Look nostalgically
A. Look primarily to
A. Look to classical
classical period of Islam
to both classical and
period oflslam as well
medieval periods of
as to the Western
for inspiration and
Islam for inspiration.
emulation.
capitalist and socialist
worlds for inspiration
B. Consider Islam's
B. Consider Islam's
and ideas.
immutability and
immutability and
B. Place all adopted
perfection to transcend
perfection to transcend
popular and beneficial
time and space.
non-Islamic concepts,
time and space.
practices and institutions
within Islamic
framework.
Strongly against taqlid;
Adhere to taqlid,
Strongly against taqlid;
support folk Islam;
actively advocate
advocate ijtihad.
opposed to ijtihad
ijtihad.
(except for some Shi'a
sects).
Opposed to
Opposed to secularization
Opposed to
secularization.
and often launch a jihad
secularization in
However, the majority
principle, but
to stop and reverse
secularization processes.
do little to reverse
conveniently tolerate
secularization
secularization with
processes.
either benign neglect or
as a necessary evil.
Advocate an Islamic state, though its character differs significantly in each case.
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9-Nature of
the State
10Constitution
and Laws

11-Basis of
Sovereignty

12-Degree of
Fatalism
13- Degree of
Activism

Prefer one with
traditional theocratic
manifestations.
Would like to
implement a
constitution that is
Islamic in both letter
and spirit. The Islamic
state should be
governed by the
shari'a.

Prefer one with liberal
democratic
manifestations.
W auld like to
implement a
constitution consonant
with the letter and
especially the spirit of
Islam. Believe in
revision of the shari' a
to cope with
contemporary problems
and would not remove
many secular laws
already implemented.
Believe in Allah's
sovereignty, but next in
popular sovereignty.
The latter is manifested
in a form of
parliamentary
democracy legitimized
as essentially Islamic.

Prefer one with puritanical
manifestations.
Would like to implement a
constitution that is Islamic
in both letter and spirit. The
Islamic state should be
governed by the shari' a.

Sovereignty primarily
Sovereignty primarily rests
rests with Allah.
with Allah. Believe all
Believe all Muslims
Muslims should reject
should reject
sovereignty of humanity.
sovereignty of
With a few exceptions,
humanity. With a few
have come to accept
exceptions, have come
parliamentary democracy in
to accept
the modem period implying
parliamentary
that they do give
democracy in the
importance to popular
modem period
sovereignty.
implying that they do
give importance to
popular sovereignty.
Vary in their fatalism believing in such notions as kismet, taqdir (fate),
predestination and preordination.
Very fatalistic, often
Moderately to very
Very fatalistic, but
passive, apolitical,
fatalistic, though
extremely active religiocontemplative, and
extremely dynamic
political crusaders for
mystical scholars of
reformers of Islam and
revolutionary Islamism,
traditional Islamic
Muslim societies. Desire piety and puritanism.
doctrine and practice. to promote the spirit of
However, do get
Islam.
involved in politics if
and when they
perceive that Islam is
threatened by nonMuslims or

14-Major
Foreign Policy
Orientations

"wayward" Muslims.
Often extremely
insular and parochial,
exponents of a united
Muslim world or an
Islamic bloc. Believe

Often relatively
cosmopolitan, broadminded and highly
principled pragmatists.
Exponents of a united

Often extremely insular and
parochial, exponents of a
united Muslim world or an
Islamic bloc. Believe in dar
al Islam (Adobe of Islam)
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15-Common
Stereotypes

16- Prominent
Figures

in dar al Islam
(Adobe of Islam)
versus dar al harb
(Adobe of the war)
dichotomy of the
world. End up with a
Us-Them, Good-Evil
distinction.
A. Critics:
Obscurantists;
reactionaries
B. Defenders: Islamic
scholars; learned
theologians;
conservatives.
The Farangi
Maha/lis, most
prominent of whom
was Qayam ud Din
Muhammad Abdul
Bari (1878-1926).
The Barelvis, most
prominent ofwhom
was Ahmad Raza
Khan Barelvi (18561921).
The Deobandis, most
prominent of whom
were Haji Imdadullah
(1815-1899) and
Rashid Ahmad
Gangohi (18291950).
Sayyid Kazem
Shariatmadari ( 19051986) Hayrettin
Karaman (1934- )

Islamic bloc. Hardly
preoccupied with the
dichotomy of dar al
Islam and dar al harb.

versus dar al harb (Adobe
of the war) dichotomy of
the world. End up with a
Us-Them, Good-Evil
distinction.

A. Critics: Apologists;
revisionists; syncretists.
B. Defenders:
Progressives; reformers;
modernizers; realists;
liberals; adaptationists.

A. Critics: Fundamentalists;
fanatics; militants; religious
zealots; puritans;
iconoclasts.

Jamal ad Din al Afghani
(1838-1897)
Muhammad Abduh
(1849-1905)
Muhammad Rashid Rida
(1865-1935)
Muhammad Iqbal (18731938)
Ali Shariati (1933-1977)
Abdul Karim Soroush
(1945- )
Bediuzzaman Said-i
Nursi (1876-1960)
Fethullah Gulen (1938)
Ali Bulac (1951- )

Muhammad Ibn Abd al
Wahhab (1703-1792)
Muhammad ibn Ali al
Sanusi (1787-1859)
Hasan al Banna ( 19061949)
Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi
(1903-1979)
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966)
Ayatollah Ruhullah
Khomeini (1902-1989)
Zia ul Haq (1924-1988)
Hasan al Turabi (1932- )
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin
(1938-2004)
Osama bin Laden (1957- )
Salih Mirzabeyoglu (1950)
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